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Abstract 
This thesis is an exploratory study of the boundaries of English and 
Welsh criminal law where the legally protected personal and proprietary 
interests of innocent persons are intentionally infringed by another. 
Despite fulfilling the definitional elements of a criminal offence, there may 
be circumstances in which the law is prepared to exculpate the actor 
even where the interests of an innocent person are set back by the 
conduct. The justifications and excuses to be considered fall 
predominantly within the province of self-defence, necessity and duress 
and the correspondence between these respective domains is 
addressed. 
The aim is to explore the extent to which the criminal law in a liberal 
society negates criminal liability for deliberate intrusions on the rights of 
innocent persons by defining the precise scope of the relevant defences. 
The innocent persons to be considered fall into three main categories. 
First, the criminal responsibility of an actor who sets back the interests of 
an innocent incompetent person in their best interests will be addressed. 
Next, the liability of a defendant who infringes the rights of an innocent 
person who poses a threat, unjust or incidental, to the interests of the 
defendant or another will be analysed. Finally, the criminal responsibility 
of an actor who violates the rights of an innocent non-threatening 
bystander in order to stave off a threat to their own interests will be 
considered. It is argued that in English law the scope of criminal liability 
for intentional acts which set back the interests of an innocent person is 
ill-defined. An attempt is made to provide a more consistent philosophical 
and practical approach to the limits of criminal responsibility in this 
challenging area of law. 
XIII 
Chapter One: 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction to the thesis: aims and objectives 
The central aim of this thesis is to examine when, in English chminal law,^ 
the person or property of innocent persons may be subject to certain 
forms of intrusion without the defendant incurring any criminal liability in 
respect of that intrusion. The concern is with the putative criminal 
responsibility^ of an actor who claims some form of justification or excuse 
in circumstances where they have knowingly and deliberately infringed an 
innocent person's rights. The defendant may claim a justification or 
excuse for the intentional invasion on the grounds that they acted out of 
necessity, self-defence or under duress, all of which sustain a claim that 
the action was reasonably necessary to avoid a threat of harm. 
To date, much of the theoretical discussion underpinning criminal law has 
centred upon general principles^ or specific offences."* Although there 
has been some substantive work devoted to the general defences, self-
defence, duress, and particularly necessity, are often sidelined in favour 
^ Any reference to 'English' criminal law made throughout the thesis should be taken to 
mean 'English and Welsh' criminal law. 
^ The position under civil law of persons who violate protected interests will not be 
considered. For instance, it may be the case that in some forms of emergency, the 
property of innocent persons may be taken or used without incurring any criminal liability 
in respect of the taking or use of property. However, damages may be payable to 
persons who have suffered a proprietary loss. The thesis will concern itself only with 
issues of criminal law. 
^ See, for example, significant contributions offered by Stephen Shute and Andrew P 
Simester (eds.) Criminal Law Theory: Doctrines of the General Part (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002); Tony Honore and Herbert LA Hart, Causation in the Law 2'^" 
edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985); Anthony Duff, Intention, Agency and Criminal 
Liability (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990); Celia Wells, Corporations and Criminal 
Responsibility 2"" edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
" Important contributions have been advanced by Anthony Duff and Stuart P Green 
(eds.) Defining Crimes: Essays on the Criminal Law's Special Part (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005); Andrew Ashworth and Barry Mitchell (eds.) Rethinking English 
Homicide Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); ATH Smith, Property Offences: 
The Protection of Property through the Criminal Law (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 
1994); John C Smith, The Law of Theft edition (London: Butterworths, 1993). 
of mental condition defences,^ or the defence of provocation.^ Some 
invaluable work has been advanced on the theoretical framework 
underlying defences generally'' and there has been some useful 
philosophical analysis of the individual defences pertinent to this thesis.^ 
In somewhat lesser supply is literature which offers extensive analysis of 
the relationship between self-defence, necessity and duress.^ Even 
where such analysis has been presented, the confines of the literary form 
dictate that the work cannot be as comprehensive as the analysis 
undertaken here. To the knowledge of the author no study to date has 
focused its attention on the particular challenges generated by innocent 
persons whose rights are infringed in situations of necessity, self-defence 
and duress. 
^ Ronnie Mackay, Mental Condition Defences in the Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995); Robert F Schopp, Automatism, Insanity and Psychology of 
Criminal Responsibility: A Philosophical Inquiry (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991); Norval Morris, Madness and the Criminal Law (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1982). 
^ Jeremy Horder, Provocation and Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1992). See also the recent proposals on the defence of provocation contained in the 
Law Commission Report, Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide (Law Com No 304) 
(London: HMSO, 2006), from paragraph [5.1]-[6.1]. 
Jeremy Horder, Excusing Crime (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Robert F 
Schopp, Justification Defenses and Just Convictions (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998); Paul H Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses (St. Paul: West Publishing, 
1984); George P Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law {Bosloo: Little Brown, 1978); John C 
Smith, Justification and Excuse in the Criminal Law (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1989). 
^ See in relation to self-defence, for instance, Suzanne Uniacke, Permissible Killing: The 
Self-Defence Justification of Homicide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); 
Fiona Leverick, Killing in Self-Defence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Boaz 
Sangero, Self-Defence in the Criminal Law (Oxford: Hart, 2006). Numerous less 
extensive philosophical accounts of self-defence are offered in relevant journals, many 
of which are considered later in the thesis, for example, Judith J Thomson, 'Self-
Defense' (1991) 20 Philosophy and Public Affairs 283; Tziporah Kasachkoff, 'Killing in 
Self-Defence: an Unquestionable or Problematic Defence?' (1998) 17 Law and 
Philosophy 509; and Kimberly Kessler-Ferzan, 'Justifying Self-Defense' (2005) 24 Law 
and Philosophy 711. In relation to duress, important contributions have been made by 
Joshua Dressier, 'Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching 
for its Proper Limits' (1989) 62 Southern California Law Rewew 1331; Anthony Duff, 
'Rule Violations and Wrongdoings' in Stephen Shute and Andrew P Simester (eds.) 
Criminal Law Theory {Oxford. Oxford University Press, 2002); and Kyron Huigens, 
'Duress is not a Justification' (2004) 2 Ohio Journal of Criminal Law 303. The literature 
on necessity is arguably more sparse, but some significant work has been produced, 
see Larry Alexander, 'Lesser Evils: A Closer Look at the Paradigmatic Justification' 
(2005) 24 Law and Philosophy 6^^ : and Alan Brudner 'A Theory of Necessity' (1987) 7 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 338. 
^ The most comprehensive work to date is attributed to Jeremy Horder, 'Self-Defence, 
Necessity and Duress; Understanding the Relationship' (1998) 11 Canadian Journal of 
Law and Jurisprudence 143. See also Winnie Chan and Andrew P Simester, 'Duress, 
Necessity: How Many Defences?' (2005) 16 King's College Law Journal 121; and DW 
Elliott, 'Necessity, Duress and Self-Defence' [1989] Criminal LaM/Rewew611. 
This thesis intends to make an original contribution by developing a 
coherent account of the scope of criminal responsibility for intrusions on 
the rights of innocent persons in situations of extreme pressure. The 
criminal defences of necessity, self-defence and duress should effectively 
guard the boundaries between intrusions for which the defendant should 
take criminal responsibility, and intrusions which may be legitimately 
justified or excused in light of the difficult circumstances faced by the 
actor. The thesis aims to present and defend guidelines which clarify the 
boundaries of criminal responsibility where the defendant is compelled to 
act to avert some harm to themselves or another. In pursuit of this aim, 
the moral limits of the criminal law will be analysed at the outset in order 
to establish the type of conduct that should be criminalised in a liberal 
society and to outline a role for the exculpatory defences in deciding 
criminal liability. Issues surrounding the theoretical and philosophical 
foundations of self-defence, necessity and duress will be considered in 
depth and the appropriate parameters of the defences will be challenged 
with reference to the underlying rules and governing principles. In order 
to provide a backdrop to the subsequent discussion it may be useful to 
briefly consider the basis of the three relevant defence claims before the 
substantive analysis proceeds further. 
1.2 Defining necessity, self-defence and duress 
Ordinarily, if an actor intrudes on the legally protected personal or 
proprietary interests of another person prima facie a criminal offence is 
committed. That is, unless the defendant has a plausible explanation for 
the intrusion. Good reasons, agent-neutral or agent-specific, may furnish 
the actor with an exculpatory defence which negates any liability for the 
crime even though the definitional elements of the offence are satisfied. 
The exculpatory defences to be considered in this thesis are necessity, 
self-defence and duress, which operate as substantive defences to 
absolve the actor from any responsibility for what would othen/vise have 
been a wrongful intrusion. 
It is important to distinguish tlie defences examined in this thesis from 
others that fall outside of its scope. A defendant pleading a defence of 
necessity, self-defence or duress does not claim to be exempt from the 
criminal law on account of the fact that they do not have the status of a 
responsible agent/'" Nor is there any suggestion that the defendant is 
incapable of forming the requisite state of mind which is ordinarily 
required for responsibility to be attributed/^ Indeed, a defining feature of 
cases involving genuine claims of self-defence, necessity and duress is 
that the crime is committed voluntarily, in that a conscious choice to act is 
made, and intentionally, in the sense that the action is deliberate. As 
indicated above, the reason that a defence is extended in situations of 
necessity, self-defence or duress is that in circumstances of extreme 
pressure the defendant did what was reasonably necessary to avoid 
harm to their own interests or those of another. If an actor pleads the 
defence of necessity, the claim is that they were morally compelled to 
break the letter of the law in order to avert some greater harm and the 
action is, all things considered, justified. A claim of self-defence denies 
the criminal responsibility of an actor for repelling an unjust threat to their 
own interests or those of another because the act is, from an objective 
view, permissible. A defendant may successfully plead duress if they can 
provide a sound personal reason for deflecting a threat of harm to 
themselves or another onto an innocent third party. 
There is some debate surrounding the appropriate rationale and ambit of 
necessity, self-defence and duress and the conceptual overtap between 
them. However, one of the most challenging aspects of the defences is 
their ability to undermine the rights of innocent people by permitting 
legally protected interests to be infringed without the defendant incurring 
any criminal responsibility. In light of the growing significance of 
individual autonomy and the protection of human rights it is increasingly 
^° Defendants who claim a defence of insanity might fall within this category, see 
M'Naghten (1843) 10 C & F 200. 
" For instance, the defence of voluntary intoxication is only permitted in circumstances 
where the intoxication negates the mens rea element of a specific intent offence; see 
DPP V. Majewski [1977] AC 443; DPP v. Beard [1920] AC 479. 
important that the circumstances in which rights infringements will be 
tolerated by the criminal law are carefully and transparently defined. 
Impinging on the rights of innocent autonomous people is generally to be 
discouraged, but in circumstances of compulsion it is clear that the 
criminal defences may allow the rights of innocent people to be 
overridden by other considerations. Before there is any further 
deliberation on the scope of the relevant defences it is important to define 
the categories of innocent persons to be considered in this thesis. 
1.3 Defining 'innocent persons' 
The thesis examines the scope of criminal responsibility for intrusions on 
the rights of innocent people. The term 'innocent' is a technical 
expression, denoting persons who are lawfully at liberty and are neither 
committing nor are about to commit any criminal offence. The innocent 
persons to be considered essentially fall into three categories and the 
thesis is structured on this basis. The first category to be deliberated is 
the innocent incompetent patient, innocent in the sense that the victim of 
the infringement is unoffending and non-threatening, but simply unable to 
make meaningful decisions regarding their own welfare due to some 
permanent or temporary incapacity. It is suggested that the necessity 
defence may justify an infringement of the rights of an innocent 
incompetent patient if there is a moral imperative to act in the patient's 
best interests. The second category of innocent persons to be 
considered is the innocent unjust tlireat, which includes both an innocent 
active threat and an innocent passive threat to the protected interests of 
the defendant or another. Where the defendant is actively attacked by a 
person who is, for instance, insane or below the age of criminal 
responsibility, the aggressor is innocent in the sense that they are not 
responsible for their behaviour. This category also accommodates the 
innocent passive threat, an individual who is not engaged in any sort of 
positive attack but who nonetheless unwittingly threatens the interests of 
the defendant. It is suggested that the defence of self-defence may 
justify any intrusive action taken by the defendant to ward off either of the 
innocent unjust threats described here. The thesis will also consider the 
more precarious position of innocent incidental threats, a class of 
unoffending people who cannot convincingly be described as unjust 
threats, but are closely linked to the threat in that they expose themselves 
and others to it. It is suggested that in very carefully defined 
circumstances, the defence of necessity may exculpate an actor who 
intrudes on the rights of an innocent incidental threat. The third, and final, 
category of innocent persons to be considered is the innocent non-
threatening bystander, who poses no threat whatsoever and is merely a 
spectator whose rights are infringed to stave off a threat to the actor or 
another person. It is argued that the rights of an innocent non-
threatening bystander are paramount and can never be justifiably 
infringed; but nonetheless the rights violation may be excused by virtue of 
the defence of duress (by threats or of circumstances) if certain stringent 
conditions are fulfilled. Having shed some light on the coverage of the 
thesis, a brief synopsis of each chapter will now be provided. 
1.4 Overview of the thesis 
In the first substantive chapter a number of central issues are outlined 
which ought to provide some guidance for determining the general scope 
of criminal responsibility. The first step in analysing criminal liability is an 
investigation into the type of conduct the criminal law generally prohibits, 
as this should assist in defining the role that the exculpatory defences 
have to play in deciding whether to attribute criminal responsibility to the 
actor. Three predominant philosophical approaches to the limits of 
criminalisation are examined. Two accounts, legal moralism and 
paternalism, are assessed and rejected insofar as they cannot 
convincingly provide a singular basis for deciding criminality. The main 
reason for their dismissal is that they do not afford sufficient consideration 
to the principle of individual autonomy when deciding what sort of conduct 
people should generally take responsibility for. In view of this criticism, 
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liberalism is defended throughout the chapter and the thesis as a whole 
as the most plausible underlying political philosophy since is it 
predominantly concerned with the promotion and protection of autonomy. 
However, it is conceded that autonomy must be subject to some 
constraint in order to prevent an inevitable conflict when individual 
autonomies collide. In deciding the appropriate scope of criminal 
responsibility, it is suggested that the criminal justice system ought to 
prohibit only that conduct which causes harm to others. Harmful conduct 
is that which not only results in a setback to the interests of another, but 
which is wrongful in the sense that it causes a violation of rights. This 
principle carves out a role for the exculpatory defences. It is proposed 
that if, all things considered, there is a good reason for the defendant's 
action from a societal perspective, no rights are violated and there is no 
wrongful or harmful setback to interests. Thus the action is outside the 
scope of criminal responsibility. The harm principle even leaves some 
scope for wrongful harms to fall outside of the bounds of criminal law 
because in deciding whether conduct is deserving of criminalisation, the 
likelihood and seriousness of the harm can be weighed against the 
blameworthiness of the actor and the consequences of criminalisation. 
Hence, if a defendant wrongfully violates the rights of another but offers 
good personal reasons for the violation, the actor may still avoid the 
attribution of criminal responsibility depending on an objective view of 
their blameworthiness. 
Having established the general philosophical foundation for the thesis, 
closer analysis of the specific exculpatory defences which may preclude 
liability for intrusions on the rights of the categories of innocent persons 
outlined above is provided. In chapter three, medical interventions 
deemed to be necessary in the 'best interests' of the innocent 
incompetent patient are c o n s i d e r e d . I t is established at the outset of 
What will not be discussed is the extent to which failures of intervention (for example, 
the failure of a National Health Service Trust to provide particular drugs or procedures) 
the chapter that invasive medical treatment administered to competent 
patients without their consent constitutes a wrongful intrusion which 
disrespects the patient's right to make their own decisions. However, the 
interests of an innocent incompetent person unable to consent to 
treatment may be permissibly infringed if the intrusion is necessary in the 
best interests of the patient. The necessity principle is considered in 
greater detail, and the historical development and theoretical and 
practical issues underlying the doctrine are addressed. Although the use 
of the defence to justify medical intrusions in emergency and non-
emergency situations is relatively well established, there is some debate 
as to what constitutes the 'best interests' of an incompetent patient 
unable to communicate their wishes. Some particularly controversial 
examples of best interests intervention are considered which test the 
boundaries of the necessity principle. It is suggested that intrusions on 
the rights of an innocent incapacitated person can be justified on a rights-
based analysis of the patient's best interests; but the balancing act must 
pay close attention to the protected rights and interests of the innocent 
person, particularly where the intrusion is non-therapeutic. 
In chapter four, intrusions on the rights of innocent unjust threats are 
considered, where the defendant takes intrusive action to ward off a 
threat to their own interests or those of another. It is established that in 
these circumstances the defendant may rely on the doctrine of self-
defence to justify the action. The theoretical functioning of the defence as 
a justification is examined and there is some analysis of the predominant 
philosophical explanations of the defence. It is argued that self-defence 
is not sufficiently explained by appeal to consequentialist considerations, 
personal partiality or the doctrine double effect as in all of these accounts 
rights are subordinate considerations. Hence, a rights-based account 
accompanied by a theory of forfeiture is defended as the most plausible 
rationale for the defence. It is suggested that this theory may permit 
intrusive action against an innocent active threat who is not culpable 
may be characterised as a violation of legal interests; that might be considered a field in 
its own right. 
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because of the making of some mistake of fact, disability, or lack of 
competence. Perhaps more controversially, the theory is also invoked to 
justify the use of self-defensive force to set back the interests of innocent 
passive threats who are not aggressing against the defendant but 
nonetheless constitute a direct source of the threat which is posed. 
Following a detailed analysis of the conditions underlying the defence, 
which are relatively well established but subject to some criticism in this 
thesis, the uncertain territory between self-defence and necessity is 
called into question when innocent indirect or incidental threats are 
considered. Any intrusion on the rights of an innocent person who is not 
the source of the threat but merely exposes it to themselves and others, 
cannot be justified by self-defence. Necessity could provide the only 
possible justification; and even then the defence would only be available 
in exceptional circumstances where the innocent person's interests could 
not be honoured regardless of the defendant's action. 
Finally, in chapter five interventions against non-threatening innocent 
bystanders will be considered and it is in these cases that the criminal law 
must confront perhaps the starkest choice between individual interests. 
This category deals with duress by threats cases where the personal or 
proprietary rights of entirely innocent bystanders are violated to stave off 
a threat to the accused. Following a detailed exposition of the historical 
development of the defence and its theoretical basis as an excuse, the 
legitimacy of intruding on the interests of an innocent third party in 
compliance with a serious threat to bodily integrity is explored, with a 
particular focus on the difficult relationship between duress and murder. 
It is argued that subject to appropriately strict conditions, which are 
explored in detail, and the proviso that any reasonable person would 
have acted in the same way as the defendant did, the duress defence 
should, in principle, excuse any intrusion on an innocent bystander's 
interests. The final part of the chapter considers whether, when 
threatened by naturally occurring events, the residual necessity 
justification extends to exculpate intrusions on the rights of innocent 
bystanders in situations other than those already outlined in previous 
chapters. It is submitted that an intrusion on the rights of an innocent 
autonomous bystander can never be justified if the rights of that person 
can otherwise be honoured as this would show a complete disrespect for 
autonomy. However, the criminal law may, subject to the satisfaction of 
stringent conditions, provide an excuse for the intrusion in the form of 
duress of circumstances, where the actor violates the rights of an 
innocent non-threatening bystander to stave off a threat arising from 
circumstances. The provision of an excuse highlights that the objective 
observer at least understands the self-preferential action of the 
defendant, although the conduct is nonetheless regarded as wrongful. 
Chapter six recalls the objectives set out at the start of the study and 
demonstrates how these aims have been fulfilled by the analysis. Some 
overall concluding remarks are also offered. In particular, it will be 
submitted that the criminal law should not generally intervene to restrict 
the autonomy of its citizens and may only legitimately do so to prevent 
harmful conduct. Where an actor intrudes of the rights of an innocent 
incompetent patient in their best interests necessity may provide a 
justification for the action. Similarly in cases where an actor is confronted 
by an innocent person who is actively or passively threatening their 
interests or those of another, the actor may, subject to certain limitations, 
respond by exercising self-defensive force without incurring criminal 
responsibility. The interests of an innocent person who is not the direct 
source of the peril but who exposes a threat to themselves and others 
may be justifiably infringed by virtue of a restrictively defined defence of 
necessity. In cases of duress, where the threat emanates from a human 
agent, violations of the rights of an innocent bystander may be excused 
but only if the pressure of the situation is such that any reasonable 
person would have responded in the same way. A defendant who 
violates the rights of an innocent bystander in response to naturally 
arising threats may not rely on the necessity justification to absolve them 
of liability; but if the circumstances would have driven any reasonable 
person to encroach on the rights of another to protect their own interests, 
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the actor may be afforded an excuse in the form of duress of 
circumstances. 
The law is discussed as it stood on 1^' September 2008. 
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Chapter Two: 
Principles of criminalisation 
2.1 Introduction to chapter two 
Prior to any detailed discussion regarding the lawfulness of specific 
instances of intervention against innocent persons, it is necessary to 
pursue some philosophical guidance regarding the general principles 
which underpin the choice of the legislature to prohibit certain forms of 
conduct. Outlining the principles which dictate the type of conduct which 
should constitute a criminal offence should help to clarify our thinking 
about when it is inappropriate to impose criminal responsibility on an 
actor, even though the conditions of an offence have been fulfilled. Such 
analysis will, therefore, support any further examination of the scope and 
operation of necessity, self-defence and duress in the difficult sphere of 
crimtes committed against innocent persons. It is argued in this chapter, 
and defended throughout the thesis, that the most fundamental principle 
on which the criminal law is premised is the protection of individual 
autonomy and human rights. The philosophy underlying the operation of 
the criminal law must therefore offer "certain protections for the freedom 
and basic interests of individuals."^ It is suggested that a political system 
which grants significant weight to a principle of autonomy when deciding 
what conduct to criminalise, must also provide a range of defences which 
grant corresponding weight to violations of a defendants autonomy,^ and 
this contention is explored further throughout the thesis. 
The chapter begins with an overview of the main philosophical 
approaches to criminalisation in section 2.2. A liberal philosophy, which 
regards individual autonomy and the right to self-determination pertaining 
^ Herbert LA Hart, 'Utilitarianism and Natural Rights' in Herbert LA Hart, Essays in 
Jurisprudence and Pliilosophy {Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988) at 194. 
^ Schopp, Justification Defenses and Just Convictions at 64. 
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to individual citizens as paramount, is defended in section 2.3. It is 
suggested that the criminal law promotes basic principles of liberalism by 
prohibiting only harmful behaviour which violates the protected interests 
of another person. The notion of harm is addressed in detail and, since 
harm denotes a wrongful violation of the rights of another there is further 
discussion of what constitutes a wrongful setback. It is contended that 
not all setbacks to the interests of others should be criminalised, since it 
may sometimes be necessary to infringe the rights of another if such 
action is necessary and would serve some overriding principle in the 
conventional morality. It is suggested that in order to reflect this notion 
that the actor is not always criminally responsible for setting back the 
interests of another, the criminal law provides a range of justificatory and 
excusatory defences. In section 2.4 legal moralism is evaluated, and 
rejected, as an alternative philosophical explanation of the limits of 
criminalisation, which focuses broadly on prohibiting immoral, as opposed 
to harmful, conduct. In section 2.5 paternalism is briefly examined, an 
approach which essentially encourages state intervention to protect the 
welfare interests of the individual for their own good. This approach is 
also rejected as a general principle. Finally, section 2.6 provides a 
summary of the main philosophical approaches, and acknowledges 
support for a liberal philosophy in which the autonomy of individuals is 
paramount. This sets the foundation for the subsequent theoretical 
discussion regarding the scope and appropriate parameters of necessity, 
self-defence and duress which are analysed in the following chapters. 
2.2 The main philosophical approaches to criminalisation 
The criminal law essentially dictates what actions can legitimately be 
carried out by the citizens under its rule and what conduct is 
impermissible by providing a range of offences and defences. The state 
is able to control and regulate the behaviour of its citizens; any individual 
who transgresses the prohibitions laid down will be convicted, and those 
convicted may accordingly be punished. However, due to the coercive 
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and punitive nature of the criminal law and its potential to undermine the 
liberty of its subjects, it should never be deployed without good reason. 
Simester and Sullivan highlight that as a regulatory device, the criminal 
law is a "bluntly coercive and morally loaded tool, something to be used 
sparingly and with care."^ Resort to the criminal law is irrefutably 
necessary in certain clear cut cases, for example, where X strikes and 
kills Y in order to receive a windfall from Y's life insurance policy.'* X is 
justifiably condemned by the criminal law, as most people would 
intuitively agree that such behaviour is harmful, wrongful and deserving of 
criminal sanction. However, not all harmful or wrongful action is 
necessarily criminal: if, during an argument, X insults Y with a hurtful 
comment about Y's appearance the use of the criminal law to convict and 
punish X seems inappropriate, despite the fact that X's behaviour may 
hurt Y's feelings or be morally wrong.^ So when exactly is it legitimate to 
invoke the criminal law? If the criminal law should only operate to restrict 
the behaviour of individuals where there are compelling reasons for state 
intervention, what constitutes a compelling reason? 
Joel Feinberg, in his masterful work of four volumes, identifies four 
possible grounds for legitimate state intervention via the criminal law: 
where the conduct causes harm to others; where the conduct causes 
offence to others; where the conduct is immoral; and where the conduct 
causes harm to self.^ The first two of these categories appeal to most 
liberal philosophers; legal moralists would support the third ground for 
^ Andrew P Simester and Robert Sullivan, Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine 3"^ edition 
^Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007) at 581. 
This example is adapted from a similar scenario described in Simester and Sullivan, 
Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine at 5-6. 
^ This example is also adapted from a similar scenario described in Simester and 
Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory: and Doctrine at 6. It refers to the type of verbal insult 
that occurs in 'everyday' argument. It should be distinguished from more serious forms 
of verbal threats which can result in psychological harm. The former behaviour would 
not ordinarily be the subject of criminalisation; the latter could constitute a common law 
assault, or possibly an offence under Section 47 (assault occasioning actual bodily 
harm) or Section 20 (inflicting grievous bodily harm) of the Offences against the Person 
Act 1861. See, for example, the cases of R v. Ireland; Burstow [1998] AC 147 and R v. 
Constanza [1997] 2 Cr App R 492. 
® Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law (New York: Oxford University 
Press): volume 1, Harm to Others (1984); volume 2, Offense to Others (1985); volume 3, 
Harm to Se//'(1986); volume 4, Harmless Wrongdoing (1988). 
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criminalisation; and paternalists would advocate the fourth ground as an 
appropriate guide for criminal prohibition. These competing perspectives 
(liberalism, moralism and paternalism) form a central part of any 
philosophical inquiry into the moral limits of the criminal law. Indeed, it 
has been suggested by Roberts that these three broad theories cover 
virtually all aspects of the debate surrounding criminalisation, and that, 
"[a]ny arguments that fall outside their parameters are likely to be so 
outlandish that they would command very little support."'' Therefore, 
these primary philosophical approaches to criminalisation will be 
evaluated in turn, by examining the underlying general principle(s) to 
which each approach adheres. 
It is incredibly difficult to do justice to the wealth of literature and 
philosophical debate on the moral limits of the criminal law. The depth of 
discussion in this field is vast and, as acknowledged by Roberts, "often 
marred by the conflation of arguments that are incompatible or even 
mutually contradictory and by slippage between different levels of 
analysis which ought to be kept separate."^ The following introductory 
analysis attempts to critically evaluate the main philosophical arguments 
regarding the appropriate ambit of criminalisation. It begins with a 
discussion of a liberal philosophy which regards individual autonomy as 
the cornerstone of the criminal justice system. 
^ Paul Roberts, Appendix C, Law Commission Consent and Offences against thie Person 
(Law Com CP No 134) (London: HMSO, 1994), paragraph C23 at 251. Stephen Shute 
has commented that describing these three broad perspectives as all-encompassing 
places an "unnecessary strait jacket around the debate...[and that]... further 
perspectives might be necessary", see Stephen Shute, 'Something Old, Something 
New, Something Borrowed: Three Aspects of the Project' [1996] Criminal Law Review 
684 at 691. Although there may be other relevant perspectives, this thesis is only 
primarily concerned with the main philosophical debates on criminalisation to provide a 
background for more specific discussion on the legitimacy of violations against the rights 
of innocent persons. The intention is not to provide an exhaustive survey of competing 
philosophies, but merely to analyse the broad general principles underpinning the main 
theories to establish a framework for the analysis of specific defences in subsequent 
chapters. 
® Roberts, Appendix C, Consent and Offences against the Person, paragraph C17 at 
250. 
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2.3 Autonomy and the liberal philosophy 
It is argued here that the most important principle which underpins a 
liberal society is autonomy. Individual freedom is a fundamental precept 
of any democratic society and should be promoted and protected 
wherever possible. The principle of autonomy is guarded by the criminal 
law in a number of ways. Respect for individual autonomy not only 
explains why the system of chminal law exists in the first instance; it also 
plays a role in limiting the scope of criminal prohibition and provides a 
function for criminal law defences by requiring criminal responsibility to be 
imposed only on those who make a free and unconstrained choice to do 
wrong. The impact of the principle of autonomy on the criminal justice 
system is considered in greater detail in the following sections. 
2.3.1 Autonomy and the criminal law 
In a liberal society, criminal law is underpinned by the basic premise that 
human beings are free to make their own choices as autonomous moral 
agents.^ Autonomous persons have sovereign authority over their own 
lives; the decisions they make, goals they set and relationships they forge 
throughout their lives are self-determined and self-created.^° A useful 
indication of the primacy of autonomy in a liberal society is provided by 
Roberts, who asserts that: 
"It is essential to the liberal's conception of the good life that 
people should be free to choose, follow and revise their own life 
projects, to have the opportunity to develop their talents and to 
indulge their tastes, and to be given the chance of living out a good 
and fulfilling l i fe ."" 
9 It is important to note that there are considerable debates within liberalism regarding its 
precise tenets which are outside of the scope of this thesis, but the fundamental 
principle of autonomy is central to all versions of the philosophy. 
^° For a general discussion of the fundamental importance of autonomy from a leading 
proponent, see Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985) 
particularly chapter 14. 
^ Roberts, Appendix C, Consent and Offences against ttie Person, paragraph C34 at 
255. 
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Life is meaningful because individuals have the freedom to choose 
different projects and goals and to pursue them; being forced by others to 
lives our lives in a restricted way significantly diminishes the value of 
autonomy. This point is endorsed by Kymlicka, who suggests: 
"...no life gets better by being led from the outside according to 
values the person doesn't endorse. My life only gets better if I'm 
leading it from the inside, according to my beliefs about value. 
Praying to God may be a valuable activity, but you have to believe 
that it's a worthwhile thing to do....You can coerce someone into 
going to church and making the right physical movements, but you 
won't make someone's life better that way." 
So, for liberal theorists, autonomy and the ability to make one's own life 
choices unhindered by external coercion are essential components of a 
good life. 
Autonomous citizens have access to a wide range of options and there is 
always an opportunity to choose wisely or foolishly. Indeed, life choices, 
particularly the most valuable ones, often expose the individual to a risk 
of loss and suffering. People are free to make bad choices as well as 
good; and they must bear the consequences of their free choices. This 
is, after all, what makes for a meaningful life. This point was endorsed by 
Raz, who submits that: 
"[a]nguish, frustration, and even suffering are often part and parcel 
of rewarding activities and experiences, which depend on the 
suffering, etc. for their meaning, and therefore for their value as 
well."'^ 
It is unsurprising, therefore, that a liberal philosophy, with autonomy as its 
foundational principle, supports the notion of minimum state interference 
in the lives of autonomous citizens. Criminal prohibition is the most 
Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1989) at 12, cited in Roberts, Appendix C, Consent and Offences against the Person, 
paragraph C34 at 256, footnote 31. 
^ Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) at 
14-15, cited in Roberts, Appendix C, Consent and Offences against the Person, 
paragraph C37 at 256. 
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coercive form of state control and places direct limits on freedom, as 
noted by Raz, who observes, "[cjoercion by criminal penalties is a global 
and indiscriminate invasion of autonomy."^"* It follows that, for liberals, 
criminalisation should be kept to a minimum. A criminal law which is 
unnecessarily dictatorial and which gratuitously constrains liberty is surely 
damaging to society; therefore over-criminalisation should be avoided in 
order to prevent the erosion of the principle of individual autonomy. 
However, the criminal law also plays an important role in guarding 
individual autonomy by proscribing actions that violate the rights and 
interests of others. Inhibiting the individual choices of citizens through 
criminal prohibition is justified only if those choices reveal a disregard for 
the autonomy of others and lead to a diminution of their rights to self-
determination. So, despite the primacy of autonomy, liberal thinkers 
accept that there are inevitable, and indeed necessary, limits to individual 
freedoms. Even the extreme liberal stance adopted by Mill acknowledges 
that, "[a]ll that makes existence valuable to anyone depends on the 
enforcement of restraints upon the actions of other people. Some rules of 
conduct, therefore, must be imposed."^^ On a logical analysis, if each 
citizen had absolute autonomy to do as they freely chose, individual 
autonomies would be on an inevitable collision course. Autonomy is not, 
therefore, absolute but should be given the maximum possible effect 
insofar as that promotes a similar liberty for all citizens. In pursuit of this 
balance, the criminal law proscribes only conduct which leads to a 
violation of individual rights, and the imposition of liability in respect of 
that violation vindicates the sovereignty of the v i c t i m . T h e proposition 
that only conduct which violates the rights of another should be subject to 
criminal prohibition is explored further in the following section. 
It is established here that the criminal law is coercive by its very nature, 
and will, rightly, impinge on the autonomy of an individual when the 
Raz, Tlie Morality of Freedom at 418-419, cited in Roberts, Appendix C, Consent and 
Offences against the Person, paragraph C39 at 257. 
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974) at 63-64. 
Schopp, Justification Defenses and Just Convictions at 71 . 
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behaviour is serious enough to warrant criminalisation. But, according to 
liberal principles, it will only do so if the choice of the autonomous agent 
causes a wrongful setback to, or violation of, the rights of another 
autonomous being. On this account, only the 'harm principle' or its 
subsidiary the 'offence principle' can ever provide compell ing reasons for 
the imposition of criminal liability.^'' The contention that only harmful (and 
somet imes offensive) conduct should be criminalised is addressed below. 
2.3.1.1 The 'harm principle' 
Liberal theory dictates that the state is only permitted to intervene and 
regulate the conduct of citizens when that conduct causes harm to othiers. 
This notion is commonly referred to as the 'harm principle', and was first 
espoused by John Stuart Mill: 
"Th[e] principle is that the sole end for which mankind are 
warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty 
of action of any of their number is self-protection. . . [T]he only 
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any 
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent 
harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a 
sufficient warrant. He cannot be rightfully compel led to do or 
forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will 
make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so 
would be wise or even right. 
In short, Mill's "one very simple principle"^^ dictates that the state cannot 
legitimately restrict the liberty of an individual citizen via the mechanism 
of the criminal law in the absence of 'harm'. Commentators such as 
Wilson have acknowledged that this principle "provides a useful check 
^' Most l iberals agree that conduct which causes sehous o f fence to others should be 
cr iminal ised and this 'of fence principle' is general ly accepted as a subsid iary principle of 
cr iminal isat ion. However , the d iscussion here is l imited to the harm pnncip le s ince the 
cases in point all involve direct intrusions on the rights of innocent persons 
Mill, On L/ fc ie/ tyat68. 
" Ibid at 68. 
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against the potentially overweening power of the state to restrict our 
liberty."2° 
I's theory requires elaboration for it to be meaningfully applied, since 
the notion of 'harm' is left undefined, rendering the application of his 
account of the harm principle "hopelessly indeterminate."^^ Other liberal 
theorists have developed the foundations erected by Mill and perhaps the 
most comprehensive supplementation to date is Joel Feinberg's work The 
Moral Limits of the Chminal Law.^^ The governing principle when 
deciding what type of conduct should be criminalised is, for Feinberg, 
respect for individual autonomy, as opposed to Mill's maximisation of 
utility.^"' Feinberg summarises the harm principle as follows: 
"It is always a good reason in support of penal legislation that it 
would be effective in preventing (eliminating, reducing) harm to 
persons other than the actor (the one prohibited from acting) and 
there is no other means that is equally effective at no greater cost 
to other values."^'* 
Feinberg's account does not appear to be as restrictive or exclusive as 
M i l l ' s , s ince although harm to others is acknowledged as a good reason 
for the intervention of criminal law, it is, on one interpretation, not 
necessarily the only grounds for criminalisation. Feinberg appears to 
leave open the possibility that there may be other supplementary reasons 
warranting the imposition of criminal liability.^^ What follows is a 
necessarily condensed explanation of Feinberg's account of the harm 
^° William Wilson, Central Issues in Crinninal Theory (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002) at 
20. 
A point emphasised by Simester and Sullivan, Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine at 
582. 
Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law volume 1, Harm to Others (1984): 
volume 2, Offense to Others (1985); volume 3, Harm fo Se/f (1986): volume 4, Harmless 
Wrongdoing (1988). 
Larry Alexander, 'Harm, Offense and Morality' (1994) 7 Canadian Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudence 199 at 199. 
Feinberg, Harm to Others at 26. 
See John Kleinig, 'Criminally Harming Others' (1986) 5 Crime, Justice & Ethics 1 at 3-
4, in vi^hich the author contrasts the work of Feinberg with that of his predecessor Mill. 
Feinberg concedes that legal moralism, for example, advocates reasons for 
criminalising conduct that are "sometimes (but rarely) good," see Feinberg, Harmless 
Wrongdoing at 322-324. For further discussion of legal moralism, see section 2.4 below. 
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principle,^'^ which provides a theory regarding what conduct should be 
criminalised and leaves room for defences to take the defendant's action 
outside the scope of criminalisation. 
2.3.1.2 The meaning of harm 
For the harm principle to be fully comprehended, it is necessary to 
consider the meaning of the concept of 'harm'. On Feinberg's 
interpretation, there are two relevant notions of harm: (1) harm consists of 
a "thwarting, setting back, or defeating of an interest,"^^ interests being 
the things that promote a person's general well-being or welfare; and (2) 
harm involves a wrong Xo another person, that is, a violation of their 
rights. Feinberg's version of the harm principle dictates that these two 
types of harm must coincide for an actor to be held criminally 
responsible.^^ He asserts that "only setbacks of interests that are 
wrongs, and wrongs that are setbacks to interest, are to count as harms 
in the appropriate s e n s e . B o t h of these relevant senses of harm will be 
considered in turn below. 
The synopsis of the harm principle provided here is relatively brief for reasons of 
space. 
^ Feinberg, Harm to Others at 33. 
®^ Cf. Joseph Raz, 'Autonomy, Toleration and the Harm Principle' in Ruth Gavison (ed.), 
Issues in Contemporary Legal Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987) at 313, who, 
at 328, states, "Since 'causing harm' by its very meaning demands that action is prima 
facie wrong it is a normative concept acquiring its specific meaning from the moral 
theory within which it is embedded." Many other commentators have questioned 
Feinberg's account of the harm principle. Duff asserting that the artificial separation of 
setbacks to interests and wrongdoing distorts the character of the relevant harm, see 
Anthony Duff, 'Harms and Wrongs' (2001) 5 Buffalo Criminal Law Review ^2. In the 
same volume of the same journal dedicated to Joel Feinberg, Hamish Stewart criticises 
Feinberg's account with equal rigour, but for distinct reasons. For Stewart, Feinberg's 
account lacks clarity because it conflates the notion of setbacks to interests and that of 
wrongdoing, see Hamish Stewart, 'Harms, Wrongs, and Set-Backs in Feinberg's Moral 
Limits of the Criminal Law' (2001) 5 Buffalo Criminal Law Review 47. 
^° Feinberg, Harm to Others at 36. 
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Harm (1): A setback to interests 
If an actor's conduct adversely affects a person's well-being, then that 
person has been harmed as their interests have been se^ back by the 
conduct. Simester and Sullivan suggest that this type of harm is 
something which impairs the victim's personal and proprietary resources 
and hampers the attainment of self-determined activities, goals and 
relationships."'^ In relation to harm which thwarts the victim's personal 
interests, Feinberg asserts: "A broken arm is an impaired arm, one which 
has (temporarily) lost its capacity to serve a person's needs effectively, 
and in virtue of that impairment, its possessor's welfare interest is 
harmed.""'^ Conduct which interferes with proprietary resources, Raz 
comments, denies the victim the value or use of their property, and is 
harmful in the sense that it sets back their interests, "precisely because it 
diminishes [the victim's] opportunities."^^ 
Interests in personal integrity and property are arguably not, however, the 
only types of harm worthy of cons idera t ion .Gross offers a much 
broader categorisation of harm which causes a person's interests to be 
set back.^^ For Gross, it would appear that this type of harm may occur 
even if individual citizens are not direct victims of the setback as his 
account encompass harms which are, in a sense, 'victimless', such as 
violations of the collective welfare. For example, evading the payment of 
tax is intuitively a crime and one which affects society in general, but 
Simester and Sullivan, Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine at 583-584. 
Feinberg, Harm fo Others at 53. 
Joseph Raz, 'Autonomy, Toleration, and the Harm Principle' at 256, cited in Simester 
and Sullivan, Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine at 584. 
^ Wilson has criticised the above evaluation of what constitutes harm as being too 
narrow to serve the interests which the criminal law acts to defend: "Restricting the 
scope of the criminal law to the prevention of direct harm-creating acts is a blue-print for 
legislation informed by political conservatism, rather than that which might be expected 
to advance general human flourishing. A society truly committed to the autonomy of its 
members would, one might suppose, be committed to a more radical set of dos' and 
don'ts' underwritten by the prospect of state coercion," in William Wilson, Criminal Law: 
Doctrine and Theory 3"^ edition (Harlow: Longman, 2008) at 33. 
Hyman Gross, A Theory of Criminal Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1979) at 119-121. 
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which does not directly deprive an individual of any particular assets. 
The suggestion is that the state can rightly intervene to prevent harm to 
these nnore general interests.^'' This interpretation is not necessarily in 
conflict with Feinberg's conception of harm, since state intervention is 
warranted on account of the setback that would consequently be 
experienced by society as a whole if such action escaped sanction. 
However broad a conception of this type harm is adopted, the harms of 
concern in this thesis are, in any case, those which involve direct 
setbacks to the personal and proprietary interests of particular individuals. 
For these setbacks to be harmful not only must they cause a setback to 
interests but they must also violate a right of the victim. 
Harm (2): A violation of rights 
To fall within the harm principle, for Feinberg the harm must also be a 
wrong; and just because our interests have been set back does not mean 
that we have necessarily been wronged in any way.^^ This qualification is 
endorsed by Roberts: 
"[not every] setback to an interest [is] morally objectionable. When 
one considers the moral limits of the criminal law one is concerned 
only with setbacks to interests that are also M/rongs.""" 
In order to illustrate the point that conduct must constitute a wrong to fall 
within the harm principle, take a paradigm example of self-defence. If A 
®^ Simester and Sullivan, Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine at 584. 
It must be noted that the issue of remote harm, that is, action which is not immediately 
harmful but may lead to harm indirectly, is outside of the scope of this thesis. For further 
discussion of the difficulties of remote harm and the harm principle, see Andrew von 
Hirsch 'Extending the Harm Principle: 'Remote' Harms and Fair Imputation' in Andrew 
Simester and ATH Smith (eds.), Harm and Culpability (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1996) at 267. 
Simester and Sullivan, Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine at 584-585. 
The most plausible rationale for the inclusion of a requirement of wrongfulness is this: 
flouting the criminal law is, by definition, subject to penal sanction. Such punishment 
can be only be justified if the defendant is deserving of punishment, that is, his/her 
conduct is blameworthy or wrongful. See Douglas Husak, 'The Nature and Justifiability 
of Nonconsummate Offences' (1995) 37 Arizona Law Review 151 at 155. 
''° Roberts, Appendix C, Consent and Offences against the Person paragraph C28 at 
253 (emphasis added). 
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launches an unprovoked and aggressive attack on B for no good reason 
and B wards off the attack by pushing A, B has set back A's personal 
resources by interfering with A's autonomy. However, few would regard 
this setback as wrongful as A lost nothing to which s/he had a right. 
This example adequately illustrates that for conduct to be harmful and 
consequently criminal, in addition to setting back interests it must also 
violate some right of the victim. But when precisely does a setback to 
interests constitute a wrongful setback? Feinberg attempts to define the 
notion of wrong, offering the following exposition: 
"One person wrongs another when his indefensible (unjustifiable 
and inexcusable) conduct violates the other's right, and in all but 
certain very special cases such conduct will also invade the other's 
interest and thus be harmful." 
Douglas Husak elaborates on Feinberg's assertion: 
"Harmful but permissible conduct is not eligible for criminal 
penalties because it fails to satisfy the wrongfulness requirement. 
Person A might set back the interests of person B...through a 
legitimate competition, for example. But A's conduct should not be 
criminalized because B has not been wronged or treated unjustly. 
The interests of B may have been set back and infringed, but they 
have not been violated."'*^ 
So it is submitted here that a victim is harmed if they have suffered a 
wrongful setback to their interests. A setback is only wrongful if it results 
in a violation of the rights of another autonomous person, which is 
inexcusable, unjustified and has not been voluntarily consented to by the 
v i c t i m . T h i s suggests that a defendant may sometimes set back (or 
infringe) the rights of another person without incurring criminal 
responsibility for the infringement. 
For other examples see Simester and Sullivan, Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine at 
586. See section 4.3 for further discussion of the self-defence justification. 
Feinberg, Harm to Others at 34 (emphasis added). 
Husak, 'The Nature and Justifiability of Nonconsummate Offences' at 156. 
Feinberg, Harm to Others at 215-216. 
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2.3.1.3 Harm, wrongful setbacks and defences 
The logical corollary of the accounts of the harm principle articulated 
above is that if an actor sets back the interests of another individual, but 
has some justification for their action, they will not be criminally 
responsible as there has been no violation of any right, and consequently 
no violation of the harm principle."*^ This concept assumes that rights are 
not necessarily absolute and can be infringed without being violated."*^ 
This idea is crucial to the remainder of the thesis since it suggests that 
rights are only violated if a defendant acts wrongly, or unjustly, or, in other 
words, has no good reasons for their action."'' If the defendant can offer 
sound reasons for intruding on the protected interests of another person, 
then criminal responsibility may be avoided even though the definitional 
elements of an offence are satisfied. What constitutes a good reason for 
infringing the protected interests of another will be discussed in due 
course when the justificatory and excusatory defences central to this 
thesis are examined in greater depth. For now, the important point to 
note is that the harm principle, in defining the type of conduct for which an 
actor should take criminal responsibility, leaves room for considerations 
regarding the type of conduct which should fall outside of its scope. 
See section 3.3.1 below for further discussion of the distinction between justification 
and excuse. This mode of classifying criminal law defences is adopted throughout the 
thesis to provide moral clarity. 
Husak, 'The Nature and Justifiability of Nonconsummate Offences' at 156. Husak 
usefully distinguishes between violations of rights (wrongful set-backs to interests) and 
infhngement of rights (permissible set-backs to interests). See also Judith Jarvis 
Thomson, 'Some Ruminations on Rights' (1977) 19 Arizona Law Review A5\ Joel 
Feinberg, 'Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life' (1978) 7 Philosophy 
and Public Affairs 93, at 102; and Andrew Botterell, 'In Defence of Infringement' (2008) 
27 Law and Philosophy 269. However, Nozick appears to suggest that all basic rights 
are absolute and therefore every small infringement constitutes a violation, see Robert 
Nozick, Anarchy. State and Utopia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974) at 29. Yet 
there are also passages in which he admits that the question remains open as to 
whether rights are absolute, or whether they may be overridden or violated "in order to 
avoid catastrophic moral horror," at 30, for example. 
''^ Hohfeld's influential analysis of rights suggests that rights consist of claims and 
privileges. Where a defendant has a right or a privilege to act, they do not act unjustly in 
exercising that right or privilege. In other words, they may infringe (or set back) the 
rights of a victim in exercising their right/privilege, but they do not violate those interests; 
see Wesley N Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1919). 
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It is established, then, that to fall within the scope of the harm principle 
there must be a wrongful setback to the interests of another. But the fact 
that there has been a wrongful setback to the interests of an individual, 
however, does not necessarily result in conviction for a criminal offence. 
This issue is considered in greater detail in the following section. 
2.3.1.4 Not a//wrongful harm should be criminalised 
It does not follow from the analysis above that all wrongful violations of 
rights should necessarily be subject to criminal law prohibition. Some 
types of harm may, for instance, be too insignificant to result in 
conviction. Alternatively, it may be felt that although the actor has 
wronged a victim, they are not sufficiently blameworthy to be criminally 
responsible. The harm principle allows for the likelihood and seriousness 
of the harm to be weighed against the consequences of criminalisation 
and so is useful because it requires thought to be given as to why the 
activity is criminalised. This thought process allows us to consider where 
certain harms reside in terms of their severity or seriousness, and 
whether harm should fall within the scope of criminal prohibition at all. 
Establishing a threshold of seriousness should assist in limiting the scope 
of the criminal law to those who have committed culpable wrongdoing. 
Von Hirsch and Jareborg have developed a way of gauging criminal harm 
by setting a threshold of seriousness to decide whether criminalisation is 
appropriate. Their undertaking was to develop concrete and illuminating 
criteria which eradicate the need to rely solely on simple intuition when 
deciding the scope of criminal prohibition.''^ For them, the most 
significant interests to be protected are those which are central to a 
person's well-being; and, the most grievous harms are consequently 
those which cause the most significant diminution to the standard of well-
""^  See Wilson, Central Issues in Criminal Theory at 22. 
Andrew von Hirsch and Nils Jareborg, 'Gauging Criminal Harm: A Living-Standard 
Analysis' (1991) 11 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1 at 3. 
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being.^° They differ in this regard from the criteria set down by Feinberg, 
who claimed that the various interests infringed by criminal conduct could 
be ranked according to the degree to which such interests affect a 
person's choice.^^ Von Hirsch and Jareborg acknowledge the appeal of 
Feinberg's approach, in that "...it helps to assure that the criminal law, in 
its criteria for harm, gives due recognition and scope to individual 
choice."^^ Yet they are less complementary about his devotion to the 
idea that diminishing a person's choice is necessarily the worst thing that 
can happen to that person^"' and they argue that the reduction of other 
vital interests to a 'capacity to choose' dilutes the significance of the 
range of other interests which may be violated. Furthermore, the 
categories of interest identified by Feinberg do not offer sufficient 
distinction among harms, and are arguably so vague as to be "virtually 
unworkable."^" 
Von Hirsch and Jareborg overcome these difficulties by examining the 
adverse affect criminal conduct can have on the victim's 'living standard', 
that is their ability to live a good life. They identify four generic interests 
pertaining to each individual citizen: (i) physical integrity; (ii) material 
support and amenity; (iii) freedom from humiliation or degrading 
treatment; and (iv) privacy and a u t o n o m y . O n l y conduct which invades 
at least one of these protected interests is within the legitimate scope of 
the criminal law. The authors then identify four levels of 'living standard' 
which may be detrimentally affected by intrusion upon one of the four 
generic interests. These standards are: (a) subsistence; (b) minimal well-
being; (c) adequate well-being; and (d) significant enhancement. Crimes 
^° Ibid, at 7. 
For Feinberg, the interests of paramount importance are what he labels 'welfare 
interests', described as those interests required by a person in order to have the 
capacity to make meaningful choices and to shape their own lives, at 42. A less 
important set of interests are the so-called 'security interests', which constitute any 
interest needed to cushion or provide a safety margin to the welfare interests, described 
at 207. Those interests ranked lowest in terms of significance are what Feinberg calls, 
'accumulative interests', which seems to accommodate all of the other interests not 
caught up by the previous categories, defined at 207; see Feinberg, Harm to Others. 
Von Hirsch and Jareborg, 'Gauging Criminal Harm: A Living-Standard Analysis' at 8. 
" Ibid, at 8. 
Ibid, at 9. 
Ibid, at 19-21. 
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are graded by reference to how they affect quality of life, rather than how 
significantly they restrict choice. So, homicide is, rightly, criminalised 
because it impacts significantly on the victim's physical integrity and 
general well-being, and undermines even subsistence. Von Hirsch and 
Jareborg can boast that their work supplies, "a systematic conceptual 
framework for making such judgments - and [they] believe that [to be] 
superior to untutored intuition and guesswork,"^^ but they also recognise 
the limitations of their project, in that the living-standard categories are 
relatively imprecise and that much will still be left to judgement to assess 
the seriousness of the harm in question. In view of this, attention must 
also be paid to Feinberg's means of evaluating the seriousness of the 
harm by weighing it against the consequences of criminalisation.^'^ 
Feinberg suggests that a number of factors, which he calls "mediating 
maxims,"^^ should be taken into account when the consequences of 
criminalising wrongful harm are considered. In short, he suggests that 
the harm principle requires a balance between the likelihood and extent 
of the wrongful harm, the level of intrusion into the lives of citizens if the 
conduct were to be subject to criminal prohibition, and the overall social 
value of the conduct in q u e s t i o n . T h e greater the magnitude of the risk 
of harm (taking into account individual rights and freedoms), the greater 
the case for criminalisation; however, the greater the social value of the 
conduct, the weaker the case for criminalisation.^° These considerations, 
and those of von Hirsch and Jareborg discussed above,^^ should assist in 
^® Ibid, at 38. 
Note the criticism of William Wilson who maintains that neither Feinberg nor von 
Hirsch and Jareborg's grading schemes may be considered adequate, since both focus 
on harms committed against individuals. For Wilson, criminalisation is also about 
"defining public interests worthy of enforcement and identifying the factors which convert 
wrongs against individuals into matters of public concern," see Wilson, Central Issues in 
Chminal Theory at 24. 
Feinberg, Harm to Others at 187. The mediating maxims are listed in full at 214-217. 
Feinberg, Harm to Others at 216. 
^° See Simester and Sullivan, Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine at 586, commenting on 
Feinberg's mediating maxims. 
Other scholars have articulated other practical considerations which may limit the 
scope of criminal responsibility. For instance, Husak suggests that criminal laws should 
not punish innocent conduct, each criminal law must do more good than harm, and, 
perhaps most significantly for the purposes of this thesis, only conduct worthy of 
condemnation should be punished. See Douglas Husak, 'Limitations on Criminalisation 
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formulating appropriate judgements regarding the imposition of criminal 
responsibility in the difficult cases arising in subsequent chapters where 
the rights of innocent people are interfered with. 
2.3.1.5 Criticisms of the harm principle 
The harm principle is intuitively attractive since harming others would 
seem, to most, to be a plausible reason for criminal prohibition. But 
various criticisms have been waged at the liberal approach to 
criminalisation. Legal moralists, for instance, frequently challenge the 
ideology of liberalism, claiming that it is "filled with internal contradictions 
and will eventually explode as a result of the tensions generated by such 
conflict."^^ It has been contested that distinguishing between harms and 
non-wrongful injuries and performing the complex balancing exercise at 
the root of Feinberg's account is predicated upon a background of moral 
values and judgements." Murphy emphasises that many liberals like to 
rank liberties on a scale of importance, minor liberties being worthy of 
only minimal protection and more fundamental liberties worthy of the 
greatest protection. For Murphy, these fundamental rights and liberties 
cannot be defended on morally neutral grounds; appeal must be made to 
substantive moral theory and to an examination of the human values that 
these liberties and rights seek to protect.^'' However, Murphy appears to 
overlook the point that most liberal theorists do incorporate "at least a 
minimal account"^^ of morality in order to defend constitutional rights. 
and the General Part of the Criminal Law' in Stephen Shute and Andrew P Simester 
(eds.) Criminal Law Theory: Doctrines of the General Part (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002) at 13. 
" A criticism acknowledged by Jeffrie G Murphy, 'Legal Moralism and Liberalism' (1995) 
37 Arizona Law Review 73 at 78. 
Whilst acknowledging the insightful and perceptive ideas emanating from Feinberg's 
exposition of 'wrongfulness', Stewart comments that his theory is "left incomplete, with 
the result that much of his analysis relies on an implicit and rather intuitive specification 
of what a person's rights are," see Hamish Stewart, 'Harms, Wrongs, and Set-Backs in 
Feinberg's Moral Limits of the Criminal Law' at 52. For Stewart, Feinberg's account 
needs to be more explicit about the role and value of rights. 
Murphy, 'Legal Moralism and Liberalism' at 87. 
Clark Wolf, 'Liberalism and Fundamental Constitutional Rights' (1995) 37 Arizona Law 
Review 185 at 186. 
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Feinberg himself concedes that a strict application of the harm principle 
has limitations, and thereby rejects the notion that liberal philosophy 
should be morally neutral: 
"Legislators must decide not only wlietherto use the harm 
principle.- but also liowXo use it in cases of merely minor harms, 
moderately probable harms, reasonable and unreasonable risks of 
harm, aggregative harm, harms to some interests preventable only 
at the cost of harms to other interests irreconcilable with them, 
structured competitive harms, imitative harms, and so on. 
Solutions to these problems cannot be provided by the harm 
principle in its simply stated form, but absolutely require the help of 
supplementary principles, some of which represent controversial 
moral decisions and maxims of justice."^'' 
According to Feinberg's view, the harm principle does not claim to be a 
genuine alternative to the claim of legal moralism, which dictates that the 
chminal law should enforce mora l i t y ,bu t rather identifies particular 
manifestations of immorality that should be the business of the criminal 
law.®^ For Duff, however, yielding to the idea that any free-floating evil^" 
provides a relevant reason for criminalisation is a hasty and ill-considered 
concession to legal mora l i sm.A lexander also suggests that Feinberg's 
case is weakened by several concessions he is prepared to make by: 
"...allowing moralistic concerns to affect the interests that are 
covered by the Harm and Offence Principles and the amount of 
punishment meted out in criminalizing harmful and offensive 
conduct, and also in the exceptions he makes with varying 
degrees of reluctance for non-criminal regulation of immoralities 
®® Even those neutrality' liberals such as John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin import some 
(albeit limited) notion of morality and the human good into their theories. See, for 
example, John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) 
at 178 and Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Senous/y (London: Duckworth, 1977), 
'^ ^ Feinberg, Harm to Others at 187 (emphasis added). Feinberg appears to concede 
that prohibiting only harm which wrongfully violates another's interests may sometimes 
be difficult to apply in practice where there are competing interests at stake. For 
instance, in the case of duress, which is defended in sections 5.3.2 and 5.3.3 below as 
an excuse, there is a wrongful setback to the interests of the innocent victim, yet some 
consideration must also be given to the competing interests of the actor faced with 
extreme pressure to commit what would otherwise be a crime. 
®^ See section 2.4 below for further discussion of legal moralism. 
Husak, 'The Nature and Justifiability of Nonconsummate Offences' at 157. 
^° That is, evils other than harm and offence. 
Duff, Harms and Wrongs' (2001) at 37. 
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and for prohibiting truly grave evils and evils that are so because of 
their effects on welfare interests."''^ 
In answer to the critics, however, Feinberg and others, most significantly 
von Hirsch and Jareborg, seek to retain the harm principle as a distinctive 
philosophical theory by setting down a number of more concrete and 
determinative maxims which should form part of the criminalisation 
process. These maxims supply the harm principle with its content and 
provide proper principles for ascertaining the moral limits of the criminal 
law. They may also prove valuable tools in determining the scope of the 
inquiry at hand, as they may form the basis of a more determinate set of 
principles upon which to decide whether the rights of innocent persons 
can ever be violated without the imposition of liability. 
2.3.2 Summary of the liberal approach 
In summary, the liberal position is built upon the paramount importance of 
the concept of individual autonomy. Although the primary consideration, 
liberals accept that the freedom of citizens to do as they please may 
sometimes be suppressed if those choices encroach on the protected 
rights and interests of others. So the liberal position is underscored by 
the harm principle: the conduct of any autonomous citizen may only be 
subject to coercion if the choices made cause harm to another. Harm 
involves a wrongful violation of rights; and a setback is not wrongful, and 
therefore falls outside of the criminal prohibition, if there is a good reason 
for it. Even if a setback is wrongful, however, an actor may still avoid 
criminal responsibility on account of the maxims governing the application 
of the harm principle in difficult cases. In applying the harm principle the 
more plausible liberal theories are not, however, morally neutral and 
many liberal philosophers have "strived to occupy a middle place 
between the impotence of radical moral neutrality on the one hand, and 
Alexander, 'Harm, Offense and Morality' at 205. 
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the dogmatism of legal moralism on the other."^^ This approach will be 
defended and applied throughout the thesis, but in order to understand 
why it is adopted as the most plausible philosophy underpinning the 
criminal law, two other approaches must first be briefly considered: 
moralism and paternalism. 
2.4 Legal moralism 
2.4.1 The enforcement of morals and the criminal law 
Another prominent philosophical approach to the moral limits of criminal 
law is provided by legal moralism. Although, as with liberalism, this 
philosophical doctrine has numerous tenets which cannot be explored in 
great depth here, it is premised upon the central notion that: 
"The law must protect...the institutions and the community of idea, 
political and moral, without v\^ hich people cannot live together. 
Society cannot ignore the morality of the individual any more than 
it can his loyalty; it flourishes on both and without either it dies."'''' 
So, the underlying feature of legal moralism is its conviction to the idea 
that, in phnciple at least, the criminal law can be used to enforce the 
shared moral beliefs of the community. In other words, the criminal law 
can be utilised to prevent certain actions which are inherently immoral, 
even where the conduct in question is not harmful to others and does not 
constitute a violation of another's rights.''^ With such renowned 
proponents as Stephen''^ and Devlin,'''^ the appeal of legal moralism has 
even been acknowledged by some liberal thinkers. 
Wolf, 'Liberalism and Fundamental Constitutional Rights' at 186. 
Patrick Devlin, 'Morals and the Criminal Law," in The Enforcement of Morals (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1965) at 22. 
76 
Murphy, 'Legal Moralism and Liberalism' at 74. 
James Fitzjames Stephen, Liberty, Equality and Fraternity {^874) (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1991). 
Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals. 
''^  See Murphy, 'Legal Moralism and Liberalism' who, at 75, concedes that "the 
conservative position of legal moralism retains some philosophical power." 
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The seminal case of Brown^^ demonstrates how moralistic considerations 
sometimes permeate criminal prohibitions. The House of Lords decided 
that homosexual sadomasochistic activity, which involved the application 
offeree upon the body of a consenting adult in private, was, legitimately, 
a criminal offence. The legal moralist would support this decision as it 
penalised conduct which, for advocates at the time, was inherently wrong; 
for these theorists the lack of harm, offence or infringement of rights is 
irrelevant and behaviour of which is offensive to the shared morality 
legitimately falls within the ambit of the criminal law. A number of distinct 
theories have emerged under the rubric of 'legal moralism': strict legal 
moralism and the related social disintegration theory are the only versions 
with which we will concern ourselves here. Each of these accounts will 
be briefly explained and analysed below. 
2.4.1.1 Strict legal moralism 
One version of legal moralist thought is advanced by 'strict' legal 
moralism. According to this classic thesis of moralism, "not only may the 
law be used to punish men for doing what morally it is wrong for them to 
do, but it should be so used."^° Adherents to this approach believe that it 
is appropriate to utilise the criminal law to prohibit immoral conduct per 
se, despite the fact that such conduct causes neither harm nor offence to 
the actor or to any other person, and aside from the fact that it does not 
violate any of the protected interests of the v i c t i m . L e g a l moralism 
justifies the criminalisation of what Feinberg deems "free-floating, non-
grievance evils,"^^ 'free-floating' in the sense that they do not infringe 
human interests and 'non-grievance' because they give no one individual 
legitimate cause for complaint. For strict moralists, any conduct which is 
inherently 'evil' should be within the bounds of criminal prohibition. At first 
Rv Brown [1994] 1 AC 212. 
°° See Herbert LA Hart, 'Social Solidarity and the Enforcement of Morality' in Hart, 
Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy at 248 (emphasis added). 
Feinberg, Harm to Others at 27. 
®^  Feinberg, Harmless Wrongdoing at 20-25 and 40-43. 
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glance, this account seems plausible. If liberals concede that the criminal 
law may justifiably be invoked to enforce some moral rules, that is, those 
resulting in harm or serious offence to others, then why should all 
immoral conduct not be the proper subject of criminalisation even if there 
is no wrongful violation of rights? 
The standard counter-attack of the liberal is to deny the immorality of the 
action in question; indeed, there is little consensus about the scope of 
true morality. Despite the fact that there may be an "overtapping 
consensus"®'^ between moralists and liberals regarding the core content of 
morality, there is much less certainty about peripheral issues.®'' Even if 
the liberal concedes that the conduct is, in fact, immoral, s/he will 
denounce resort to the criminal law unless there is also a wrongful 
violation of rights. The liberal and the strict legal moralist further disagree 
irreconcilably about autonomy. Although advocates of the moral 
approach do not generally deny the importance of autonomy, the moralist 
philosophy accords it much less significance than the liberal tradition. 
Fundamental liberal beliefs about the value of liberty, on the other hand, 
will not allow a liberal to yield to purely moralistic considerations. 
2.4.1.2 Social disintegration theory 
Distinguished from what Hart refers to as the 'classical thesis' of moralism 
summarised in brief above, is the 'disintegration thesis'.®^ Devlin is 
perhaps the most well-known proponent of this version of legal moralism. 
®^  John Rawls, 'The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus' (1987) 7 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 1. 
For instance, if a defendant repels a threat to their own interests by exercising lethal 
force, but that threat comes from a child or an insane person who is not culpable for their 
action, reasonable people might disagree about the moral content of the action. On the 
basis of the harm principle, however, this conducts falls outside the scope of 
criminalisation as there is no wrongful violation of the innocent person's rights. This 
argument is defended later in the thesis, in section 4.3 below. 
Devlin The Enforcement of Morals at 8-14. This thesis emerged in the 1960's, 
building on the work of Emile Durkheim, who submitted that there are certain values that 
people must hold in order for society to survive, and only these values can be enforced 
by the state, see Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labour in Society (London: Macmillan, 
1984). 
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and his viewpoint is premised upon the notion that a society's moral code 
is an integral part of its structure, and if harmless but immoral behaviour 
was beyond the ambit of criminal law that structure would erode, leading 
ultimately to a n a r c h y . O n Devlin's account, a state should be permitted 
to criminalise even immoral acts carried out in private because it is 
precisely this sort of behaviour that would loosen and eventually dissolve 
the moral foundation of society. This school of thought values morality as 
"the cement of society, the bond, or one of the bonds, without which men 
would not cohere."^'^ For Devlin, as distinguished from strict legal 
moralists, society may not criminalise an activity simply because the 
majority find it unacceptable or even repugnant, or because it is immoral 
perse; criminal sanctions should only be introduced if the behaviour 
constitutes a serious threat to the social structure. It is worth noting that 
this approach is not entirely discordant with the harm p r i n c i p l e . I f 
permitting an immoral act would result in social disintegration this would, 
in itself, be a harmful thing for individual c i t i z e n s . S o criminalising any 
such immoral act appears justifiable and non-offensive to the liberal spirit 
of the harm principle. The foundation of the liberal ideal is, however, 
completely undermined if the criminal law is used to proscribe all immoral 
acts,^° including those which do not cause any harm or serious offence to 
others. Such a restriction on individual autonomy would be too significant 
for liberals to accept. 
Devlin's approach appears to suffer from a number of further flaws. 
Firstly, it demands an empirical link between immorality and the 
®^ Devlin The Enforcement of Morals at 8-14. 
Hart, 'Social Solidarity and the Enforcement of Morality' in Hart, Essays in 
Jurisprudence and Philosophy at 248. 
William Wilson asserts that "[i]t is not difficult to reformulate Lord Devlin's legal 
moralism in terms which are consistent with the conceptual thrust if not the ethical spirit 
of the harm principle", see Wilson, Central Issues in Criminal Theory at 34. 
For example, tax evasion is a criminal offence on application of either the liberal or 
social disintegration theory 
^° It is important to note that not even Devlin insists on the criminalisation of immorality 
generally. He submits: "I do not assert that any deviation from a society's shared 
morality threatens its existence any more than I assert that any subversive activity 
threatens its existence. I assert that they are both activities which are capable in their 
nature of threatening the existence of society so that neither can be put beyond the law", 
see Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals at 13 (emphasis added). 
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destruction of s o c i e t y . I n a much-publicised dispute with Devlin over the 
enforcement of morality, Hart submits that, apart from one vague 
statement that "history shows that the loosening of moral bonds is often 
the first stage of disintegration,"^^ there is otherwise no evidence given in 
support of the proposition and "no indication is given of the kind of 
evidence that would support it, nor is any sensitivity betrayed to the need 
for evidence."^^ As noted above, even liberals would support the 
criminalisation of conduct which leads to social disintegration on the basis 
that this leads to harm but, crucially, only if it is factually proven that there 
is some truth to this claim. Arguably, human experience dictates that not 
all immoral acts destroy the fabric of society; adultery, for example, is an 
act regarded as immoral by many, but there is little evidence to suggest 
that adultery leads to a breakdown in social order, as Devlin's theory 
proposes. For these reasons, legal moralism is rejected as a general 
guiding philosophy. 
2.4.2 Summary of legal moralism 
In general terms, legal moralism in all of its guises arguably suppresses 
change and is conservative in its approach, immorality being measured 
against prevailing social mores of the time. In their critique of moralism 
Simester and Sullivan note: "[d]ifference, even conflict, between the lives 
It has been noted by Hart that when pressured to substantiate the claim that society 
will disintegrate unless morality is claimed, the disintegration thesis often collapses into 
another moral argument, which he labels the 'conservative thesis': see Hart, 'Social 
Solidarity and the Enforcement of Morality' in Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and 
Pliilosophy at 249. On this 'conservative' approach, society has a right to enforce 
morality via the mechanism of the criminal law on the grounds that otherwise traditional 
ways of life will be eroded and that society has a right to defend its existing moral 
environment from change. Dworkin distinguishes that conservative approach from 
Devlin's disintegration thesis in Ronald Dworkin, 'Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of 
Morals' (1965-66) 75 Yale Law Journal 986. This thesis suffers from fundamental flaws 
in that it cannot plausibly be assumed that innovation and change are necessarily 
detrimental to society; individual autonomy cannot surely be legitimately restricted purely 
on the basis of a preference for familiarity, emotional attachment and long-standing 
tradition. See also comments in Roberts, Appendix C, Consent and Offences against 
the Person, paragraph C75-C79. 
Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals at 13. 
Hart, 'Social Solidarity and the Enforcement of Morality' in Hart, Essays in 
Jurisprudence and Philosophy at 250. 
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and values of citizens can be a dynamic force for the evolution of a 
vigorous, thriving, and valuable culture."^'' Furthermore, it is inevitably 
difficult to categorise immoral acts; what appears immoral to one person 
may not to another. Criminal laws created purely on the immorality of the 
action are surely an example of legislators imposing their own moral 
value judgements upon society. According to Wilson, if such an 
approach was ever accepted as a general principle: "[t]he danger...is that 
we may be left with a society in which an irrational and unprincipled 
majority is given licence to impose their views of right conduct on a 
powerless minority."^^ 
Perhaps the most robust criticism of legal moralism relates to its conflict 
with the fundamental principle of any liberal society: autonomy. 
According to Wilson, the main liberal argument with this position is that it: 
"...substitutes the harm principle's starting point to criminalisation, 
namely the enhancement of individual freedom and autonomy, 
with its polar opposite, namely the enhancement of state control 
over individual forms of life. 
As established in section 2.3 above, the criminal law, by its very nature, 
intrudes into the private lives of its citizens and encroaches upon 
individual autonomy. There must therefore be very strong reasons for 
deviating from the principle of autonomy.^'' The strongest reason for 
encroaching upon autonomy seems to be if the action of the defendant 
diminishes the opportunities of other citizens to live good lives. The 
criminal law justification for limiting the defendant's autonomy is weighed 
against the encroachment by the defendant upon the autonomy of the 
victim. The defendant's conduct is necessarily harmful in such instances. 
Simester and Sullivan, Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine at 592. 
Wilson, Criminal Law: Doctrine and Theory at 38. 
Wilson, Central Issues in Criminal Theory at 34. 
It is worth noting that most modern proponents of the moralist tradition acknowledge 
the undesirability of state coercion, and recommend that the only compelling reason for 
criminalisation must be to promote social cohesion; see, for example, Nicola Lacey, 
Sfafe Punishment (London: Routledge, 1988) at 100; and Michael S Moore, Placing 
Blame (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) at 70, both cited in Wilson, Central 
Issues in Chminal Theory at 35. 
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intruding as it does upon the rights of another. If mere immorality is 
prohibited then the weighing exercise is between the autonomy of the 
defendant in criminalising the behaviour, and some abstract judgement of 
morality. It follows that there is no autonomy based reason for 
criminalisation, but merely one against. Since this thesis advocates that 
autonomy forms the foundation of any liberal society, and the self-
determined, free choices of individuals therefore take priority, it is argued 
that actions should not be criminalised purely on the basis that they are 
immoral. Before any further conclusions can be drawn regarding the 
primacy of principles underpinning decisions to impose criminal 
responsibility, one further philosophical approach must be considered, 
which claims that criminal prohibitions should be underscored by 
beneficence. 
2.5 Paternalism 
2.5.1 Paternalism and the criminal law 
Paternalistic justifications dictate that state intervention may be justified 
where the action causes harm to the individual themselves, and criminal 
prohibition is justified purely for the individual's own good, as it promotes 
the actor's own welfare interests. This theory has roots in political 
philosophies advanced by, for instance, Plato, Aristotle and Hegel, who 
propose that achieving perfection or 'human excellence' takes priority 
over rigid adherence to autonomy. As with legal moralists, it is not 
necessarily the case that paternalists disregard the virtue of autonomy 
outright; it is simply that they do not afford it the same primacy that 
liberals do. 
The paternalistic justification for criminalising conduct has been usefully 
summarised by Feinberg, although it is important to note that this is not a 
principle to which he subscribes: 
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"It is always a good reason in support of a prohibition that it is 
probably necessary to prevent harm (physical, psychological, or 
economic) to the actor himself and there is probably no other 
means that is equally effective at no greater cost to other values."^^ 
A number of current laws appear to be underscored by paternalistic 
considerations or, as Feinberg suggests, have "paternalism as an 
essential part of their implicit rationales."^^ Take, for instance, Simester 
and Sullivan's example of the criminal law duty to wear a seat belt;^°° and 
further, the paternalistic intervention of the criminal law to protect children 
and the mentally incompetent from making certain ill-considered and 
irresponsible judgments, for instance, by restricting sexual activity. 
The prohibition of such activities for the benefit of the individuals 
concerned is often justified on the basis that the restriction of choice and 
infringement of autonomy is relatively minor and arguably outweighed by 
other welfare interests of the individual. But these are strong cases for 
paternalistic intervention and would appear, to most, sensible restrictions 
upon free choice. It is submitted here, however, that the criminal 
prohibition of such activities is better explained by reference to the harm 
principle without the need to appeal to paternalistic arguments. 
Feinberg, Harm to Others at 26-7. 
Feinberg, Harm to Self at. 25. 
Simester and Sullivan, Criminal Law: Theory and Docthne at 594. However, the duty 
to wear a seatbelt might also be justified via the harm principle, in that wearing a 
seatbelt may also prevent the causing of harm to others in the event of an accident. 
It could be argued that children and mentally incompetent or incapacitated persons 
are not autonomous and therefore a limited degree of 'soft' paternalism is necessary in 
such circumstances. 'Soft' paternalism is defined as coercion which interferes with non-
voluntary choices, rather than fully voluntary choices, see Danny Scoccia, 'In Defense of 
Hard Paternalism' (2008) 27 Law and Philosophy 351 at 354-355. 
For example, a doctor who administers invasive treatment to an incompetent patient 
incapable of communicating their wishes does not wrongfully violate the rights of that 
patient but merely infringes them, since the necessity justification provides good all 
things considered reasons for the action. For further discussion of the necessity 
principle in this context see chapter 3, particularly 3.3.3. 
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2.5.2 Criticisms of paternalism 
The views of the legal paternalist are in direct contrast to those of the 
liberal, since for the latter the principle of autonomy always outweighs 
beneficence when the two values collide. Because liberty and autonomy 
are generally accepted as valuable features of our culture, paternalism 
faces an uphill struggle if it is ever to be accepted as a general principle 
of criminalisation. The wholehearted application of a theory which 
restricts personal autonomy simply for the actor's own good is, for many, 
offensive and undermines the principle that the rights of competent and 
responsible adults take precedence in a liberal society. The paternalist 
would support legislation which saves people from themselves and 
prevents them from making bad decisions which will detrimentally affect 
their welfare. As submitted by Roberts, advocates of this approach argue 
from a "philosophical slippery slope and [are] at constant risk of taking a 
t u m b l e . F e i n b e r g suggests that wholesale adoption of a policy of legal 
paternalism would lead to the "creation of new crimes that would be 
odious and offensive to common sense, leading to the general 
punishment of risk-takers, the enforcement of prudence, and the 
interference with saints and h e r o e s . M a n y of the life choices made by 
human beings are not strictly in their best interests, but not all of these 
choices are subject to criminalisation. The implications of the 
paternalistic ideal are decidedly less attractive when considered in 
contrast to the liberal philosophy. 
2.5.3 Summary of paternalism 
In summary, in relation to specific crimes, it is easy to see why the 
concept of paternalism could be used to justify state intervention to 
promote the welfare interests of the individual, at the expense of 
Roberts, Appendix C, Consent and Offences against ttie Person, paragraph C63 at 
264. 
Feinberg, Harm fo Self at 25. 
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autonomy. But as a general principle of criminalisation, paternalism lacks 
rigour and should not be guiding our system of criminal law. Criminalising 
conduct for the defendant's own good seriously undermines autonomy of 
choice. Citizens have the freedom to determine their own self-chosen 
goals for life, and in pursuit of these goals, have the freedom to make 
some wrong choices. As Simester and Sullivan acknowledge, "[a] 
paternalistic legal system which made people's choices for them may well 
end up alienating people from their own conduct."^°^ It must be reiterated 
that the shaping of our own lives through the pursuit of self-chosen goals 
is what makes life meaningful; but the criminal law is coercive and 
invasive and restricts the fulfilment of aspirations. Imposing criminal 
prohibitions purely for the individual's own good interferes with the 
accomplishment of a meaningful life. 
2.6 Conclusion to chapter two 
The philosophical foundations of the criminal law have been investigated 
in this chapter and the three main positive grounds for state intervention 
considered. This necessarily condensed critique of the competing 
philosophies underpinning decisions to criminalise illustrates that each of 
the main three theories has some merit. Liberalism protects individual 
autonomy and only endorses criminal prohibitions which cause harm to 
o t h e r s . L e g a l moralism promotes state intervention to prevent all forms 
of immorality, which, it is argued, could maintain the status quo in society 
or prevent the erosion of the social structure. Paternalism calls for 
criminal law intervention for the actor's own good, to protect the welfare 
interests of the individual. It is argued here that in a pluralistic and 
diverse society, the liberal ideal seems intuitively the most plausible and 
attractive. Indeed, Roberts contends that, "the presumption in favour of 
individual autonomy places the burden of persuasion firmly on the 
Simester and Sullivan, Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine at 595. 
Or serious offence. 
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shoulder's of liberalism's o p p o n e n t s . A u t o n o m y is, after all, the 
fundamental political value in western liberal democracies, and citizens 
closely guard and value their personal freedom. Moralism and 
paternalism are not completely ignorant of notions of autonomy; however, 
they place autonomy lower down the list of protected priorities than 
liberals do. Any philosophical perspective which gives insufficient weight 
to the value of autonomy cannot, it is submitted here, be adopted as a 
t»as/s upon which to outline the limits of criminal responsibility. 
Feinberg's liberal account remains the most comprehensive and 
convincing attempt to outline the boundaries of the criminal law to date. 
The general proposition which will be defended throughout the thesis is 
that an actor can only be held chminally responsible for conduct which 
wrongfully violates the rights of another. As Feinberg suggests, the 
authority of the state to impose criminal sanction should be limited by a 
theory which identifies a coherent set of principles which protect 
individual r i g h t s . H o w e v e r , is difficult to sustain an argument that rights 
to liberty, health, life and possessions are absolute and wholly inviolable. 
In view of this, Feinberg advances a presumption in favour of liberty, and 
is not rigidly committed to the claim that liberty has absolute priority 
whenever it is weighed against competing values. He acknowledges that 
the harm principle must be supplemented by other worthy considerations 
that are always relevant, if not good or decisive, reasons for the 
imposition of criminal liability. So even where rights are violated, it is 
conceded that there may be other relevant reasons for denying the 
criminality of certain conduct, depending, for instance, on the seriousness 
of the harm and the culpability of the actor. 
So, it may be concluded that autonomous citizens are free to make their 
own choices, good or bad; but if conduct is chosen which causes a 
wrongful setback to the fundamental interests of an innocent autonomous 
Roberts, Appendix C, Consent and Offences against the Person, paragraph CI09 at 
281. 
See Husak, 'The Nature and Justifiability of Nonconsummate Offences' (1995) 37 
Arizona Law Review 151 at 155. 
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person the actor must take responsibility. Conversely, respect for the 
autonomy of the defendant is manifested in the provision of a range of 
defences which may absolve the actor of criminal responsibility. The 
defences featured in this work include necessity, self-defence and 
duress, which are all exculpatory defences that negate liability despite the 
fulfilment of the definitional elements of an offence. Each defence 
contains a claim that the action of the defendant was reasonably 
necessary due to some threat to their own protected interests. When 
necessity and self-defence are raised they operate as justificatory 
defences which emphasise that there is no wrongful setback to the rights 
of another person, that is, no violation of their rights. In such 
circumstances there is no violation because there is no objectively 
wrongful act; a person who is compelled to act out of necessity or in 
response to an unjust threat to their own interests has a right to intrude 
on the personal sphere of another agent. A person does, however, 
wrongfully violate the rights of another if they commit crime in response to 
serious threats to their own interests, or those of another to whom they 
are connected. In situations of duress, the actor's choice to violate rights 
is coerced and therefore the criminal law provides the actor with an 
excuse in recognition of the unfair personal sacrifice demanded of the 
defendant. It is evident that the justificatory defences are compatible with 
the harm principle in that they exonerate an actor who is outside of the 
scope of criminalisation dictated by the principle since there is no 
wrongful violation of rights. On the other hand, excusatory defences 
exonerate defendants whose conduct would otherwise fall within the remit 
of the harm principle on account of the lack of fair opportunity for the 
actor to exercise free choice. 
Important rights come into conflict in many of the dilemmas considered in 
the subsequent chapters of this thesis, and it is hoped that the basic 
principles established in this chapter will provide useful guidance as to 
whether intrusions on the rights of the innocent persons to be considered 
below are an appropriate target for criminal prohibition. The discussion 
begins with a consideration of the scope of criminal responsibility for 
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intrusions on the rights of innocent incompetent persons in their best 
interests. 
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Chapter Three: 
Intruding on the rights of innocent persons in their 'best interests' 
3.1 Introduction to chapter three 
As established in chapter two, criminal law in a liberal society prohibits 
conduct which results in a wrongful setback to the rights of others.^ The 
imposition of criminal responsibility for such violations supports the claim 
that English law "goes to great lengths to protect a person of full age and 
capacity from interference with his personal liberty."^ It follows that, as a 
general rule, anyone who violates the protected personal interests of an 
innocent non-threatening, non-consenting autonomous person will be 
committing a criminal offence. Hence a surgeon who performs an 
operation without the consent of a competent patient commits an 
assault.^ Indeed, it has been authoritatively asserted by Mill that each 
competent individual is the "proper guardian of his own health, whether 
bodily or mental and spiritual,'"* and, further, there is judicial recognition of 
the fundamental principle that "[ejvery human being of adult years and 
sound mind has a hght to determine what shall be done with his own 
body."^ The imposition of criminal responsibility for intrusions on the 
protected interests of innocent persons reflects the basic principle that the 
bodily integrity and self-determined choices of autonomous patients must 
be respected. As Dworkin notes: "failure to respect [a person's] wishes 
' Husak, 'The Nature and Justifiability of Nonconsummate Offences' at 155. 
^ Per Lord Reid in S (An Infant) v. S; W vW[1Q72] AC 24 at 43. 
^ Per Cardozo J in the American case Schloendorff v. The Society of the New York 
l-lospital 105 NE 92 (1914). The assault referred to constitutes both the crime of battery 
and the tort of trespass to the person, a point reiterated in numerous cases, perhaps 
most authoritatively in Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1 at 71 , per Lord 
Goff. 
" Mill, On Liberty ai 72. 
^ Per Cardozo J in the American case Schloendorff v. The Society of the New York 
Hospital. 
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concerning [their] body is a particularly insulting denial of autonomy,"^ 
which the criminal law, on the principles established in chapter two, rightly 
condemns. 
However, it is also established in chapter two that although the 
definitional elements of a particular offence may be fulfilled in that rights 
have been infringed by the actor, sometimes s/he may be exculpated on 
the grounds of justification or excuse. So, despite admirable 
proclamations regarding the primacy of self-determination, the courts 
have sometimes declared that although certain intrusions undeniably 
encroach on another's individual autonomy, that conduct is not 
necessarily a wrongful setback to interests; or, alternatively, it is a 
wrongful setback for which the defendant should not be blamed. It would 
appear, then, that the fundamental rights of autonomy and non-
interference with bodily integrity are sometimes limited and subservient to 
other considerations: 
"The right to maintenance of the inviolability of a person's body 
exists for the benefit of all who inhabit our shores. But it is not an 
absolute right. It is subject to exceptions. Nor does it exist in a 
vacuum. It must co-exist with other rights, such as the right to 
skilled treatment by doctors who have assumed the responsibilities 
inherent in the doctor - patient relationship."^ 
It is submitted in this chapter and, indeed, throughout the thesis that 
intrusions on the rights of competent non-consenting innocent persons 
will rarely, if ever, be justified. But interference with the legally protected 
interests of an innocent incompetent patient \Nho is unable to give valid 
consent to medical intervention due to incompetence or incapacity may 
be justified provided it is recognised as a legitimate and necessary 
response to a medical dilemma. Hence, the privileging of autonomy 
depends on the soundness of mind of the individual: if patients have the 
capacity to make treatment decisions, those decisions are conclusive. 
^ Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988) at 113, cited in Elizabeth Wicks, Human Rights and Healthcare 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007) at 60. 
^ Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1 at 13. 
46 
However, if lacking the requisite capacity to consent, a doctor may 
lawfully encroach on the incompetent person's autonomy on the basis 
that treatment is necessary in the best interests of the patient. 
This chapter examines the necessity doctrine which may, in certain 
circumstances, provide a defence to defendants who intrude on the rights 
of innocent incompetent persons. In section 3.2 the necessity doctrine is 
introduced and its development as a common law principle is charted. 
The scope of the necessity defence is uncertain and it has been applied 
in a broad range of contexts and it is perhaps for this reason that the 
rationale undertying the defence is problematic. Before attempting to 
elucidate the theoretical foundation of the defence, section 3.3 begins 
with a brief synopsis of the distinction between justificatory and 
excusatory defences, a categorisation which will be adopted as a mode of 
classifying the defences for the remainder of the thesis. The subsequent 
analysis considers whether necessity operates to justify or excuse rights 
violations in a medical context, and an attempt is made to rationalise the 
justificatory force of the defence. In section 3.4 the vague conditions 
limiting the defence are briefly considered before section 3.5 addresses in 
greater detail the general principle that necessity can rarely, if ever, be 
invoked to justify infringements on the rights of an autonomous, 
competent, non-consenting patient. Judicial commitment to the primacy 
of autonomy is also challenged, with particular concern for the treatment 
afforded to women who are compelled to undergo forced caesarean 
section operations. In section 3.6 the legitimacy of interventions in the 
best interests of the innocent incompetent patient is considered in both 
emergency and, somewhat more controversially, non-emergency 
situations. The ambiguous notion of best interests is discussed in detail 
in order to illuminate the scope of the necessity principle in the medical 
context. The remainder of the chapter comprises a more detailed 
examination of three particularly contentious examples of intervention for 
which criminal responsibility has been denied on the grounds of 
necessity. A summary of the scope and operation of the principle of 
necessity in this context is offered in section 3.7, which suggests that it 
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may only be justifiable to encroach on the protected interests of an 
innocent incompetent patient if the intrusion vindicates a superior right of 
the patient. There is also recognition that the justification does not extend 
to intrusions against innocent and autonomous competent patients. This 
chapter attempts to define the limits of the common law defence of 
necessity in respect of violations of the rights of innocent persons in their 
best interests; and the analysis begins with an inquiry into the current 
scope and application of the doctrine. 
3.2 The doctrine of necessity 
Necessity renders lawful conduct which is necessarily undertaken to 
prevent harm to the interests of the defendant or another in a situation 
where the alternative involves breaking the letter of the law. There has 
been considerable uncertainty surrounding the availability of necessity as 
a genera/defence, with both legislature and judiciary reluctant to give full 
commitment regarding its existence and, as a result, the defence has 
lingered in the common law shadows for centuries. Any argument to the 
effect that there is no such defence in operation now is, however, no 
longer sustainable,° although the doctrine is relatively undeveloped and of 
limited applicability. 
It is true that necessity has long been considered one of the "obscure"^ 
curiosities of English law and thus a topic generating immense interest 
amongst academics, since its tentative beginnings as far back as the 
sixteenth century.^° The doctrine has sound historical foundations, with 
Bracton, Hale, Hobbes and Blackstone all admitting the allure of "a 
discretionary judicial power to justify illegal acts in morally complex 
Simester and Sullivan state that the defence is now "impossible to deny," in Criminal 
Law: Theory and Doctrine at 714. 
^ Per Brooke LJ in Re A (Children: Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2000] 4 All 
ER 961 at 1032. 
^° Renigerv. Forgossa (1552) 1 Plowd 1. 
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situations."" It was conceded even then that there were certain 
situations in which otherwise criminal conduct is rendered lawful on 
account of this principle called necessity: for example, where a prisoner is 
forced to escape from a burning jail; or a cargo is jettisoned to save a 
vessel in a s t o r m . I n d e e d in Moore v. Hussey^^ it was declared by 
Hobart J that "all laws admit certain cases of just excuse... where the 
offender is under necessity, either of compulsion or inconvenience."^'* 
Influential scholar Stephen reinforced this proposition, claiming that "[i]t is 
just possible to imagine cases in which the expediency of breaking the 
law is so overwhelmingly great that people may be justified in breaking 
it."^^ Historically, it would seem that there is at least some partial 
recognition of the possible effect of necessity on criminal responsibility. 
Despite general support for the notion of necessity from influential 
scholars, the defence has often been rejected by the courts. Potent 
arguments have been articulated against the recognition of necessity as a 
general defence, largely borne out of an understandable concern for the 
consequences of allowing individuals to judge when the letter of the law 
can be overridden. This reluctance to admit the defence is evident from 
comments made by Dickson J in Perka v. R that: 
"...no system of positive law can recognise any principle which 
would entitle a person to violate the law because on his view the 
law conflicted with some higher social value. To...hold that 
ostensibly illegal acts can be validated on the basis of their 
expediency, would import undue subjectivity into the criminal law. 
It would invite the courts to second-guess the legislature and to 
assess the relative merits of social policies underlying criminal 
prohibitions."^^ 
Elizabeth Wicks, 'The Greater Good? Issues of Proportionality and Democracy in the 
Doctrine of Necessity as applied in Re A' (2003) 32 Common Law World Review ^5. 
^^Mouse's Case (1608) 12 Co Rep 63. 
'^Moore v. Hussey (1609) Hob 93. 
However, Hale, with whom Blackstone subsequently agreed, restricted the availability 
of the necessity plea, stating that,"... if a person, being under necessity for want of 
victuals or clothes, shall. . . clandestinely and animo furandi siea\ another man's goods, it 
is a felony and a crime by the laws of England punishable with death," see Hale, Pleas 
of the Crown volume 1 at 54. 
Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England at 109. 
Perka v. R(1984) 13 DLR (4*^) 1 at 14 (emphasis added). 
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Further, in London Borough of Southwark v. Williams^^ Lord Denning 
dealt another blow to the operation of the doctrine of necessity by his 
declaration that, "[njecessity would open a door which no man could 
shut...The plea would be an excuse for all sorts of wrongdoing. So the 
courts must, for the sake of law and order, take a firm stand."^^ Thus, for 
the judiciary, the operation of necessity is limited by the political and 
social implications of allowing such a defence to exist. This point can be 
seen in the following statement by Lord Denning noted in Buckoke: 
"A driver of a fire engine with ladders approaches the traffic lights. 
He sees 200 yards down the road a blazing house with a man at 
an upstairs window in extreme peril...At that moment the lights turn 
red...I suggested to both counsel that the driver might be excused 
in crossing the lights to save the man. He might have the defence 
of necessity. Both counsel denied it. They would not allow him 
any defence in law. The circumstances went to mitigation, they 
said, and did not take away his guilt. If counsel are correct - and I 
accept they are - nevertheless such a man should not be 
prosecuted. He should be congratulated."^^ 
Ironically, this excerpt highlights the drawback of denying a defence of 
necessity. By imposing criminal liability for such a breach of the letter of 
the law, appropriate conduct is actually discouraged and too much rests 
on the good sense of relevant authorities not to prosecute or to exercise 
sentencing discretion. But the prosecuting authorities cannot always be 
relied on to relax punishment to reflect the blameworthiness of the actor, 
as seen in the case of Kitson.^° Although there was no express ruling in 
that case that necessity could not have been pleaded, if the defence was 
generally available "it is surprising that it did not emerge in that case."^^ 
In the last two decades there has been increasing recognition of the role 
of necessity as a ground of exculpation and it is now accepted that the 
strictures placed on the defence by previous authorities are "not 
Southwark London Borough Council v. Williams [1971] 2 All ER 175. 
'^Ibid. at 179. 
^^Buckoke v. Greater London Cot/nc//[1971] 1 Ch 655 at 668. 
V. Kitson (1955) 39 Cr App R 66. 
Martin Wasik, 'A Case of Necessity?' [1984] Criminal Law Review 544 at 545. 
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conclusive of the matter."^^ Lord Goff authoritatively outlined three 
narrow categories of incident to which necessity has been held to apply. 
The final, and most relevant, group of cases^^ are those concerned with 
"action taken as a matter of necessity to assist another person without his 
consent."^" The judgment in Re F is grounded in this latter category, 
which is quite distinct from the other forms of circumstantial pressure in 
which a necessity defence has been invoked. In Re F^^ Lord Goff 
attempts to articulate the criteria required for this type of defence: 
"To fall within the principle, not only (1) must there be a necessity 
to act when it is not practicable to communicate with the assisted 
person, but also (2) the action taken must be such that a 
reasonable person would in all circumstances take, acting in the 
best interests of the assisted person." 
If the above criteria are fulfilled, interference with the person or property 
of the assisted adult is permitted and will not, therefore, be deemed 
unlawful. Analysis of the recent case law reveals growing appreciation of 
a more general defence of necessity, one which is not limited to its 
somewhat ad ^oc application in the older cases, which generally involved 
victimless crimes, or very minor intrusions on the rights of another, but 
which could even be extended to justify intentional k i l l i ng .A l though the 
defence can, in principle, be applied this broadly, necessity has only been 
explicitly recognised as a defence where there has been a significant 
intrusion on the rights of another in a medical context.^'^ In healthcare, 
^^Re A (Children: Conjoined Twins) [2000] 4 All ER 961. 
The first two include "cases of public necessity and cases of private necessity...the 
former [occurring] in the Great Fire of London in 1666. The latter cases occurred when 
a man interfered with another man's property in the public interest," see Re F (Mental 
Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1 at 74. Other instances of necessity will be 
addressed later in the thesis, see particularly sections 4.5.3 and 5.6.1. 
Lord Goff gives the example of "a man who seizes another and forcibly drags him 
from the path of an oncoming vehicle, thereby saving him from injury or even death, 
commits no wrong," in Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1 at 74. 
Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1. 
®^ Winnie Chan and Andrew P Simester, 'Duress, Necessity: How Many Defences?' 
(2005) 16 King's College Law Journal 121 at 122. The applicability of the necessity 
defence to murder is discussed in more detail in sections 4.5.3 and 5.6 below. 
Wilson, Criminal Law Doctrine and Theory at 247. Glazebrook submits that there are 
many instances of a 'concealed' necessity principle where defendants are exonerated 
on the basis that they chose the lesser of two evils although no explicit reference is 
made to the necessity defence. He cites the example of R v. Bourne [1938] 3 All ER 
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the necessity principle is used to deny the criminal responsibility of a 
doctor who administers invasive treatment to an incompetent or otherv^/ise 
incapacitated person, where that intervention would otherwise constitute 
an assault.^^ Indeed, necessity is relatively well-established as providing 
a defence to crimes involving serious intrusions where the interference is 
aimed at the preservation of the life, health or well-being of an 
incompetent person who is unable to decide their own best interests or 
w e l f a r e . I t is this manifestation of the necessity defence that forms the 
focal point of this chapter, but prior to any detailed consideration of the 
scope of the necessity principle in this particular context, it is important to 
establish the rationale of the defence in order to explain why it operates 
to exonerate a defendant. Such theoretical discussion is distinctly 
lacking, even where the defence has been accepted, perhaps because it 
evades easy classification. The discussion proceeds primarily with a 
general consideration of the difference between defences which are 
considered justificatory and those which are excusatory, a distinction 
which is adopted throughout the thesis as a means of providing moral 
clarity regarding the operation of the defences. 
615 where a doctor was found not guilty of any criminal offence for procuring an abortion 
on a fourteen year old rape victim as he was purportedly acting 'for the purpose of 
preserving the life of the mother'. See Peter R Glazebrook, The Necessity Plea in 
English Criminal Law' [1972] 30 Cambridge Law Journal 87. 
®^ Simon Gardner, 'Direct Action and the Defence of Necessity' [2005] Criminal Law 
Review 37^. 
The reluctance of the English legal system to acknowledge a defence of necessity has 
resulted in such cases being considered in terms of constructive consent but, as 
affirmed by Glanville Williams, in 'Necessity' [1978] Criminal Law Review 128 at 132, "it 
is a case not of consent but of necessity." Similarly, other commentators regard the 
implicit consent argument as a "fictitious" response to the problem of treating 
incompetent patients unable to consent to treatment, see John K Mason and Greame T 
Laurie, Mason & McCall Smith's Law and Medical Ethics 7'^ edition (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006) at 350-351. 
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3.3 Theoretical foundations of necessity 
3.3.1 The distinction between justification and excuse 
It is suggested in chapter two that a liberal philosophy which promotes 
the autonomy of individuals should only criminalise conduct which causes 
harm to another.^" Further, it is submitted that harm comprises a 
M/rongfu/violation of the rights pertaining to an individual. An interference 
with rights is not thought to be harmful if the defendant can offer a 
justification for their action. Hence, it may be possible to encroach on the 
rights of an innocent person without incurring criminal liability for the 
action, provided the infringement is permissible. It is also proposed that 
even where there has been a violation of rights, criminal responsibility 
may be avoided if the actor is not deserving of blame because s/he has a 
good excuse for their action. It is commonplace in criminal law theory to 
distinguish between the underlying nature of a defence as either 
justificatory or excusatory;'^^ indeed, some theorists /ns/snhatthe criminal 
law should categorise defences in this way.^^ Since a discussion of the 
classification could fill the pages of a thesis in its own right, the analysis 
offered here is inevitably limited to a synopsis of the principal 
ramifications of the distinction which are pertinent to the subsequent 
analysis. 
Justifications and excuses operate as substantive exculpatory defences 
which absolve an actor of criminal responsibility even though the 
^° For further discussion of the harm principle, see section 2.3.1 above. 
It must be noted that not all commentators subscribe to this mode of classifying 
defences. Colvin is particularly critical, claiming that criminal law would be better off 
without the distinction since labelling defences in this simplistic way does not do justice 
to the varying circumstances in which defences may arise, see Eric Colvin, 'Exculpatory 
Defences in Cnminal Law' (1990) 10 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 381 at 382 and 
385. 
This is a central theme within the work of prominent American criminal theorists, such 
as Paul H Robinson, 'Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis' (1982) 82 
Columbia Law Review 199 at 213-229 and George P Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law 
(Boston: Little Brown, 1978) at 552-568. English academics have also followed this 
approach, see Glanville Williams, 'The Theory of Excuses' [1982] Criminal Law Review 
732, and it is now the most common mode of classification in the theory of criminal law 
defences. 
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elements of an offence are made out. If a defendant successfully 
establishes a justification or excuse for their prima facie wrongdoing, they 
will be absolved of responsibility completely. But what separates a 
justification from an excuse? Justifications and excuses are completely 
distinct normative conceptions which serve to absolve the actor of 
criminal responsibility in very different ways. The distinction is 
appropriately captured by Fletcher: 
"...claims of justification concede that the definition of the offence 
is satisfied, but challenge whether the act is wrongful; claims of 
excuse concede that the act is wrongful, but seek to avoid the 
attribution of the act to the actor. A justification speaks as to 
rightness of an act; an excuse as to whether the actor is 
accountable for a concededly wrongful act."^^ 
It would appear, then, on this account that if a defendant claims a 
justification for intruding on the rights of an innocent person, they claim to 
have not acted wrongly at all; but if a defendant claims an excuse the 
action is concededly wrongful and thus ordinarily prohibited by the 
criminal law, but the actor has some good reason why they are not 
culpable. The substance of each of these claims is considered in greater 
detail below. 
3.3.1.1 Justifications 
It is universally accepted that justifications provide a much stronger form 
of exculpation than excuses, for they concern the rightness of the action 
itself. Hart described a justification as "something the law does not 
condemn or even welcomes."^'* If conduct is justified, the wrongness of 
Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law at 759. See also Miriam Gur-Arye, 'Should a 
Criminal Law Distinguish between Necessity as a Justification and Necessity as an 
Excuse?' (1986) 102 Law Quarterly Review 71. 
Hart, Punisliment and Responsibility at 13. But note, in an engaging study, Suzanne 
Uniacke argues that justified conduct is conduct that one has a 'right' to do in a particular 
situation. Rather than being 'congratulated' or 'welcomed', it is perhaps better 
categorised as conduct which is 'permissible'; see Uniacke, Permissible Killing at 26, 
and chapter 2 generally. 
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the action is denied; so although an actor may set back the interests of 
another, the action is outside the scope of criminalisation as the 
infringement is not w r o n g f u l . I t is submitted that: 
"In the context of justifications, a defence is allowed because the 
special circumstances in which the action (otherwise criminal) is 
performed make the action desirable,'^^ or at least permissible, 
from a social and moral point of view...The action is not wrongful, it 
is warranted."^'' 
A justification asserts that what the actor did is, all things considered, an 
acceptable thing to do. In the typical case of justification, the actor will 
have, on balance, normative reasons for their action and those guiding 
reasons explain why they acted prima facie in breach of the letter of the 
law. For instance, if a defendant is randomly and brutally attacked in an 
unprovoked incident, the circumstances justify her/his reaction in warding 
off the threat, and the defendant acts for those reasons by intruding on 
the (ordinarily) protected domain of the attacker. There is, however, 
some debate amongst academics as to whether justification defences are 
purely objective and concerned primarily with the defendant's act, or 
whether the defendant's belief is also significant in deciding whether the 
action should be justified. In other words, there is disagreement among 
theorists as to whether justifications are available where there are 
normative, or guiding, reasons for action, but these are not the reasons 
for which the defendant acts;''^ or conversely, where the defendant acts 
for what they believe to be good reasons, but where the guiding reasons 
for action do not actually exist because the actor's perception of the 
In other words, there is no violation of the rights of another, merely a permissible 
infringement; see section 2.3.1.3 for further discussion of this point. 
®^ In 1811 Mr. Purcell of County Cork was knighted for killing four burglars with a carving 
knife; see JW Cecil Turner, Kenny 's Outlines of Criminal Law, 19'^ edition (Cambridge; 
Cambridge University Press, 1966) at 141-143. 
Kugler, 'Necessity as a Justification in Re A (Children)' at 441. An example of a 
justification defence would be self-defence; the action is praiseworthy, or at least 
warranted, or permissible. 
Robinson is an advocate of this objective approach (also known as the 'deeds' theory) 
which suggests that if the deed produces a net social benefit, the action is justified 
irrespective of the reasons for which the defendant actually acted, see Paul H Robinson, 
'Competing Theories of Justification: Deeds v Reasons' in Harm and Culpability a\. 45. 
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circumstances is m is taken .A l though there is limited scope for detailed 
discussion of these issues here, the approach adopted in this thesis is 
that a justification is only available where there are guiding (or normative) 
reasons for action and these guiding reasons correspond with the actor's 
explanatory reasons for so acting.'*^ This assertion has important 
implications for issues considered later in the thesis, for instance, where 
the actor mistakenly believes they are about to be attacked, since there 
would be no justification for the action as there were no guiding reasons 
for it."*^  Since both guiding and explanatory reasons must coincide for the 
actor to rely on a justification defence, such a defendant would only be 
entitled to an excuse in the absence of justifying circumstances. The 
adoption of a subjective or objective approach to justification, or 
alternatively a hybrid model of defences which incorporates both guiding 
and explanatory reasons for action which is supported here, also has 
ramifications for the categorisation of excuses, which are considered in 
further detail below. 
3.3.1.2 Excuses 
It is widely accepted that an excuse is operative not to confer approval, 
but to deflect punishment or blame; but excuses manifest themselves in 
very distinct ways."*^ Some excuses state that the agent did not intend to 
perform the proscribed act; others concede that the action was intentional 
but simultaneously deny it was entirely voluntary; and in other cases the 
Christopher supports the subjective approach to justifications (also known as the 
'reasons theory') which would provide a justification for the defendant as long as they 
acted for good reasons, even if there was in fact no good reason to act, see Russell L 
Chnstopher, Unknowing Justification and the Logical Necessity of the Dadson Principle 
in Self-Defence' (1995) 15 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 229 and 'Mistake of Fact in 
the Objective Theory of Justification: Do Two Rights Make Two Wrongs Make Two 
Rights'?' (1994) 85 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 295. 
Gardner, Justification and Reasons' in Andrew P Simester and ATH Smith (eds.) 
Harm and Culpability {Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) at 121-122 at 105, 
*^  See section 4.3 3 below. Similarly if the defendant was unaware of the existence of 
circumstances which justified their action, and did not, therefore, act on the basis of 
those reasons, a justification defence is precluded. 
Further discussion on the rationale of excuses with particular reference to the defence 
of duress will follow in chapter five below, see section 5,3.3 in particular. 
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agent is either incapable of forming a criminal intent or lacks the capacity 
for full deliberation of the moral and legal issues i n v o l v e d . T h e 
availability of an excuse for criminal conduct signifies that: 
"...the action is morally and socially forbidden even in the special 
circumstances of the case, but because of a special characteristic 
of the actor or because of the special circumstances in which the 
action is performed, the actor is not morally culpable (or sufficiently 
morally culpable) for the wrongful conduct."'*'* 
In short, the presence of an excuse admits that the action constituted a 
wrongful violation of rights, but concedes that the actor is not 
blameworthy for some reason pertinent to tiie individual.'^^ Although 
some conditions typically classified as excuses, such as automatism, are 
intrinsically based on subjective reasons offered by the actor,"*^ 
uncertainty surrounds other defences often classified as excusatory, such 
as duress. As discussed further in chapter five, duress typically provides 
a defence to an actor who commits a crime when faced with serious 
threats to their own interests, or those of another with whom they have a 
connection. Yet if the crime undertaken is relatively minor in comparison 
with the interest spared, for instance if petty theft is committed to save the 
life of a family member threatened by a third party, there appears to be a 
Leading criminal law theorists have categorised these defences as excuses (Joshua 
Dressier, 'Reflecting on Excusing Wrong-Doers: Moral Theory, New Excuses and the 
Moral Penal Code' (1988) 19 Rutgers Law Journal 67^ at 682; George P Fletcher, 'The 
Individualisation of Excusing Conditions' (1974) 47 Southern California Law Review 
1269 at 1293; Paul H Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses (St. Paul Minnesota: West 
Publishing, 1984) at 118; Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and 
Excuse' (1984) 84 Columbia Law Review ^ 897 at 1915; and Sanford H Kadish, 
'Excusing Crime' (1987) 75 California Law Review 257 at 262), although others prefer to 
classify them as 'lack of capacity' defences, as distinct from excuses, see John Gardner, 
'Justification and Reasons'. Colvin uses the phrase defences of 'mental impairment' to 
separate those who fall outside the scope of criminal law altogether so do not need to 
rely on an excuse: see Colvin, 'Exculpatory Defences in Criminal Law' at 383. The 
merits of this approach are not strictly relevant to the present discussion, although it 
does seem intuitively more plausible for defences such as insanity and automatism to be 
categorised separately from the defences under consideration in this thesis. 
Kugler, 'Necessity as a Justification in Re A (Children)' at 441. 
''^ Horder refers to an excuse revealing some personal justification or agent-specific 
reason for action, see Horder, 'Self-Defence, Necessity and Duress' at 161-162. 
That is, assuming defences such as automatism are regarded as excuse defences at 
all, see footnote 43 above. 
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strong justificatory element to the defence.'''' However individual excuse 
defences are constructed, it is clear that excuses deny the criminal 
responsibility of the actor, despite the action being recognised as 
wrongful, because the psychological state of the defendant or the 
circumstances of compulsion when the crime was committed were such 
that it ruled out public condemnation and punishment."*^ 
3.3.1.3 Is the distinction important? 
The significance of this theoretical categorisation has been doubted by 
some commentators who consider that the distinction has no important 
connotations as both justification and excuse lead to a complete 
acquittal."*^ It is conceded that in practice acquittals are given with no 
mention of whether the defendant was excused or justified, so the public 
are unaware of the subtle distinction.^° It has also been suggested that 
the dividing line between justification and excuse is neither fixed nor 
definite and that reasonable people can disagree about where the 
boundaries should be d r a w n . T h e contention is that the distinction is 
pointless unless there is universal agreement regarding the 
categorisation of each defence. 
In response it is submitted here that the classification assumes great 
moral significance and helps us think carefully about the reasons why we 
It is submitted below in section 5.3.2 that despite the presence of strong justificatory 
circumstances, the reasons remain agent specific and therefore duress is an excuse 
defence which retains an element of objectivity in that the response to threats must be 
reasonable in the circumstances. 
Hart, Punishment and Responsibility at 13-14. 
This opinion has been voiced recently by Chris MV Clarkson, 'Necessary Action: A 
New Defence' [2004] Criminal Law Review 8^, in particular, at 85. See also Jerome 
Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law, 2"" edition (Indianapolis: New York, 1960) at 
228, and 'Comment on Justification and Excuse' (1976) 24 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 638; see also Mordechai Kremnitzer, 'Proportionality and the 
Psychotic Aggressor: Another View' (1983) 18 Israel Law Review ^78 at 196-199. 
See Colvin, 'Exculpatory Defences in Criminal Law'. A possible solution would be the 
express declaration of classification as an integral part of the verdict, clarifying whether 
or not such behaviour will be tolerated in future, see Robinson 'Criminal Law Defenses: 
A Systematic Analysis' at 247. 
Colvin, Ibid, at 384. 
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are prepared to deny the criminal responsibility of an actor.^^ There is 
unlikely ever to be universal agreement regarding any theoretical 
discussion, but that does not render philosophical analysis futile, in any 
case, it has been suggested that the distinction has some important 
practical consequences. For instance, it is claimed that sanctions of 
some kind, punitive or rehabilitative, may be attached to excuse forms of 
a defence but not to justificatory d e f e n c e s . T h e classification of conduct 
as justificatory or excusatory also has important implications for the rights 
of others, namely the victim and third parties. Where an act is justified, 
there is a corresponding duty not to resist the actor, since no two parties 
in any one conflict can be justified. The victim of an excused attack, say 
because the defendant mistakenly believed they were about to be 
attacked, may, however, permissibly resist such action. Perhaps more 
striking are the consequences for the rights of assistance of third parties. 
It is permissible for a third party to assist someone in performing a 
justified act; but a third party cannot justifiably assist an excused act.^"* 
Furthermore, it is suggested that justification defences may act as 
societal guides to acceptable behaviour,^^ in the sense that in a 
dilemmatic situation, an individual may rely on justification defences to 
illustrate the faultlessness of their action. Excuse defences do not 
convey an equivalent message, as excusable behaviour does not, in 
itself, denote a 'right way' to act.^^ Hence, the justification and excuse 
distinction is adopted here as a useful way of categorising the relevant 
defences in order to clarify our understanding of their moral substance. 
Further elaboration, and relevant application, of the justification and 
excuse doctrine will be offered at sections 3.3.2, 4.3 and 5.3 below when 
Hart, Punishment and Responsibility at 13. 
" For instance, if the defence of insanity is successfully invoked, the defendant may be 
subject to compulsory medical treatment as they are a continuing risk to the public and 
are at times incapable of co-operating with the criminal law (although this latter reason 
supports the assertion that insanity is a 'lack of capacity' defence rather than an 
excuse). 
Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law at 760; cf. Rodin, War and Self-Defense at 30-33. 
See Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, 3'" edition (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999) at 138; and Donald L Horowitz, 'Justification and Excuse in the 
Program of the Criminal Law' (1986) 49 Law and Contemporary Problems 109 at 112. 
However, excusable behaviour may operate as a negative guide to conduct, in that it 
may demonstrate, for example, that defenders should not utilise self-defensive force 
irrationally and should treat the accuracy of their beliefs with caution. 
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the theoretical underpinning of necessity, self-defence and duress is 
considered in more detail. 
Although it is generally accepted that action taken as a matter of 
necessity to assist another in the absence of their consent is not unlawful, 
there is limited discussion as to why this is so. If necessity provides a 
defence for an otherwise unlawful intrusion, does it operate as a 
justification for the interference or merely an excuse? The theoretical 
underpinning of necessity is seldom addressed, perhaps because it does 
not appear to have any unitary rationale.^'^ The residual nature of 
necessity and the lack of stringent conditions attached to the defence 
make it difficult to establish exactly when and why it denies criminal 
responsibility. It is suggested below that the defence provides a 
justification for what would otherwise be criminal action, and the precise 
nature of the justification, at least in relation to intervention in the best 
interests of the incompetent patient, is located in a rights-based theory. 
3.3.2 Necessity: justification or excuse? 
There is clearly a commixture of purpose within the necessity defence, 
which makes the underlying rationale variable. The theoretical 
underpinning of necessity is, however, an issue which may at least prove 
academically and morally significant, given that the reasons why we are 
prepared to excuse a defendant may be quite distinct from the 
corresponding reasons for justification.^^ As suggested in section 3.3.1.3 
above, defining the appropriate theoretical classification conveys an 
important message regarding the rightness or wrongness of the action. 
The justification / excuse categorisation does not, however, appear to 
As suggested by Simester and Sullivan Criminal Law: Doctrine and Theory at 716. 
Michael J Allen, Elliott & Wood's Cases and Materials on Criminal Law 8'^ edition 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2001) at 284. 
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have been applied to the necessity defence with any consistency;^^ it is 
treated as justificatory in some contexts and excusatory in others. The 
sub-division of the defence of necessity into one of excuse and one of 
justification is arguably necessary to reflect the preferences of society in 
cases where there are conflicting interests.^° 
In comparison to other manifestations of the necessity defence, however, 
the theoretical underpinning of the 'best interests' formulation is relatively 
uncomplicated. At first blush, the only conceivable rationale for denying 
liability for crimes that violate the personal interests of another in pursuit 
of their best interests must surely be justificatory. Interference with the 
rights of incompetent or otherwise unconscious patients in order to treat 
them appropriately is surely something to be tolerated if not p r a i s e d . I t 
is submitted here that for the necessity defence to absolve the actor of 
criminal responsibility, there must be an overriding reason for the 
intrusion on the rights of an innocent person. If a reason for acting is 
overriding it outweighs any countervailing reasons for not acting and 
creates what Horder calls a moral imperative to act.^^ 
3.3.3 Necessity as a justification 
The task of defining an appropriate theoretical underpinning of necessity 
is complicated by the fact that cases of necessity "do not always involve 
the same type of justification, with the same parameters and scope."^"^ 
Essentially there are two different streams of justification which could be 
applicable to the necessity defence: consequentialist or utilitarian 
®^ See the decision of Brooke LJ in Re A (Children), where the necessity doctrine was 
introduced in its excusatory form; contrasted with, for example, Kugler, 'Necessity as a 
Justification in Re A (Children)'. 
^° Exponents of this view include Fletcher, Rethinking Chminal Law at 774-798 and 885; 
and Albin Eser, 'Justification and Excuse' (1976) 24 American Journal of Comparative 
Law 621 at 634-637. 
To this end, cases involving intrusions against the person have a very strong affinity 
with self-defence cases, which are necessarily justificatory in nature. 
Horder, 'Self-Defence, Necessity and Duress; Understanding the Relationship' at 156. 
®^  Chan and Simester, 'Duress, Necessity: How Many Defences?' at 124. 
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justifications; and justifications deriving from the rights of the person 
concerned. Although there is limited guidance as to which type of 
justification applies when, the following sections will define an appropriate 
rationale for the necessity principle, focussing on the application of the 
defence in a medical context. 
3.3.3.1 Lesser evils justification 
Traditionally necessity is often grounded on utilitarian calculations, that is, 
the harm done is outweighed by the resultant good.^"* On the basis of a 
utilitarian rationale, necessity as a justification is frequently referred to as 
the 'lesser evils'^^ or 'choice of evils' defence.^^ If society expresses 
approval of the sacrifice of a legitimate interest that is of substantially 
lesser value than another interest, such conduct may be justified. 
According to Robinson, the "harm [to the victim's interests] is outweighed 
by the need to avoid an even greater harm or to further a greater societal 
interest;"®'' and on this view conduct which maximises social welfare 
should be permitted, if not positively encouraged. 
A defence of necessity based purely on utilitarian principles is, however, 
unsustainable since any account which focuses solely on the 
consequences of an action may justify conduct which is essentially 
immoral, such as the killing of one innocent person to save two. The 
utilitarian theory of necessity implies the subordination of individual rights 
in furtherance of the greater good,®^ with the result that there is no clear 
^ See Glanville Williams, 'The Defence of Necessity' (1953) Current Legal Problems 
216; Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law at 788-798; and Paul H Robinson, 'A Theory of 
Justification: Societal Harm as a Prerequisite for Criminal Liability' (1975) 23 University 
of California at Los Angeles Law Review 266. 
®^  Suzanne Uniacke, 'Was Mary's Death Murder?' (2001) 9 Medical Law Review 208 at 
215. 
Necessity in a 'lesser evils' form is recognised by the US Model Penal Code, section 
3.02 and the German Penal Code, section 34, and on the definition offered would justify 
the taking of an innocent life to achieve a net saving of life. 
®^  Robinson, 'Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis' at 213. 
®° Wilson, Criminal Law Doctrine and Theory at 249, who comments that a utilitarian 
approach is "capable of defeating rights without democratic accountability." 
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'law' of necessity with any discernable principles. In Per/ca, Wilson J 
submitted that any assessment "cannot entail a mere utilitarian 
calculation of, for example, lives saved and deaths avoided in the 
aggregate but must somehow attempt to come to grips with the nature of 
the rights and duties being assessed..."^^ Decisions regarding the 
appropriateness of the justification would have to be made on a case-by-
case basis. 
This lesser evils explanation of necessity has been fiercely rejected in the 
case of medical interventions,''^ and Wilson notes that there is certainly 
no reference in the cases to doctors having to make a choice between 
two evils.'^^ In cases where the concrete interests are vaguely 
comparable and the crimes are victimless, a lesser evils calculation may 
be satisfactory;'''^ but in cases where life and liberty is at stake the 
balancing of harms proves much more difficult and it appears that the 
lesser-evils evaluation cannot do all of the work. By intruding on the 
bodily integrity of an innocent incompetent patient, in contrast to other 
necessity cases covered later in the thesis which involve a conflict 
between the actor's interests and the victim's,'''' the doctor is not acting in 
her/his own interests at all. Hence it is strongly suggested that the 
utilitarian approach is not the correct basis for necessity at least in the 
context of the 'best interest' cases. 
Perka v. R (1984) 13 DLR (4'") 1 at 36. 
^° For a particularly insightful critique, see Brudner, 'A Theory of Necessity' at 342-344. 
As suggested by Simon Gardner, 'Necessity's Newest Inventions' (1991) 11 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 125 at 131, Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law, chapter 26; 
and is implicit in the work of Brudner, 'A Theory of Necessity' who rejects any 
manifestation of a utilitarian theory of necessity as a justification. 
Wilson, Criminal Law Doctrine and Theory at 253. 
" Simester and Sullivan make this point in relation to the example of the driver of a fire 
engine who speeds through a red light on the way to effect the rescue of a person 
trapped in a burning building. The lesser-evils calculus is compatible with such cases as 
there is no difficulty in distinguishing the relative value of a minor traffic offence and the 
value of life, and the offence does not impinge on the rights of another (i.e. the crime is 
victimless); see Simester and Sullivan Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine at 717. 
'^^  See section 4.5.3 and section 5.6. 
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3.3.3.2 Rights-based justification 
If the balance of harms test does not provide a plausible explanation of 
the necessity defence in the context of medical interventions, it is 
submitted here that the necessity justification is better understood as a 
vindication of rights. That is, necessity provides a defence where a 
defendant sets back the interests of an innocent person in order to secure 
a superior interest. Such a rights-based analysis seems to offer a "more 
robust analytical tool"''^ than the utilitarian explanation offered above. In 
Re F Lord Goff suggests that encroaching on the bodily integrity of the 
patient is justified only on the basis that it promotes or respects the rights 
of a patient. The calculation of whether the invasive treatment is justified 
is, after all, governed by an evaluation of the best interests of the 
p a t i e n t . A rights-based justification of necessity maintains that 
intervention is not justified if it is contrary to the known wishes of the 
competent patient; so although treatment may appear to be in the best 
physical interests of the patient, it does not show sufficient respect for the 
patient's right to autonomy. 
As suggested in section 2.3.1.3 above, central to our understanding that 
rights can be justifiably setback is the idea that rights are not absolute. 
Brudner suggests that rights can be overndden in circumstances where 
ordinarily a breach of that right would constitute an unlawful violation.^'' 
Rights are capable of being ordered because some are more dispensable 
to the moral agent than others. For instance, a right to property is 
necessarily subordinate to a right to personhood, as the more essential 
value must be preferred in any conflict. Bodily intrusions which would 
otherwise be unlawful may therefore be justified if such action vindicates 
a right which is superior to the interest protected by the law.^^ In other 
words, the action of a doctor treating a mentally incompetent patient 
without consent may be justified if that treatment saves the life of the 
Gardner, 'Direct Action and the Defence of Necessity' at 377. 
Per Lord Goff in Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1 at 74. 
" Brudner, 'A Theory of Necessity' at 360-361. 
Gardner, 'Direct Action and the Defence of Necessity' at 377. 
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individual, a right which is arguably more fundamental than the slavish 
protection of a right to bodily integrity. Although privacy, autonomy and 
physical integrity, for instance, are fiercely protected and would rank at 
the forefront of any hierarchy of the seriousness of harms, if the intrusion 
serves to enhance the living standard of the incompetent patient unable 
to consent and is, on balance, socially valuable to the actor and others, it 
is suitably exempt from criminal sanction. 
It seems, then, that an anti-consequentialist rights-based theory of 
justification provides the most plausible explanation of the necessity 
defence in the context of intervention taken against an incompetent 
patient in their own best interests. Even though certain rights may be 
subject to legitimate infringement, these rights are enduring and only the 
minimum level of intrusion to protect the more essential value will be 
tolerated. The right of necessity only arises where there is no available 
legal alternative and where the threat to agency is imminent. Absent 
these restrictions, which are considered further below, the violated right 
would seem to be yielding to the self-preference of the accused as 
opposed to some higher value. 
3.4 The conditions of necessity 
Any consideration of the restrictions on the operation of necessity is 
inevitably brief since the defence is not, unlike self-defence and duress, 
furnished with easily discernable rules and principles. As established 
above, the necessity defence can, in principle, be used to justify the 
commission of both victimless crimes, such as driving offences, and 
intrusions on minor property rights to protect, say, the right to life of 
another, if breaking the letter of the law is required to avert some greater 
harm. It is also argued in chapter four below, that the defence may very 
occasionally permit intrusions on the personal rights of an innocent 
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person in strictly limited circumstances.''^ However, since there is no 
singular rationale and the defence is often used as a residual device 
when no other defence is available, it is not governed by precisely 
defined rules. Williams insightfully commented that the "peculiarity of 
necessity as a doctrine of law is the difficulty or impossibility of 
formulating it with any approach to p rev is ion .None the less , an attempt 
will be made to illustrate some boundaries for the defence below. 
Stephen articulated the most authoritative definition of necessity in his 
Digest of Criminal Law,^^ and these rules were recently reiterated in Re A 
(Children: Conjoined Twins).^^ The success of a necessity plea is 
dependent on the satisfaction of three conditions: the act must be done to 
avoid inevitable and irreparable evil; no more should be done than is 
reasonably necessary; and the evil inflicted must not be disproportionate 
to that avoided. Taken literally, however, arguably these rules "would 
allow extreme invasions of the personal integrity of autonomous, non-
threatening persons whenever...welfare overall would be increased."^^ 
Suppose X is on his deathbed and urgently requires a blood transfusion; 
the hospital fail to locate an appropriate blood donor, given his very rare 
blood group, but another patient, Y, is found to be a perfect match. 
According to the rules articulated by Stephen and endorsed in Re A, the 
necessity defence may justify using force against Y to give blood in order 
to save X's life. Although, on a balance of interests, the right to life is 
arguably superior to the right to bodily integrity, it is universally agreed 
that this kind of rights violation of an innocent person should not be 
permitted by law. Without further guidance as to the precise ambit of the 
defence, this kind of intrusion remains, conceptually at least, permissible 
on the rules articulated here. It has been asserted that the ill-defined 
See section 4.5.3 below for further discussion of this point. 
®° Glanville Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part 2"" edition (London: Stevens & 
Sons, 1961) at 724. 
James Fitzjames Stephen, A Digest of the Criminal Law 4"" edition (London: John 
Murray, 1887) at 9. 
Per Brooke LJ in Re A (Children: Conjoined Twins) [2000] 4 All ER 961 at 1037-1038. 
Simester and Sullivan, Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine at 720. 
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scope of the defence, although regrettable, is perhaps unavoidable given 
that: 
"...the law of cases of necessity is not likely to be well-furnished 
with precise rules...[since]...necessity creates the law; it 
supersedes rules; and whatever is reasonable and just in such 
cases is likewise legal. It is not to be considered a matter of 
surprise, therefore, if much instituted rule is not to be found on 
such subjects."®'' 
It seems that the courts are reluctant to develop the necessity defence on 
anything other than a case-by-case basis, but this thesis will, in due 
course, attempt to provide a more principled approach to the wide-
ranging defence. For now, the discussion will focus on the application of 
the necessity principle where the victim's rights are infringed in their 'best 
interests', one of the few contexts in which it has been explicitly 
recognised. 
The English courts have, often controversially, utilised the necessity 
principle to defend non-consensual treatment including: caesarean 
section operations performed in spite of objections from the woman in 
labour; sterilisation operations on the mentally incapacitated for both 
therapeutic and non-therapeutic reasons; and detention of incompetent 
patients lacking the capacity to make decisions regarding such detention. 
The imposition of non-consensual treatment on innocent people strikes at 
the very core of individual autonomy but is often necessary to enhance 
the quality of life of the individual. The use of the necessity principle in 
this context thus raises many difficult issues. The courts are mindful of 
the fact that any deviation from the principle of self-determination is 
troublesome. This trepidation is acknowledged by the statement that, 
"We have too often seen freedom disappear in other countries not only by 
coups d'etat but by gradual erosion: and often it is the first step that 
counts. So it would be unwise to make even minor concessions."®^ 
Per Sir William Scott in The Gratitudine (1801) 165 ER 450 at 459. 
®^  Per Lord Reid in U / f M/[1972] AC 24 at 43. Indeed, the right to bodily integrity is 
included within the ambit of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
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Nonetheless, minor concessions have been made, and It is within this 
context that the necessity defence and its appllcabHlty to interventions In 
the best interests of Innocent persons will be examined. The discussion 
begins with an analysis of the primacy of a competent patient's right to 
make their own choices regarding medical care before proceeding to 
consider the more precarious position of the innocent patient incapable of 
giving consent to treatment where the principle of necessity plays a 
significant role. 
3.5 Intruding on the rights of a competent patient 
As expressed earlier in the thesis, self-determination lies at the heart of 
any democrat ic society: " . . . the power of self-direction as an embodied 
human being Is even more substantively condit ional of human worth and 
dignity than most of the political rights reputed to be basic In a liberal 
society."^^ It is a cornerstone of medical law that the right to bodily 
integrity and autonomy of the competent^' ' patient are paramount and the 
right to accept or refuse treatment which constitutes an interference with 
those hghts cannot be coerced. It is generally and universally accepted 
that, the human body is what separates the individual f rom the world and 
is therefore the primary object of each individual's autonomy.^^ This 
autonomy must be respected because It "encourages and protects 
people's general capacity to lead their lives out of a distinctive sense of 
their own character, a sense of what is important to and for them."^^ 
Indeed, respect for the competent patient's self-determination constitutes 
which secures a right to respect for private life, as decided by the European Court of 
Human Rights in X and Y v. Netherlands (1986) 8 EHRR 235 at paragraph 22. 
Beverley W Harrison, Our Right to Choose: Towards a New Ethic of Abortion (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1983)at 341. 
For a detailed discussion on the concept of competence, see Tom Buller, 
'Competence and Risk-Relativity' (2001) 15 Bioethics 93. See also section 3.6.1 below 
for further discussion on the meaning of incapacity. 
Laurence H Tribe, American Constitutional Law (Foundation Press, 1979) at 15-19. 
®^ Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion: An Argument about Abortion and Euthanasia 
(London: Harper Collins, 1993) at 224. 
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good medical practice^° and autonomous treatment choices are now 
implicitly protected by the Human Rights Act 1998. Al though the 
European Convent ion on Human Rights does not expressly preserve a 
right of self-determination, this notion is central to the other rights 
protected by it.^^ So the overarching ethos of the Convent ion is the 
primacy of autonomy. 
3.5.1 The primacy of patient autonomy 
Judicial recognition of the unreserved right of a competent adult to refuse 
medical treatment, even where his or her own life depends on it, 
demonstrates the real signif icance of individual autonomy in a liberal 
society. The courts acknowledge that the personal rights of a competent 
patient t rump any notion that medical intervention was 'necessary' f rom 
the doctor 's perspective. In Re F, discussed further below, Neill LJ 
declared that the right of a competent adult to refuse medical treatment 
existed "even where there are overwhelming medical reasons in favour of 
the treatment and probably even where if the treatment is not carried out 
the patient's life will be at risk."^^ A more robust commitment to patient 
autonomy was subsequently adopted by the House of Lords in the 
seminal case of Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland.^^ Lord Goff, in considering 
the issues surrounding the possible withholding of treatment of a victim of 
the Hil lsborough disaster who was in a persistent vegetat ive state, 
authoritatively stated: 
^° British Medical Association, Withholding and Withdrawing Life-prolonging Medical 
Treatment: Guidance for Decision Making 2"" edition (British Medical Association, 2001) 
at paragraph 9.1, which states, "It is well established in law and ethics that competent 
adults have the right to refuse any medical treatment, even if that refusal results in their 
death." 
Various rights contained in the European Convention on Human Rights may be 
relevant to patient autonomy, including, for instance, Article 5 (the right to liberty) and 
Article 8 (the right to respect for private and family life). See also Elizabeth Wicks, The 
Right to Refuse Medical Treatment under the European Convention on Human Rights' 
(2001) 9 Medical Law Review 17 at 17. 
Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1 at 29 (emphasis added). Note the 
typical reluctance of the judiciary to make any kind of commitment to principle when life 
and death decisions are at issue. 
®^ Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland [1993] AC 789. 
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"...it is established that the principle of self-determination requires 
that respect must be given to the wishes of the patient, so that, if 
an adult patient of sound mind refuses, however unreasonably, to 
consent to treatment or care by which his life would or might be 
prolonged, the doctors responsible for his care must give effect to 
his wishes, even though they do not consider it to be in his best 
interests to do so. . .To this extent, the principle of the sanctity of 
human life must yield to the principle of self-determination."^'* 
Further support for this view can be found in the words of Lord Mustill in 
that same case: 
"If the patient is capable of making a decision on whether to permit 
treatment and decides not to permit it his choice must be obeyed, 
even if on any objective view it is contrary to his best interests. A 
doctor has no right to proceed in the face of object ion, even if it is 
plain to all, including the patient, that adverse consequences and 
even death will or may ensue."^^ 
The priority of the principle of patient self-determination and autonomy 
was also expressed in Re 7^^, a case involving undue influence being 
placed upon a patient to deny a blood transfusion on religious grounds. 
Butler-Sloss LJ declared: 
"A man or woman of full age and sound understanding may 
choose to reject medical advice and medical or surgical t reatment 
either partially or in its entirety. A decision to refuse medical 
treatment by a patient capable of making the decision does not 
have to be sensible, rational or well-considered."^' ' 
It seems appropriate to acknowledge at this juncture that al though patient 
autonomy should be encouraged, greater rationality and deliberation by 
patients should equally be promoted. As one commentator notes, "[n]ot 
to make the effort to promote rational, critical deliberation is to risk a very 
Per Lord Goff in Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland [1993] AC 789 at 864. 
Per Lord Mustill in Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland [1993] AC 789 at 891. This opinion is 
further validated in the speech of Lord Browne-Wilkinson at 882-884. 
Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1993] Fam 95, discussed in greater detail 
below. 
Indeed, the remaining judges in the Court of Appeal (Lord Donaldson MR and 
Staughton LJ) expressed similar support for the fundamental principle of patient 
autonomy. 
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contemporary form of patient abandonment: abandonment of human 
rationality."^^ Great care should be taken to ensure that competent 
patients make considered decisions regarding medical treatment. To this 
end, a degree of paternalism appears justif iable in order to guard against 
excessively individualistic considerations, but only insofar as the 
intervention encourages an informed competent decision and does not 
interfere with patient autonomy. In support of this approach, Glick has 
submitted that: 
"it is high t ime that the pendulum which has swung f rom 
overbearing, autocratic and insensitive paternal ism to an often 
cruel and dangerous autonomy, be al lowed to swing back to a 
more moderate and sensible balance between autonomy and 
beneficence."^^ 
Nonetheless, al though doctors may do all that they can to persuade a 
patient to undergo a particular course of treatment, ult imately a patient 
with the requisite capacity has, and indeed should have, the final word 
regarding any potential invasions of their bodily integrity. Despite judicial 
adherence to the view advanced in this thesis that the rights of 
autonomous patients should not be interfered with even for the patient's 
own good, the fol lowing discussion suggests that occasional ly the 
primacy of patient autonomy is di luted. 
3.5.2 Undermining patient autonomy? 
Whilst the law in relation to the refusal of invasive treatment of a 
competent adult appears to be relatively sett led, dispensing with the non-
consensual treatment of mentally competent patients without further 
consideration ignores other serious issues arising f rom specific cases. 
The courts have somet imes permitted one possible exception to the 
98 
Julian Savulescu & Richard W Momeyer, 'Should Informed Consent be based upon 
Rational Beliefs?' (1997) 23 Journal of Medical Ethics 282 at 287. 
®^  Sharon Glick, The Morality of Coercion' (2000) 26 Journal of Medical Ettilcs 393 at 
393. 
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primacy of patient autonomy, as respect for the treatment decisions of 
one particular group of competent adults has not been steadfast: 
pregnant women who refuse caesarean section operations. In these 
cases, the f reedom to make valid treatment decisions appears almost 
illusory, as often women are legally compel led to undergo surgery as it is 
necessary in order to save the foetus. 
When caesarean sections are forced upon a woman because the 
potential life of a foetus is at risk the intrusion on the woman 's body raises 
important issues regarding individual autonomy and the rights and status 
of a viable foetus. In such a conflict it is clear that the courts will be faced 
with a "novel problem of considerable legal and ethical complexity."^°° 
The di lemma is concisely articulated as fol lows: "[i]f human life is sacred, 
why is a mother entitled to refuse to undergo treatment if this would 
preserve the life of the foetus without damaging her own?"^°^ This 
suggests that when deciding the necessity of intervention the courts must 
balance the right to bodily integrity of the woman with the "unborn child's 
right to live" and the "state's compell ing interest in preserving the life of 
the f o e t u s . W h e n life (or more accurately, potential life) is at stake the 
justif ications for unwanted medical intervention are particularly powerful 
as the right to life is a unique and fundamental right, and therefore, 
according to Kadish, "society must place a high value on preserving it."^""^ 
However, if the right to life of the foetus were to be deemed paramount, 
assuming that the foetus could even claim a right to life in the first 
instance, this would undermine to the point of extinction the principle of 
Acknowledged by Lord Donaldson in Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) 
[1993] Fam 95 at 102 In this case, T, a pregnant patient of 34 weeks gestation was 
admitted to hospital following a road accident. When alone in a hospital room with her 
mother (a Jehovah's Witness) she had stated that she did not wish to have a blood 
transfusion, despite the fact that she was not a member of that faith. The child was 
stillborn and the patient's condition rapidly deteriorated; she was sedated and given 
artificial ventilation. Her father applied to the court for a declaration that the hospital 
could administer a blood transfusion in the absence of her consent. The declaration was 
granted. 
St. George s Healtficare NHS Trust v. S [1998] 3 WLR 936 at 953. 
As articulated in the US case Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital Authority 5 
247 Ga 86(1981). 
Sanford H Kadish, Respect for Life and Regard for Rights in the Criminal Law' 
(1976) 64 California Law Review 871 at 871. 
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autonomy and the fundamental right to self-determination of the 
m o t h e r . T h e overriding principle, it fol lows, should be that of self-
determinat ion; the individual has the fundamenta l right to decide what 
shall be done with their own body. In practice, however, a very different 
picture emerges. 
In recent years, one of the most controversial cases involving an intrusion 
on the protected interests of a pregnant woman was the decision of Re 
S,^°^ In which the High Court authorised a caesarean section operation to 
be lawfully performed despite the contrary wishes of the competent 
patient and her h u s b a n d . S i r Stephen Brown, the presiding judge, was 
mindful of the urgency of the declaration^"' ' and his decision was 
undoubtedly, and perhaps somewhat inevitably, coloured by the 'life and 
death'^°^ situation with which the court was presented. By the t ime the 
hospital was notif ied of the decision, however, the foetus had died in 
utero. At first glance, this decision is arguably inconsistent with Article 8 
of the European Convent ion on Human Rights as it constitutes a serious 
interference with the right to respect for private life.^°^ Such interference 
can only be justif ied by necessity If the patient is incapable of giving or 
refusing consent; but this Issue was not raised In Re S . " ° The troubling 
Implication Is that the necessity defence could somet imes be used to 
justify an Intrusion on the rights of a competent patient. Sir Stephen 
Brown P sought to rely primarily on the US authority of Re AC to support 
This view was supported in the US case of McFall v. Shrimp 127 Pitts LJ 14 (1978) in 
which Flaherty J stressed, "[fjor our law to compel the defendant to submit to an 
intrusion of his body would change every concept and principle upon which our society 
is founded. To do so would defeat the sanctity of the individual..." 
Re S (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1992] 3 WLR 806. 
The couple were described as 'born again Christians' and had thereby refused 
consent to the operation on religious grounds. 
The High Court hearing took less than an hour. 
Re S (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1992] 3 WLR 806 at 807. It was 
stressed within the judgment that without the performance of a caesarean section there 
was a grave risk that the woman's uterus would rupture, which resulted in a potentially 
fatal risk to both the woman and the foetus. 
Wicks, 'The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment Under the European Convention on 
Human Rights' at 24. It is important to note, however, that at the time of the decision the 
Human Rights Act 1998 was not yet in force. 
" ° Re S is not an isolated example of such a decision. See also Tameside and Glossop 
Acute Sen/ices Trust v. CH [1996] 1 FLR 762 and Norfolk and Norwich Healthcare NHS 
Trust V. M/[1996]2 FLR613. 
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his d e c i s i o n . F u r t h e r examinat ion of an earlier Amer ican authority 
involving a forced caesarean section might also shed light on the Re S 
decision. 
Re AC was preceded by the case of Je/fersoA?"^, the only other reported 
example of a caesarean operation being forced on a competent woman in 
the United S t a t e s . ^ I n Jefferson, a caesarean section was thought to be 
medically necessary as the woman was suffering f rom placenta previa, a 
condit ion which resulted in a 99 per cent chance of the foetus dying and 
around a 50 per cent chance of the patient dying. Despite this prognosis, 
the woman decl ined a caesarean section and refused a blood transfusion 
on religious grounds. The Court performed what it v iewed as a balancing 
act between respect for the defendant 's liberty and the "state's duty to 
protect a living, unborn human being from meeting his or her death before 
being given the opportunity to live."^^" The fol lowing conclusion was 
reached; 
" . . .we weighed the right of the mother to practise her religion and 
to refuse surgery on herself, against the unborn child's right to live. 
W e found in favor [sic] of the child's right to l i ve . " "^ 
Hence the obstetrical intervention was declared necessary to protect the 
child's rights at the subordination of the m o t h e r ' s . ^ T h e Court used 
emotive l a n g u a g e ^ a n d , contrary to the earlier stance taken in the 
landmark case of Roe v. IVade , " ^ appeared to treat the foetus as a moral 
Re AC 573 A 2d 1235 (1990). 
Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital 247 Ga 86 (1981). 112 
Although there are purportedly many other unreported examples, see Veronica EB 
Kolder, Janet Gallagher and Michael T Parsons, 'Court Ordered Obstetrical 
Interventions' (1987) 316 New England Journal of Medicine 1192. 
Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital 247 Ga 86 (1981) at 88. 
''^Ibid. 
In the event, the mother gave birth by natural means and there was ultimately no 
requirement for a caesarean section operation; nonetheless the judgment had wider 
implications in the realm of medical intervention. 
The foetus was referred to at various stages as a 'child'; a 'viable unborn child'; an 
'unborn human being'; and an 'unborn child'. 
Roe V. Wade 34 93 S Ct 705 (1973). Further analysis of the legal status of the foetus 
in American law can be found in Janet Gallagher, 'Prenatal Invasions and Interventions: 
What's Wrong With Fetal Rights?' (1987) 10 Harvard Women's Law Journal 9 at 40-41. 
74 
and legal individual with rights worthy of balancing against those of the 
mother. 
In the subsequent case of Re /AC^^^, Angela Carder became pregnant at 
the age of 28. She had cancer since chi ldhood, and in her 26'^ week of 
pregnancy, the cancer attacked her lungs. The Medical Centre at which 
she was residing sought an emergency order to perform a caesarean 
section in an attempt to save the foetus, in light of the fact that Miss 
Carder was already dest ined for death. Despite the contrary wishes of 
the patient, her partner and her doctors, an order that the operat ion would 
be lawful as it was necessary on a balance of interests, was granted 
expedit iously. Angela Carder died two days after the operat ion and the 
foetus proved not to be viable. On appeal, the District of Columbia Court 
of Appeals initially approved the decision of the lower court, assert ing that 
"the trial judge did not err in his subordinating >AC's right against bodily 
intrusion to the interests of the unborn c h i l d . T h i s opinion was justif ied 
by the Court on the grounds that AC only had a couple of days to live 
irrespective of the operation, despite the fact that the decision meant that 
she "lost the last two days of her life, and her right to a dignif ied death, as 
she was forced to undergo major surgery for the benefit of an unviable 
fetus [s/c]."^^^ In response to fierce crit icism, the Court reheard the case 
and years later subsequently overruled the decision finally acknowledging 
that setting back the interests of a competent person against their wishes 
could not be justif ied by the necessity p r i n c i p l e . H o w e v e r , a potentially 
significant caveat was inserted; that if there were 'truly extraordinary and 
compell ing reasons', the court may be permitted to override the wishes of 
the competent p a t i e n t . I t is submitted here that no such truly 
compell ing reasons exist if the autonomy of the patient is to be respected. 
Re AC 533 A 2d 611 (1987). After much criticism of the decision, the case was 
subsequently reconsidered in Re AC 573 A 2d 1235 (1990). 
Per Nebeker AJ in Re AC 533 A 2d 611 (1987) (DC Ct App). 
Michael Thomson, 'After Re S' (1994) 2 Medical Law Review 127 at 136. 
Re AC 573 A 2d 1235 (1990) at 1252. 
Ibid 
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On closer investigation. Re AC is an authority which eventual ly concluded 
that any invasive treatment on the body of a competent patient against 
their wishes is indefensible, even if without it the foetus will die. The 
ultimate ruling in Re yAC is, in fact, seen as a something of a landmark 
decision in the United States, "marking the conclusion of a decade of 
judicially sanct ioned obstetrical intervention."^^"* The US authority does 
not seem to support or validate the declaration made in Re S. 
Consequently, returning to the decision in Re S, it appears to be based 
on somewhat dubious authority^^^ and runs counter to settled common 
law precepts which dictate that competent individuals can legitimately 
exercise the right to refuse medical treatment and that any intrusion on 
their interests is unlawful and cannot be justif ied on the grounds that it 
was necessary. The judgment also contradicts another settled principle 
of English law; that the foetus has no legal personality and does not 
acquire legal rights until it exists as a live child, "that is to say breathing 
and living by reason of its breathing through its own lungs alone, without 
deriving any of its living to power to live by or through any connect ion with 
its mother."^^^ In Re MB^'^\ it was declared, albeit obiter, that: 
" . . . the foetus up to the moment of birth does not have any 
separate interests capable of being taken into account when a 
court has to consider an application for a declarat ion in respect of 
a Caesarean section operat ion. The court does not have the 
jurisdiction to declare that such medical intervention is lawful to 
protect the interests of the unborn child even at the point of 
birth."^2« 
This statement appears to reflect the general consensus in English 
common law that the foetus does not acquire individual rights until it can 
Ibid, at 128. This decade of judicial intervention began with the decision of the 
Supreme Court of Georgia in Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital 247 Ga 86 
^1981). 
Indeed, the decision appears to have more in common with the equally dubious 
judgment in Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital 247 Ga 86 (1981). 
Ranee v. Mid-Downs Health Authority [1991] 1 QB 587 at 621. 
Re MB (Adult: Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FCR 541, in which the Court of Appeal 
ruled that it would be unlawful to require a caesarean section operation against the 
wishes of a competent patient. 
Re MB (Adult: Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FCR 541 at 561, per Butler-Sloss. 
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sustain an independent existence from the mother.^^^ Similarly, 
numerous statutory provisions declare the primacy of the mother 's rights 
over that of the f o e t u s , a n assertion which is also supported by the Law 
Commission.^"^^ In light of these declarations, any non-consensual 
performance of a caesarean section would arguably ignore the basic 
components of a competent woman's fundamental human rights, 
including the right to bodily integrity, equality, privacy and dignity.^"'^ 
The controversy surrounding the Re S decision split academic opinion 
regarding the future of English law. On the one hand, some 
commentators anticipated that Sir Stephen Brown's judgment signalled a 
move "towards greater recognition of the foetus as a legal person;"^^"^ 
whilst others dismissed the reasoning on the basis that it was "so fatally 
f lawed, it could not survive the scrutiny of the House of Lords."^^"^ The 
latter prediction proved accurate. The emergence of foetal rights as a 
means of justifying medical intervention on the grounds of r ights-based 
necessity in the case of competent patients would diminish the 
This point was highlighted more recently in Attorney General's Reference (No.3 of 
1994) [1997] 3 All ER 936, a case which considered the potential liability for murder of a 
registered medical practitioner who performed a lawful abortion (i.e. within the provisions 
of the Abortion Act 1967), but where the foetus was born alive and subsequently died 
from injury inflicted in the womb. This case was preceded by numerous similar 
judgments, such as Paton v. British Pregnancy Advisory Service Trustees [1979] 1 QB 
276 in which Baker P declared that "the foetus cannot, in English law...have a right on 
its own at least until it is born and has a separate existence from its mother"; see also 
Paton V. UK (1980) 3 EHRR 408; B v. Islington Health ;^ivf/?or/fy [1991] 1 QB 638, where 
Potts J claimed at 647 that the foetus is "undefined in law and without status"; and Re F 
(in utero) [1988] 2 All ER 193, a case involving an unsuccessful attempt by a local 
authority to make a foetus a ward of court. 
The Abortion Act 1967, section 1(1)(b) provides that a pregnancy may be lawfully 
terminated if it is "necessary to prevent grave permanent injury to the physical or mental 
health of the pregnant woman." Similarly, the Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 
1976 governs the right to sue for disabilities inflicted in utero. Such rights only accrue 
once the foetus has independent existence from the mother, and are derivative in that 
liability to a child depends on a pre-existing liability to a parent. 
See Law Commission, Report on Injuries to the Unborn Child (Law Com No 60) 
(London: HMSO, 1974) which stated at paragraph 32 that "legislation should deal with 
the rights of the living person and no rights should be given to the foetus." 
McLachlin J in Supreme Court of Canada in Winnipeg Child and Family Services 
(Northwest Area) v. G [1997] 2 SCR 925, declared that, "any intervention to further the 
foetus's interests would necessarily implicate, and possibly conflict with, the mother's 
interests." 
Thomson, 'After Re S' at 132. 
Katherine De Gama, 'A Brave New World? Rights Discourse and the Politics of 
Reproductive Autonomy' in Anne Bottomley and Joanne Conaghan (eds.) Feminist 
Theory and Legal Strategy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993) 114 at 122. 
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signif icance of the concept of bodily integrity and consequently allow the 
infr ingement of fundamental rights. For this reason, the competent 
pregnant woman's rights must take priority and, after Re S, English law 
retreated from travelling any further down the road of recognit ion of the 
foetus as a 'person'. 
In Sf. George's Healthcare NHS Trust v. S^^^ a woman in the latter stages 
of labour was advised to have a caesarean section operat ion, without 
which her life and that of her unborn child were in serious danger. 
Want ing a natural delivery, the woman consequently refused the 
operation and she was compulsori ly admitted to hospital under section 2 
of the Mental Health Act 1983, for assessment. In the meant ime the 
hospital authorit ies obtained an ex parte declarat ion permitt ing them to 
carry out the operat ion as it was necessary to vindicate the rights of the 
mother, despite the absence of her consent and the treatment was 
carried out accordingly. The Court of Appeal later conf irmed that the 
court order should never have been granted, as the competent woman 's 
right to bodily integrity was paramount in the eyes of the law. Since the 
woman was competent throughout, her autonomous decision, though it 
may have appeared irrational to many,^^^ should have been respected by 
doctors regardless of the fact that it may have resulted in her death or the 
death of her unborn child: 
"When human life is at stake the pressure to provide an aff irmative 
answer authorising unwarranted medical intervention is very 
powerful . Nevertheless, the autonomy of each individual requires 
continuing protection even, perhaps particularly, when the motive 
for interfering with it is readily understandable, and indeed to many 
would appear commendable." 
St. George's Healthcare NHS Trust v. S [1998] 3 WLR 936. 135 
On this point, Lord Donaldson MR, Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95 
at 102, declared "[t]his right of choice is not limited to decisions which others might 
regard as sensible. It exists notwithstanding that the reasons for making the choice are 
rational, irrational, unknown or even non-existent." This reflected the general opinion 
voiced in an earlier case, Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital 
and the Maudsley Hospital [1985] AC 871 at 904-905. 
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The Court of Appeal 's judgment In St. George's NHS Trust v. S 
represents the current state of the law and demonstrates a firm 
commitment to patient autonomy as the foundat ion of all decisions. If 
non-consensual t reatment is administered to a competent person there is 
consequently no applicable defence of necessity to justi fy the intrusion. It 
has been noted that: "[t jhe entire judgment. . . Is permeated by the theme 
of patient autonomy and the obligation of a free society to guard that 
autonomy f rom erosion."^^'' 
This would seem an appropriate place to end the discussion of the 
competent patient; but one final Issue must be addressed. Despite 
admirable declarations of the supremacy of patient autonomy by the 
courts, It is interesting to note that the operat ion had already been carried 
out in S^. George's NHS Trust v. S by the t ime the Court of Appeal 
declared It unlawful. It could be argued that al though in principle patient 
autonomy Is the fundamental consideration and the courts hold the 
common law right of a competent patient to refuse medical t reatment in 
high esteem in practice the reality is often quite different. The courts are 
somet imes will ing to declare the pregnant women In similar cases 
incompetent \.o make the decisions in quest ion, and thereby proceed with 
operat ions deemed to be necessary in the best interests of the 
incompetent p a t i e n t . T h e r e Is general recognit ion that the English 
courts and the medical professions have a tendency to treat women in 
labour, for instance, as incompetent to exercise a reasoned choice, and 
this is r e g r e t t a b l e . I f the patient disagrees with the belief of the 
clinician, there is a real risk that "assessments about a patient's 
competence can be muddied by disagreements over the relative value of 
deep-seated b e l i e f s . T h i s has led to suggest ions that the persistent 
137 
Rebecca Bailey-Harris, 'Pregnancy, Autonomy and Refusal of Medical Treatment' 
(1998) 114 Law Quarterly Review 550. 
As in Re MB (Adult: Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FCR 541. 
Wicks, 'The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment Under the European Convention on 
Human Rights' at 27-28: see also Ian Kennedy, Treat Me Right: Essays in Medical Law 
and Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991) at 337. 
" ° Heather Draper, 'Anorexia Nervosa and Respecting a Refusal of Life-Prolonging 
Therapy. A Limited Justification' (2000) 14 Bioethics 120 at 130; see also Heather 
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assert ion of patient autonomy by the courts is "more apparent than 
real."^"*^ The European Court of Human Rights have, however, 
highlighted that the Convent ion "is intended to guarantee not rights that 
are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective."^"^ 
Therefore the courts must proceed with caution, to avoid the danger that 
medical practit ioners will perceive an irrational or i l l -considered refusal to 
consent as a manifestat ion of the patient's incompetence.^'*^ 
When faced with life and death d i lemmas, in practice it seems that the 
courts are not always so eager to rigidly adhere to the principle of self-
determinat ion. It is imperative that the English courts achieve a degree of 
clarity regarding the issue of non-consensual medical treatment because 
such cases are especially t roublesome. As Wicks argues: 
"If the law is that an individual may refuse consent to any t reatment 
even if it will cause her death (and the death of an unborn child), 
this rule must be applied even when judges are under the pressure 
of an ex parte application. If the rule is not applied when lives are 
at stake, it is not a rule at all."^'*'* 
Even if, hypothetically speaking, it was to become legally permissible on 
the grounds of necessity to subject a pregnant woman of sane mind to 
undergo any such operation in the interests of the foetus, it is surely in 
any case "not for the judiciary to extend the law."^"*^ Should such a power 
be extended, it is for Parl iament to stipulate the boundaries of that 
control, al though this suggestion is strongly refuted here as the autonomy 
Draper, 'Women, Reproductive Responsibilities and Forced Caesareans' (1996) 22 
Journal of Medical Ethics 327 at 327-328. 
Michael Wright, 'Medical Treatment: The Right to Refuse' (1993) 3 Journal of Social 
Welfare and Family Law 204. 
'"^ Airey v. /re/and (1979-1980) 2 EHRR 305 at paragraph 24, cited in Rosamund Scott, 
Rights, Duties and the Body: Law and Ethics of the Maternal-Fetal Conflict (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2002) at 231. 
'^'^  This note of caution is exercised by DJ Harris, Michael O'Boyie and Colin Warbrick, 
Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (London: Butterworths, 1998) at 337-
338. 
Wicks, 'The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment Under the European Convention on 
Human Rights' at 30. 
'"^ Per Balcombe LJ in Re F (in utero) [1988] Fam 122 at 143. 
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of a competent person should not be overr idden. Since this opportunity 
has not been taken, the law seems fairly settled on this matter. 
In summary, the cornerstone principle is that a competent adult can 
refuse any invasion of their bodily integrity even if the decision appears ill-
considered to the objective observer. No intervention can be justif ied on 
the basis that it is necessary in the best interests of the patient where that 
patient has the capacity to govern his/her own life and to determine what 
happens to his/her body. One important qualif ication to this fundamenta l 
notion of autonomy and self-determination is the case of pregnant 
women , where the life of the patient or that of the foetus are at risk unless 
a caesarean section operation is performed. It has been suggested that 
in forced caesarean cases, "the clinicians and the courts have been more 
inf luenced by the perceived risky consequences than the principles of 
respect for autonomy."^''^ Al though the courts assert the pr imacy of 
autonomy when faced with such di lemmas, this principle is not always 
borne out in practice, and this section il lustrates examples of women 
being compel led to undergo treatment against their wil l . This compuls ion 
is, it seems, in some cases, based on the inadequate assumpt ion that the 
foetus enjoys rights which somet imes outweigh those of the mother, and 
in others on the views that pregnant women in the throes of labour could 
not possibly be competent to make treatment decisions.^'*'' These 
assert ions are contrary to the generally accepted view of the maternal / 
foetal conflict and judges should be mindful of the fol lowing submission: 
"For our law to compel the [competent] defendant to submit to an 
intrusion of his body would change every concept and principle 
upon which our society is founded. To do so would defeat the 
sanctity of the individual, and would impose a rule which would 
know no limits, and one could not imagine where the line would be 
drawn."^ '^ 
Sameer Sarkar and Gwen Adshead, 'Treatment over Objection: Minds, Bodies and 
Beneficence' (2002) Journal of Mental Health Law 105 at 112. 
'"^ In Rochdale Healthcare NHS Trust v. C [1997] 1 FCR 274, Johnson J declared the 
pregnant patient to be incompetent as she was "in the throes of labour with all that is 
involved in terms of pain and emotional stress." 
Per Judge Flaherty in McFall v. Shrimp 127 Pitts. LJ 14 (1978). 
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Although not a domestic authority, the sent iments should resonate 
equally in English law whenever non-consensual t reatment of competent 
patients arises and the defence of necessity should not be extended to 
justify such rights invasions. True to the liberal spirit of this thesis, the 
competent patient should not be subjected to invasion which encroaches 
upon privacy and autonomy, physical i n t e g r i t y , o r wh ich causes 
humiliation or results in degrading treatment.^^° These intrusions 
inevitably affect the quality of life of the patient and constitute a form of 
harm which is, taking into account the extent of the harm weighed against 
the social utility of the conduct and the consequences of imposing liability, 
serious enough to warrant the imposit ion of criminal sanct ion. 
3.6 Intruding on the rights of an inco/npefenf patient 
In the case of a competent patient, consent or refusal to undergo medical 
treatment is, in principle at least, conclusive; the status in law of an 
incompetent patient is, however, more uncertain. This is because the 
philosophical notion of autonomy is dependent on having the capacity 
and authority to govern oneself.^^^ Consent has no role to play in the 
treatment of the adult incompetent because the patient is necessari ly 
incapable of offering valid consent, or dissent for that matter, and 
exercising autonomy. In the case of incapacitated innocent persons, 
benef icence is staking a claim for priority, leading to the possibil ity of 
paternalistic decision m a k i n g . A s Murphy acknowledges, incapacitated 
patients are: 
'"^ Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights protects the right to respect 
for private life, and this encompasses a right to privacy and a right to bodily integrity. It 
was held in X v. Austria that "compulsory medical intervention, even if it is of minor 
importance, must be considered as an interference with this right", see X v. Austria 
11980) 18 DR 154 at 156, cited in Wicks, Human Rights and Healthcare at 93. 
^° Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights prohibits degrading 
treatment. 
Sarkar and Adshead, Treatment over Objection: Minds, Bodies and Beneficence' at 
107-108. 
As suggested in Wicks, Human Rights and Healthcare at 92-93. 
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". . .a class of persons who will never be in a posit ion where it could 
reasonably be claimed that their destinies ought to be determined 
by their own choices and decisions, so if there are rights here, they 
will for the most part be rights to a certain kind of paternalist ic 
protection."^^^ 
The incompetent patient retains some basic human rights^^" but they may 
also have a right to receive treatment, and not to have the maintenance 
of their health and well-being o v e r l o o k e d . I n short, an incapacitated, 
incompetent patient or a patient who is permanently unable to 
c o m m u n i c a t e ^ c a n be treated without consent, as any intrusion upon 
the bodily integrity of that patient may be justified (i.e. may fall outside the 
remit of the criminal law) by virtue of the common law doctr ine that the 
treatment was necessary in the patient's 'best interests'. An 
understanding of the notion of 'competence' or 'capacity' is therefore 
critical before any analysis of the scope of the necessity principle can be 
undertaken. 
3.6.1 Defining incapacity 
The importance of establishing competence cannot be underest imated as 
the necessity defence is inapplicable to intrusions on the right of 
competent persons which constitute a wrongful violation of rights. The 
signif icance of capacity Is captured by the following statement: 
"Competence is a pivotal concept in decision making about 
medical treatment. Competent patient's decisions about accepting 
Murphy, 'Rights and Borderline Cases' at 238. 
As identified in Wicks, Human Rights and Healthcare at 93. This suggestion may be 
refuted by some commentators. Jeffrie Murphy refers to incompetent patients as: 
"individuals who have some of the features normally found in individuals who are clearly 
right-bearers, but who do not seem to have quite enough of such features to make us 
confident in ascribing rights to them. They are of such a nature ...that they lack certain 
features (such as the power of rational choice) normally found in rights-bearers." See 
Murphy, 'Rights and Bordertine Cases' at 230. 
If a person agrees to medical treatment, but their choice was not free and informed, 
as in the case of an incompetent patient, then the criminal law is right to protect them. 
According to Duff, "such 'soft paternalism' is fully consistent both with liberalism and the 
Harm Principle", see Duff, 'Harms and Wrongs' at 33. 
Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1 at 71-77. 
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or rejecting proposed treatment are respected. Incompetent 
patients' choices, on the other hand, are put to one side, and 
alternative mechanisms for deciding about their care are sought. 
Thus, enjoyment of one of the most fundamental rights of a free 
society - the right to determine what shall be done to one's body -
turns on the possession of those characteristics that we view as 
constituting decision-making competent."^ 
The right to make autonomous choices is not so potent when the patient 
is deemed to be incapable of giving valid consent to intrusions on their 
protected interests. Treatment may be justifiably administered if it is 
necessary in the patients interests but the intervener must, however, be 
mindful of the fundamental rights of the patient, and accord with 
"acceptable principles and values, which will involve the use of a 
substituted judgement test by preference or, in the alternative, a 'best 
interests' test."^^^ 
It is interesting to note that in some of the most significant authorities on 
the issue of medical intervention performed on the incompetent patient, 
there is little discussion as to whether the patients at the centre of the 
cases were actually able to make the treatment decision for themselves, 
and incapacity is often incorrectly a s s u m e d . T h e leading English 
authority on the issue of capacity is Re C,^^° a case involving a 68 year 
old paranoid schizophrenic who refused a leg amputation despite an 85% 
chance he would die without it. Despite the fact that C was clearly 
mentally ill, Thorpe J declared that he "understood and retained the 
relevant treatment information, that in his own way he believes it, and that 
Thomas Grisso and Paul S Appelbaum, Assessing Competence to Consent to 
Treatment: A Guide to Pltysicians and Ottier Health Officials (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1998) at 1. 
Michael Gunn, The Meaning of Incapacity' (1994) 2 Medical Law Review 8 at 8. 
See for example Re F (A l^ental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1; r v. 7 [1988] 1 
All ER 613; and Re SG (Adult Mental Patient: Abortion) [1991] 2 FLR 329. This point is 
emphasised by Gunn, The Meaning of Incapacity' (1994) at 9. 
Re C (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1994] 1 WLR 290. The Re C capacity 
test was subsequently endorsed by the Court of Appeal in Re MB (Adult: Medical 
Treatment) [1997] 2 FCR 541 and forms the basis of the statutory test for incapacity 
expounded in the Mental Capacity Act 2005. Although generally approved by the 
judiciary and Parliament, it has been suggested that Re C "does contain a iew 
ambiguities", see Emily Jackson, Medical Law: Text, Cases & Materials (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006) at 199. 
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in the same fashion he has arrived at a clear choice."^^^ The judgment 
confirms that even though a patient may be suffering from a mental 
illness this does not preclude an ability to make important life and death 
decisions^^^, and that mental illness and mental incompetence are not 
necessarily synonymous. The Law Commission has also been keen to 
stress that patients should be "enabled and encouraged to take for 
themselves those decisions which they are able to take."^®^ Further, 
leading academic Kennedy has stated, the only valid criterion of capacity 
is the ability of the individual to understand the nature and consequences 
of the proposed p r o c e d u r e . W h e n deciding whether an adult patient 
retains the capacity to make a treatment decision the emphasis appears 
to be placed upon the decision-making process undertaken by the 
individual and whether the minimum threshold of ability has been 
achieved. 
In response to criticisms directed at the existing law relating to 
incompetent patients and their treatment, Parliament launched a period of 
consultation, culminating in the passing of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 
(hereafter MCA 2005). The Act does not radically alter the common law 
position in relation to determining the meaning of 'capacity' and is clearly 
underpinned by Thorpe's criteria in Re C. According to the statute, in 
order to assess the capacity of a patient it must be established that the 
patient is suffering from "an impairment of, or a disturbance in the 
Per Thorpe LJ in Re C (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1994] 1 WLR 290 at 
295. Thorpe endorsed the view of an expert witness in the case, a Dr Eastman, who 
suggested a tripartite analysis of the process: (1) comprehending and retaining 
treatment information; (2) believing it; and (3) weighing it in the balance to arrive at 
choice. 
See also Re JT (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1998] 1 FLR 48, where a 
woman with severe learning and behavioural difficulties was judged to have the 
necessary capacity to make a meaningful decision regarding dialysis; and Secretary of 
State for the Home Department v. Robb [1995] 1 All ER 677, where a prisoner with a 
personality disorder was deemed to be competent to refuse consent to be force-fed. 
Law Commission, Mentally Incapacitated Adults and Decision-Making: A New 
Jurisdiction (Law Com CP No 128) (London: HMSO, 1993) at paragraph 1.9. 
Ian Kennedy, Treat Me Right (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988) at 57-58. 
See Jackson, Medical Law: Text, Cases & Materials at 193. For an empirical study 
into the scope and application of the concept of capacity, see also Michael Gunn ef a/., 
'Decision-Making Capacity' (1999) 7 Medical Law Review 269. 
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functioning of, the mind or brain."^^^ Once this is determined, it must be 
ascertained whether or not the patient is able to make decisions for 
her/himself. The assessment of capacity detailed in section 3(1) of the 
Act is essentially an enactment of the common law test in Re C, and it is 
emphasised that patients should be individually assessed in the context 
of the decision being made. No assumptions are to be made regarding a 
person's capacity^^'' and seemingly irrational decisions are not 
necessarily demonstrative of an inherent lack of capacity. 
Although codification of the common law principles may be welcomed, 
the Act does not significantly resolve any of the outstanding problems. It 
remains extremely difficult to determine the capacity or otherwise of a 
patient, as the question is essentially one of degree. Capacity is thus an 
"extremely slippery concept."^^^ Gunn suggests: 
"Capacity / incapacity are not concepts with clear a priori 
boundaries. They appear on a continuum which ranges from full 
capacity at one end to full incapacity at the other end. There are, 
therefore, degrees of capacity. The challenge is to choose the 
right level to set as the gateway to decision-making and respect for 
persons and autonomy."^''° 
Although the line between capacity and incapacity can be extremely 
difficult to draw, what is clear is that once a patient is declared 
incompetent to consent to medical treatment, certain bodily invasions 
may be justified by necessity provided they vindicate some superior right 
of the patient. It is unfortunate, then, that the concept of capacity is 
shrouded in ambiguity.^''^ In the following discussion, it is acknowledged 
Mental Capacity Act 2005, section 2(1). According to the Code of Practice issued in 
April 2007, a wide variety of conditions will be covered, including the effects of a head 
injury, for example, alongside the obvious inclusion of categories such as mental illness. 
Section 1(2) declares that '[a] person must be assumed to have capacity unless it is 
established that he lacks capacity.' 
Section 1(4) confirms the common law approach that '[a] person is not to be treated 
as unable to make a decision merely because he makes an unwise decision.' 
Peter Bartlett, The Test of Compulsion in Mental Health Law: Capacity, Therapeutic 
Benefit and Dangerousness as Possible Criteria' (2003) 11 Medical Law Review 326 at 
341. 
Gunn, The Meaning of Incapacity' at 14. 
Wicks, Human Rights and Healthcare at 72. 
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that people may be incapacitated in different circumstances, each 
requiring slightly different considerations. Patients who are temporarily 
incapacitated in circumstances of emergency and incompetent adults 
requiring non-emergency treatment will be considered separately below. 
3.6.2 Emergency treatment of incapacitated persons 
One clear and relatively uncontroversial limitation to the exercise of the 
right to bodily integrity is emergency medical treatment performed on 
incapacitated subjects. '^'^  There is little dispute that a patient admitted to 
an accident and emergency department following, for instance, a serious 
road accident should receive medical treatment despite the fact that they 
may be in no position to give or to refuse consent to treatment due to 
their injuries. But the doctor in such cases has little time to ponder the 
choices available in that moment; "[s]he must act in the best interests of 
his patient, as [s]he sees them, but [s]he can be more readily forgiven if 
[s]he errs in [her/]his judgement."^''^ So, the norm that prohibits the 
violation of bodily integrity without consent is not absolute, as emergency 
medical treatment administered to temporarily incapacitated subjects is 
justified by the doctrine of necessity. The necessity principle thus 
absolves the doctor of any liability for bodily intrusions against an 
otherwise competent adult: "in cases of emergency where the patient is 
unconscious, and where it is necessary to operate before consent can be 
ob ta ined . " ^Th is principle of necessity may also justify treatment in the 
case of a different sort of emergency where, for instance, a patient is 
unconscious during surgery and a doctor discovers a serious condition 
which may result in grievous harm or even death if the doctor does not 
act i m m e d i a t e l y . T h e r e is little dispute that such action will be lawful by 
The other most obvious exception to the rule is that which allows for the "exigencies 
of everyday life," per Goff L J in CO///A?S V. Wilcock [1984] 3 All ER 374. 
Per Lord Donaldson in Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1 at 17. 
PerCardozo J in Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital 105 NE 92 (1914) at 
93. 
An example offered in Jackson, Medical Law: Text, Cases & Materials at 195. In 
Williamson v. East London & City Health Authority [1998] Lloyd's Rep Med 6, a 
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virtue of the common law necessity justification, providing, of course, that 
is more than merely inconvenient to wait until the patient regains 
consciousness and is able to make a decision for him/herself.^^^ 
So, in either type of emergency situation, where a patient is physically 
incapable of giving consent to any invasion of his/her bodily integrity, a 
doctor could lawfully proceed with any necessary intrusion. This prima 
facie interference with the patient's autonomy is not incompatible with 
liberal ideals because in such a situation, the doctor is not overriding the 
patient's self-chosen preferences. The patient's wishes for shaping 
his/her own life are not known, so the doctor proceeds on a safe 
assumption that the patient would consent to treatment if in a position to 
do so. The emergency circumstances therefore justify the invasion of 
bodily integrity and, all things considered,^'''' there will be no wrongful 
violation of human rights. If, however, it is known that the patient would 
have refused treatment if conscious, then liberals robustly affirm the 
primacy of autonomy and demand that the treatment be withheld, even if 
the result is fatal The Law Commission acknowledge that "[m]ost people 
may think that this is not in [the patient's] best interests, but it is the only 
way to respect his autonomy."^''^ This position is supported here. 
3.6.3 Non-emergency treatment of incapacitated persons 
The position of the incompetent patient in cases where the circumstances 
are not those coloured by emergency is somewhat less settled. As 
indicated above, it is more generally accepted that in emergency 
mastectomy performed by a surgeon whilst the patient was unconscious during an 
operation for the replacement of a breast implant was thought to be merely convenient 
rather than necessary. It follows that consent should therefore have been sought prior 
to the invasion, see Wicks, Human Rights and Healthcare at 95. 
Jackson, Medical Law: Text, Cases & Materials at 195. 
^ " Although such intervention may prima facie violate rights of privacy, personal 
autonomy, bodily integrity and freedom from degrading treatment, the quality of life of 
the patient will be significantly enhanced by the intrusion and the social utility and value 
of the conduct will place it outside of the scope of criminal intervention. 
Roberts, Appendix C, Consent and Offences against the Person paragraph C48 at 
260. 
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circumstances one can act on behalf of another without the consent of 
that person, but in Re F Lord Goff made it clear that, "the principle is one 
of necessity, not of emergency."^''^ It appears that far more is required by 
law of a doctor where deliberation is a luxury. Once incompetence has 
been established and it is clear that the patient is incapable of offering 
valid consent and thus incapable of exercising autonomy, intrusions may 
be justified on the common law principle of necessity, with careful 
consideration given to what constitutes the 'best interests' of the patient. 
3.6.3.1 Treatment in the patient's 'best interests' 
The defining criterion for any invasive treatment administered to an 
incompetent adult is that it must be necessary in the patient's 'best 
interests'. But, the calculation of best interests is not altogether clear^®° 
since there are tremendous conflicting medical, social and human rights 
considerations at play.^ ®^ In the other forms of necessity, duress, or self-
defence for that matter which involve conflicting interests, a 'best 
interests' calculus would be an excluded consideration^^^ but in the case 
of medical intervention to protect the health and welfare of the 
incompetent person, it seems to be the only consideration. 
In Re F, Lord Neill contended that an operation would only be deemed 
necessary if the "general body of medical opinion in the particular 
speciality would consider [it] to be in the best interests of the patient in 
order to maintain the health and to secure the well-being of the 
In Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1 Lord Goff stated at 75, 
"[e]mergency is however not the criterion or even a pre-requisite; it is simply a frequent 
origin of the necessity which impels intervention." 
Ian Kennedy & Andrew Grubb, Principles of Medical Law 2"" edition (Oxford. Oxford 
University Press, 2004) at 275. 
A point emphasised by Lord Steyn in R v. Bournewood Community and Mental 
Health NHS Trust ex parte L [1998) 3 All ER 289 at 493. 
Despite attempts by Ward LJ in Re A to justify the separation operation with 
reference to self-defence, which he claimed involved considering the best interests of 
the children, see Re A (Children: Conjoined Twins) [2000] 4 All ER 961. Chan and 
Simester, 'Duress, Necessity: How Many Defences?' at 129 cite the following example, 
"where P attacks D when D has only one hour to live and P is healthy. D is still entitled, 
if necessary, to kill P in self-defence." 
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patient."^^"^ Lord Goff confirmed this approach in the House of Lords, 
claiming that doctors, "must act in accordance with a responsible and 
competent body of relevant professional opinion, on the principles set 
down in So/am."'^" Essentially, on Lord Neill's synopsis of the Bolam 
test: 
"one cannot expect unanimity but it should be possible to say of an 
operation which is necessaty in the relevant sense that it would be 
unreasonable in the opinion of most experts in the field not to 
make the operation available to the patient. One must consider 
the alternatives to an operation and the dangers or disadvantages 
to which the patient may be exposed if no action is taken. The 
question becomes: what action does the patient's health and 
welfare require?"^^^ 
This declaration was further qualified by Butler-Sloss, who stated in 
recognition of the pressure of such circumstances that a decision as to 
what constitutes the best interests of a patient: 
"...ought not to be left entirely to the decision of family and the 
medical profession alone. Public policy requires that there should 
be imposed the supervision of the courts in so important and 
delicate a decision."^^^ 
Butler-Sloss has more recently emphasised the view that the Bolam test 
does not decisively establish whether treatment is in the best interests of 
the patient, and it is now beyond doubt that the principle of best interests 
"extends beyond the considerations set out \n...Bolam,"^^^ to include 
broader considerations of social, ethical and moral significance. Indeed, 
it is apparent in a number of cases that best interests not only include the 
patient's clinical needs, but also the broader social and psychological 
183 
184 
185 
186 
Per Lord Neill in Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1 at 32. 
Per Lord Goff Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1 at 78. 
Per Lord Neill in Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1 at 32. 
Per Butler-Sloss LJ Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1 at 42. Judicial 
sanction is also necessary in other junsdictions: for instance, in the United States (see In 
re Grady 426 A 2d 467 (1981)); Canada (see In re K (1985) 19 DLR (4") 255); and 
Australia (see Re Jane (unreported) 22 December 1988). Indeed, the dangers of 
leaving the evaluation of best interests to the immediate carers are emphasised in Re D 
(A minor) (Sterilisation) [1976] 1 Ail ER 326. 
Re S (Adult Patient: Sterilisation) [2001] Fam 15 at 28. 
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r e q u i r e m e n t s . T h e r e is also significant academic support for this 
interpretation of the best interests test, McLean highlighting the deficiency 
of the So/am test in that it is "designed to judge the competence of a 
medical procedure - it is not designed to test its lav\^ulness."^^^ The 
rejection of Bolam as decisive on the issue of best interests represents a 
more favourable approach since it demands that judges choose the best 
possible option for the individual patient, rather than treatment being 
administered purely because it is deemed acceptable to a body of 
responsible and competent medical opinion. On this approach, deciding 
best interests involves a genuine reconciliation between the incompetent 
patient's rights and the security of that patient's w e l f a r e . A l t h o u g h the 
inherently vague 'best interests' test is retained as the yardstick of 
appropriate medical intervention, the move away from the Bolam test in 
isolation represents a welcome step in the right direction. 
An important question still remains. How do the courts ultimately decide 
what is in the individual patient's best interests when that patient is 
unable to communicate their wishes due to incompetence?^^^ Authority 
on this issue is, at best, vague and the courts have, on occasion, 
explicitly refused to articulate any general legal principle which might 
direct difficult decisions in the determination of best interests. It has been 
declared that: 
'°° For further discussion, see Re W (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1993] 1 FLR 381; Re 
HG (Specific Issue: Sterilisation) [1993] 1 FLR 587; Re A (Medical Treatment: Male 
Sterilisation) [2000] 1 FLR 549. Indeed in a Practice Note issued in 2001, it was 
suggested that the calculation of best interests "will incorporate broader ethical, social, 
moral and welfare considerations [and the] emotional, psychological and social benefit to 
the patient," see Practice Note (Official Solicitor Declaratory Proceedings: Medical and 
Welfare Decisions for Adults who Lack Capacity) [2000] 2 FLR 158. 
Sheila McLean, Old Law, New Medicine (London: Pandora, 1999) at 100. See also 
Peter Bartlett, 'A Matter of Necessity? Enforced Treatment under the Mental Health Act' 
2007) 15 Medical Law Review 86 at 95. 
This point is emphasised by Wicks, Human Rights and Healthcare at 100. 
Wicks, 'The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment Under the European Convention on 
Human Rights' at 35-36. 
The courts cannot consent to the medical treatment of an incompetent patient since 
the Crown lost its prerogative power as parens patriae under the Mental Health Act 
1959; they can merely declare that a procedure is in the patient's best interests are thus 
lawful. 
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"By transforming a 'complex moral and social question' into a 
question of fact, the best interests approach leaves that court in 
the hands of 'experts' who assemble a dossier of fact and opinion 
on matters which they deem relevant without reference to any 
check-list of legal requirements."^^"^ 
It seems that the question to be posed in such cases is, what course of 
action will promote the true welfare and interests of the patient?^^"* Lord 
Brandon in Re F claims that an operation will be in the best interests of a 
patient "if, but only if, it is carried out in order either to save lives, or to 
ensure improvement or prevent deterioration in their physical and mental 
health."^^^ According to Kennedy and Grubb, invasive treatment can 
sometimes be necessary to promote a patient's best interests even 
though it is not therapeutically necessary,^^^ carries some medical risks 
or, perhaps, no medical benefit,^^'' and the primary purpose of the 
procedure is to further some interest of a third p a r t y . I n accordance 
with the general principles underpinning this thesis, such a claim must be 
strongly contested since the only way in which the invasion of the 
patient's right to bodily integrity can be justified is on the basis that it 
protects tlieir own interests. Subjecting an innocent, incompetent patient 
to the trauma, pain, discomfort and risk of, for instance, a bone marrow 
transplant for the benefit of another and which has no therapeutic benefit 
to the individual seriously undermines the patient's rights and should not 
be tolerated in a liberal society. 
Per Brennan J in Secrefary. Department of Health and Community Services v JWB 
and SMB (1992) 175 CLR 218 at 270 and 272-273. 
194 — 
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Per Lord Donaldson in Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1 at 18. 
Per Lord Brandon in Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1 at 55. 
Kennedy and Grubb, Principles of Medical Law at 278-279. For instance, Re F 
involved the non-therapeutic sterilisation of an incompetent female; see section 3.6.4.2 
below for further discussion of the case. 
See Re J (Specific Issue Orders: Muslim Upbringing and Circumcision) [2000] 2 FLR 
678 in which the perceived religious benefits to ritual circumcision of male children 
arguably outweighed the absence of medical benefit and the potential risks involved in 
such an operation. The courts will not, however, permit invasive treatment which is 
cruel, excessive, involves any sort of mutilation or is "socially obnoxious", per Scarman 
LJ in Re T (Minors) (Custody: Religious Upbringing) (1981) 2 FLR 239 at 244. 
See Re Y (Mental Patient: Bone Marrow Donation) [1997] Fam 110: this controversial 
decision is discussed in greater detail in section 3.6.4.1 below. 
Wicks, Human Rights and Healthcare at 102. 
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The assessment of the patient's own views when competent appear to 
constitute an important consideration in a number of judgments and there 
is support for the view that "the patient's best interests would normally 
also include having respect paid to what seems most likely to have been 
his own views on the subject."^°° This approach is common in America 
(where it is known as the substituted judgement test), but one of the 
major criticisms of this interpretation is the difficulty of ascertaining the 
subjective viewpoint of the patient.^°^ For this reason English courts 
favour an objective best interests test,^°^ which takes into account certain 
handicaps of the individual patient.^°"' Even where a patient has never 
been able to communicate their wishes due to a permanent incapacity, 
the personality, views and beliefs of the patient may still play a 
fundamental role in the best interests ana l ys i s .Pa r l i amen t intervened 
in an attempt to elucidate the meaning of best interests with the passing 
of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, which dictates that any decision made 
on behalf of the incapacitated subject must be made in a way which least 
restricts that person's rights and freedoms of a c t i o n . T h i s is simply a 
restatement of the common law position, although there is some 
elaboration on the meaning of 'best interests' in section 4, which includes: 
consideration of the likelihood that the patient will regain capacity and the 
ability to make the decision for himself;^°^ acknowledging the patient's 
past and present beliefs, values and feelings, and any written statement 
to that effect;^"'' and taking into account the views of any potentially 
relevant parties to the decision-making process. 
Per Hoffmann LJ in Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland [1993] AC 789 at 827-828 
A point emphasised by Catherine Elliott, 'Patients doubtfully capable or incapable of 
consent' in Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer (eds.) A Companion to Bioethics (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1998) at 452-462 and particularly 458. 
At least as far as questions of physical and bodily welfare are concerned. With 
regard to the patient's property and affairs, the court does, in fact, apply a substituted 
judgement test which seeks to do that "which the actual patient, acting reasonably, 
would have [done] if notionally restored to full mental capacity, memory and foresight;" 
per Megarry VC in Re D(J) [1982] Ch 237 at 244. 
See Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medicai Treatment) [1991] Fam 33 at 44 and 46-47. 
See Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1993] Fam 95 at 103. 
See the Mental Capacity Act 2005 section 1(5) and 1(6). 
Mental Capacity Act 2005 section 4(3). 
Mental Capacity Act 2005 section 4(6). 
Detailed in the Mental Capacity Act 2005 section 4(7). Somewhat controversially, 
sections 24 and 25 of the Act also make provision for the competent patient to make an 
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In summary, the best interests test appears to be a sensible mechanism 
for safeguarding the rights and interests of incompetent patients, whether 
in emergency or non-emergency s i t ua t i ons .A l t hough there is little 
certainty surrounding the scope of the best interests test, the concept 
appears to include the patient's psychological health and well-being, and 
quality of life; ethical, moral, spiritual and religious welfare; relationship 
with carers (parents or otherwise); financial interests; ties of affection; and 
moral and civic o b l i g a t i o n s . I n order for the intrusion to be justified on 
the basis of the necessity principle, the advantage of any proposed 
treatment which may encroach on the protected interests of the individual 
must outweigh the potential detriment. The balancing exercise performed 
by the courts is, however, fraught with difficulty, and there have been 
persistent calls for the issues to be dealt with "in a more structured and 
proactive way, rather than leaving it to ad hoc pronouncements by courts 
adopting the vague rhetoric of best interests."^^^ It is submitted here that 
the test may be successfully retained, but only if greater consideration is 
given to the basic rights pertaining to each individual. As argued above, 
certain core rights to, for instance, bodily integrity and autonomy, the right 
to life and freedom from degrading treatment, are retained by 
incompetent patients, yet there appears to have been a general judicial 
reluctance to acknowledge their significance. The degree of intrusion on 
these protected rights and interests must be explicitly addressed and 
weighed against the effect it has on the patient's quality of life and the 
overall social utility of the invasion. The discussion will now turn to 
consider some particularly contentious applications of the best interests 
test by considering three specific examples of intervention: intrusions to 
facilitate the donation of a regenerative organ; intrusions involving non-
advance directive which sets out prior instruction for treatment in the event of 
incapacitation. For a critical discussion on the challenges presented by advance 
directives, see Alasdair R Maclean, 'Advance Directives, Future Selves and Decision-
Making' (2006) 14 Medical Law Review 291. 
Wicks, Human Rights and Healthcare at 106. 
Ideas taken from Kennedy and Grubb, Principles of Medical Law at 280-281. 
Marie Fox and Jean McHaie, 'in Whose Best Interests?' (1996) 60 Modern Law 
Review 700 at 709. 
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therapeutic sterilisations; and intervention to detain an incompetent 
patient. 
3.6.4 Specific examples of necessary intrusions on the rights of 
incapacitated persons 
The reported cases involving necessary interventions in the best interests 
of innocent people are many and varied, but some particularly 
controversial examples of the best interests principle have been selected 
for further consideration here. The analysis outlines the extent to which 
the courts are prepared to invoke the necessity justification to prevent 
criminal responsibility for infringements on the rights of innocent 
incompetent persons. A number of contentious applications of the 
broadly construed best interests test will be considered, including cases 
in which the interests of a third party are served by the intervention, cases 
where the intervention was not necessary to preserve the health of the 
patient, and others where a patient has been detained by virtue of the 
common law doctrine of necessity. 
3.6.4.1 Necessity and organ donation 
The donation of regenerative organs (or of other tissue or bodily fluid) 
inevitably involves invasive medical treatment which encroaches on the 
autonomy of the p a t i e n t . P e r f o r m i n g a donation operation on an 
incompetent patient will therefore only be lawful if it is justified on the 
basis that it is necessary in the 'best interests' of the patient. If it cannot 
be shown that the inter^/ention was in the patient's best interests, it will 
constitute a wrongful violation of rights which could, in principle, entail 
criminal conviction. 
It is highly doubtful whether the donation of a non-regenerative organ could ever 
satisfy the best interests test; see John K Mason and Greame T Laurie, Mason & McCall 
Smith 's Law and Medical Ethics 6"" edition (London: Butterworths, 2002) at 428-429. 
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It was suggested above that the best interests test appears to include, 
amongst other things, considerations relating to the patient's 
psychological health and well-being, and quality of life. Controversially, 
and it is suggested here, wrongly, this construction of the best interests 
test has permitted invasive treatment for the perceived benefit of a third 
party. One of the most striking examples of the broad interpretation of 
the best interests test is provided by the case of Re Y.^^'^ In this case, it 
was held to be in the best interests of a severely mentally and physically 
incapacitated patient to act as a bone marrow donor to her sister who 
was seriously ill. Despite the fact that there was clearly no medical 
benefit to be derived from this operation for the patient herself, the 
procedure was deemed to be necessary for her emotional, psychological 
and social benefit. Although emphasising that the concept of best 
interests relates wholly to the interests of the incompetent patient, the 
courts appear to have been tempted to find that invasive treatment that 
benefits a third party rather than the patient directly is, in fact, in the 
patient's best interests where it enhances the emotional and 
psychological welfare of the patient. Although there were obvious 
benefits for the potential recipient of the donated bone-marrow, the court 
acknowledged that this is "not relevant unless, as a result of the [donor] 
helping the [recipient] in that way, the best interests of the [donor] are 
served."^^^ The restoration of physical and mental health to both Y's 
sister and mother respectively, coupled with the fact that the patient did 
not object to the donation and the relatively low risks attached to this 
surgery were clearly fundamental factors in the judgment. Mindful of the 
potential of the decision to cause controversy, the court was careful to 
emphasise that "[i]t is doubtful that this case would act as a useful 
precedent in cases where the surgery involved is more intrusive [than in 
the instant case]."^^^ 
Re Y (Mental Patient: Bone Marrow Donation) [1997] Fam 110. 
Per Connell J in Re V (Mental Patient: Bone Marrow Donation) [1997] Fam 110 at 
113 (emphasis added). 
Ibid, at 116. 
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Aside from this case, there is limited English authority on the issue of 
organ donation operations being permitted on the grounds of necessity. 
It appears that in Re V some American authority was relied upon to 
support the decision that although performance of a medical operation 
without consent is prima facie unlawful, the prohibitory norm can be 
overridden in cases where the operation can be justified as necessary on 
the basis of a broadly construed best interests test.^^^ That this case was 
confined to its own facts does not mask the blatant intrusion on protected 
human rights and the detrimental effect this invasive surgery may have 
had on the innocent patient. Although the best interests test has the 
potential advantage of enhancing a patient's right to beneficial medical 
treatment, it appears that "there remains the possibility of treatment being 
imposed which is not therapeutically necessary"^^'^ and which therefore 
may breach, for instance, Article 3 of the ECHR, which prohibits torture 
and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, or Article 8, which 
secures the right to respect for a private life. It is submitted here that if 
more overt balancing acts were carried out by the courts with express 
reference to the significance of certain basic human rights, troubling 
decisions such as Re V would no longer slip through the judicial net. 
3.6.4.2 Necessity and non-therapeutic sterilisation 
The necessity principle has been recognised as a justification for the 
sterilisation of an incompetent patient in their best interests. The features 
of an operation of this nature mean that it is a similar to the donation of a 
non-regenerative organ in that both involve the removal of an undamaged 
and naturally present organ in the body which is functioning normally. A 
sterilisation operation is, in most instances, irreversible and potentially 
impinges most significantly on two fundamental human and personal 
See, for example, Strunk v. Strunl<A45 SW 2d 145 (1969) where the Court 
authorised the donation of a kidney by an incompetent patient on the basis that it was 
necessary in the patient's best interests. 
Wicks, 'The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment Under the European Convention on 
Human Rights' at 24. 
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rights. The first is, in general terms, a right to self-determination, which is 
essentially enshrined by the more concrete right to respect for private life 
secured by Article 8 of the Convention, and is also promoted by the 
general ethos, which is the enhancement of autonomy. The second is 
the right of reproductive autonomy, which finds its legal force in Article 12 
of the Convention, which protects a right to found a family. Depriving an 
incompetent woman of such fundamental rights inevitably involves 
complex moral considerations, but the courts have considered it 
necessary in some instances to override these rights in order to protect 
the health and general welfare of the patient. 
Therapeutic sterilisations carried out on incompetent adults^^^ will usually 
be declared lav\rful by the court with little controversy, if indeed resort to 
the court is necessary at all.^^^ Non-therapeutic stenlisations, for 
contraceptive reasons, for example, are more difficult to defend. 
Nonetheless, most notably in Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation),^^'^ it was 
held that a sterilisation operation was necessary to prevent a sexually 
active thirty-six year old woman with the mental age of a child becoming 
pregnant, despite her being in no position to give consent due to mental 
incapacity. It was thought by both hospital staff and the woman's mother 
that a sterilisation operation would be in her best interests as it would 
prevent any future risk of pregnancy. This was a prime example of 
intrusive intervention which was not therapeutically necessary in 
circumstances where there was "no opportunity to consult with the 
beneficiary,"^^^ here, due to the patient's incapacity. 
Similar facts arose in the case of Re B^^^ in which the courts had to 
decide whether it was lawful to sterilise a mentally incapacitated 
seventeen year old girt who was deemed incapable of giving valid 
For instance, where a woman becomes sterile as a result of a hysterectomy 
operation. 
See for example Re GF (Medical Treatment) [1992] 1 FLR 293: and Re ZM and OS 
(Sterilisation: Patient's Best Interests) [2000] 1 FLR 523. 
Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1. 
Chan and Simester, 'Duress, Necessity: How Many Defences?' at 127. 
Re e (A Minor) (Wardship: Sterilisation) [1988] AC 199. 
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consent to such a procedure, again, in order to avoid the risk of any 
future pregnancy. The House of Lords responded, again, in the 
affirmative, In making this decision the judges appear to have hastily 
sidelined important issues of human rights,^^^ considering the notion of 
rights only to, almost instantaneously, reject their application in the case. 
Lord Oliver indicated that, "the right to reproduce is of value only if 
accompanied by the ability to make a choice."^^'^ This statement found 
further support from the judgment of Lord Hailsham in that same case, 
who declared that: 
"To talk of the 'basic right' to reproduce of an individual who is not 
capable of knowing the casual connection between intercourse 
and childbirth, the nature of pregnancy, what is involved in 
delivery, unable to form maternal instincts or to care for a child 
appears to me wholly to part company with reality."^^^ 
In defence of the decision, it may be conceded that if it is sometimes in 
the interests of a competent woman to be sterilised, it is equally plausible 
that it may sometimes be in the best interests of an incompetent person 
to have that opera t ion .None the less , there has been much criticism of 
sterilisation operations which are carried out for what could be construed 
as questionable reasons. Sterilisation operations have been carried out 
on incompetent patients merely for the prevention of future pregnancy, or 
in anticipation of the risk of sexual assault, or, sometimes, for some other 
non-therapeutic reasons.^^'^ It is arguable, however, that although it may 
prevent conception, sterilisation does not decrease the vulnerability of the 
patient to sexual assault, for instance, or sexually transmitted disease. 
Unconvinced by the reasons sometimes presented by the courts, McLean 
insightfully observes that, "the actual reasons given for non-consensual 
Although it must be remembered that, like Re F, Re S is a pre-Human Rights Act 
decision, and it is hoped that greater consideration would be given to the protected 
interests of the incompetent patient if the courts were confronted by a similar case today. 
Re B (A Minor) (Wardship: Sterilisation) [1988] AC 199 at 211. 
Ibid, at 204. 
See Raanan Gillon, 'On Stenlising Severely Mentally Handicapped People' (1987) 13 
Journal of Medical Ethics 59 at 61 . 
For example, in Re HG (Specific Issue: Sterilisation) [1993] 1 FLR 587 a sterilisation 
operation was authorised as being in the patient's best interests even though sexual 
intercourse was unlikely. 
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sterilisations are not [always] the same as those which are overtly 
given."22« 
In response to this scepticism, more recently there has been a positive 
move towards requiring proof that a non-therapeutic sterilisation 
operation is actually necessary in the protection of health of the 
incompetent adult. In Re S (Medical Treatment: Adult Sterilisationf^^ the 
courts refused to authorise the sterilisation of an incompetent woman 
simply because she might be at risk of some sexual abuse some time 
in the future. This represents an encouraging shift away from the blatant 
paternalism that underscores many of the contrary decisions discussed 
above which have led to a denial of autonomy. A purely speculative risk 
of harm is now seemingly insufficient justification for the performance of 
such invasive surgery, and it seems that the risk must now be 
identifiable.^^° This advance should surely be encouraged to prevent 
officious intervention which potentially undermines the interests of the 
patient, and to foster an approach which places greater emphasis upon 
respect for concrete human rights. 
It must be acknowledged, however, that non-consensual sterilisation 
operations are, in practice, extremely rare. Nonetheless, the human 
rights implications of such decisions remain significant. It is submitted 
here that the basic rights of incompetent patients have to be more closely 
guarded than the rights of their competent counterparts as they are, in a 
sense, more susceptible to violations which may be overlooked. It follows 
that when the treatment is such that it will have a profound and 
irreversible effect on a patient, and has no palpable therapeutic benefit, it 
will be difficult to justify on the basis of the necessity principle. English 
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Sheila McLean, Old Law, New Medicine (London: Pandora, 1999) at 100. Wilson 
also comments that although the patient's best interests are supposed to be the only 
consideration in deciding whether the intrusion is justified, in many cases these interests 
conveniently coincide with a broader network of interests pertaining to the immediate 
carers and to the public generally, see Wilson, Criminal Law Doctrine and Theory at 254. 
Re S C/Wed/ca/ Treatment: Adult Sterilisation) [1998] 1 FLR 944. 
" ° Jackson, Medical Law: Text, Cases & Materials at 209-211. This approach is also 
endorsed by Practice Note (Official Solicitor: Declaratory Proceedings: Medical and 
Welfare Decisions for Adults Wfio Lack Capacity) [2001] 1 FLR 549. 
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courts have, however, frequently found a way to do just that. Although 
the non-consensual non-therapeutic sterilisation operations considered 
here were addressed prior to the introduction of the Human Rights Act 
1998, the suggestion that such invasive treatment is necessary will surely 
become increasingly difficult to defend in future against a backdrop of 
growing judicial recognition of human rights. If, as this thesis suggests, 
incompetent patients retain some basic human rights, it is difficult to see 
how those rights can be permissibly encroached upon where there is no 
therapeutic benefit to the incompetent patient. On balance, this intrusion 
appears to be a harmful, wrongful intrusion for which there is no 
justification. The use of best interests necessity to justify the intrusion 
upon an incompetent adult in non-therapeutic sterilisation operations is 
therefore limited and, if anything, likely to be subject to even further 
restriction in the future as human rights considerations become more 
prevalent. 
3.6.4.3 Necessity and detention 
Necessity has long been used as a common law justification for the 
detention of incompetent patients for specialist medical care. In R v. 
Bournewood,^^^ the House of Lords controversially applied the necessity 
doctrine to justify the informal detention and treatment of a mentally 
incompetent person, who was autistic and mentally disabled, had a 
history of self-harm, and had become a danger to himself. The patient, L, 
was a forty-eight year old adult male who had spent thirty years of his life 
in hospital on account of an autistic disorder. He had eventually been 
settled in a community for three years, with weekly visits to a day centre. 
On one such visit L's behaviour became agitated and the psychiatrist at 
the hospital demanded that L should be assessed in the behavioural unit. 
Since L did not resist the admission, as he did not have the capacity to 
dissent or consent, the clinical staff thought it inappropriate for him to be 
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R V. Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust, ex parte L [19981 3 All 
ER 289. 
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formally detained under the Mental Health Act 1983.^^^ L's carers 
brought an action in judicial review to the effect that L's informal 
admission could not be justified by the common law doctrine of 
necessity."^ 
On appeal, the House of Lords was presented with a difficult dilemma as 
the detention and treatment inevitably involved some interference with the 
patient's body and liberty, and therefore undeniably interfered with his 
rights. But only if the intrusion was wrongful, that is, not justified on the 
grounds of necessity, would the hospital be held responsible. In 
response, the consultant at the detaining institution argued that the action 
taken was necessary since, "[the patient's] best interests required his 
readmission to the unit with a view to stabilising his c o n d i t i o n . T h e 
prosecution in the case sought to argue that there was no scope for the 
Trust to invoke the common law doctrine of necessity to justify the 
detention, since the Mental Health Act 1983 had a regime designed 
specifically to deal with a patient in the position of the victim and that the 
hospital only had a right to detain the victim under that particular statutory 
regime.^"^^ The dispute raised an important question regarding the use of 
the common law doctrine of necessity to justify detention in preference to 
the extensive statutory powers vested in the medical profession to detain 
and treat. In resolution of the conflicting arguments, it was asserted by 
If L had resisted admission or had attempted to leave he would have been detained 
under the Mental Health Act 1983. Because he was not detained under the Act, the 
Hospital had to resort to the common law principle of necessity to justify the detention. 
Detaining a patient via the common law as opposed to the Act directly impacts on the 
position of relatives and carers as under the legislation, such parties have a right to be 
consulted or even to veto admission; but the common law denies any such rights. 
They also argued that the detention fell outside of the scope of section 131 Mental 
Health Act 1983, which preserved the informal admission of patients but did not extend 
to the admission of patients who lacked the capacity to make any meaningful decision 
regarding their detention. 
R V. Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust, ex parte L [1998] 3 All 
ER 289 at 291. 
This argument was apparently supported by Sir Thomas Bingham in Re S-C (Mental 
Patient) (Habeus Corpus) [1996] QB 599 at 603 and is implicit in the speech of Lord 
Brandon in Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1 at 55. In a Scottish case. 
Black V. Forsey (1988) SLT 572, Lord Keith of Kinkel went so far as to say, at 576, that 
any common law power of detention (that is, on the basis of necessity) that a hospital 
authority might have had has been impliedly removed by the introduction of a 
comprehensive statutory scheme. 
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Goff LJ that although there had been no compulsory detention in L's 
case,^^^ the actions taken, "in so far as they might otherwise have 
constituted an invasion of his civil rights, were justified on the basis of the 
common law doctrine of n e c e s s i t y . G o f f observed the long history of 
using the doctrine to detain patients^"^^ and concluded that the detention 
of those who are a danger, or potential danger, to themselves or another 
may be permitted by common law principles, at least until the danger 
subsides. It was thereby declared that the action taken was necessary in 
the circumstances; that is, on balance of the competing rights and 
interests involved, the health and welfare of the patient was the overriding 
consideration. Accordingly no tort or crime had been committed on the 
facts. 
Many commentators have expressed concern that the common law 
doctrine of necessity does not contain a transparent set of criteria on 
which principled decisions can be made. Further, according to Fennel!, 
the common law powers should only be available "where it is in the 
patient's best interests, not merely where [s]he is 'dangerous to self or 
others'."^^^ Despite these anxieties, Lord Goff reaffirmed the continued 
relevance of the common law doctrine in preference to the statutory 
powers to detain vested In doctors: 
"In the present case all the steps. . .taken by [L's psychiatrist] 
were...lav\/ful because justified under the common law doctrine of 
necessity and this conclusion is unaffected by the realisation that 
she might have to invoke the statutory power of detention. 
This suggestion has been treated with scepticism, being described by one 
commentator as a "convoluted and unconvincing claim," see Kirsty Keywood, 'Detaining 
Mentally Disordered Patients Lacking Capacity: The Arbitrariness of Informal Detention 
and the Common Law Doctrine of Necessity' (2005) 13 Medical Law Review ^ 06 at 110. 
Per Lord Goff in R v. Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust, ex 
garte L [1998] 3 All ER 289 at 300. 
®^ Authorities dating as far back as the eighteenth century were cited in support of the 
principle, see Rex v. Coate (1772) Lofft 73; Scoff v.Wakem (1862) 3F & F 328; and 
Symm v. Fraser(1863) 3F & F 859. 
Phillip Fennell, 'Doctor Knows Best? Therapeutic Detention Under Common Law, 
The Mental Health Act, and the European Convention' (1998) 6 Medical Law Review 
322 at 343. 
Per Lord Goff in R v. Bournewood Community and Mental Health Trust, ex parte L 
[1998] 3 All ER 289 at 301. 
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Mindful of the imminent incorporation of the European Convention on 
Human Rights into English law at the time of the hearing in the House of 
Lords, it is somewhat surprising that the their Lordships did not show a 
greater willingness to consider decisions emanating from Strasbourg on 
the issue of detention. At international level, it was apparent that a broad 
discretion was granted to the medical profession with regard to invasive 
treatment administered to the incompetent patient, as seems to be the 
case in domestic law, but this discretion did not extend to detention.^''^ 
This limitation was acknowledged in the case of Herczegfaivy v 
Austria^'^^ in which the European Court of Human Rights held that 
although medical treatment of incapacitated subjects could, in principle, 
amount to a contravention of Article 3 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, which prohibits inhuman and degrading treatment, a 
measure which is deemed a therapeutic necessity cannot be so 
regarded.^''^ In contrast, according to Article 5 of the Convention, 
detention on the grounds of unsoundness of mind is permitted, but 
subject to the more stringent safeguard that the detention is carried out in 
accordance with a procedure prescribed by law, and the lawfulness of the 
detention decision is open to external review.^"'* 
Following the House of Lords ruling, L and his carers appealed to the 
European Court of Human Rights alleging that there was no lawful 
detention in accordance with the requirements of Article 5 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. In October 2004, the 
This issue is discussed further by Fennel!, 'Doctor Knows Best? Therapeutic 
Detention Under Common Law, The Mental Health Act, and the European Convention' 
at 323. 
^"^ Herczegfaivy v Austria (1992) 15 EHRR 437 at paragraph 82. 
^"^ So, although the patient in this case was heavily sedated and handcuffed to a bed for 
a period of time, the Court held that medical necessity justified the treatment. This 
judgment may have wider implications for the rights of incompetent patients who are 
subject to non-therapeutic treatment, such as Re Yand Re F, discussed in more detail 
in sections 3.6.4.1 and 3.6.4.2 respectively. 
See Article 5(4) of the European Convention on Human Rights. It is noteworthy that 
because the detention was justified on common law principles, L had no right to have his 
detention considered by a Mental Health Review Tribunal. 
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Bournewood saga reached its climax in the case of HL v. UK.^^^ The 
European Court of Human Rights held that L had, in fact, been detained 
on grounds of unsoundness of mind, in accordance with the substantive 
criteria required by Article 5(1). However, the Court was not prepared to 
accept that the detention was in accordance with a procedure prescribed 
by law, as required by Article 5(4). Whilst acknowledging such 
procedures need not necessarily be entrenched in statute, it was 
suggested that where incompetent patients were deprived of their liberty, 
the common law doctrine of best interests necessity was too vague and 
had insufficient safeguards to be compatible with the Convention. Hence, 
the informal admission of a compliant but incompetent adult patient, 
lacking the capacity to make decisions about his own psychiatric care, 
therefore violated Article 5(4) and constituted an arbitrary detention. 
So, the Court found that the scope of the necessity doctrine was not 
sufficiently precise to justify the intrusion on the rights of the incompetent 
patient. This sentiment has been echoed by others who have questioned 
the piecemeal development of the doctrine and, particularly, its "gradual 
extension to welfare issues that extend considerably beyond its original 
domain of healthcare decision-making."^"'' It was acknowledged above in 
section 3.6.3.1 that the best interests test which forms the foundation of 
the necessity doctrine has been significantly expanded since it is no 
longer determined solely by a responsible body of medical opinion, but 
'objectively' by a judge. Consequently the application of the doctrine in 
this context is vague and imprecisely defined. On a similar point, the 
Court expressed a further objection that the 'extensive network of 
safeguards' offered by the Mental Health Act 1983 to detained patients to 
prevent any injustice is in stark contrast to the loose regulatory scheme at 
HL V. United Kingdom (2005) 40 EHRR 32. 
^"^ Similar questions have been raised in other jurisdictions; see the US Supreme Court 
case of Zinermon v. Burch 494 US 113 (1990), where Blackmun J submitted, at 133-134 
that the informal admission of persons lacking capacity to consent to admission was 
'unconstitutional' 
Keywood, 'Detaining Mentally Disordered Patients Lacking Capacity: The 
Arbitrariness of Informal Detention and the Common Law Doctrine of Necessity' at 111. 
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the root of the doctrine of necessity.^""^ It would appear, therefore, that 
the informal detention of patients lacking capacity to make decisions 
regarding such detention, if justified, would operate to marginalise the 
fundamental and basic rights of an already very vulnerable group of 
people.^""^ 
In response to these criticisms the government consulted widely on the 
issues raised by Bournewood and produced a new framework which 
declares it unlawful to deprive the liberty of an intellectually incapable 
adult who cannot consent to admission to a hospital or care home.^^° 
The result is that hospital / care home managers wishing to deprive 
patients of their liberty will have to seek authorisation for their action to be 
l a w f u l . A request for authorisation will result in numerous assessments 
of the patient's age, mental health and capacity, whether the deprivation 
is necessary, proportionate and in the best interests of the patient.^^^ It 
seems that the criteria that will result in a deprivation of liberty are more 
rigorous than those in the common law. However, "they remain vague, 
depending as they do on such comparatively abstract notions as 'best 
interests', 'necessity', 'proportionality' and the 'likelihood of harm'."^^^ 
Despite these shortcomings, the framework is now enshrined in statute 
and it remains to be seen whether it will effectively close the Bournewood 
gap and result in a diminished role for the common law defence of 
necessity. The European Court of Human Rights decision in 
Bournewood must be welcomed as a positive move towards recognition 
and protection of the fundamental rights of vulnerable groups. It is an 
example of the Court engaging in a more overt human rights analysis to 
"^"^  This point was emphasised by the Court in HL v. United Kingdom at paragraph 120. 
^"^ See Keywood, Detaining Mentally Disordered Patients Lacking Capacity. The 
Arbitrariness of Informal Detention and the Common Law Doctrine of Necessity' at 115. 
Department of Health, Protecting the Vulnerable: The Bournewood Consultation 
(London: Department of Health, 2006). Deprivation of liberty appears to go beyond 
simple confinement, and medical treatment could amount to deprivation of liberty. 
Section 50 of the Mental Health Act 2007 amends the Mental Capacity Act 2005 on 
this issue 
Department of Health, Bournewood Briefing Sheet (London: Department of Health, 
2006) at 3. 
David Hewitt, 'Closing the Bournewood Gap?' (2006) 156 New Law Journal 1234 at 
1234-1235. 
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evaluate the suitability of domestic decisions regarding potential 
invasions of the rights of innocent persons. This explicit and reasoned 
approach could be developed further in domestic courts to include a more 
precisely defined analysis of conflicting rights. 
3.7 Conclusion to chapter three 
This chapter has considered the scope of criminal responsibility for 
intruding on the rights of innocent incompetent patients. It is clear from 
an analysis of the case law that the necessity principle is used routinely in 
medical cases to justify otherwise criminal intrusions on the bodily 
integrity of patients who are unable to give consent to treatment due to 
some incapacity. Beyond this category of cases, however, the defence 
has been used sparingly. Although necessity has been recognised as a 
residual defence for centunes it has seldom been exploited, only in 
comparatively uncontroversial cases where there is either no victim 
whatsoever, or where proprietary or minor personal rights are invaded to 
prevent significant harm to the actor or another. It is submitted here that 
necessity principle has been extended as a justification for medical 
treatment administered to an incompetent patient, but only to vindicate 
some superior right of the innocent patient and not merely because the 
treatment causes a lesser evil than that which it averts. Although the 
necessity justification is not beset by rules and restrictions it is submitted 
that in the medical context, it may only be used if the intrusion is in the 
incapacitated patient's best interests. 
The starting point for the analysis in this chapter was the assertion that 
any medical intervention which intrudes on the rights of an innocent 
competent patient in the absence of consent will constitute a wrongful 
violation. The broad notions of autonomy and liberty, which proved 
fundamental in the development of a moral framework for criminalisation 
in chapter two, are particularly significant in the context of medical 
intervention. To reiterate: 
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"The right to determine what shall be done with one's body is a 
fundamental right in our society. The concepts inherent in this 
right are the bedrock upon which the principles of self-
determination and individual autonomy are based. Free individual 
choice in matters affecting this right should...be accorded very 
high priority. 
Since such basic and fundamental rights are paramount, any 
encroachment on the autonomous individual's bodily integrity could result 
in a charge of criminal assault. In the case of medical intervention, the 
consent to treatment of the competent patient negates any wrongful 
intrusion on their rights and no offence is committed. Should consent be 
withheld, any invasive treatment would be unlawful. This is so even if the 
invasion would dramatically enhance the living standard of the patient, 
because the right to self-determination must protect both rational and 
unorthodox decisions. However, it is evident that when life (or potential 
life) is at stake, the phnciple of self-determination can effectively be 
overridden by other perceived societal i n t e r e s t s . T h i s is particularly 
apparent in a number of cases where caesarean section operations have 
arguably been forced upon competent women because of the court's 
misguided attempt to protect the foetus. Although the courts are eager to 
declare the primacy of a competent individual's freedom of choice, it is 
argued, particularly in section 3.5.2 above, that this superficial 
commitment to patient autonomy is often a mask for paternalistic 
considerations. Sometimes the courts have circumvented the problem of 
patient choices that are perceived to be detrimental to the individual's 
welfare, or the potential life of a foetus, by declaring the patient 
incompetent to make their own welfare decisions. This paternalistic 
attitude should be discouraged as it is contrary to the basic liberal ideals 
set forth in chapter two. 
Per Robins J A in Malette v. Shulman (1990) 67 DLR (4'") 321 at 338. 
This difficult balancing act was acknowledged by Hoffmann LJ in Airedale NHS Trust 
V. Bland [1993] AC 789, where he stated at 827, "[Tjhere is no morally correct solution 
which can be deduced from a single ethical principle like the sanctity of life or the right of 
self-determination. There must be an accommodation between principles, both of which 
seem rational and good, but which have come into conflict with each other." 
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Some have argued that "involuntary treatment constitutes a paternalistic 
intervention into the lives of those who are merely socially deviant...[and] 
that involuntary treatment for mental disorder represents the most severe 
intrusion by the state into individual civil liberties."^^^ Despite such 
scepticism, it is widely accepted that in the case of the incompetent 
patient who is incapable of consenting to medical intervention, the 
doctor's action is not generally considered unlawful, especially in 
emergency circumstances. Even where there is time for deliberation 
serious intrusions on the bodily integrity of the patient are invariably 
permitted in the case of incapacitated subjects, provided that intervention 
is necessary on a balance of the patient's best interests. It has been 
asserted that in such cases, "...when the magnitude of the beneficence is 
huge, and the weight of the autonomy consideration weak...beneficence 
[should be permitted to] override autonomy."^^^ 
In calculating best interests, the courts have struggled, or perhaps more 
accurately have been reluctant, to determine any clear principles and the 
legislature have not assisted in any significant way. It may be argued that 
the difficulty of calculating the best interests of a patient who cannot 
consciously or rationally consent to treatment can never be eradicated, 
but that more guidance could be made available to the medical 
p r o f e s s i o n . E v e n with such guidance, however, best interests 
calculations are essentially performed on a case-by-case basis, resulting 
in a lack of consistency and giving rise to potential human rights 
challenges. This point was emphasised by the analysis of the best 
interests test in three specific contexts; where necessity has been used to 
justify the non-consensual donation of organs; non-therapeutic 
sterilisation, and the detention of incompetent adults. These cases and 
the commentary arising from them highlight that human rights issues are 
becoming increasingly difficult to ignore and the permissibility of medical 
Sameer Sarkar and Gwen Adshead, Treatment Over Objection: Minds, Bodies and 
Beneficence' [2002] Journal of Mental Health Law 105 at 106, citing the views of 
Thomas S Szasz, The Myth of Mental Illness' (1960) ^5 American Psychologist 113 at 
113-118. 
Click, 'The Morality of Coercion' at 394. 
Per Lord Donaldson (CA) in Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1 at 18. 
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treatment can arguably only be fully comprehended by reference to a 
more concrete human rights f r a m e w o r k . W h a t is required in relation to 
incompetent subjects is a greater respect for human rights, equivalent to 
that afforded to the competent patient, whose rights are far less likely to 
be exploited. Medical treatment administered to incompetent patients 
highlights the tension between patient autonomy and competing forces of 
paternalism. The legislature and judiciary have a fundamental role to 
play in steering a middle path between autonomy and p a t e r n a l i s m . A 
more principled approach, which respects autonomy and physical well-
being as primary values and invokes the language of human rights to 
arrive at carefully considered solutions, should be developed at judicial 
level; and if the infringement genuinely vindicates a superior right of the 
patient then it should be justified by the necessity principle. 
The necessity justification is arguably available beyond the confines of 
victimless crimes, or infringements on the rights of incompetent patients. 
It appears that the defence may even justify a lethal intrusion on the 
rights of another in certain limited circumstances. The discussion will 
now turn to the scope of criminal responsibility for intruding on the rights 
of an innocent threat to the interests of the defendant or another and it is 
argued that it may sometimes be justifiable to lethally setback the rights 
of an innocent person if they actively or passively threaten the interests of 
the actor on the grounds of self-defence. Further the necessity doctrine 
may also be used outside of the context in which it was employed in this 
chapter to justify infringements on the rights of an innocent incidental 
threat, but only in very limited circumstances. 
The rights-based approach is supported by Wicks, 'The Right to Refuse Medical 
Treatment Under the European Convention on Human Rights' at 17. Other 
commentators are more cautious. Murphy pleads that philosophers "[do] not give into 
the romantic and knee-jerk liberal temptation to multiply rights beyond necessity." He 
warns: "The more one attempts to go above the minimum to assert something more 
substantial as a matter of right, the more one runs the risk of developing a list of 'rights' 
which are either so economically expensive to support or so morally intrusive to enforce 
that no sane society will in fact support or enforce them. They will be paid at most a kind 
of lip service in manifestos - something which cheapens the concept of a right, makes 
people cynical about rights, and deprives them of their moral force," see Murphy, 'Rights 
and Borderline Cases' (1977) 19 Arizona Law Review 228 at 240. 
Wicks, Human Rig fits and Healtficare at 61 . 
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Chapter Four: 
Intruding on the rights of innocent threats 
4.1 Introduction to chapter four 
It was established in chapter three above that an actor may not be 
criminally responsible for interfering with the rights of an innocent 
incompetent person if the interference was justified by the necessity to 
act in the best interests of the person concerned. This chapter considers 
setbacks to the interests of a very different category of innocent victim, 
one who poses a threat to the personal or proprietary interests of the 
actor (or another). Unlike the innocent victims discussed in chapter three, 
a denial of liability for interference with the rights of a non-culpable yet 
threatening individual involves a difficult appraisal of the protected 
interests of two innocent parties: defendant and innocent threat. 
Intrusions on the interests of two distinct categories of threat will be 
examined in this chapter: innocent unjust threats and innocent incidental 
threats. At the outset the chapter will consider the extent to which a 
defendant is exempt from responsibility for intruding on the rights of a 
person who represents an innocent unjust thread through the defence of 
self-defence. In order to provide a cohesive and robust evaluation of 
criminal responsibility for force used against an innocent unjust threat it is 
essential to outline the theoretical, philosophical and practical challenges 
posed by the defence of self-defence Despite being a well-established 
feature of the criminal law, much of the literature pertaining to this 
comparatively neglected defence concentrates on its boundaries, with 
limited analysis of important theoretical questions such as whether the 
defence is justificatory or excusatory. Any comprehensive account of the 
' The term unjust threat is preferred to unjust attacker as the latter phrase unduly 
restricts the scope of self-defence. This point is addressed in greater detail in section 
4.2.2 below. 
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legitimacy of using self-defensive force to ward off an innocent unjust 
threat also necessitates detailed investigation of the philosophical 
foundations of the defence, since establishing a clear philosophy will, it is 
hoped, provide useful guidance on the boundaries of using defensive 
force against innocent unjust threats. Whilst such philosophical analysis 
is paramount,^ regard must also be paid to the legal requirements, or 
conditions, of self-defence in order for the account to be complete. 
The second category of threat to be considered is the individual that will 
be classified here as an innocent incidental threat. Strictly speaking such 
a person does not constitute a threat per se, but is so closely linked to an 
independent immediate threat that one might consider them to be part of 
that threat. It is this latter connection with the immediate source of the 
threat that sets the innocent incidental threat apart from the innocent 
bystander addressed in chapter five. The innocent incidental threat 
unwittingly brings the immediate threat, initiated by another agent or 
circumstances, closer to fulfilment yet the direct source of the threat 
exists independent of their action (or inaction). If a defendant's interests 
are indirectly endangered by an innocent person then there is some 
dispute as to whether the defendant's response in infringing the hghts of 
the innocent incidental threat may be justified on the grounds of self-
defence or, alternatively, a residual defence of necessity. The precise 
coverage of these two related defences and the conceptual overlap 
between them must be determined before any principled guidance can be 
offered regarding the scope of criminal responsibility. 
With these aims in mind, the chapter proceeds with a brief introduction to 
the defence of self-defence in broad, general terms in section 4.2. It is 
^ As indicated by the attention focused on philosophical perspectives in the 
comprehensive analysis offered by Uniacke, Permissible Killing. Other less extensive 
accounts have been offered by other commentators including, Kasachkoff, 'Killing in 
Self-Defence: An Unquestionable or Problematic Defence?' at 509-531; Susan Levine, 
'The Moral Permissibility of Killing a 'Material Aggressor' in Self-Defense' (1984) 45 
Philosopt^ical Studies at 69-78; Phillip Montague, 'Self-Defense and Choosing Between 
Lives' (1981) 40 Philosophical Studies at 207-219; Brian J Smart, 'Understanding and 
Justifying Self-Defense' (1989) 4 International Journal of Moral and Social Studies at 
231-244. 
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suggested that self-defensive force may be legitimately exercised against 
any unjust threat to one's protected interests and the discussion 
determines what constitutes an unjust threat. Section 4.3 analyses the 
theoretical basis of the defence and examines the manifestation of self-
defence as a justification and putative self-defence as an excuse. The 
section also scrutinises competing philosophical accounts in order to 
clarify where the defence derives its justificatory force and proposes a 
coherent philosophy which incorporates both paradigm and non-standard 
cases of self-defence, paying particular attention to the correct treatment 
of cases involving innocent unjust threats. A rights-based philosophy with 
an accompanying theory of forfeiture is defended as the most plausible 
explanation of why we are permitted to use self-defensive force, even 
against innocent threats. Section 4.4 explores the limitations on the 
availability of self-defence by examining and defending appropriate 
parameters of the defence which are compatible with the general aims of 
the criminal law in a liberal society. In particular the operation of 
necessity and proportionality requirements will be considered, insofar as 
they underscore the central notion of reasonableness. Having 
established a satisfactory theoretical and practical basis for the defence 
which accommodates cases involving intrusions against innocent unjust 
threats, section 4.5 considers in greater detail the precarious position of 
the innocent incidental threat, the person who is not technically a threat at 
all, but who is closely linked to the threat in that they expose it to 
themselves and others. The limits of self-defence are challenged, and 
the conceptual overlap between self-defence and necessity is explored 
with reference to some difficult, thought provoking, examples. Finally, 
section 4.6 summarises and concludes the arguments presented and 
defended throughout the chapter. In essence, the submission is that 
criminal responsibility shall not be imposed on an actor who intrudes on 
the rights of an innocent unjust threat by virtue of the self-defence 
justification, provided certain conditions are fulfilled; and that intrusions on 
the rights of an innocent incidental threat can be justified, in rare and 
carefully defined circumstances, on the grounds of necessity. 
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4.2 The doctrine of self-defence 
4.2.1 Introduction to self-defence 
In modern society aggression and violence create formidable challenges 
within moral, legal and political spheres. Aggressive violence cannot be 
tolerated in any civilised society, save for special exceptions; and it is on 
this basic premise that the defence of self-defence^ is both permitted to 
ward off unjust violence, but is also subject to stringent limitation to 
prevent its misuse."* Self-defence intrinsically represents an attempt to 
resolve the tension between the fundamental prohibition against intruding 
on the personal and proprietary rights of another and the permitted 
exceptions to such action. For this reason, even in the paradigm case 
where aggressive violence perpetrated by a malevolent aggressor is 
warded off by a defendant, the defence poses a special challenge to 
criminal jurisprudence as it often appears to endorse shameless self-
interest^ and can, in the most serious cases, involve intentional killing,^ at 
times instantiating an ostensibly unjustified preference for one human life 
^ The term 'self-defence' is used throughout this thesis in a broad sense to encompass 
defence of self, defence of another and defence of property; other authors prefer the use 
of the phrase 'private defence', see Glanville Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law 2"" 
edition (London: Stevens, 1983) at 501; and Boaz Sangero, Self-Defence in Criminal 
Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006) at 1 
" See section 4.4 for further discussion of the conditions of self-defence. 
^ Defence of oneself Is regarded as the most problematic form of defensive action to 
justify in light of the self-interest involved. 
This aspect of self-defence distinguishes it from the related defences of necessity and 
duress, which currently provide no defence to murder, see section 4.5.3 and section 5.4 
respectively. Some of the most difficult cases to resolve involve lethal self-defensive 
action that leads to the death of the unjust threat, whether that threat is culpable or, even 
more challenging, non-culpable. If the justifiability of self interested killing, arguably the 
most serious form of the defence, can be sustained then other somewhat lesser self-
defensive acts will be correspondingly justified; see the approach taken by Leverick, 
Killing in Self-Defence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). Leverick has been 
criticised for limiting her monograph to lethal self-defensive acts in a publication review 
authored by Rogers, who comments that "...to focus on homicide at all is rather 
distracting. . . [i]n explaining the commission of non-fatal offences in self-defence, a wider 
theory of rights of bodily integrity will be needed," see Jonathan Rogers, 'Publication 
Review: Killing in Self-Defence' (2008) Law Quarterly Review 172 at 172-173. Others 
have also criticised such a restrictive approach, see Sangero, Self-Defence in Criminal 
Law. In light of these criticisms it is hoped that this account incorporates a broader 
theory of rights of bodily integrity. 
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over another.'' However, legitimate defensive force exonerates the actor 
for a much broader range of responses beyond the typical case involving 
a reaction to aggressive violence. Self-defence may, for example, 
provide a complete defence for an actor who is not defending themselves 
against any aggression or violence, but who instinctively preserves 
her/his own interests by thwarting a threat posed by an innocent passive 
person. 
Self-defence absolves a defendant of any criminal responsibility by 
providing a legal permission^ to intrude on the personal or proprietary 
rights of an unjust threat in order to protect private or public interests, 
provided the defendant uses a reasonable level^ of force^° in the 
circumstances as s/he believes to exist." The defence has two distinct 
legal sources, which differ according to whether public or private interests 
have been defended. Section 3(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1967 is 
applicable where defensive force is exercised to protect public interests in 
the prevention of crime (that is, in response to an an/aw^u/threat) or to 
effect an arrest.^^ Most instances of public defence will also be cases of 
private defence, since most involve the use of force against an unlawful 
^ Kasachkoff, 'Killing in Self-Defence: An Unquestionable or Problematic Defence?' at 
513. Although the circumstances in which a letfial act of self-preservation is morally or 
legally permitted are infrequent, understanding why even such a serious intrusion on the 
rights of another is permitted in the case of self-defence is crucial to the development of 
a coherent theory of self-defence which is generally applicable as a justification for all 
degrees of defensive force used against all manner of unjust threat. 
® Jeremy Horder highlights the defendant's legal permission to act as the key issue in 
cases of self defence, see Jeremy Horder, 'Self-Defence, Necessity and Duress: 
Understanding the Relationship' (1998) 11 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 
143 at 143. If a defendant's action is legally permissible it is thereby rendered lawful. 
^ The level of force must be reasonable on an objective evaluation, see R v. Owino 
(1996)2 CrApp R 128; Shaw v. R[2001] UKPC 26; and R v. Martin (Anthony) [2002] 1 
Cr App R 27. See also section 4.4 below for detailed analysis of the conditions of the 
defence. 
'° It is accepted that the defence may be available where something other than 'force' is 
used defensively, see Horder, Self-Defence, Necessity and Duress: Understanding the 
Relationship' at 144. Horder uses the example of releasing poisonous gas into a room 
to defend oneself from an attacker. 
" See R V. Gladstone (Williams) (1984) 78 Cr App R 276; and Beckford v R [1988] AC 
130. See also section 4.4 below. 
Section 3 dictates that: "(1) A person may use such force as is reasonable in the 
circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawrful arrest 
of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large; (2) Subsection (1) 
above shall replace the rules of the common law on the question when force used for a 
purpose mentioned in the subsection is justified by that purpose." 
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attack. Indeed, conventional accounts of self-defence restrict the 
availability of the defence to use of force against an unlawful attack. But 
the central theme of this thesis is the legitimacy of intrusions on the rights 
of innocents, who have, by definition, done nothing unlawful. It follows 
that the subsequent discussion is limited to consideration of the common 
law defence of self-defence which contains no such restriction.^^ 
4.2.2 The scope of self-defence 
In the common law of self-defence it is well established that the defensive 
action must be directed against the source of the threat to one's interests. 
Relying on theories advanced by Uniacke and developed by Horder, it is 
submitted here that any unjust threat, culpable or innocent, may be the 
legitimate target of self-defensive f o r c e . I f it is accepted that self-
defensive force can only be exercised in these conditions, it is necessary 
to explore what constitutes an unjust threat. 
4.2.2.1 Culpable unjust threats 
Typically in paradigm case of self-defence the threat emanates from a 
fully competent and culpable aggressor who launches an attack on, for 
instance, an entirely innocent passer-by in order to steal her/his personal 
property. If the victim of the attack instinctively exercises defensive force 
However , it is accepted that the statutory de fence may be of s o m e use if the person 
at tacked is unaware of the non-culpabi l i ty of their at tacker. If, for example , a r a n d o m 
attack is launched against a de fendant by an at tacker w h o is not commi t t ing any cr ime 
because s/he is in a state of au tomat i sm, the de fendant is unl ikely to be aware of the 
c i rcumstances wh ich abso lve the at tacker of guilt. Sect ion 3 may prov ide a statutory 
de fence as the de fendant in tended to use force in the prevent ion of cr ime. W h e r e the 
de fendant is aware of the c i r cumstances that exemp t the at tacker of responsibi l i ty, 
sect ion 3 is inappl icable, but the c o m m o n law de fence wou ld yield a simi lar result. 
Suzanne Uniacke, Permissible Killing: The Self-Defence Justification of Homicide 
(Cambr idge: Cambr idge Universi ty Press, 1994) chapter 5; Horder, 'Se l f -Defence, 
Necessi ty and Duress : Unders tand ing the Relat ionship ' ; and Wi l son , Criminal Law 
Doctrine and Theory chapter 10. At 268, Wi lson emphas i ses the s igni f icance of the 
requ i rement that the defens ive force be taken against unjust threats, c la iming that it 
"ensures that w h a t coun ts a s 'good consequences ' is f i rmly te thered to soc iety 's 
expressed priori t ies, not unpredictably to the w h i m s of the act ion taker." 
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by kicking the attacker in the shins to prevent their escape, the offence 
elements for assault have been fulfilled and the victim of the attack has 
intruded on the attacker's rights of physical integrity. Yet subjecting the 
self-defender to punishment in such circumstances would, for most, be 
unpalatable since the defensive reaction is morally and legally justified. 
The response is a reasonable one in the circumstances, does not 
wrongfully intrude on the rights of the aggressor and is therefore outside 
the scope of criminal law prohibition. Defending the claim that the threat 
posed by a fully competent and culpable aggressor can be warded off is 
relatively uncomplicated. All things considered, there is no moral 
justification for the malevolent aggressor's action; the attack represents 
objectively unjustified action which the defendant has a right to exercise 
self-defensive force to ward off. This objective appraisal of the action 
may not be quite so straightforward, however, if the threat emanates from 
a non-culpable source. 
4.2.2.2 Innocent unjust threats 
In order for any account of self-defence to be complete, it must 
accommodate the more difficult cases which form the basis of this thesis 
in which the legitimacy of employing self-defensive force is rather more 
complicated. When an actor is confronted by a threat to their personal or 
proprietary interests and that threat emanates directly Uom an innocent 
person, intuitively it seems that no criminal responsibility should be 
imposed for thwarting the threat. From the defendant's perspective, the 
threat is equally hostile to their interests whether the source is culpable or 
blameless, active or passive. As indicated in section 4.2.1 above, there is 
no requirement in the common law of self-defence that the threatening 
conduct is unlawful. The defendant who impinges on the rights of an 
innocent unjust threat in self-defence is, it is submitted here, beyond 
criminalisation as s/he has a legal permission to act. This permission 
derives from the fact that there is, objectively, no good reason for the 
threat being posed; the blamelessness or otherwise of the threatening 
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person is irrelevant in the contemplation of the normative position of the 
defendant.^^ Where the defendant is attacked^^ by an insane person, a 
child, or someone who mistakenly believes the defendant is about to 
attack them, the threat posed is unjust in the sense that there is, overall, 
no sound reason for it. If sanity was restored, maturity reached or full 
knowledge of the circumstances imparted, these three innocent targets of 
self-defensive force would appreciate that there was, in fact, no good 
reason for their action/''' 
This analysis may be extended to innocent threats who are not positively 
attacking at all, but who pose a threat as a consequence of something 
that has happened to them, rather than some voluntary or involuntary 
action on their part.^ ® Take, for instance, Smith and Hogan's familiar 
case of the two mountaineers (A and B) connected together by rope on a 
climbing expedition/^ A falls over the edge of a cliff and subsequently 
drags B to a precarious position perilously close to the edge of the cliff. 
In the knowledge that both will imminently fall to their deaths if no action 
is taken, B decides to sever the rope attaching the two, with the result 
that A falls to his death. B has undoubtedly infringed the fundamental 
rights of his fellow mountaineer, but should his action fall within the scope 
of criminal prohibition? Instinctively, the answer is no. Whilst some 
commentators have attempted to avoid the criminal liability of the actor on 
the grounds of necessity,^° the more convincing view is, on a careful 
analysis of the facts, that this is more naturally an example of self-
defence.^^ The dangling mountaineer. A, represents a direct and unjust 
threat to his colleague, direct because he is the source of the threat; 
In suppor t of asser t ions nnade by Horder, it is submi t ted here that t he normat ive 
posit ion of the de fendant is of pa ramount impor tance, rather than the culpabi l i ty of the 
threat; see Horder, 'Se l f -defence, Necessi ty and Duress . Unders tand ing the 
Relat ionship ' at 146. 
Un iacke suggests that an 'at tack' is an of fens ive act which causes ha rm or danger to 
another. For further d iscuss ion, see Uniacke, Permissible Killing at 160-164. 
^' The idea that an absence of a mora l just i f icat ion for the threat ent i t les the de fendan t to 
respond to protect their in terests w i thout the threat of cr iminal sanct ion is deve loped 
further in sect ion 4.3.9 below. 
Uniacke, Permissible Killing at 164. 
Ormerod , Smith and Hogan: Criminal Law at 350. 
^° Ibid, at 350. 
Horder, 'Se l f -Defence, Necessi ty and Duress: Unders tand ing the Rela t ionsh ip ' a t 147. 
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unjust because the threat is posed for no objectively justified moral 
reason. The absence of fault on the part of A does not affect the 
normative status of B who is, on this account, justified in exercising his 
right to defensive force against the unjust threat. 
It is unfortunate that the dangling mountaineer became caught up in such 
a terrible situation, but he is, undeniably, a direct source of the unjust 
threat to the defendant, who is under no obligation to surrender her/his 
life by not responding to the threat.^^ This reasoning may be extended to 
other difficult cases. Take, for instance, Nozick's famous falling projectile 
e x a m p l e . T h e defendant (D) is standing at the bottom of a well; an 
innocent person (V) is thrown down the well by a third party^"* and is 
hurtling towards D. D will certainly die if s/he does nothing. D 
instinctively protects her/his life by killing the projectile, using a vaporising 
gun to eradicate the threat. It is submitted here that the self-defence 
justification is sufficiently broad to permit serious infringements^^ on the 
rights of the innocent unjust threat in self-preservation,^® even where the 
threat is passive.^^ This passive innocent threat is someone absent of 
fault, who is not positively 'aggressing' at all and whose "mere 
movements qua physical object or mere presence constitutes a threat to 
our life"^^ and a potential violation of our r i g h t s . O n Herder's persuasive 
analysis, the projectile poses a direct and unjustified tiireat to the 
Simester and Chan , 'Duress , Necessi ty : How Many Defences? ' at 129. 
Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia at 34-35. 
It mat ters not for the present d iscuss ion whether the innocent man w a s pushed down 
the wel l by a vil lain or a gust of w ind . 
Logical ly it fo l lows that less ser ious intrusions on the r ights of innocent unjust threats 
(for instance on r ights of bodi ly integrity or propr ietary interests) will thereby be permi t ted 
in se l f -defence, prov ided the use of force is d e e m e d reasonable. 
There are, however , s o m e w h o mainta in that the protected interests of innocent 
threats cannot be usurped by a right of se l f -preservat ion, see Michae l Otsuka , 'Ki l l ing 
the Innocent in Se l f -Defense ' (1994) 23 Phi losophy and Publ ic Af fa i rs 65 and Richard 
Norman , Ethics. Killing and Ul/ar (Cambr idge : Cambr idge Universi ty Press , 1995) at 32. 
The suggest ion is that harm incurred by, say, our meet ing with a c razed mad m a n in a 
lift or by walk ing into the path of a fal l ing fat man is s imply a product of our bad luck and 
this harm cannot be just i f iably t ransfer red. 
This termino logy is also preferred by Nancy Davis. 'Abort ion and Se l f -Defense ' (1984) 
13 Philosophy & Public Affairs 1 7 1 . 
®^ Davis, 'Abort ion and Se l f -Defense ' at 190. 
A l though the c la im that an innocent passive threat can cause a r ights violat ion is 
resisted by s o m e commenta to rs , see Otsuka , 'Ki l l ing the Innocent in Se l f -De fense ' a t 82 . 
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defendant's protected interests, even though there is an absence of fault 
and no active a t t a c k . T h e projectile is therefore a legitimate target of 
self-defensive force. 
To summarise, the self-defence justification may be extended not only to 
force used against a culpable unjust threat, but also to an innocent unjust 
threat, whether active or passive. Provided the innocent person is the 
direct source of the threat to the defendant's interests and the threat is 
unjust, the fault of the threatening person and the activity or passivity of 
the threat is irrelevant to the exercise of legitimate self-defensive force. 
The above discussion provides some insight into the kind of innocent 
person who may find themselves a target of self-defensive force.'^^ But it 
offers limited analysis of the reasons \Nhy the actor has a legal permission 
to intrude on the rights of another. Appeal must be made to the 
theoretical basis of the defence to provide this critical explanation. To 
begin with, the implications of the justification and excuse distinction, 
adopted throughout this thesis as the most convenient mode of 
classifying de fences ,w i l l be examined in the context of self-defence. 
4.3 Theoretical foundations of self-defence 
4.3.1 Introduction to the theoretical challenges 
Self-defence "identifies certain circumstances in which the conventional 
public morality underlying the criminal law provides an exception to the 
prohibitory norm represented by the homicide and assault statutes."^^ 
From a liberal perspective, conduct which causes harm to other persons, 
in that it consists of a wrongful violation of their rights, is proscribed. 
^° Horder, 'Sel f -defence, Necessi ty and Duress: Unders tand ing the Relat ionship ' at M S -
M S . 
There is further d iscuss ion of another sub-set of cases involving innocent persons 
whose interests are int ruded on as an incidental ef fect of repel l ing the immedia te threat 
in sect ion 4.5 belovi/. 
See sect ion 3.3.1 above for an in t roduct ion to the genera l d ist inct ion. 
Schopp , Justification Defenses and Just Convictions at 64. 
120 
Although self-defence involves the infringement of personal or proprietary 
rights of other human beings, such action is generally thought to be 
outside the scope of criminalisation, a recognised exception to the 
prohibitory norm. The most severe cases concern serious intrusions on 
the victim's right to life, bodily integrity, or autonomy, which may affect 
even basic subsistence; but if justified the action is not wrongful and 
should not, therefore, be the subject of criminal sanction. But why is this 
so? According to some theorists self-defence provides the actor with a 
positive right to defend themselves or another against an unjust threat, 
with the result that although another person's interests are set back by 
the self-defensive conduct, they are not violated or w r o n g e d . R o d i n 
suggests that self-defence may be considered a 'right' consisting of a 
simple Hohfeldian liberty to intrude on the legally protected interests of 
others in defence of oneself or another."^^ The exceptional nature of this 
liberty in terms of outlining and protecting important individual interests 
and providing guidance for future normative deliberation, "enables it to 
function as a genuine right within legal and moral normative systems."'^® 
Intuitions regarding the scope of the right to use force to defend protected 
interests tend to converge when considering standard cases of self-
defence against a culpable aggressor, but theoretical explanations are 
often thwarted by non-standard cases. A credible theoretical account of 
self-defence must accommodate all cases and the theory advanced 
below has been developed with a particular emphasis on the problems 
presented by hard cases involving innocent unjust threats. Before the 
account is considered in greater detail, we must first determine how self-
defence fits into the justification and excuse scheme of classification. 
Alternat ively, Un iacke suggests that se l f -defence is not a just i f ied in f r ingement of 
another 's right, but rather an except ion to the genera l rule that r ights should not be 
v io lated s ince the unjust threat is not w ronged in any way. Un iacke, Permissible Killing 
at 26-28; see also Kent Greenawal t , Conflicts of Law and Morality (Oxford : Oxford 
Universi ty Press, 1989) at 286. 
Rod in , War and Self-Defense a t 2 6 and aga in at 33. 
Ibid, at 33. 
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4.3.2 Self-defence: justification or excuse? 
On what theoretical basis is self-defensive force permitted: is it 
excusatory or justificatory in nature? This particular query was articulated 
by Smith: 
"It is debated whether certain acts done by way of self-defence or 
the defence of others are properly described as justified or 
excused. Whether the act done is one which society wants to be 
done, or merely tolerates, is a question which is not easy to 
answer if society has not expressed its wishes in the form of 
legislation or judicial decision.""^'' 
Although early historical classifications of the defence claimed it provided 
an excuse for a c t i o n , i t is now widely accepted that self-defence is a 
justification.^^ Justification is defended here as an all things considered 
judgement about the conduct under consideration.''^ Even though 
conduct which is justified may cause a setback to the interests of another 
person (for instance, causing someone pain by striking them) the action is 
not, on an all things considered evaluation, wrongful. Justified conduct is, 
therefore, permissible or right."^ 
If an action is permissible or right on an all things considered evaluation 
the implication is that justifications are to be assessed objectively, rather 
Smith , Justification and Excuse in the Criminal Law at 12. 
B lackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England IV vo lumes at 176. 
See Sangero , Self-Defence in Criminal Law at 30-35 for a conc ise history of the 
historical deve lopmen t of the defence; a lso Bernard J Brown, 'Se l f -Defence in Homic ide : 
From Strict Liabil i ty to Comp le te Exculpat ion ' [1958] Criminal Law Review 583. More 
recently o thers have a t tempted, unsuccessfu l ly , to c lassi fy se l f -defence as an excuse , 
see Cathryn J Rosen 'The Excuse of Sel f -Defense: Correct ing a Histor ical Acc iden t on 
Behal f of Bat tered W o m e n w h o Kill ' (1986) 96 American University Law Review 11 and 
Claire Finkelste in, 'Se l f -Defense as a Rat ional Excuse ' (1996) 57 University of 
Pittsburgh Law Review 6 2 1 . 
See Sangero , Self-Defence in Chminal Law at 14 and Rodin , War and Self-Defense at 
29-30. Fiona Lever ick, descr ibes sel f -defence as the "archetypa l just i f icat ion" in Killing 
in Self-Defence at 2. It has been sugges ted that this assumpt ion , wi thout further 
qual i f icat ion, is i l l -conceived, see Jonathan Rogers , 'Publ icat ion Review: Kil l ing in Self-
Defence ' (2008) Law Quarterly Review 172 at 173-175. See a lso Uniacke, Permissible 
Killing at 35. 
See the d iscuss ion in sect ion 3 .3 .1 .1 , and also Uniacke, Permissible Killing at 12-14. 
Un iacke concedes that there are weaker (permissib le act) and s t ronger (right act) 
s tandards of just i f icat ion but wherever conduct is just i f ied it is not wrongfu l , see 
Permissible Killing at 14. 
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than based on an agent-specific evaluation. If a defendant mistakenly 
believes s/he is about to be viciously attacked by an entirely innocent 
victim, from the defendant's agent-specific perspective s/he is justified in 
her/his response; but from a more informed objective all things 
considered perspective the action is wrongful and unjustified. It is 
proposed here that an action which is wrongful will be merely excused. 
4.3.3 Putative self-defence: justification or excuse? 
The self-defence justification is only available if the defendant responded 
to an unjust threat, that is, a threat posed for no objective moral reason. 
Hence, the defence may be relied on if the defensive action is, all things 
considered, the right thing to do. There are, however, some facets of 
self-defence which weaken the claim that self-defence is justificatory,'*^ 
one of which is the position of the person who mistakenly believes they 
need to use self-defensive force to ward off a threat. An all things 
considered judgement allows no room for mistaken beliefs on the part of 
the defendant and, as Horder correctly indicates, there is a conspicuous 
distinction between a self-defensive action being objectively morally 
justified, and that action being justified from the personal perspective of 
the agent!^^ 
If a defendant mistakenly believes they are being attacked there is no 
guiding justificatory reason for their action, even if the defendant acted for 
what they personally believed were good reasons. As discussed 
previously in section 3.3.1.1, individual justification for law-breaking is 
thought to be present only if, "there [is both] an applicable (guiding) 
reason for so acting...and that this correspond[s] with the (explanatory) 
reason why the action was performed."'''' So where the individual lacks 
''^ This point is h ighl ighted by Uniacke, Permissible Killing at 9. 
Horder, 'Se l f -Defence, Necessi ty and Duress: Unders tand ing the Relat ionship ' at 147, 
d rawing on the work of Uniacke, Permissible Killing at 15-17. 
Gardner , 'Just i f icat ion and Reasons ' in S imester and Smi th (eds ), Harm and 
Culpability ai 105. A s d iscussed in greater detai l in sect ion 3.3.1.1 above, others 
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guiding reasons for actions because s/he mistakenly but reasonably 
believes s/he is justified in using self-defensive force, the individual would 
merely be e x c u s e d . T h e absence of an objectively good reason for 
acting means that the defendant must rely on the authenticity of her/his 
belief to avoid criminal responsibility and this type of defence is 
consequently excusatory in structure."*^ To this end, there is an excuse 
form of self-defence whereby there is, overall, no guiding reason for the 
use of force but the defendant has a genuine well-grounded belief that 
they must act. The reasons behind the self-defensive action are personal 
to the actor rather than sound objective reasons to act, so on that basis 
the actor is merely excused and the excuse reflects the wrongness of the 
action. If the belief in the need to use force is, however, well-grounded,'*'' 
the stronger the personal reasons for the action and the more likely it is 
that a complete excuse will operate to absolve the actor of any criminal 
responsibility. 
propose that just i f ied conduc t requires either the ex is tence of gu id ing reasons for the 
act ion, o r exp lanatory reasons, but does not require both. Rob inson has ar t iculated the 
debate in te rms of a 'deeds ' theory of just i f icat ion and a ' reasons ' theory. On the 
' reasons ' theory act ion is just i f ied on the basis of explanatory reasons alone; an 
individual w h o mistakenly but genuine ly bel ieves in the need for se l f -defensive force is 
just i f ied i r respect ive of whether the force w a s actual ly necessary. Regard ing putat ive 
se l f -defence as a just i f icat ion s e e m s untenable, s ince it conveys the confus ing message 
that an act ion is lawful permiss ib le or r ight even though it is object ively wrongfu l . 
Converse ly , the 'deeds ' theory just i f ies cr iminal conduc t on the basis of guiding reasons 
a lone; an individual is just i f ied wheneve r just i fy ing c i rcumstances exist, regard less of 
whe ther they acted for a good reason, see Smi th , Justification and Excuse in tlie 
Criminal Law at 28-44. Rob inson is a chief p roponent of this approach , a long wi th 
Dressier and Greenawal t . On this theory of just i f icat ion, a mis taken (self) de fendant 
wou ld mere ly be excused as there w a s no gu id ing reason for their act ion. 
Indeed, F letcher addresses some diff icult, non-s tandard cases by vir tue of the vehic le 
of excuse: (1) innocent v ic t ims who protect themse lves by uti l ising equal ly innocent 
shie lds shou ld be excused for their conduc t rather than just i f ied; see George P Fletcher, 
'The Right to Life' (1980) 63 Ttie Monist 135; (2) v ic t ims w h o de fend themse lves on the 
basis of a m is taken belief that they are being a t tacked (putat ive se l f -defence) must be 
excused and not just i f ied; see Fletcher, Rethinl<ing Criminal Law at 762-769; and 'The 
Right and the Reasonab le ' (1985) 98 Harvard Law Review 949 at 971-980. 
As d iscussed in sect ion 3.3.1.3 above , the c lassi f icat ion of putat ive se l f -defence as an 
excuse has impl icat ions for third party rights of ass is tance and res is tance: a third party 
wou ld have a cor respond ing right to intervene to prevent the mis taken de fendant f rom 
exerc is ing wha t s/he bel ieves to be se l f -defensive force, and the innocent v ic t im wou ld 
have a r ight to resist the force emp loyed by the mis taken defendant . 
See sect ion 4.4.1.3 be low for fur ther d iscuss ion on whe the r the actor 's bel ief must be 
reasonable or merely honest . 
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4.3.4 A summary of the self-defence classification 
It may be concluded that in a situation where the circumstances are 
correctly perceived, the defendant is justified in exercising self-defensive 
force and their conduct is, therefore, lawful. If the individual is mistaken 
as to the existence of a threat, however, the action is merely excusable 
and consequently wrongful. Individual perception of events is therefore 
crucial to the nature of the classification. Having successfully established 
an appropriate structural classification for the defence attention must now 
turn to the reasons why self-defensive action which encroaches on the 
personal or proprietary interests of another is justifiable. 
4.3.5 Self-defence as a justification 
Although it is relatively uncontroversial to characterise self-defence as a 
justification, it is more difficult to explain the moral foundation of that 
justification. Determining i/i//?y the criminal law offers complete 
exoneration for those who use self-defensive force to repel unjust threats 
is central to any analysis of the scope of self-defence, particularly when 
force is permitted against innocent unjust threats. At first blush, self-
defence may seem a "morally transparent""*® defence in that its underlying 
doctrine is relatively simple. The most intuitive response to the question 
of why we are permitted to impinge on the protected interests of unjust 
threats in self-defence is, quite simply, that we are entitled to protect our 
own interests (or those of another) from any unjust threat against them. 
That is as much explanation as is required by many theorists; but it is 
clear that in order to construct a defensible account of the legitimacy of 
self-defensive force a more convincing explanation is required, one which 
goes beyond mere intuition. Against a moral theory which promotes the 
importance of autonomy and rights, what gives the self-defender the right 
to regard the interests of an unjust threat, particularly an innocent 
Judith J T h o m p s o n , 'Sel f -Defense ' (1991) 20 Philosophy and Public Affairs 283 at 
283. 
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threatening person, as less worthy than their own? To avoid criminal 
responsibility there must be a strong moral justification for encroaching on 
the protected interests of another person, particularly where they are not 
at fault for the threat they pose. 
A number of divergent theories have been advanced to explain the moral 
foundation of self-defence. The following sections provide a brief 
summary of some of the main contemporary approaches to this problem. 
The discussion will include accounts which explain the permissibility of 
self-defensive action on the grounds that it is beneficial, on a balance of 
harms (alternatively branded the 'lesser evils' or consequentialist 
approach); others that accept the personal preference of the defendant 
as paramount; and others based on the fact the self-defensive intrusions 
are essentially unintentional. Having rejected these competing theories, 
a rights-based approach is defended here based on a supplementary 
theory which dictates that the unjust threat forfeits their interests on 
account of the threat they pose. It is argued that this account succeeds 
where others fail in justifying the use of self-defensive force against 
innocent unjust threats, whilst precluding the justification in the case of 
intrusions against innocent non-threatening bystanders. 
4.3.6 Consequentialist approaches 
Philosophical explanations which may broadly be categorised as 
'consequentialist' provide the most significant alternative to the rights-
based philosophies defended in section 4.3.9 below. For some theorists 
the moral foundation of self-defence is grounded in consequentialism 
which, as a general theory, dictates that "...the moral value of any action 
lies in the consequences.'"*^ In essence, consequentialism maintains that 
actions are right or wrong according to the consequences they produce 
as opposed to any intrinsic features of the conduct itself. Proponents of 
Bernard Wi l l iams, 'A Cri t ique of Ut i l i tar ianism' in JJC Smar t & Bernard Wi l l i ams, 
Utilitarianism: For and Against {Cambridge. Cambr idge Universi ty Press, 1973) at 79. 
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consequentialist accounts of self-defence claim that the use of force is 
justified because the consequences of invading the interests of the 
aggressor are preferable to the consequences of allowing the victim's 
interests to be violated.^° 
One account based on consequentialist reasoning is that self-defence is 
justified if, on balancing the harm caused by the use offeree against the 
harm avoided, overall harm is minimised or the 'lesser evil' is chosen. 
Although this approach seems commendable in that it promotes the 
greater good, most subscribers take into account the guilt of the 
aggressor in carrying out the balancing exercise and this inevitably 
excludes innocent unjust threats from consideration.^^ The challenge for 
consequentialist accounts is that they must explain why the defendant 
chooses the lesser evil when, for instance, a lethal attack is warded off 
with lethal harm: on the face of it the harms are equal. In response, one 
variant of such a theory suggests that the value of the aggressor's 
interests is reduced on account of their moral blameworthiness. This 
explanation is labelled the 'discount' approach, as the value of the harm 
to the aggressor's interests is discounted on the overall balance of harms. 
For Robinson, the aggressor's culpability is "seen as discounting the 
value of their lives in the balance."^^ For Montague, the interests of the 
aggressor are morally weakened by virtue of the threat they pose and this 
renders their interests less worthy than that of the v i c t i m . H a r m can 
^° Many commenta to rs have ignored consequent ia l is t accounts a l together, see Un iacke 
Permissible Killing and Kasachkof f , 'Kil l ing in Sel f -Defence: an Unquest ionab le or 
Prob lemat ic Defence? ' Others have d ismissed t hem as unworthy of cons idera t ion , see 
Judith J T h o m s o n , Rights. Restitution and Risk: Essays in Moral Theory (Cambr idge : 
Harvard Universi ty Press, 1986) at 43. 
Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law at 858. 
Rob inson, Criminal Law Defenses at 70. A simi lar approach was taken more recently 
in a monograph penned by Sangero a l though the te rm 'consequent ia l i sm ' is avo ided and 
the account a lso takes a broader range of cons iderat ions into account , such as the 
social- legal order, see Sangero Self-Defence in Criminal Law at 90 -106 
Montague , 'Se l f -Defense and Choos ing Be tween Lives ' ; Phi l l ip Mon tague , 'The 
Moral i ty of Se l f -Defense: A Reply to W a s s e r m a n ' (1988) 17 Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 8 1 . 
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thus be distributed to the aggressor because the culpability of the latter 
forced the defendant to choose between competing interests 54 
An alternative consequentialist approach suggests that the use of self-
defensive force is justified by the fact that an overall beneficial result is 
achieved through the adoption of a rule that permits such a c t i o n . T h i s 
'rule-consequentialist' approach is argued to be desirable on the basis 
that "awareness by a potential aggressor that force against him is 
legitimate is itself a deterrent factor."^^ It appears, however, to justify 
infringements on the aggressor's interests when the force was no longer 
necessary to repel the threat, for example because the aggressor has 
become incapacitated.^'' It is also submitted here that a rule permitting 
attacked persons to legitimately intrude on the interests of aggressors in 
self-defence is unlikely to deter the aggressor from engaging in violent 
attacks.^® Other theorists^^ have essentially amalgamated the 'act' and 
'rule' forms of consequentialism in the various theories they have 
advanced. Leverick summarises the contention of these hybrid 
consequentialist accounts as follows: "if the benefits to society in having a 
rule likely to deter aggression are placed on the 'same side of the scales' 
as the life of the victim, then self-defensive killing is justified on this 
Other p roponents of the ' forced cho ice ' concept ion include Cheyney Ryan , 'Self-
Defense, Paci f ism and the Possibi l i ty of Kil l ing' (1983) 93 Ethics 508. T h e credibi l i ty of 
this exp lanat ion is doub ted by S e a m u s Miller, 'Se l f -Defence and Forc ing the Cho ice 
be tween Lives' (1992) 9 Journal of Applied Philosophy 239. 
Rodin cr i t ic ises this reasoning in War and Self-Defense at 54. 
Richard B Brandt, 'Consc ience (Rule) Ut i l i tar ianism and the Cr iminal Law' (1995) 14 
Law and Philosophy 65 at 88. Th is is ef fect ively the approach ar t icu lated by Sangero 
Self-Defence in Criminal Law at 90-106. In his proposed rat ionale Sange ro a t tempts to 
just i fy se l f -defence by invoking a comp lex evaluat ion exerc ise wh ich ba lances the 
interests of the aggressor with the interests of the a t tacked person, and wh ich takes into 
account the guilt of the aggressor and the need to protect the 'social legal order' . 
" This point is acknow ledged by Kad ish , 'Respect for Life and Regard for Rights in 
Cr iminal Law' at 883 and W a s s e r m a n , 'Just i fy ing Se l f -Defense ' at 360. 
®^ Converse ly , Fiona Lever ick suggests that such a rule may, in fact, p romote 
aggress ion , "either by encourag ing aggressors to a rm themse lves more heavi ly because 
they know that their in tended v ic t ims are permi t ted to use se l f -defensive force, or by 
encourag ing v ic t ims to uti l ize self de fens ive force aga ins t aggressors too quickly, sa fe in 
the knowledge that they wil l not face pun ishment for doing so," Fiona Lever ick, 
'Defending Se l f -Defence ' (2007) 27 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 563 at 568. 
®^ Including Rob inson Criminal Law Defenses. Mi r iam Gur-Arye, 'Shou ld the Cr iminal 
Law Dist inguish be tween Necessi ty as a Just i f icat ion and Necessi ty as an Excuse? ' 
(1986) 102 Law Quarterly Review 7 1 ; and Mordecha i Kremnitzer , Proport ional i ty and 
the Psychot ic Aggressor : Another V iew' (1983) 18 Israel Law Review 178. 
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balance of i n t e r e s t s . I t is argued below that no matter how theories 
based on consequences are explained they suffer from fundamental 
deficiencies which render a rights-based approach decidedly more 
attractive. 
It is undeniable that the consequences of an action are morally relevant 
to an evaluation of permissibility but it is questionable whether 
consequences are the only or even the dominant moral consideration.®^ 
Many commentators have rejected approaches which discount the value 
of the aggressor's interests on account of their culpability, since all 
human interests should be valued equally.®^ Further, if culpability 
diminishes the value of the aggressor's life and moral worth is the priority, 
the presumption is that the general moral character of both aggressor and 
victim should be taken into account. The logical implication of the 
discount approach is that the victim's life is subject to discount in the 
same way as the aggressor's if s/he has a poor moral history.®"^ 
Conversely, what if the aggressor threatened the defendant in a rare 
moment of rage, but was on the verge of discovering a cure for cancer? 
In such circumstances consequentialist theories would presumably prefer 
for the victim of the attack to be harmed rather than the aggressor, but 
this is unjust to the individual and completely neglects notions of 
individual rights and justice. 
A more rigorous objection to such theories is the absence of guidance on 
the relative worth of competing interests. Suppose a victim is attacked by 
ten yobs; although of bad character, they retain some value in terms of 
what their lives are worth. The danger is that the collective worth of this 
®° Lever ick, Killing in Self-Defence at 49 . 
®^  Consequent ia l is t approaches are cr i t ic ised by Lever ick, Ibid, at 45 -50 and Rodin War 
and Self-Defense at 51-55. 
See W a s s e r m a n , 'Just i fy ing Se l f -Defense ' at 358; Shiomi t Wal lers te in 'Just i fy ing the 
Right to Sel f -Defense: A Theory of Forced Consequences ' (2005) 91 Virginia Law 
Review 999 at 1003; and Lever ick 'Defending Se l f -Defence ' at 566. Indeed, Rob inson 
himsel f appears to d isassoc ia te h imsel f w i th the d iscount pr inciple th roughout his later 
work , see Criminal Law Defenses at 7 0 - 7 1 . 
®^  Lever ick, Killing in Self-Defence at 46. 
This point is emphas ised by Lever ick, 'Defending Se l f -Defence ' at 567 . 
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multiplicity of aggressors may outweigh the relatively high value of the 
sole victim's life, and thus self-defensive killing in such circumstances is, 
by virtue of this approach, unjustifiable.^^ Unless the aggressor's life is 
devalued to the point of worthlessness, the discount approach does not 
account adequately for the problem of multiple aggressors.^^ 
Arguably the most central criticism to accounts based on balancing 
harms^'' is the lack of consideration afforded to innocent unjust threats. 
Any argument based on the culpability of the aggressor cannot justify the 
use of lethal self-defensive force against innocent threats, active or 
pass i ve . Innocen t aggressors lacking technical fault for their actions 
cannot plausibly be subject to any kind of discounting of their moral 
worth; nor can innocent passive threats who are not positively aggressing 
at all. In general, advocates of such theories refute any suggestion that 
the exclusion of innocent threats leaves the theory flawed.^° They simply 
require self-defence against innocent aggressors and passive threats to 
be alternatively excused,''^ or justified by some other means. 
®^  This point is h ighl ighted by Rodin, War and Self-Defense at 53 and W a s s e r m a n 
'Just i fy ing Se l f -Defense ' at 359. 
®® Lever ick quest ions the plausibi l i ty of this cr i t ic ism on the basis that it a s s u m e s the 
interests of the mult ip le aggressors are joint ly d iscountab le , when they may in fact be 
several ly d iscountab le , see Lever ick, Killing In Self-Defence at 47 -48 . 
A point conceded by Sangero , Self-Defence in Criminal Law at 48 . 
®^  Fletcher 'Proport ional i ty and the Psychot ic Aggressor : A V ignet te in Compara t i ve 
Cr iminal Theory ' at 378; Kadish, 'Respect for Life and Regard for Rights in the Cr iminal 
Law' at 884. 
en 
Mindful of these def ic iencies, some, including Nancy Davis, 'Abort ion and Self-
Defense ' (1984) 13 Philosoptiy and Public Affairs 171 at 189-190, have g rounded the 
just i f icat ion of se l f -defence in te rms of the ' future ha rm ' approach , wh ich c la ims that self-
defens ive force is just i f iable on the basis that it leads to a net prevent ion of ha rm as the 
aggressor is dangerous and likely to at tack again. The benef i t of th is approach over the 
d iscount theory is that it can at least just i fy the intrusions on the r ights of innocent 
aggressors (such as the insane who , a l though b lameless , may be dangerous ) and 
mult iple aggressors . But it is not thorough enough to be conv inc ing as it does not just i fy 
the use of force against innocent pass ive threats d iscussed in sect ion 4.2.2.2 above. 
^° Sangero 's rat ionale for se l f -defensive force based on the culpabi l i ty of the aggressor 
does not ex tend to innocent aggressors . He does not see this l imitat ion on his rat ionale 
as fatal to his account ; he merely proposes that at tacks by an innocent aggressor are 
outs ide the scope of se l f -defence and fall instead wi th in the sphere of excusatory 
necessi ty, see Sangero , Self-Defence in Criminal Law at 48 . Sangero has subsequent ly 
been cri t ic ised for this unexp la ined and consequent ly unconv inc ing submiss ion , see 
Leverick, 'Defending Se l f -Defence ' at 569. 
""^  See Larry A lexander , 'Just i f icat ion and Innocent Aggressors ' (1987) 33 Wayne Law 
Review 1177 at 1185; and Kremnitzer , 'Proport ional i ty and the Psychot ic Aggressor : 
Another V iew ' (1983) at 196, ci ted in Sangero , Self-Defence in Criminal Law at 58. 
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It seems that, in general, consequentialist explanations of self-defence 
which count the aggressor's guilt as a relevant factor are inadequate. 
Although in essence the approach is meritorious in that it justifies the 
conduct that causes least harm, the evaluation of actions on mere 
consequences alone neglects fundamental issues of individual human 
rights and justice, and does not explain what weight should be attached 
to competing interests. No one consequentialist account would provide a 
fair result in respect of non-culpable threats and an explanation of why it 
is permissible to intrude on the rights of innocent unjust threats is 
essential to this thesis. It is submitted here that these criticisms are 
insurmountable and that a more robust account of self-defence which is 
applicable to all unjust threats and which gives sufficient respect to the 
rights of all parties must be located elsewhere. 
4.3.7 Personal partiality approach 
An alternative explanation suggests that self-defence is justified because 
people are entitled to give preference to their own lives in situations of 
forced choice simply because they personally value it more. This 
approach is deemed the 'personal partiality' or 'indifference'''^ argument/'^ 
Unlike consequentialist accounts focused on the fault of the aggressor, 
this theory provides a plausible justification for certain intrusions on the 
rights of innocent threats in self-defence. A situation may arise whereby 
there is a genuine conflict of equal rights where, say, an insane person 
lunges at the defendant with a knife in an unprovoked attack. On the face 
of it, due to the non-culpability of the threat, there is no moral reason to 
justify the defensive response of the accused if, for instance, they kill the 
''^  For instance, on the basis of the personal partial ity approach , see Montague , 'Self-
Defense and Choos ing Between Lives' at 211-212. 
Kasachkof f , 'Kil l ing in Se l f -Defence: A n Unques t ionab le or Prob lemat ic Defence? ' at 
520. 
Proponents include Davis, 'Abort ion and Sel f -Defense ' ; Levine, 'The Mora l 
Permissibi l i ty of Kill ing a Mater ia l Aggressor in Sel f -Defence ' ; and Montague , 'Self-
Defense and Choos ing be tween Lives' . 
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insane attacker. It follows that in such circumstances the defendant is 
simply permitted to use self-defence because s/he personally values the 
protection of his/her own interests over that of any person who poses a 
threat to them. Indeed, it is understandable that a defendant would give 
priority to their own interests, even if they are aware that the threatening 
person is innocent. On this view, concession is made to what Blackstone 
has termed "the passions of the human mind"^^ arising from a moral 
permission to prefer oneself over even an innocent threat if 
circumstances arise for which no one is morally or legally responsible. 
This moral explanation has consequentialist overtones in that self-
defence is phrased in terms of justifying a particular distribution of harms. 
Accordingly it may be conceived as an 'agent-relative' form of 
consequentialism in that the victim is entitled to protect her/his interests 
over those of a threatening person because s/he personally values them 
more. 
Semantics aside, this approach is, like consequentialist accounts based 
on the aggressor's culpability, vulnerable to criticism. The theory is 
substantially flawed as it is ill-equipped to defend claims that the 
aggressor is equally justified in launching a counterattack by virtue of 
their personal preferences. The account also lacks appropriate 
boundaries and therefore allows latitude for the justification of, for 
instance, killing an innocent bystander in self-preservation.''^ On this 
approach, for instance, a woman suffering from a weak heart would be 
justified in killing another to obtain their healthy heart with no respect 
being afforded to the rights of the innocent unoffending victim. Perhaps 
the most potent criticism is that the personal partiality approach simply 
does not offer a sufficient explanation of why the self-defender is 
permitted to override the rights of the threat. The absence of any clear 
reasoning renders this approach nothing short of "egoism."^^ It may be 
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England volume III at 3-4. 
See Michael Gorr, 'Private Defence' (1990) 9 Law and Philosophy 241 at 252 and 
Kasachkoff, 'Killing in Self-Defence: An Unquestionable or Problematic Defence?' at 
526. 
Gorr, 'Private Defence' at 252. 
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more acceptable to suggest that a defendant who attaches greater value 
to their own Interests could be provided with an excuse for their conduct, 
but as a theory of justification, personal partiality is insubstantial. 
4,3.8 The doctrine of double effect 
A further justification for the use of self-defensive force derives from the 
doctrine of double effect/^ In essence, the theory asserts that 
intentionally doing bad acts for the sake of good consequences to follow 
is always wrong; but it may be permissible to do a good act in the 
knowledge that bad consequences may follow. Thus it can be morally 
permissible to bring about the death of another provided it was not 
intended. If the good effect is proportionate to the foreseen bad effect, 
the act may be permitted by virtue of this doctrine.''^ The term 'double 
effect' derives from the influential work of Aquinas, who claimed that: 
"...moral acts take their species according to what is intended and 
not according to what is beside the intention, since that is 
accidental. . . Accordingly, self-defence may have two effects: one, 
the saving of one's life; the other, the slaying of the aggressor."®° 
The central tenets of the doctrine were developed through the work of 
Anscombe, who stated that killing in self-defence was justified whereby 
the death of the other was not intended, but was a mere side effect of the 
measures taken to ward off the attack. 
The primary objection generated by this theory is that it is questionable 
whether there is any meaningful distinction between the intended effects 
Double effect is a predominant theory within Roman Catholic theology. 
See Suzanne Uniacke, The Doctrine of Double Effect' (1984) 48 The Thomist 188, 
and the subsequent development of the critique in Uniacke, Permissible Killing chapter 
4. 
®° Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (London; Blackfriars, 1975) at Article 7. 
Gertrude EM Anscombe, War and Murder' in Gertrude EM Anscombe, Ethics, 
Religion and Politics. Collected Philosophical Papers (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1981) at 54. 
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of self-defensive force and merely foreseeable consequences.^^ The 
moral difference between the two is arguably too fine to have any real 
significance. Drawing on the example given by Kadish, if a self-defender 
is confronted by a person who is threatening her with a weapon and 
responds by shooting the threatening person at close range between the 
eyes, "it seems strange to allow [her] to say [she] did not choose to take 
[the life of the threatening person], but that [she] chose only to prevent 
the attack."^^ These are fundamental deficiencies which enable the 
doctrine of double effect to be dispensed with expeditiously, and help us 
to understand why even supporters of the general doctrine have doubted 
whether it can be applied with any relevance to the law on self-defence.^'* 
4.3.9 Rights-based approaches 
4.3.9.1 Introduction to rights-based philosophies 
None of the competing philosophical explanations of self-defence 
considered thus far have satisfied intuitions regarding the scope of self-
defensive force. This is arguably because less attention is focused on 
the rights and protected interests of the defendant and innocent victim, as 
other moral considerations take precedence. By subordinating rights the 
accounts presented above have been either over-inclusive (that is, they 
have permitted self-defence to be used against innocent bystanders) or 
under-inclusive (in that certain innocent threats have been excluded from 
the justification). It is therefore submitted here that an explanation which 
emphasises the significance of rights will provide the most plausible 
justification for using self-defensive force. The account will accommodate 
the use of force against innocent threats and exclude force used against 
On this point see Douglas Husak, The Complete Guide to Self-Defense' (1996) 15 
Law and Philosophy 399 at 405. 
" Kadish, 'Respect for Life and Regard for Rights in Criminal Law' at 880. 
Germain Grisez, 'Towards a Consistent Natural Law Ethic of Killing' (1970) 15 
American Journal of Jurisprudence 64 at 79. 
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innocent b y s t a n d e r s . T h e basic tenets of the approach are explained in 
greater detail below. 
In a liberal society autononny is a fiercely guarded right and one popular 
explanation of the self-defence justification is based on the notion that if 
the defendant's autonomy is compronnised by an intrusion from a 
threatening person, then the defendant has a right to repel the threat to 
protect her/his a u t o n o m y . I n other words, any encroachment on the 
living standard of another is sufficient to justify a self-defensive response. 
The advantage this approach has over others rejected above is that the 
culpability of the aggressor is irrelevant, due to the central notion of 
objective wrongdoing: 
"what counts is the objective nature of the aggressor's 
intrusion...Defending one's living space is not to punish the 
intruder for his culpable conduct, but to nullify an objectively hostile 
intrusion by an enemy."^'^ 
The definition of an unjust threat has already been established in section 
4.2.2 above as one which is posed for no objectively justified reason and 
both culpable and innocent threats (active or passive) are accommodated 
by this definition. The account developed thus far, then, asserts that an 
unjust threat violates the autonomy of the defendant and the defendant 
can respond with self-defensive force by encroaching in some degree on 
the (usually protected) domain of the threatening person. But why are the 
rights of the unjust threat subordinated in this way? If both the defendant 
and the aggressor have equal rights of autonomy why is it permissible for 
the defendant to intrude on the rights of the threatening person but not 
For a detailed exposition of the virtues of this approach see Levericl<, Killing in Self-
Defence at 54-68. For some commentators, however, rights-based considerations are 
categorically rejected, see Sangero, Self-Defence in Criminal Law at 44. 
John Locke talked of an absolute right of the defendant to protect one's own liberty 
and other rights from intrusions by an aggressor, see Locke Treatise of Civil 
Government al 14. 
" Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law at 862. 
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vice versa, despite the fact that at the point of engagement each is an 
equally potent threat to the other?^^ 
Further explanation is required in order to fully comprehend why the 
defendant's autonomy outweighs the equivalent rights of the victim. 
According to some theorists, the outstanding problem with any rights-
based theory of justification is that it does not provide a satisfactory 
account of why, given the universality of basic human r i g h t s , t h e 
defendant can protect his own rights by diminishing the rights of the 
threatening person. It is acknowledged here that to be workable, such 
accounts require a corresponding theory of forfeiture in order to make 
these issues morally comprehensible. With a forfeiture theory, there is 
some rationalisation of whyVne threat does not possess the same basic 
and universal rights as the defendant in equal measure.^° It has been 
suggested that, in cases of self-defensive force, the threat may sacrifice 
their rights in one of two ways: first, by forfeiting rights by virtue of their 
threatening action; or alternatively, by virtue of the fact that rights contain 
implicit limitations meaning that their effective functioning depends on 
non-engagement in aggressive ac t i on .A l t hough presented as separate 
explanations, they are theoretically and moral indistinct in that they both 
deny the unconditional nature of rights, which is explained with reference 
to significant facts about the relationship between the threatening person 
and the defendant.^^ In essence, by virtue of their behaviour being 
objectively wrong, or unjust, the defendant secures a right of self-defence 
which entails a corresponding duty incumbent upon the threat not to 
Rodin articulates this difficulty as the 'moral asymmetry' between aggressor and 
defender, in David Rodin, War and Self-Defense (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 
at 70-71. 
®^ Leslie J Macfarlane, The Theory and Practice of Human Rights (London: Maurice 
Temple Smith, 1985) at 3. 
^° Some writers have deemed 'forfeiture' as a theory of justification in its own right, see 
Nancy M Omichinski, 'Applying the Theories of Justifiable Homicide to Conflicts in the 
Doctrine of Self-Defense' (1987) 33 Wayne Law Review 1447 at 1449. It is, however, 
more fruitful to ground forfeiture as part of a justification of self-defence that also 
includes appeals to hghts. As Leverick highlights, there would be nothing to forfeit if the 
unjust threat possessed no rights in the first instance, see Leverick, Killing in Self-
Defence at 61 . 
Rodin, War and Self-Defense at 70-77. 
Ibid, at 74. 
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respond. In order to give the rights-based account a more profound 
explanatory force it is necessary to examine why, at the moment of 
engagement, the defender has the right to intrude on the autonomy of the 
threat and the threatening person no longer has the right to respond (or, 
conversely, has a duty not to resist). 
4.3.9.2 Rights and a supplementary theory of forfeiture 
The most sophisticated and stimulating contributions to date on the 
forfeiture theory emanate from the work of Suzanne Uniacke^^ and Judith 
Jarvis T h o m s o n . F o r both, the permissibility of self-defensive force is 
grounded on the premise that all human beings have basic rights^^ and 
rights are worthy of protection even if that means recourse to defensive 
force. Both schemes provide an objective account of what constitutes an 
unjust threat to a person's rights. Whilst many features of the two 
accounts are similar, there is some disparity in that Thomson's account is 
constructed upon a notion of temporary forfeiture whilst Uniacke's is 
predicated upon what she terms 'qualification'. To elaborate, for 
Thomson the aggressor only forfeits their rights as long as they pose an 
unjust threat to the victim. When the unjust threat ceases, the rights of 
the formerly threatening person are immediately r e s t o r e d . T h i s 
proposed temporary state of forfeiture does not, however, sit comfortably 
with the concept that fundamental human rights cannot be temporarily 
disengaged.^'' In response to this criticism Uniacke developed a theory 
couched in slightly different terms in order to avoid the difficulties 
®^  Whose most comprehensive contribution to date consists of Permissible Killing. See 
also 'In Defence of Permissible Killing: A Response to Two Critics' (2000) 19 Law and 
Philosophy 627, and 'Rights and Relativistic Justifications: Replies to Kasachkoff and 
Husak' (2000) 19 Law and Philosophy 645. 
Whose most significant work in this area is entitled 'Self-Defense' (1991) 20 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 283. See also Rights, Restitution and Risk: Essays in 
Moral Theory. See also the careful analysis of these two accounts in Leverick, Killing in 
Self-Defence at 60-68. 
®^  Both accounts focus on the right to life, but a broader conception of rights is 
considered here, with a right to autonomy being of paramount importance. 
®^ Thomson, 'Self-Defense' at 320; and Rodin, War and Self-Defense at 71-72. 
Kadish, 'Respect for Life and Regard for Rights in Criminal Law' at 884; Wallerstein 
'Justifying the Right to Self-Defense: A Theory of Forced Consequences' at 1020. 
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associated with forfeiture^® but sharing almost identical features. On this 
account, the acquisition of rights is conditional upon appropriate conduct. 
For example, if a human being becomes an unjust and immediate threat 
to another person's life, rather than having lost or forfeited their right to 
not be killed they simply do not acquire a right to life in the first instance. 
As already mentioned, it appears that the distinction between the two 
accounts is principally one of expression, and Uniacke herself concedes 
that there is little theoretical difference between more explicit forfeiture 
theories and the mask for forfeiture that is the specification theory.''°° 
Thus the two accounts will be treated as one insofar as they both explain 
with equal rigour that it is permissible to exercise self-defensive force 
against an unjust threat because their rights are absent subject to the 
continued presence of the threat. 
4.3.9.3 Forfeiture and culpability 
Some commentators suggest that a considerable chink in the armoury of 
the rights-based forfeiture explanation of self-defence is that it does not 
spell out why self-defensive force can be used against an innocent active 
or passive unjust threat. It is, morally speaking, undeniably more 
challenging to rationalise self-defensive force which involves a serious 
intrusion against innocent active and passive threats. Some forfeiture 
accounts exclude self-defensive force used against innocent threats on 
the basis that rights cannot be forfeited unless the threatening person is 
Uniacke has consistently maintained that her explicit rejection of the term 'forfeiture' is 
intended to avoid the negative connotations of the term, which suggests that the unjust 
threat deserves to be punished in some way, see 'In Defence of Permissible Killing: A 
Response to Two Critics' at 627 and Permissible Killing at 195. 
®^  Thomson calls this theory 'the method of factual specification' in Rights, Restitution 
and Risk: Essays in Moral Theory at 38. Rodin suggests that there is no material 
difference between the accounts offered by Thomson and Uniacke, see War and Self-
Defense at 74. 
Indeed, there are numerous instances of Uniacke's seemingly mistaken referral to 
'forfeiture' as opposed to 'specification' throughout her work, a discrepancy highlighted 
by Tziporah Kasachkoff, 'Comment and Reply to Suzanne Uniacke's 'A Response to 
Two Critics' (2000) 19 Law and Philosophy 635 at 636-637. 
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b l a m e w o r t h y . I t is submitted here that the version of forfeiture 
expounded by Thomson and Uniacke successfully accommodates the 
difficult cases involving innocent unjust threats, since no significance is 
attached to the culpability of the threatening person. This latter approach 
offers a defensible account of the philosophical underpinning of self-
defence since it supports the premise maintained throughout this thesis 
that defensive action taken to repel an objectively unjust innocent threat 
is permissible, whilst action taken against an unoffending non-threatening 
bystander is wrongful. 
For some commentators, however, fault is the central issue in any 
account of forfeiture. Rodin, for instance, advances an explanatory 
account of the self-defence justification in which fault plays a decisive role 
which, for him, completes any rights-based justification of self-defence. 
He undertakes a moral comparison between the threatening person, 
whose conduct puts her/him at a moral disadvantage in respect to the 
defendant, and the latter, whose inherent innocence enables him to reap 
the moral advantage. The defendant does no moral wrong to the 
threat^°^ and does not forfeit her/his own rights at the point of 
engagement. For Rodin, it is not permissible to use self-defensive force 
against an innocent threatening person who lacks responsibility for the 
harm caused. For him, the self-defence justification simply cannot extend 
to force used against innocent active or passive threats. Kasachkoff and 
Dressier are equally of this view, and for all three the forfeiture principle is 
transparently linked to c u l p a b i l i t y . B y adhering to a rights-based 
justification of self-defence which acknowledges a role for fault, Rodin et 
al profess the view that because innocent threats lack technical fault 
within the meaning of the criminal law, intrusions on their rights are 
impermissible and unjustifiable. Rodin bases his premise on the 
assumption that even when confronted by a threat of death we must 
See Rodin, War and Self-Defense at 77. 
Assuming that the defendant did not provoke the incident in the first place. 
See Kasachkoff, 'Killing in Self-Defence: An Unquestionable or Problematic 
Defence?' at 519; Joshua Dressier, 'Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defence in Search of 
a Rationale' (1982) 73 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 421 at 454. See also 
Ryan, 'Self-Defence, Pacifism and the Possibility of Killing'. 
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acknowledge the vulnerability of certain classes of people. On this view, 
innocent threats are, by virtue of their absence of criminal responsibility, 
worthy of exclusion from the exercise of legitimate self-defensive rights. 
Rodin claims that innocent aggressors are acting without volition or 
intention, and thus cannot plausibly be under any duty to abstain from 
conduct which they essentially have no responsibility for. For him, the 
suggestion that someone can involuntarily violate the rights of another is 
nonsensical, and because they lack responsibility innocent aggressors 
are excused for their conduct. Following this reasoning, an innocent 
threat cannot be understood as a moral subject as there is no connection 
between the threat they pose and their movement sufficient to warrant the 
exercise of self-defensive f o r c e . I t would seem therefore, on this 
account, that the nature of the excuse rendering the threat non-culpable 
could affect the defensive rights of the defendant.^°^ An innocent 
aggressor has contributed nothing to the harmful behaviour and that is 
why, for Rodin, killing her/him in self-defence is impermissible. Since it 
may seem hard justice to hold a person guilty for using lethal self-
defensive force against a dangerous automaton or a mistaken aggressor 
to save their own life, the defendant may alternatively avoid criminal 
responsibility on the basis of an excuse defence. 
Rodin suggests that threats must derive from a person who is properly understood as 
a moral subject rather than a mere physical entity, see War and Self-Defense at 88. 
Rodin classifies excuses into three forms, so the effect that the character of the 
excuse has on the permissibility or otherwise of self-defensive action can be analysed. 
(1) Excuses may take the form of those in which the agent lacks the intention to perform 
the proscribed act. This category is comprised of agents affected by physical 
compulsion, automatism or complete mistakes, and negates the use of lethal defensive 
force in such circumstances as the threats could not appropriately be treated as 'moral 
subjects'. (2) Duress, necessity and provocation constitute excuses whereby actions 
are intentional but the will is so overwhelmingly overborne by threats that the action 
could no longer be treated as voluntary. (3) Infancy, involuntary intoxication and insanity 
are excuses in which the agent lacks the capacity for full and proper deliberation of the 
legal and ethical issues involved to form the necessary mens rea See Rodin War and 
Self-Defense at 90. In response to this criticism, not all excuses render the threatening 
person 'innocent' in the sense that they lack volition or intention. If harmful acts are 
excused because of mistake or duress, for instance, the actors are not necessarily 
removed entirely beyond obligation and duty; to invoke these excuses the actors are 
acting from their own volition and with intention. Thus, the rights of the defendant are 
still violated, even though the actor would be excused from liability. 
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It is asserted here that forfeiture theories which are devoted to the 
culpability of the threat are unsustainable and it is arguably more 
plausible to view the threatening conduct objectively, absent any 
consideration of the fault of the threatening individual. For Uniacke and 
other proponents of a similar theory,^°^ forfeiture should be unconcerned 
with notions of fault since it is the conduct of the threatening person that 
is critical to the rationalisation of the self-defence justification.^"'' In short, 
the non-culpable threatening person's rights are abrogated purely by 
virtue of the threat s/he p o s e s . I n defence of this somewhat 
controversial stance is the persuasive argument that an absence of fault 
on the part of the threatening person does not affect the normative 
position of the defendant, whose interests remain under threat for no 
good reason. The unjust nature of the threat is therefore what makes 
defensive action taken to ward off that threat permissible as opposed to 
wrongful. Necessary and proportionate action taken to repel an unjust 
threat arguably does no injustice as the threatening person is not 
wronged where the threat itself is unjust from an objective perspective. It 
is submitted here that in such circumstances the defendant is not merely 
excused for a wrongful violation of the threatening person's rights; s/he 
has a legal permission to set back the interests of the innocent threat in 
self-defence. Consequently, a version of the forfeiture theory which is 
indifferent to the culpability of the threatening person arguably provides 
the most acceptable explanation of the scope of the self-defence 
justification. It delineates appropriate boundaries for the defence and 
gives effect to the morally salient distinction between an unoffending non-
threatening innocent bystander, against whom rights violations are unjust 
or wrongful, and an innocent person who poses an objectively unjust 
threat. A defendant is permitted to utilise self-defensive force against the 
Leverick, Killing in Self-Defence at 60-68. 
Uniacke, 'In Defence of Permissible Killing: A Response to Two Critics' at 629. 
Ibid, at 629. 
This view reflects Uniacke's desire to reject any notion of forfeiture as a punishment; 
see also Wallerstein 'Justifying the Right to Self-Defense: A Theory of Forced 
Consequences' at 1013; Frances Kamm, 'Insanity Defence, Innocent Threats and 
Limited Alternatives' (1987) 6 Criminal Justice Ethics 6^ , and Lana K Stell, 'Close 
Encounters of the Lethal Kind: The Use of Deadly Force in Self-Defence' (1986) 49 Law 
and Contemporary Problems 113. 
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latter on account of the existence of the threat to their own interests or 
those of another, which is posed for no good reason. 
4.3.9.4 Other criticisms 
The forfeiture account defended here is not only criticised for its 
ignorance of fault. Ryan^^° claims that forfeiture accounts permit self-
defensive force even where it could have been avoided by invoking some 
lesser means of defence. According to general liberal philosophy we are 
duty-bound to avoid encroaching on the living standard of another 
person, and presumably to use the least harmful method of overcoming 
the threat posed. It must be conceded that Thomson and Uniacke do 
little to address this issue in their respective accounts, but this problem 
may be circumvented by adding a further qualification to the theory. 
Where a person poses an unjust and immediate threat to the life of the 
defendant, and there is no alternative means of repelling the threat, then, 
and only then, the defendant may legitimately invoke self-defensive 
f o r c e . A related criticism of the forfeiture account is that it does not 
explicitly restrict the use of self-defensive force when it is no longer 
necessary to avoid the threat p o s e d . P r i m a facie the forfeiture theory 
seems to advocate that once the rights pertaining to the threat have been 
forfeited it is permissible to exercise self-defence even if the threat has 
dissipated. Kasachkoff makes the insightful point that the forfeiture 
theory, "seem[s] to undercut the requirement that we use the least force 
necessary to defend ourselves,"^ '^^  by focusing too intently on the conduct 
of the unjust threat. In response to this criticism, it must be emphasised 
that neither version of the forfeiture account advocated here asserts that 
aggressors forfeit their rights indefinitely. It is not permissible to use self-
n o 
111 
See Ryan, 'Self-Defence, Pacifism and the Possibility of Killing'. 
See Smart, Understanding and Justifying Self-Defense'. See also Leverick, Killing in 
Self-Defence at 65-66. 
A more detailed discussion on the necessity and proportionality limitations of self-
defence can be found at section 4.4 below. 
Kasachkoff, 'Killing in Self-Defence: An Unquestionable or Problematic Defence?' at 
517. 
142 
defensive force against a non-threatening person who no longer poses an 
unjust threat, because such a person has attained (Uniacke) or regained 
(Thomson) equal rights to life and liberty. Rodin helpfully deflects any 
argument that forfeiture accounts do not explain the limitations of 
imminence, proportionality and necessity generally by claiming that 
forfeiture is not only concerned with the forfeit of the threatening person's 
rights but also with "facts about the status, condition, actions and 
intentions of both the par t ies . "^Hence, the limitations on the defence 
are still relevant even though the unjust threat has forfeited their rights. 
4.3.10 A summary of the moral basis of self-defence 
It is relatively uncomplicated to establish a workable philosophy to explain 
the justification of defensive force against a malevolent attacker engaging 
in aggressive conduct which is manifestly unlawful. Thus, most people 
would accept that self-defence is legitimate to ward off a villainous 
aggressor who would otherwise violate rights."^ Non-criminal threats, 
however, pose a more significant obstacle. The analysis above reveals 
that some predominant competing philosophies, including 
consequentialist accounts, personal partiality and the doctrine of double 
effect, fail to provide adequate philosophical guidance and are 
incompatible with the intuition that self-defensive force may be 
legitimately used against an innocent threat but not against an innocent 
bystander. 
A more plausible explanation of the self-defence justification is grounded 
in a rights-based theory complemented by forfeiture principles. There is 
some disagreement between proponents of this approach regarding the 
significance of the culpability of the aggressor when assessing whether 
rights have been deprived. Rodin proposes a limited theory of forfeiture, 
exposing notions of fault and punishment, which appears to promote self-
Rodin, War and Self-Defense at 76. 
Gorr, 'Private Defence' at 241. Of course the use of such force must be necessary 
and proportionate in the circumstances, see section 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 respectively. 
143 
sacrifice by claiming that innocent threats belong to a class which should 
be recognised as in some way imm.une to self-defensive force. A 
philosophy requiring martyrdom is unrealistic and Rodin's theory is simply 
too demanding, providing only an excuse for a defendant who infringes 
on the rights of an innocent threat. The forfeiture account developed by 
Thomson and Uniacke and subject to appropriate modification, arguably 
provides the most persuasive and comprehensive justification for the use 
of defensive force in both the central and non-standard cases involving 
innocent active and passive threats. A careful analysis of this 
contemporary approach reveals a defensible explanation of the 
justification of self-defence which accommodates intrusions against 
innocent unjust threats and rightly excludes intrusions on the rights of 
innocent non-threatening persons from its scope. However, any account 
of self-defence that relies on a principle of forfeiture and thus permits the 
use of self-defensive force against some categories of innocent persons 
is likely to attract controversy. But, as demonstrated above, the account 
advanced here responds confidently to criticism. Hence the class of 
persons against whom the right of self-defence may be exercised is 
relatively broad, but the requirement of an unjust threat prevents the 
justification being extended to intrusions against innocent non-threatening 
persons, a conclusion which is supported throughout this thesis. 
An appropriate rationale for self-defence has now been established which 
is consistent with the broad themes of the thesis by appealing to general 
liberal principles. The philosophical model proposed above sets a 
foundation for evaluating the appropriate functioning of the conditions 
attached to the defence. It is well established in English law that 
individuals may only exercise their right to defend themselves or others 
from unjust threats by whatever means are necessary and proportionate. 
These crucial limitations on the exercise of the right of self-defence are 
considered in the following section. 
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4.4 The conditions of self-defence^ 
In order to gain a comprehensive understanding of the limits of defensive 
action it is vital to appreciate that defensive rights are not absolute and 
the legal permission to act is restricted where the defensive measures 
themselves involve an encroachment on the interests of another. The 
exercise of the defendant's right of self-defence will inevitably conflict with 
the legally protected interests of the unjust threat and the law must 
accommodate these conflicting rights.^^'' In short, there must be 
conditions under which one may exercise self-defensive force to protect 
one's own interests which also reflect concern for the autonomy of others. 
There are primary, intrinsic limitations on the right of self-defence existing 
within the legal system, as required by the interests of justice. The right 
of self-defence should not be abused and is qualified by a broad measure 
of reasonableness.^^^ This standard reflects concern for the interests of 
others by requiring that the defendant should only use such force as is 
reasonable in the circumstances s/he believes to exist. The requirement 
of reasonableness dictates that the defensive act must be necessary and 
must constitute a proportionate response to the threat as it is perceived 
by the defendant. No workable account of self-defence could operate 
apart from such restrictions,^ but the precise functioning of these limiting 
Section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 puts into statutory form 
four well-established common law principles relating to self defence in pursuit of its aim 
to clarify the operation of the (public and private) defence. The provision has been 
described by many as pointless and unhelpful, see Ian Dennis, 'A Pointless Exercise' 
[2008] 7 Criminal Law Review 507. 
" Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law at 872. 
Indeed, the English courts have demonstrated a preference for use of the broad 
flexibility offered by the concept of reasonableness. The deference to a broader test of 
reasonability is criticised by many commentators, who maintain that the unification of 
necessity and proportionality requirements erodes the individual significance of the 
concepts and is therefore undesirable; see Williams Textbook of Criminal Law at 503; 
Andrew Ashworth 'Self-Defence and the Right to Life' (1975) 32 Cambridge Law Journal 
282 at 284; and Sangero, Self-Defence in Criminal Law at 146. 
The concrete articulation of these limiting factors is missing from the theory proffered 
by Fletcher. He claims, against the background of a theory that self-defensive force is 
justified if it protects the autonomy of the individual, that no regard need be paid to 
requirements of proportionality and necessity, see Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law at 
864-868. It is submitted here that clearly defined limitations are required by the interests 
of justice to balance the respective rights of autonomy of the defendant and victim. 
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factors is beset by doubt and u n c e r t a i n t y . I n order to complete the 
delineation of the theoretical and practical boundaries of the defence in 
relation to the difficult case of the innocent unjust threat, several of the 
controversies surrounding the appropriate parameters of self-defence will 
be examined below. 
4.4.1 The necessity requirement 
An established and decisive factor in determining the availability of self-
defence is whether the defensive force used was actually necessary in 
order to repel the unjust threat. Necessity is accepted as a fundamental 
condition of self-defence^^^ and its significance is rarely challenged. 
So, what is the content of the necessity requirement? The necessity for 
self-defensive action may be evaluated by considering three principal 
derivations which are central to the framework of self-defence: the 
existence of an opportunity to retreat; the imminence of the threat; and 
any mistaken belief the defendant has regarding the circumstances that 
exist. Although imminence of the threat is often treated as a separate 
requirement of self-defence, it is arguably more appropriately considered 
as a conceptual derivative of necessity. One cannot know whether 
defensive action is absolutely necessary until the infliction of harm is 
immediately pending. Imminence is closely related to retreat in this way, 
because if the threatened harm is not imminent then the victim arguably 
has a reasonable opportunity to retreat and avoid the intrusion. For the 
purposes of the present account of self-defence imminence, mistake and 
retreat will be treated as corollaries of the broader requirement of 
necessity and an evaluation of each component requirement is 
undertaken below. 
Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law at 501. 
Smith describes the necessity requirement as a "cardinal principle," Smith, 
Justification and Excuse In the Criminal Law at 101. 
An exception is found in the work of Hume, who claimed that necessity is not a pre-
requisite for the use of self-defensive force against a criminal; this point was highlighted 
by GH Gordon, The Criminal Law of Scotland 2"" edition (Edinburgh: W Green, 1978) at 
752. 
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4.4.1.1 The duty to retreat 
There is some dispute regarding the extent to which the accused is under 
a duty to retreat before resorting to self-defensive force. Traditionally, the 
duty to retreat has been viewed as a derivation from the requirement of 
necessity^^'^ and the account offered here proceeds on that premise. The 
main contributions to this debate are examined in brief below in order to 
ascertain the most appropriate approach to the controversial issue of 
retreat. 
On one view, the law of self-defence may operate upon a rule of absolute 
retreat, in which retreat is viewed as an independent variable which 
always requires the defendant to attempt an escape before resorting to 
the use of force. Advocates of an absolute retreat rule maintain that if 
there is no attempt to retreat whatsoever then, regardless of the 
circumstances, self-defence cannot be invoked.^^'^ In Julien Lord 
Widgery suggested that before a defendant could lawfully use force to 
ward off an unjust threat "he should demonstrate by his actions that he 
does not want to fight. He must demonstrate that he is prepared to 
temporise and disengage and perhaps to make some physical 
withdrawal."^^^ It is submitted here that this approach simply demands 
too much of a defendant and does not afford sufficient respect to the 
attacked individual's right of autonomy. An alternative retreat rule must 
be sought. It is frequently stated that the morally preferable option is to 
adopt a strong retreat rule in relation to self-defence. This version is 
similar to the absolute retreat rule in that it treats the issue of retreat as 
Ashworth, 'Self-Defence and the Right to Life' at 293; Williams Textbook of Criminal 
at 509; and Rodin, War and Self-Defense at 40. Others have viewed the issue of retreat 
as derived partially from both necessity and proportionality considerations, see 
Kremnitzer, 'Proportionality and the Psychotic Aggressor' at 179; and others have 
suggested that retreat is a corollary of the issue of proportionality, see Sangero, Self-
Defence in Criminal Law at 193-195. As a consequence of this approach Sangero, 
somewhat strangely, proposes that before using lethal self-defensive force there should 
be a duty to retreat imposed on the attacked person; but there is no such corresponding 
duty to retreat where a lesser degree of force is required to ward off the threat. For 
criticism of Sangero's assertion, see Leverick, 'Defending Self-Defence' at 575-578. 
R V. Julien [1969] 2 All ER 856, per Lord Widgery at 858. 
Ibid, at 858. 
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an independent requirement of self-defence. However, the difference lies 
in the fact that the strong retreat rule only requires the accused to make 
an attempt to retreat before using force in self-defence if an opportunity to 
do so actually exists. The obvious difficulty inherent in this approach is 
deciding whether the opportunities for escape which exist are 'safe', 
'reasonable' or 'clear'. When faced with an immediate threat, it is 
submitted here that the strong retreat rule also expects too much of a 
defendant and does not sufficiently respect individual autonomy. 
The English courts have attempted to mitigate the harshness of the 
above approaches by preferring what could be construed as a weak 
retreat rule. On this view, retreat is not considered as an independent 
factor but merely a deciding factor when assessing whether actions were 
necessary and reasonable. Although on the surface this rule appears to 
be similar to the stronger version articulated above, the fact that the issue 
of retreat is merely a consideration within the broader notion of 
reasonableness means that the defendant may still be acquitted on the 
basis of self-defence in the absence of any attempt to retreat. 
One final approach should be considered for the sake of completeness. 
Some would advocate a 'no retreat' rule, where the possibility of retreat 
has no significance whatsoever to the success or otherwise of a self-
defence plea. This is a particularly prevalent theme where the attack 
takes place in the attacked person's own dwelling, the argument being 
advanced on the basis that the "invasion of a person's home constitutes a 
severe intrusion into his living space and in itself harms his autonomy."^^^ 
On this approach, there would be no imposing duty on the accused to 
escape by whatever means possible prior to using self-defensive force. 
The victim of an unprovoked attack, for example, in their own dwelling, 
has the right to stand their ground and counteract force with f o r c e . T h e 
Sangero, Self-Defence in Criminal Law at 266; see also comments made at 202 and 
266-278. 
In the United States of America some fifteen states have opted for a no-retreat rule, 
see 'Fifteen States Expand Right to Shoot in Self-Defence' New Yorl< Times, 7 August 
2006, cited in Leverick, 'Defending Self-Defence' at 579. 
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validity of this approach is questionable since it appears to prioritise the 
right to enjoy one's property over the right to life or bodily integrity of the 
aggressor. If the attacked person can safely depart from their home in 
order to spare the life of the aggressor then this approach must surely be 
encouraged, although not required/'^^ 
Debate over the significance of retreat in deciding the legitimate use of 
self-defensive force has permeated English law for many years. In the 
18*^ century retreat was not required at all in cases of self-defence in its 
purest form, that is, an unprovoked and sudden attack by a culpable 
aggressor. But in cases of 'quarrel' self-defence, involving argumentative 
and confrontational situations, a strong retreat rule applied. By the IQ'*" 
century cases of self-defence were no longer classified in this way and 
were decided in a more consistent manner. There is evidence that, at 
this time, a strong retreat rule applied in all c a s e s . I n the first part of 
the 20'*" century, it seems there are no reported cases which 
contemplated the issue of retreat in relation to the availability of self-
defence. In 1969, influential scholars Smith and Hogan advocated a 
version of the weak retreat rule in that retreat was considered as a mere 
factor to be taken into account when considering reasonableness, 
following the approach adopted in the Australian case of R v. HoweJ'^° 
which relied on the American case Brown v. L/S.'^' In R v. Ju//en,"^ 
however, Widgery LJ took a comparatively strong line on retreat, and this 
inconsistent approach to the issue continued throughout a number of 
years with the courts often displaying confusion as to how retreat should 
affect a plea of self-defence. In R v. Mclnnes^^^ Edmund Davies 
preferred the flexible approach adopted in Howe, that failure to retreat is 
only an element of the consideration of reasonableness and in R v. 
A similar approach is taken by Leverick, 'Defending Self-Defence' at 577-578. 
R V. George Smith (1837) 8 Car & P 158; R v. Odgers (1843) 2 M & Rob 478; R v. 
Dr/sco// (1841) Car & M 214; R »/. Dakin (1828) 1 Lewin 166. 
R V. Howe (1958) 100 CLR 448. 
Brown v. US 256 US 335 (1921). 
R V. Julian [1969] 2 All ER 856 at 858 
R V. Mclnnes [1971] 3 All ER 295. 
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F/'e/d"'' it was suggested that the question of whether it is necessary to 
use force should take, as a baseline, the self-defender's right to 
autonomy.^^^ The current position in English law, however tentative, is 
represented by the case of R v. B/rd,^^^ in which the Court of Appeal 
clearly favoured the weak retreat approach developed in Howe. Thus, It 
would seem that retreat is considered simply as one facet of the broader 
question of whether the use of self-defensive force was necessary and 
reasonable in the circumstances. 
This above analysis reveals that the approaches to retreat at the most 
extreme ends of the scale may be dispensed with relative ease. The 
absolute retreat rule can be rejected outright with little controversy. A rule 
requiring the victim to always retreat even when it may be unsafe to do so 
does not sit comfortably with the recognition of a right to self-defend and 
the right to make autonomous choices. This rule may only be effective in 
situations where the self-defender provoked the trouble in the first 
instance; but this is not a case of pure self-defence. Equally the no 
retreat rule is fairly readily dispensed with. Advocates of this rule would 
claim that it is highly dishonourable to require an innocent victim of attack 
to retreat. Yet it is difficult to see how the values of honour and self-
respect can outweigh the potential value of human life or other rights to 
bodily integrity. This rule has the potential to deter potential aggressors, 
but it could operate with equal rigour in the reverse by positively 
encouraging an aggressive confrontation. In favour of the weak retreat 
rule, some say that practically speaking it is easier to instruct a jury to 
evaluate whether actions were reasonable, retreat being only one of a 
number of subsidiary considerations. However, conversely it could be 
said that if retreat is simply one factor in deciding whether force was 
reasonable, the law is effectively enabling the accused to ignore a safe 
opportunity to retreat and still be judged to have used reasonable self-
defensive force. Arguably, the flexibility of the weak retreat rule has the 
R v. Field [1972] Crim LR 435. 
A conclusion also supported by R v. Redmond-Bate [1999] Crim LR 998, and 
Simester and Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine at 706-707. 
Rv. e/rd[1985]2 All ER513. 
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potential to allow the jury too much leeway in deciding what is reasonable 
in the context of self-defence. 
The above considerations have resulted in a strong tendency within 
philosophical circles toward the operation of a strong retreat rule. It 
arguably promotes the maximum respect for the right to life, and two lives 
saved is morally preferable to one life lost.^^'' There are, however, a 
number of problems even this approach, as it underplays important 
human rights and individual autonomy. The suggestion that the onus is 
on the self-defender to retreat given a safe opportunity to do so could be 
construed as a contradiction to many fundamental rights of autonomy and 
privacy. Indeed, criminal law is intended to "protect personal sovereignty 
and equal status by proscribing, preventing and punishing actions by 
some citizens that violate the rights and interests of others."^^^ Requiring 
someone to flee a potentially troublesome encounter therefore arguably 
dramatically understates important civil l i b e r t i e s . T h e r e is something 
intrinsically uncomfortable about a principle which would require people to 
distance themselves, for instance, from a place where they may be 
confronted by an archenemy with a tendency towards uncontrollable 
aggression. Whilst it would appear wise to refrain from creating such a 
situation, it cannot be said that a person would lose any right of self-
defence merely by making their presence felt. 
In summary, a strong onus on retreat would deny the effective operation 
of many individual rights and civil liberties. Thus, whilst there is a lot to 
be said for resolving problems without recourse to violence and avoiding 
the use of unnecessary force, requiring individuals to retreat from 
violence can clearly do a disservice to other people's rights. For these 
reasons, the continuing operation of the weak retreat rule is advocated 
For example Rodin, War and Self-defense at 40-41; and the American Model Penal 
Code. 
Schopp, Justification Defenses and Just Convictions at 71. 
As decided in the following cases.- R v. Field [1972] Crim LR 435; Sfafe v. Bristol 84 P 
2d 475 (1938); Beatty v. Gillbanks (1882) 9 QBD 308. All three cases promote the value 
of freedom of movement above any duty to avoid conflict. 
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here which gives the jury some latitude in evaluating the reasonableness 
of the defendant's response. 
4.4.1.2 The immediacy requirement 
In the law of self-defence the concept of immediacy refers to the lapse of 
time between the threat of harm and the defensive action taken against 
that threat; the defensive action is only permissible where the threatened 
danger is i m m e d i a t e . T h e immediacy requirement^"^ within the law of 
self-defence has an established history^"*^ and is usually accepted without 
c h a l l e n g e . T h e significance of this requirement is that in the absence 
of immediate danger, the use of self-defensive force is not necessary (or 
consequently reasonable) as an alternative course of non-aggressive 
action must have been available. Thus, immediacy is an important 
derivative of the necessity requirement, as acknowledged by Richard 
Rosen: 
"In self-defence, the concept of imminence has no significance 
independent of the notion of necessity...Society does not require 
that the evil avoided be an imminent evil because it believes that 
an imminent evil is the only type of evil that should be avoided [or] 
because an imminent threatened harm is necessarily worse than a 
non-imminent one. Rather, imminence is required because, and 
only because, of the fear that without imminence there is no 
assurance that the defensive action is necessary to avoid the 
harm."^"" 
Immediacy not only safeguards the necessity of the defensive action; it 
also raises the additional issue of probability of harm. For defensive 
This point was confirmed by the House of Lords in Attorney-General for Northern 
Ireland's Reference (No. 1 of 1975) [1977] AC 105; and R v. Ctiisam (1963) 47 Cr App R 
130. 
"^^  Other commentators prefer to use the phrase 'imminence', see Leverick Killing in 
Self-Defence at 87 and chapter 5 generally, but the terms will be used interchangeably 
here. 
Blackstone, Commentaries on tfie Laws of England volume IV at 184. 
Indeed, it is often viewed as the most central component of the necessity 
requirement, see Sangero, Self-Defence in Criminal Law at. 147 and 151. 
'^^ '^  Richard Rosen, 'On Self-Defense, Imminence and Battered Women who Kill Their 
Batterers' (1993) 71 North Carolina Law Review 371 at 379 
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action to be legitimate it must be neither too soon nor too late.^"^ But how 
close must the danger be before self-defensive force may be legitimately 
invoked? Whilst requiring a threat to be immediate does not mean that 
the attack has to actually be in progress before self-defensive action can 
be t a k e n , a n immediate threat is necessarily more likely to actually 
materialise than one which is not immediate. This is highlighted by the 
fact that a pre-emptive strike is permitted in English law, provided it is 
deemed to be reasonable.^'*'' It seems that the purpose of the immediacy 
requirement, then, is to prohibit intrusions on the interests of a perceived 
threat wherever the threat of danger is not present and existing; but the 
defendant is not required to wait until the attack is launched before 
utilising self-defensive force. 
Despite overwhelming support for the notion of immediacy as a relevant 
consideration in self-defence its significance is undermined by a minority 
of commentators who, for a variety of reasons, insist that the principle be 
modified^"*^ or abandoned.^''^ One particularly forceful criticism of the 
imminence limitation is that it unfairly restricts the availability of self-
defence to 'battered women' who attack or kill their abusive partners. 
Much academic literature has been devoted to the challenge posed by 
the immediacy requirement within self-defence and its strained 
relationship with battered w o m e n . A l t h o u g h the issue is not strictly 
'"^ Anticipatory violence falls outside of the scope of legitimate self-defence (although a 
pre-emptive strike may be permitted if it is reasonable), as does revenge violence, the 
former response being too soon, the latter too late to satisfy the imminence requirement. 
"^^  See Joseph H Beale, 'Homicide in Self-Defense' (1903) 3 Columbia Law Review 526 
at 529. 
'"^ See R V. Beckford [1988] AC 130 at 144. 
"^"^  Robinson is a proponent of the view that immediacy should be a non-decisive aspect 
of necessity; see Robinson Criminal Law Defenses volume 2 at 4 and 76-78. See also 
Williams Textbook of Criminal Law at 503-504. For further discussion, see Sangero, 
Self-Defence in Criminal Law at 157-162. 
See the detailed discussion in Leverick, Killing in Self-Defence at 93-108, which is 
relied on here. 
Important contributions include, amongst many others, Joshua Dressier, 'Battered 
Women Who Kill Their Sleeping Tormentors: Reflections on Maintaining Respect for 
Human Life while Killing Moral Monsters' in Shute and Simester, Criminal Law Theory: 
Doctrines of the General Part at 259; Jeremy Horder, 'Killing the Passive Abuser: A 
Theoretical Defence' in Shute and Simester, Criminal Law Theory: Doctrines of the 
General Part at 283; Victoria F Nourse, 'Self-Defense and Subjectivity' (2001) 68 
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relevant to the current discussion of the limits of self-defensive action 
which intrudes against innocent threats, the problem of battered women 
will be briefly considered below in order to evaluate the impact of the 
immediacy requirement and to determine whether this condition should 
be redefined to accommodate such difficult cases. 
In many 'battered women' cases the conditions of self-defence will be 
fulfilled with relative ease; but where a woman (or man, for that matter) 
who has suffered serious and prolonged abuse attacks or kills their 
partner in a non-confrontational situation where there is no proximity 
between the last act of abuse and the self-defensive force, the immediacy 
requirement is difficult to satisfy. There have been many reported cases 
in which an abused spouse has killed their sleeping partner.^^^ Clearly 
the threat of harm emanating from a sleeping partner, for instance, 
cannot properly be described as 'immediate,'^^^ and, on a strict 
construction of the requirement, the defence of self-defence is 
unavailable. Despite the literature being disproportionately focused on 
the subject of 'battered women' one must be mindful that any relaxation 
of the immediacy requirement to accommodate such cases may extend 
to other developing syndromes. 
Some commentators have advocated an approach in which both the 
imminence requirement and the requirement that the action taken in self-
University of Chicago Law Review 1235; Schopp Justification Defenses and Just 
Convictions chapter 4. 
Such outcomes are not uncommon in America, see State v. Norman 378 SE 2d 8 
(1989) at 9 and Sfafe v. Allery682 P 2d 312 (1984) at 313-314, where the defendants 
were acquitted on the grounds of self-defence. For further discussion of Norman see 
Dressier 'Battered Women Who Kill Their Sleeping Tormentors: Reflection on 
Maintaining Respect for Human Life while Killing Moral Monsters' at 264-269. Although 
similar English cases have been reported, for instance R v. Ahluwalia [1992] 4 All ER 
889, the defendants were not acquitted on the grounds of self-defence. 
Unless, for example, the defendant is locked in a room with the sleeping aggressor 
and has no alternative means of escape and cannot otherwise neutralise the threat of 
harm imminent upon the aggressor's waking; see Sangero, Self-Defence in Criminal 
Law at 342, footnote 1309. 
This warning is signalled by Cathryn J Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense: 
Correcting a Historical Accident on Behalf of Battered Women who Kill' (1986) 96 
American University Law Review 11 at 15-16; and Sangero, Self-Defence in Criminal 
Law at 345. 
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defence is necessary are abolished altogether.^^'^ In one extreme 
account, Ayyildiz maintains that "by killing her batterer, the battered 
woman becomes a spontaneous vigilante; she apprehends a criminal that 
the law has failed to bring to justice and metes out the punishment he 
richly deserves."^^^ The sentiment of this radical view has been echoed 
by other scholars who claim that a battered woman is morally justified in 
killing an abusive partner regardless of the necessity of such killing. 
Such an approach is, however, difficult to reconcile with the desirability of 
preserving human life, autonomy and bodily integrity whenever it is 
reasonable to do so, and is inconsistent with the law's attempt to 
encourage non-aggressive alternatives. A United States court provided 
an adequate synopsis of the problem by acknowledging that although we 
may feel sympathy for the plight of the battered woman: 
"... it is fundamental to our concept of law that there be no 
discrimination between sinner and saint on moral grounds. Any 
less exacting definition of imminence fails to protect every person's 
right to live."^^^ 
Advocates of a less fundamental view argue that whilst the immediacy 
and necessity requirements should not be abandoned altogether they 
could, instead, be reconceptualised. For instance, it is submitted that the 
concept of immediacy could be expanded to include in its scope battered 
women who kill abusive partners because the threat of harm is always, in 
effect, p r e s e n t . O t h e r commentators suggest a reinterpretation of 
immediacy which would incorporate a threat of future harm in order to 
For further discussion of the literature, see Leverick, Killing in Self-Defence at 93-94. 
Elisabeth Ayyildiz, 'When Battered Woman's Syndrome Does Not Go Far Enough: 
The Battered Woman as Vigilante' (1995) 4 American University Journal of Gender and 
the Law 141 at 147-148. 
See similar accounts from Jane M Cohen, 'Regimes of Private Tyranny: What Do 
They Mean to Morality and for the Criminal Law?' (1996) 57 University of Pittsburgh Law 
Review 757; Dressier, 'Battered Women Who Kill Their Sleeping Tormentors: 
Reflections on Maintaining Respect for Human Life whWe Killing Moral Monsters' at 283; 
and Anthony Sebok, 'Does an Objective Theory of Self-Defense Demand Too Much?' 
1996) 57 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 725. 
" People V. Aris 215 Cal App 3d 1178 (1989). 
'^^ For example Gregory A Diamond, 'To Have But Not To Hold: Can Resistance 
Against Kidnapping' Justify Lethal Self-Defense against Incapacitated Batterers?' (2002) 
102 Columbia Law Review 729; and Sfafe v. Stewart 763 P 2d 572 (1988), cited in 
Leverick, Killing in Self-Defence at 95. 
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provide a broad understanding of i m m i n e n c e . S u c h claims have been 
rejected on the basis that the harm threatened by a passive abuser 
cannot be described as 'immediate' on a normal construction of the 
term.^^° An immediate harm is not one that might occur at some time in 
the future, but a harm that is about to materialise. 
Other scholars have advocated that any interpretation of immediacy 
which requires the clanger to be immediate, should be replaced by a 
somewhat weaker requirement which considers the 'immediate necessity' 
of making a response. Robinson is a leading proponent of this approach, 
and his position is concisely summarised in the following passage: 
"If the concern of the limitation [of imminence] is to include threats 
of harm that are too remote to require a response, the problem is 
adequately handled by requiring simply that the response be 
'necessary'. The proper inquiry is not the immediacy of the threat 
but the immediacy of the response necessary in defence. If a 
threatened harm is such that it cannot be avoided if the intended 
victim waits until the last moment, the principle of self-defence 
must permit him to act earlier - as early as is required to defend 
himself effectively."^^^ 
Robinson effectively compared the plight of the battered woman to that of 
a hostage situation, with the victim taking any means necessary whilst the 
kidnapper is in a passive state to escape the p r e d i c a m e n t . T h i s 
example has been adopted by others who support a more general test of 
'necessity'^" or 'immediate necessity.'^^"^ 
Arthur Ripstein, 'Self-Defense and Equal Protection' (1996) 57 University of 
Pittsburgh Law Review 685 at 698. 
Leverick, Killing in Self-Defence at 96. 
Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses at 78. 
A similar analogy is made by Horder, 'Killing the Passive Abuser' at 291. 
Susan Estrich, 'Defending Women' (1990) 88 Michigan Law Review 1430 at 1433; 
Jeffrey B Murdoch, 'is Imminence Really Necessary? Reconciling Traditional Self-
Defense Doctrine with the Battered Women Syndrome' (2000) 20 North Illinois 
University Law Review 191 at 217; and Richard Rosen, 'On Self-Defense, Imminence 
and Women Who Kill Their Batterers' (1993) 71 North Carolina Law Review 371 at 380. 
Stephen J Schullofer, 'The Gender Question in Chminal Law' in Ellen Frankel Paul, 
Fred D Miller and Jeffrey Paul (eds.) Crime, Culpability and Remedy (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1990). 
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But what are the perceived benefits of such an approach? Although a 
broader test of necessity might accommodate the battered woman more 
comfortably, the floodgates may be open to a wealth of self-defence 
claims from any person who feels they have been given inadequate 
protection from violence by the s t a t e . F u r t h e r m o r e , any further dilution 
of the significance of the immediacy requirement would arguably permit 
the jury too much flexibility in deciding what is, and what is not, necessary 
in terms of defensive action. Perhaps the strongest argument put forward 
for retaining at least some role for the notion of immediacy of harm is this: 
the more distant the threat of harm is, the lower the probability that such a 
threat is actually going to materialise and the higher the likelihood that 
alternative non-violent action could have been employed and, 
consequently, that recourse to defensive force was not actually 
necessary. 
It must be conceded that in English law imminence is merely an indicator 
of the underlying requirement in self-defence that the action taken must 
be necessary;^^^ but its significance should not be underestimated. 
Essentially, self-defence requires the probability of harm occurring to be 
something approaching inevitability.^^'' Only if this level is reached can a 
defendant who intrudes on the rights of another benefit from self-defence. 
In order to satisfy this standard, the defendant must demonstrate that the 
harm threatened would have inevitably occurred but for their defensive 
action, and the harm could not have been prevented by other means. 
Whether the 'battered woman' would be able to satisfy this inevitability of 
harm test (or the additional proportionality test for that matter) is 
q u e s t i o n a b l e . I t is submitted here that the solution for battered women 
As recognised by Martin E Veinsreideris, 'The Prospective Effects of Modifying 
Existing Law to Accommodate Pre-emptive Self-Defense by Battered Women' (2000) 
149 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 613 at 625; Rosen, 'The Excuse of Self-
Defense: Correcting an Historical Accident on behalf of Battered Women Who Kill' at 54. 
Shaw v. R [2001] UKPC 26 per Lord Bingham at [19]. 
Cf. Sebok, 'Does an Objective Theory of Self-Defense Demand Too Much?' where a 
lower standard of probability is suggested. For further discussion see also Gorr, 'Private 
Defence' at 259. 
For further discussion of this point, see Leverick Killing in Self-Defence at 102-108. 
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lies not in any modification of the prevailing conditions of self-defence, 
but rather a change in the protection offered to domestic violence victims. 
Within the confines of the current law, battered women themselves may 
seek refuge in the partial excuse or lack of capacity d e f e n c e s , b u t it is 
evident that to accommodate such cases within the current formulation of 
self-defence would result in the erosion of long-established principles. 
Imminence as a requirement of self-defence has been inconsistently 
applied in the development of English criminal law. Some early 
authorities mentioned the imminence requirement^^\ but in Palmer^the 
Privy Council declared imminence as merely one factor for the jury to 
consider when deciding whether defensive action was reasonably 
necessary. This relaxed approach to imminence was further developed 
English law has also resisted the introduction of a new partial defence of excessive 
force in self-defence to assist a defendant who, when confronted with a threat of 
violence to themselves or another, uses an excessive degree of force on an objective 
assessment, but nonetheless responds with such force as s/he believes to be necessary 
in the circumstances; see Palmer v. R [1971] AC 814 at 831 and Law Commission, 
Partial Defences to Murder (Law Com No 290) (London: HMSO, 2004) at paragraph 
[127]-[4.31]. 
'™ Under the present law if an abused defendant's use of lethal force is considered an 
overreaction, and thus not within the bounds of reasonableness required by the self-
defence justification, a murder conviction may alternatively be reduced to a 
manslaughter charge on a successful plea of provocation. However, the current 
construction of the subjective and objective elements of that defence, as required by 
section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957, may preclude a battered woman from securing it. In 
particular it may be difficult to establish that at the time of the killing the abused woman 
had lost self-control (see R v. Duffy [1949] 1 All ER 932 where it is stated at 932E that 
the loss of self-control must be "sudden and temporary"). To circumnavigate this 
problem, the Law Commission has recently recommended that provocation should be 
available where "the defendant acted in response to: (i) gross provocation...which 
caused the defendant to have a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged; or (ii) fear 
of serious violence towards the defendant or another; or (iii) a combination of both (i) 
and (ii)," see Law Commission Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide (Law Com No 304) 
(London: HMSO, 2006) at paragraph [5.11]. These proposals place less emphasis on 
sudden anger as the basis for a provocation plea, thereby permitting responses borne 
out of a combination of fear, frustration and despair to ground the defence. In addition, 
the recommendations also insist on the satisfaction of a requirement that "a person of 
the defendant's age and of ordinary temperament, i.e. ordinary tolerance and self-
restraint, in the circumstances of the defendant might have reacted in the same or in a 
similar way ." For abused women the proposed provocation plea would arguably 
overcome the unpredictability and injustice inherent in the present formulation of the 
defence and it seems right that, in principle, provocation is available where a battered 
woman uses excessive force to kill her abuser in circumstances where she fears serious 
violence may be used against herself or another. 
R V. Rose (1884) 15 Cox CC 540; R v. Chisam [1963] 47 Cr App Rep 130; R v. 
Fennell[^97^] 3 All ER 215; and Devlin v. Armstrong [1971] Nl 13. 
Palmer V. R [1971] AC 814. 
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by a series of cases in which no mention of the requirement was made 
whatsoever. '^'^  This lack of judicial attention is indicative of a move away 
from the specific strictures of self-defence to the use of a more generally 
applicable test of reasonableness, thus permitting the jury to acquit a 
defender who killed to prevent a non-imminent harm provided the use of 
force is considered reasonable. This direction was adopted by the court 
in Re A (Childreny^" and Martin^^^, the latter of which arguably 
represents the state of the current law on self-defence with regards 
imminence. 
In summary, it is asserted here that self-defensive action is likely only to 
be deemed necessary when the infliction of harm is imminent. Thus, as 
the present law suggests, imminence is most appropriately categorised 
as a corollary of the general requirement of necessity; but an important 
corollary nonetheless. Despite demands for the imminence requirement 
to be diluted to accommodate 'deserving' cases which are currently on 
the margin of its boundaries, it is argued here that the conditions of the 
defence should not be modified simply to appeal to a broader range of 
circumstances which could be adequately handled by a different category 
of defence. 
4.4.1.3 Mistake 
The individual acting in self-defence may be vulnerable to making 
mistakes as to either the perception of an attack or the degree of force 
required to repel that attack. If a defendant mistakenly believes they are 
about to be subject to an attack, their use of self-defensive force is not 
strictly necessary. But to what extent is criminal responsibility avoided 
where a defendant is mistaken as to the need to use self-defence? It was 
established in section 4.3.3 above that where there is, overall, no guiding 
Attorney-General for Northern Ireland's Reference (No. 1 of 1975) [1977] AC 105; 
see also Kelly v. Ministry of Defence [1989] Nl 341. 
Re A (Children: Conjoined Twins) [2000] 4 All ER 961. 
R V. Martin (Anthony) [2002] 1 Cr App Rep 27. 
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reason for the use of force but the defendant has a well-grourided belief 
that they must act the defendant will be excused from liability. There is 
some dispute as to whether the beliefs of the defendant need to be 
reasonable in order for a self-defence claim to succeed, or whether 
beliefs should be merely honest, as English law has often fluctuated 
between these two positions. The issue of mistaken self-defence has 
generated copious literature^''^ but, given the constraints of this thesis, 
the account offered here is comparatively brief. 
From a historical perspective, many early scholars expressed the opinion 
that mistakes in self-defence had to be reasonable.Initially, English 
case law adopted a position analogous to that of the influential scholars 
with a succession of judgments suggesting that an unreasonable mistake 
in relation to a defence was insufficient to ground an acquittal.^''^ 
However, the harmony was disrupted by the ruling in DPP v. Morgan^^ 
where the House of Lords held that, in the context of rape, mistaken 
belief in consent need only be honest. The resulting uncertainty was 
settled in R v. Williams (Gladstone)^^'^ in which the Court of Appeal 
allowed a plea of self-defence on the basis of a defendant's honest but 
unreasonable belief that he was being a t t a c k e d . T h i s approach was 
subsequently echoed in a number of Court of Appeal c a s e s , w a s 
confirmed by the Privy Council in Beckford v. R^^^ and R v. Oatridge,^^"^ 
"® For instance, Andrew P Simester, 'Mistakes in Defences' (1992) 12 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 295. 
^ " See William Hawkins, William, A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown 3'" edition 
(London: E and R Nutt and R Gosling, 1739); Edward H East, Pleas of the Crown 
I Oxford: Professional Books Limited, 1987) 
®^ For instance, R v. Foster (^825) 1 Lewin 187; R v. Smith (1837) 8 Car & P 158; R v. 
Weston (1879) 14 Cox CC 346; R v. Rose (1884) 15 Cox CC 540; R v. Chisam (1963) 
47 Crim App Rep 130; R v. Fenne//[1971] 3 All ER 215; Palmer v. R[1971] 1 AC 814; 
Albert v. Lavin [1981] 1 All ER 628. 
''^ DPP V. Morgan [1976] AC 182. 
R V. Williams [1987] 3 All ER 411. 
The court made reference to the approach taken by the Criminal Law Revision 
Committee, Offences against the Person (Cmnd 7844) (London: Home Office, 1980) at 
paragraph 72(a) that "a person may use such force as is reasonable in the 
circumstances as he believes them to be in the defence of himself or any other person." 
R V. Jackson [1985] Crim LR 674; R v. Asbury [1986] Crim LR 258; R v. Fisher [A987] 
Crim LR 334. 
Beckford v. R [1988] AC 130. 
^^"^ R V. Oatridge (1992) 94 Cr App Rep 367. 
160 
and has recently been endorsed by s t a t u t e . S o , the current position in 
English law is that a genuinely held mistaken belief in the existence of an 
attack can ground a claim of self-defence, even if the belief is 
u n r e a s o n a b l e . T h e merits of this approach will be considered below. 
First, it must be established why the law permits mistaken self-defence to 
absolve an actor of criminal responsibility.^^'^ One could argue that any 
mistake as to the existence of an attack should serve to displace the 
defence altogether.^^^ This position is too demanding, however, and, 
although it fiercely protects the rights of the innocent victim, it does not 
give sufficient recognition to the lesser fault of persons who mistakenly 
believe in the existence of justifying c i r c u m s t a n c e s . T h e belief of the 
actor must be taken into account in considering criminal responsibility, but 
the mistaken belief will not render the defendant's conduct lav\/ful. In this 
regard, mistaken self-defence is very different in substance from actual 
self-defence, since the rationale for self-defence is incompatible with 
putative self-defence. When self-defensive force is exercised against a 
perceived threat in the mistaken belief that they are launching an attack, 
the reality is that no such threat exists other than in the defendant's 
imagination. According to the forfeiture theory, defended earlier in the 
thesis as the most convincing rationale for self-defence, the perceived 
threat is an unfortunate victim of circumstance who has not forfeited any 
of their rights by their conduct and has not been injurious to the actor's 
autonomy. Hence, the defendant cannot be acquitted on the justificatory 
grounds advanced by this theory. Instead putative self-defence provides 
'^^ See s76 (particularly subsections (3) and (4)) of the Criminal Justice and Immigration 
Act 2008 which confirms this principle established by the common law. 
In evaluating whether the defendant's beliefs are genuinely held, a limited set of 
personal characteristics may be considered insofar as they affect the defendant's 
perception of the circumstances. For further discussion on the perceived advantages of 
a rigorously objective approach to the issue contrasted with a more relaxed approach 
which gives recognition to certain characteristics in the assessment of reasonableness, 
see section 76(4)-(8) of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008; R v. Martin 
(Anthony) [2002] 1 Cr App R 27; Shaw v. R [2002] UKPC 26; R v. Martin (DP) (2000) 2 
Cr App R 42; and Ormerod Smith <& Hogan: Criminal Law at 361-362. 
For a detailed and carefully considered response to this question, see the discussion 
by Leverick, Killing in Self-Defence, chapter 9. 
^ ^ This position was adopted at one time by the New York Court of Appeals in People v. 
Young 183 NE 2d 319 (1962). 
Sangero, Self-Defence in Criminal Law at 282. 
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the actor with an e x c u s e . T h e excuse communicates society's 
understanding towards the defendant who acts on mistaken beliefs by 
denying the imposition of criminal responsibility; but there is certainly no 
acceptance that such conduct is desirable or justified, or that it would be 
encouraged in the future. 
One question which has often troubled academics and the judiciary alike 
is whether, in order to excuse the defendant from responsibility, any 
genuine mistake will suffice, or whether the mistake must be reasonable. 
One view is that mistakes as to the existence of an attack should be 
grounded upon reasonable perceptions before the actor is excused. 
Such reasoning appears to be motivated by the desire to encourage 
people engaging in conduct that is usually prohibited to assess situations 
more carefully and exercise caution and r e s t r a i n t . O t h e r s maintain that 
acquitting the defendant on the basis of an unreasonably mistaken belief 
undermines the rights of the perceived threat, who, through no fault of 
their own, is mistaken for an attacker.^^^ In relation to this final point, 
strong arguments have been advanced that the current English approach 
to mistaken belief in the need for self-defensive action is incompatible 
with the operation of the right to life enshrined in Article 2 of the European 
Convention on Human R i g h t s . A r t i c l e 2 acknowledges that life may be 
taken only where this is 'absolutely necessary'; and the European Court 
of Human Rights has accepted that a defence may be provided if a 
person mistakenly believes in the need to use lethal self-defensive force, 
See Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law at 103-115; Sangero, Self-Defence in Criminal 
Law at 283-285 
Fletcher Rethinking Criminal Law at 689-690. Ashworth also suggested that the rights 
of the innocent victim are not sufficiently protected in the absence of a reasonableness 
requirement, see Andrew Ashworth, 'Case Comment: Andronicou and Constantinou v. 
Cyprus' [1998] Criminal Law Review 823. 
Sangero, Self-Defence in Criminal Law at 286-287; and Simester, 'Mistakes in 
Defence' at 309. 
See Simester, 'Mistakes in Defences' at 309; Fiona Leverick, 'Is English Self-Defence 
Law Incompatible with Article 2 of the ECHR?' [2002] Criminal Law Review 347; and 
Leverick, Killing in Self-Defence at 164 
^^ "^  See Leverick, 'Is English Self-Defence Law Incompatible with Article 2 of the ECHR?' 
347; John C Smith, 'The Use of Force in Public or Private Defence and Article 2' [2002] 
Criminal Law Review 958; and Ashworth, 'Case Comment: Andronicou and 
Constantinou v. Cyprus' at 823. 
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but only if there exist 'good grounds' for that b e l i e f . T h i s appeal for 
good reasons to be provided highlights the contradiction between the 
European Court's jurisprudence and the current English approach, which 
simply requires a belief to be genuinely held. If an actor is absolved of 
criminal responsibility for taking life in the absence of reasonable grounds 
for her/his belief, it is arguable that insufficient protection is granted to the 
most fundamental of all rights. Where the self-defensive force used is 
non-lethal, this argument could be extended to other rights such as the 
right to bodily integrity which is so fiercely guarded in a liberal society. 
If the law was to demand that belief in the existence of an attack must be 
reasonable, any such requirement would not necessarily be too onerous 
as it could be "sensitive to the fact that people may make mistakes under 
the pressure of circumstances."^^^ It is possible that the moral culpability 
of a mistaken self-defendant whose belief was not reasonable and is 
therefore not entitled to exculpation on the basis of a full excuse, could be 
reflected in the resulting conviction^^'' and / or the degree of punishment, 
which would acknowledge the pressure and urgency of the situation. 
Despite potent opposition, the prevailing approach in English law is to 
regard the reasonableness of the actor's belief as immaterial; the 
mistaken belief merely has to be honest and genuine. In support of the 
current position it may be asserted that denying a defence for someone 
who makes an honest but unreasonable mistake and imposing punitive 
sanctions upon them seems to achieve little, as the criminal law has no 
McCann v. UK (1996) 21 EHRR 97; and Andronicou and Constantinou v. Cyprus 
n 9 9 8 ) 2 5 EHRR491. 
Jeremy Horder, 'Occupying the Moral High Ground? The Law Commission on 
Duress' [1994] Criminal Law Review 334 at 341. This comment was made in relation to 
the element of reasonableness required for the defence of duress, but is equally 
pertinent here. 
®^  Instead of being charged with murder, for instance, the unreasonably mistaken self-
defendant could have the charge reduced to manslaughter; see Leverick, 'Is English 
Self-Defence Law Incompatible with Article 2 of the ECHR?' at 361; and Nicola Lacey, 
'Partial Defences to Homicide: Questions of Power and Principle in Imperfect and Less 
Imperfect Worlds', chapter in Andrew Ashworth, Rethinking English Homicide Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) at 124-5. South African law also implemented 
this rule, see S v. De Oliveira (1993) (2) SALR 59. 
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real deterrent effect on errors of j u d g m e n t / ' I n response to these 
assertions, Leverick points out that there are compelling reasons for 
punishing this type of defendant, other than deterrence. Punishment 
serves an expressive function and a conduct-guiding function by virtue of 
expressing societal dissatisfaction with the mistaken defendant's lack of 
consideration for others, and guiding citizens to demonstrate more care 
before acting rashly/^^ It appears that there are strong arguments in 
favour of a more objective view of mistake and this approach is supported 
here. 
Somewhat less controversial is the claim that the defendant's response to 
the unjust threat, or the amount offeree used, is evaluated objectively, 
and must be reasonable in the circumstances that the defendant believed 
to exist. The court in R v. Scarletf°° advocated the extension of this 
principle to deny any criminal responsibility for unreasonably mistaken 
beliefs regarding the amount offeree necessary to repel an attack. 
However, English law retracted this liberal extension, and the present law 
on self-defence is clearly articulated by Collins J 'm Rv. Owino:^°^ 
"The jury have to decide whether a defendant honestly believed 
that the circumstances were such as required him to use force to 
defend himself from an attack or a threatened attack. In this 
respect a defendant must be judged in accordance with his honest 
belief, even though that belief may have been mistaken. But the 
jury must then decide whether the force used was reasonable in 
the circumstances as he believed them to be."^°^ 
Thus, the result of years of discussion is a logically disjointed 
development of mistake in relation to self-defence, in that mistakes with 
Richard G Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea II: Honest but Unreasonable 
Mistake of Fact in Self-Defense' (1986-7) 28 Boston College LawReview459 at 512, 
cited in Leverick, Killing in Self-Defence at 168. 
Leverick, Killing in Self-Defence at 166-167. 
R V. Scarlett [1993] 4 All ER 629. 
R V. Owino (1996) 2 Cr App Rep 128; followed in DPP v. Armstrong-Braun [1999] 
Crim LR 416; Shaw v. R [2001] UKPC 26; and R v. Martin (Anthony) (2002) 1 Cr App 
Rep 27. This position is also confirmed by section 76(6) of the Criminal Justice and 
Immigration Act 2008. 
R V. Owino (1996) 2 Cr App Rep 128 at 132-133. A similar approach was more 
recently adopted in R v. ftvc/or (1999) 1 Cr App R 197. 
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regard to the existence of an attack need not be reasonable, but beliefs 
with regard to the amount of force necessary to repel the attack must be 
reasonable. 
That completes the account of necessity in its function as a limiting factor 
on the use of self-defensive force.^""^ A law whose sole requirement is 
necessity, however, "would justify every weak lad whose hair was about 
to be pulled by a stronger one, in shooting the bully if he could not 
otherwise prevent the a s s a u l t . W h a t follows is a discussion of the 
remaining limitation to which all self-defensive force is subject; that the 
use offeree must be a proportionate response to the unjust threat. 
4.4.2 The proportionality requirement 
4.4.2.1 The need for a proportionality requirement 
It was once said that "for every assault it is not reasonable a man should 
be banged with a c u d g e l . S e l f - d e f e n c e is underpinned by a 
requirement not only that the use of force is necessary, but also that the 
defensive action is a proportionate response to the unjust threat.^°^ Even 
though it may be necessary, in the sense explicated above, for such force 
to be exercised there may be times when the defendant should refrain 
from engaging in it because the cost would, quite simply, be too great.^°'' 
A full assessment of whether self-defensive force is within the bounds of 
proportionality requires an objective balance to be made between the 
Before continuing, however, it has been suggested that Article 2 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights dictates that there should be a tighter test as to when 
defensive force is necessary. As mentioned above, the English assumption has 
frequently been that 'reasonableness' is the key issue, with a variety of issues potentially 
indicative of such reasonableness. Article 2 ECHR, however, maintains a somewhat 
sharper focus, with the result that the fundamental nature of the right to life means it can 
only be taken away when 'absolutely necessary'. 
Report of the Royal Commission on the Law Relating to Indictable Offences (1879) 
(C2345) note B at 44. 
Per Holt LJ in Cockcroft v. Smith (1705) 2 Salk 642. 
Leverick emphasises that the principle is a "cornerstone" of the common law, see 
Killing in Self-Defence at 131. 
See Sangero, Self-Defence in Criminal Law at 166-167. 
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respective rights of the defendant and victim and relative values must be 
prioritised. On this premise it follows that disproportionate force may be 
unreasonable force which renders self-defensive action impermissible. 
Proportionality requirements have proved controversial as there is some 
disagreement between scholars regarding the degree offeree which may 
be legitimately employed in the face of an unjust threat to one's own 
protected interests. The level of commitment to the proportionality 
requirement is underpinned by the preferred rationale, so it is not 
surprising that views differ with regard to whether there should be any 
emphasis on proportionality at all and, if so, what the content of the 
requirement should be. 
With regard to the significance of the requirement, there is often no 
consensus in relation to how the respective values of the defendant and 
victim should take precedence. For instance, for those who ground the 
justification of self-defence on a 'lesser harms' consequentialist calculus, 
proportionality is central to the logical functioning of the theory.^°^ 
Conversely, for advocates of a theory that prioritises the defendant's 
autonomy over that of the person posing an unjust t h r e a t , i t is not 
immediately obvious that proportionality should be r e s p e c t e d . I n d e e d , 
on the theory proffered here it would seem that the autonomy of the 
defendant is prioritised over that of the unjust threat, who temporarily 
forgoes their rights on account of the threat that they pose. Rights-based 
accounts, particularly those with an accompanying theory of forfeiture, 
are often criticised for the fact that proportionality is often assumed 
without further explanation. It is submitted here, however, such an 
account leaves scope for a principle of proportionality simply because it is 
required in the interests of justice. Indeed, one could say that 
proportionality is especially important to such a rights-based theory. 
Because it permits lethal self-defensive force to be used against an 
Sangero, Ibid, at 168. 
Fletcher Rethinking Criminal Law who suggested at 865 that "right should never yield 
to wrong." 
This point is made by Schopp, Justification Defenses and Just Convictions at 76; 
Sangero, Self-Defence in Criminal Law at 168-170; and Rogers 'Killing in Self-Defence: 
Publication Review' at 173. 
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innocent unjust threat the suggestion that the level of the intrusion should 
be carefully limited is arguably more potent. In a liberal society the law 
must pay equal regard to the rights of all citizens and although at the 
point of engagement the rights of the unjust threat are forfeited, the 
requirement of proportionality would limit what Schopp refers to as "tragic 
errors"^^^ when an individual assesses the reasonableness of their 
actions. The underlying premise of the proposed rationale does not, 
therefore, have to be undermined to accommodate a role for 
proportionality. 
4.4.2.2 The content of the proportionality requirement 
There is further disagreement as to the content of the requirement of 
proportionality, assuming it is accepted as a condition of self-defence. 
Proportionality is, in English law, a flexible concept.^^^ When self-
defensive force is exercised it will often be equivalent to the harm 
threatened; but it does not have to be equivalent. The reason that the 
requirement is so accommodating is that it is part of a broader concern 
for the reasonableness of the defendant's action. 
Although the thesis is not limited to considerations of lethal self-defence, 
it is within this domain that issues relating to the precise content of the 
proportionality requirement are particularly problematic, given the 
fundamental nature of the interest set back by the defendant. Where 
lesser proprietary or personal interests are infringed by a defendant 
acting in self-defence the evaluation of the reasonableness of the 
response may not be controversial. If, for instance, an actor inflicts minor 
physical injury on a victim, or damages the victim's property, in order to 
protect her/his home or a valuable item of property, it is likely that a jury 
Schopp, Justification Defenses and Just Convictions at 86. 
Palmer V. R[1971] 1 AC 814. 
Some have suggested that a reasonableness requirement which subsumes necessity 
and proportionality erodes the significance both elements (and proportionality in 
particular), see Robinson Criminal Law Defenses volume 2 at 82. 
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would deem the reaction r e a s o n a b l e . T h e particular concerns which 
have preoccupied philosophical analysis of the notion of proportionality 
involve the use of lethal defensive force to: (1) defend property; and (2) 
defend serious physical attacks against the person. There is, it is 
submitted here, an undeniably profound moral difference between 
employing, for instance, lethal self-defensive force to defend oneself 
against a serious physical attack, and utilising similar force to defend an 
attack against one's own personal property. These particularly difficult 
issues are considered briefly below in order to undertake a full 
assessment of the role of proportionality in particularly difficult cases. 
Lethal self-defensive force against sub-lethal physical harm 
Why might it be permissible to lethally defend oneself or another against 
sub-lethal harms such as loss of limb, disfigurement and rape?^^^ It is 
arguable that threats of this nature are similar, in some sense, to threats 
to one's life, and consequently the use of lethal self-defensive force to 
prevent such setbacks to one's own interests is j u s t i f i e d . U n l i k e threats 
to one's proprietary interests, serious intrusions against the person may 
sometimes, it is suggested here, permit one to respond with lethal self-
defensive force. One particular difficulty arises where self-defensive 
force is engaged to prevent rape. Rape involves the kind of irremediable 
violation that can never be appropriately compensated and inflicts grave 
psychological, if not physical, scars on the victim. For this reason it is 
submitted here that lethal force can sometimes be justified against sub-
lethal harm, if the jury deem the response reasonable. 
In order for rape to be permissibly defended with lethal force, the harm 
inflicted by the act of rape must be, in some regard, comparable to the 
deprivation of life itself. Since the right to life has not been violated by the 
See, for example, Workman v. Cowper [1961] 2 QB 143 in which it was held that the 
defendant was justified in killing a dog that was posing a threat to others. 
It may be worthy of note that Article 2 of the ECHR is vague on this question. 
Leverick, Killing in Self-Defence. chapter 8. 
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act of rape, the basis for permission to kill to ward off a threat of rape 
must be grounded in the psychological trauma experienced by the victim. 
Endorsing what can only be described as psychological self-defence 
could, however, be dangerous.^^'^ Other commentators prefer to view the 
abhorrent act of rape as akin to deprivation of life itself as it involves a 
serious intrusion on the right of autonomy and bodily integrity of the 
v i c t i m . T h e wrongness of rape rests not on the type of harm it inflicts, 
but on the way it effectively strips the victim of their humanity (and right to 
self-determination) by using them merely as an object for sexual 
penetration. 
This argument, although it cannot be elaborated further given the 
constraints of the thesis, provides the most plausible basis for the 
suggestion that one may kill to prevent rape; and that, by implication, one 
may sometimes utilise self-defensive force which produces, superficially 
at least, more harm than is threatened, provided the force used can still 
be deemed broadly proportionate and reasonable. The lack of 
authoritative guidance in English law on the issue of legitimately engaging 
lethal self-defensive force to ward off a threat of rape^^° is reflective of the 
philosophical disagreement as to whether a defensive killing in such 
^ ' T h e theft of a family heirloom has the potential to have huge psychological 
consequences for the owner, and surely it should not be permissible to kill in all such 
circumstances. 
Leverick, Killing in Self-Defence chapter 8; see also Don B Kates and NJ Enberg, 
'Deadly Force Self-Defense against Rape' (1982) 15 University of California Davis Law 
Review 873 at 894, cited in Leverick, 'Defending Self-Defence' at 574. The former 
commentators further suggested, at 885, that killing to prevent rape might also be 
permitted on the grounds that every threat of rape entails a threat of death; but it 
submitted here that the argument articulated above is more persuasive. Not all rapes 
involve a threat of death, so this premise would not be universally applicable, and 
therefore should be rejected. 
John Gardner and Stephen Shute, 'The Wrongness of Rape', in Jeremy Horder (ed.) 
Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence 4"" edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000) at 193-217. 
Rogers criticises Leverick for adopting this argument in the context of self-defence. He 
suggests that the fact that a rapist denies the humanity of a victim explains why rape is 
an abhorrent crime, but not why the rapist forfeits the right to life, see Rogers 'Killing in 
Self-Defence: Publication Review' at 173. 
In R V. l/V/7ee/er [1967] WLR 1531 (followed in R v. Clugstone October l " 1987, 
unreported) it was assumed, without discussion, that killing in defence of rape is 
permissible. The case law beyond this authority is sparse, although a number of 
philosophers have attempted to provide theoretical explanations for the use of lethal 
self-defensive force to ward off sub-lethal harm, see Hawkins, A Treatise ofttie Pleas of 
the Crown at 71. 
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circumstances should ever be justified. It is submitted here that in such 
circumstances lethal self-defence could be justified as the response is 
likely to be deemed reasonable (incorporating a notion of proportionality) 
given the severity of the intrusion on the rights of the victim. There is, 
however, a clear necessity for more explicit guidance as to how such 
cases should h a n d l e d . A more specific set of rules would override the 
current ad hoc approach to the issue which depends on the core values 
of individual jurors.^^^ Particular views are likely to be influenced by an 
individual's commitment to the sanctity of life; and it is suggested 
throughout this thesis that the sanctity of life may not always be the 
utmost consideration in situations of great pressure, thereby rendering 
the use of lethal force in self-defence permissible in certain 
circumstances where the unjust threat consists of some sub-lethal 
physical harm. 
Lettial self-defensive force in defence of property 
It is generally accepted in English criminal law that a defendant cannot 
rely on the self-defence justification if s/he uses lethal force to defend 
property.^^"^ This is so because there are established means of 
compensating violations of proprietary interests which do not apply to 
violations of personal interests. Stolen goods, for instance, could be 
reclaimed, or damaged property repaired. According to Rodin, attacks 
against property and those against persons are not just different in 
magnitude, but quality.^^"^ There is a deep moral distinction between the 
As in the American Model Penal Code, which provides that deadly force is not 
justified "unless the actor believes that such force is necessary to protect himself against 
death, serious bodily harm, kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled by force or 
threat" (Model Penal Code, section 3.04). 
Contrast Sangero who supports the flexibility of the proportionality requirement, see 
Sangero Self-Defence in Criminal Law at 168-169; see also Robinson Criminal Law 
Defenses at 89. 
Although Leverick points out that the issue of whether it is legitimate to kill in defence 
of property has never been directly at issue in any English case, see Leverick Killing in 
Self-Defence at 133. 
This accords with the approach taken by von Hirsch and Jareborg in their 
assessment of the gravity of harm, see section 2.3.1.4 above. 
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two, "derived from a fundamental comparative appraisal of intrinsic value 
and worth."^^^ As a feature of our legal system, much greater value is 
attributed to personal integrity than property; and it follows that "[tjhere is 
absolutely no room in a civilised society to justify the rescue of property at 
the price of human life, not even at the price of the aggressor's life."^^^ 
The current approach in English law, however, following R v. Martin,^^^ is 
to leave the issue of self-defence to the jury to deliberate on the basis of 
an overall test of reasonableness. It is not beyond the bounds of 
possibility that a jury may acquit a defendant who has killed in defence of 
property, depending on their core values. Such a development would, it 
is contested here, be incompatible with Article 2 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and thus the argument for legitimising the 
use of lethal self-defensive force against property is diluted. 
4.4.3 A summary of the conditions of self-defence 
Limitations on the operation of self-defence are central to its effective 
functioning, regardless of which philosophical standpoint is adopted. It 
has been established that necessity and proportionality cumulatively 
indicate whether the force used in self-defence was reasonable in the 
circumstances and this is a settled requirement in English law. 
Rodin, War and Self-Defense at 43. 
Sangero, Self-Defence in Criminal Law at 181. This approach is also supported by 
Leverick Killing in Self-Defence at 136-137. In contrast Simester and Sullivan question 
whether property is necessarily less worthy of protection than human life say, for 
instance, if the life of a terrorist is weighed in the balance against protecting a priceless 
historic artefact, see Simester and Sullivan, Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine at 708. 
R V. Martin (Anthony) (2002) 1 Cr App R 27; see also DPP v. Bayer [2003] EWHC 
Admin 2567. 
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According to Article 2 ECHR defence of property is not one of the legitimate 
circumstances in which the right to life may be violated. See also Leverick, Killing in 
Self-Defence at 133 and 181-183. Although Article 2 does not specify a proportionality 
requirement, the European Court of Human Rights clearly endorses strict principles of 
proportionality when deadly force has been utilised, see Andronlcou and Constantinou v. 
Cyprus (1998) 25 EHRR 491 at paragraph 171. 
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In deciding whether the use of self-defensive force against an unjust 
threat is necessary, considerations of retreat, imminence and mistaken 
beliefs may be significant. It is submitted here that in accordance with the 
liberal principles advocated throughout this thesis, due weight should be 
attached to conflicting rights of the defendant and victim. In relation to 
retreat it is proposed that any suggestion that the defendant must 
withdraw from the confrontation must be rejected as this idealistic 
approach reveals a complete lack of respect for individual autonomy and 
the right of each person to make their own meaningful choices 
unhindered by o t h e r s . T h e current approach of English law which 
considers the issue of retreat as one aspect of a broader requirement of 
necessity (and even broader still, reasonableness) is supported. With 
regard to imminence, it is submitted that there must be a high probability 
that the harm threatened is likely to occur before self-defensive force is 
engaged, but the defendant does not have to wait for the attack to be 
launched in order to respond, as that would undermine the primacy of 
her/his autonomy. With reference to the concept of mistake, it is 
submitted here that in order to benefit from an excuse and be absolved of 
criminal responsibility, the defendant must use reasonable force; and s/he 
must reasonably believe in the existence of justifying circumstances. A 
rule which allows a defence for someone who mistakenly and 
unreasonably believes in the existence of an attack arguably affords 
insufficient respect to the rights of the innocent non-threatening person 
whose interests have been wrongfully set back for no good reason. 
It is suggested above that, although accounts which explain the self-
defence justification in terms of protecting the fundamental rights of the 
defendant are not prima facie bound by proportionality requirements, 
such considerations are crucial in the interests of justice. The principles 
of proportionality described above are applied flexibly as part of an overall 
A submission which might be contested by Ashworth, 'Self-Defence and the Right to 
Life.' A similarly proactive view is adopted by Rodin, War and Self-Defense at 40. 
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assessment of the reasonableness of the self-defender's r e s p o n s e . A 
requirement of proportionality raises difficult questions regarding the use 
of lethal defensive force against sub-lethal harms and lethal force in 
defence of property. Deciding whether such lethal forms of self-defence 
are reasonable, taking into account considerations of proportionality, very 
much depends on the core values of individual jurors and perceptions of 
intrinsic worth. It is submitted here that lethal defensive force against 
serious injury or the threat of rape is permissible in certain circumstances. 
The proposition that the harm caused may be greater than the harm 
threatened highlights that the proportionality requirement is merely one 
factor that is taken into account in the overall assessment of 
reasonableness. However, when property is defended with lethal force 
there is no self-defence justification in recognition of the fundamental 
moral difference between personal and proprietary interests. 
A relatively comprehensive account of the philosophical and practical 
challenges underlying the use of self-defensive force against innocent 
unjust threats has been provided. However, before the discussion can 
proceed to chapter five and a consideration of the scope of criminal 
responsibility for intrusions against innocent non-threatening bystanders, 
one final category of difficult cases must be addressed. These cases 
involve intrusions on the legally protected interests of what we will call 
innocent incidental threats, a category of innocent persons who do not 
pose a direct unjust threat but who are closely linked to the threat in that 
they expose it to themselves and others. Force used against such 
innocent persons is difficult to defend as it is unclear which ground of 
exculpation is most appropriate to exonerate the actor of criminal 
responsibility, assuming that liability should be avoided at all. Because 
such difficult cases lie on the borderland between self-defence and 
necessity they will be considered in this chapter largely for reasons of 
convenience. 
" ° See Palmer v f? [1971] 1 AC 814; and Simester and Sullivan, Criminal Law Theory 
and Doctrine at 708. 
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4.5 Innocent incidental threats: self-defence or necessity? 
It is established above that the self-defence justification permits the use 
of defensive force against culpable or innocent, active or passive, unjust 
threats, within appropriate p a r a m e t e r s . B u t the account would not be 
complete without considering a sub-set of cases which have thus far 
evaded simple classification^"^^ and have tested the limits of two related 
justification defences: self-defence and necessity. The exact boundaries 
of these defences and their application to 'hard' cases involving action 
which infringes the rights of a particular category of innocent persons 
have thus far eluded precise philosophical and legal demarcation. An 
attempt will be made here to establish some clear guiding principles on 
which these difficult cases may be resolved. 
4.5.1 Defining innocent incidental threats 
The cases in point involve innocent incidental, indirect or contingent 
threats,^^^ where the innocent person whose rights are infringed by the 
defendant poses no direct and unjustified threat whatsoever but is 
harmed as an incidental effect of warding off a more immediate direct 
threat. Although not a direct source of the threat itself in the same way 
that the dangling mountaineer or falling projectile are,^'^'' incidental threats 
are nonetheless connected to the source of the threat in that they bring it 
closer to realisation^^^ or facilitate it in some way, albeit unwittingly. 
See sections 4.1-4.4. 
Uniacke aptly describes these cases as "conceptually grey", see Uniacke, 
Permissible Killing at 164. 
The phrase 'contingent threat' was coined by Uniacke, Permissible Killing at 167. 
See also Horder, 'Self-Defence, Necessity and Duress: Understanding the Relationship,' 
who uses the phrase 'indirect threat' at 152. Here the phrase 'incidental threat' is 
preferred. 
See section 4.2.2.2 above. 
Horder, 'Self-Defence, Necessity and Duress: Understanding the Relationship' at 
154. 
Uniacke, Permissible Killing at 167. 
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Where a defendant intrudes on the rights of an innocent person who is 
associated with the direct threat to their interests, there is some debate 
as to whether that defendant's action should be justified on the grounds 
of self-defence or necessity. It seems that in these difficult cases there is 
"perhaps no definitive test that will mark out a bright line between the 
two."^^'' If deemed to be inextricably bound to the direct threat, then it 
could be argued that such innocent persons are the legitimate target of 
self-defensive force. But it is submitted here that the correct approach is 
to regard such persons as entirely non-threatening, and therefore the 
self-defence justification cannot be invoked to exonerate the defendant 
for encroaching on their rights. However, one may instinctively wish to 
vindicate the action of a person in these circumstances, and therefore it is 
argued that appeal should be made to the residual doctrine of necessity 
to deny the actor's criminal responsibility, subject to stringent limitations. 
The extent to which necessity will provide any defence to justify intrusions 
on the rights of innocent incidental threats is a matter which requires 
careful deliberation.^"^^ But first, there must be some explanation as to 
why the self-defence justification is inapplicable. 
4.5.2 Self-defence and innocent incidental threats 
A number of modern dilemmas have sparked intense philosophical and 
legal debate regarding the appropriate scope of criminal responsibility for 
intruding on the rights of an innocent incidental threat. Some of these 
thought provoking examples warrant deliberation here not least because 
they challenge us to clarify some of our moral thinking and to consciously 
and mechanically formulate our r e s p o n s e s . O n e example is the 
sinking of the ship, the Herald of Free Enterprise. At the inquest following 
this disaster, a witness (an army corporal) gave evidence that he and 
numerous other passengers were trapped in the stricken ferry and in 
Horder, 'Self-Defence, Necessity and Duress: Understanding the Relationship' at 
154. 
See section 4.5.3 below for further discussion. 
"® Jonathan Bennett, Tfie Act Itself (Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press, 1995) at 165. 
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grave danger of drowning. A possible way of escape up a rope ladder 
was barred by a man, petrified by cold or fear, who could move neither up 
nor down. After fruitless attempts to persuade him to move the corporal 
ordered those nearby to push him off the ladder. They did so; he fell into 
the water and was not seen again. The trapped passengers were then 
able to climb up the ladder to safety. The coroner expressed the opinion 
that a reasonable act of self-preservation, or the preservation of others, is 
'not necessarily murder'. So far as is known, no legal proceedings 
against the corporal were ever contemplated. The rights of the innocent 
man on the ladder, caught up in a crisis created by circumstances, were 
infringed in order to save a number of others. It is accepted that the man 
on the ladder was preventing the passengers from going where they had 
a right and a most urgent need to go and he was endangering lives. Yet 
he was essentially doing no 'wrong'. It is difficult to rationalise why the 
frozen man's autonomy was disregarded, especially since that right is so 
fundamental to the functioning of English law. Should such a case ever 
reach the courtroom would the accused, who took decisive action in 
circumstances of emergency, be absolved of criminal liability? If so, what 
is the appropriate ground of exculpation? 
Let us primarily appeal to the doctrine of self-defence. The man on the 
ladder is clearly a potential violator of the rights of the other desperate 
passengers; he is 'unwittingly imperilling'^''° their lives. On one view, the 
frozen man, though absent of fault, constitutes an immediate unjust threat 
to the protected interests of the other passengers. Horder rightly claims, 
however, that this is a much more complex example than the roped 
mountaineer case, which, on the principles stated above, is a clear cut 
case of self-defence, due to the dangling mountaineer being a direct 
source of the threat which was posed for no objectively justified moral 
reason. The normative status of the man on the ladder, it is advanced 
here, is different. Arguably, the man is not the actual direct source of the 
threat, as this can be attributed to the rising water. This interpretation 
Ormerod, Smitti and Hogan: Criminal Law at 350. 
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was originally developed by Uniacke,^"^ who states the importance of 
distinguishing between human agents who are the direct source of the 
threat (against whom self-defensive force can legitimately be used) and 
circumstances constituting the direct source of the threat (where the 
violation of another's rights does not fall within the purview of self-
defence). Her account proceeds with the claim that the frozen man, 
although not the direct source of the threat, has inadvertently become 
linked to it. For Uniacke, if viewed as an exacerbation of the direct threat, 
the man on the ladder would be a legitimate target for self-defensive 
force.^''^ However, she goes on to draw a distinction between the 
innocent person who aggravates the threat and the innocent person who 
merely exposes another to an independent threat; the latter case she 
describes as a contingent threat. For her, this difference is determinative 
of the legitimacy of self-defensive force being used to permit an intrusion 
on the rights of an innocent person. The frozen man falls within this latter 
category as he is a contingent threat and is thus not a legitimate target of 
self-defensive force.^''^ 
Horder, not entirely convinced by Uniacke's distinction between 
exacerbation of and exposure to a t h r e a t , a t t e m p t s to further elucidate 
the position. For him, the man on the ladder increases the chances that 
Uniacke, Permissible Killing: The Self-Defence Justification of Homicide at 164-177. 
'^^ ^ An example of an exacerbation of a threat would be someone who rocks a sinking 
rowing boat, which Uniacke classifies as the type of threat which might be "resisted, 
repelled or warded off," see Uniacke, Permissible Killing at 167. 
Other examples of a contingent threat include Foot's fat pot-holer who becomes 
stuck in the exit, impeding the passage to safety of his fellow pot-holer's from a rapidly 
rising tide, see Philippa Foot Virtues and Vices, and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1978), chapter 2. In this example, the threat exists independent of 
the pot-holer, who merely exposes others to an independent threat. Another example 
arises in the case where X fires an arrow at D, who cannot move out of its path. The 
path is currently blocked by V. If V bends down to tie his shoelace, V exposes D to the 
threat, but is not the source or an exacerbation of the threat (or, for Horder, V does not 
increase the threat in and of itself). This type of contingent threat is not the legitimate 
target of self-defensive force. This example is adapted from Uniacke, Permissible Killing 
at 167. Horder points out that the self-defensive action may be warranted if V 
deliberately bends down in order that D is hit by the missile, as the exposure to the 
threat would be free, deliberate and informed; see Horder, 'Self-Defence, Necessity and 
Duress: Understanding the Relationship' at 152, using the phrase articulated by Herbert 
LA Hart and Tony Honore, Causation in the Law 2"" edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1985) at 361. 
^"^ He suggests that the distinction is, notionally, a difficult one to draw, see Horder, 
'Self-Defence, Necessity and Duress: Understanding the Relationship' (1998) at 153. 
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the threat will turn into reality for the desperate passengers; but the threat 
is still operative independent of the man's actions. The man does not 
affect the threat in itself but simply brings it closer to being realised for the 
p a s s e n g e r s . T h e innocent man is, in this sense, indirectly connected 
to the threat; and because of his passivity and the fact that he does not 
pose any unjust threat, nor affect the independent threat in itself, he 
cannot be the legitimate target of self-defensive force. He is, effectively, 
an innocent non-threatening subject who is simply caught up in an 
unfortunate set of circumstances. 
The difficulty of distinguishing unjust threats, against whom self-defensive 
force may be exercised and incidental or contingent threats, who are not 
a legitimate target of self-defensive force, is further highlighted by Re A 
(Childrenf^^ in which the Court of Appeal was given the unenviable task 
of deciding whether to authorise an operation to separate conjoined 
twins, Mary and J o d i e , T h e dilemma facing the judges was formidable; 
they were asked to determine whether it would be lawful for surgeons to 
separate the siblings, even though it was a certainty that Mary, the 
weaker twin, would die as a result. If nature was left to run its course, 
however, both twins were destined to suffer untimely deaths. If the 
operation proved to be a success, as indeed it did, Mary's life would, in 
effect, be sacrificed for the continued existence of her sister. 
In a landmark judgment the Court of Appeal held that, in the special 
circumstances of the case, it was lawful for the surgeons to override the 
right to life of the weaker twin, Mary, in order to save the life of the 
stronger sister, Jodie.^"^ The decision left the criminal law in "total 
disarray"^"*^ by "throw[ing] away years of legal precedent, itself based on 
Horder, Ibid, at 154. 
Re A (Children: Conjoined Twins) [2000] 4 All ER 961. 
The twins were allocated these names throughout the court process, but their real 
names were later disclosed as Rosie and Grace Attard. 
'^'^  It was accepted by both Ward LJ, at 1012, and Brooke LJ, at 1029, that, absent any 
defence, the surgeons would intentionally kill Mary, the actus reus and mens rea for 
murder both being present. 
"^"^  Jenny McEwan, 'Murder by Design: The 'Feel-Good Factor' and the Criminal Law' 
(2001) 9 Medical Law Review 246. 
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moral arguments which were not addressed."^^° Although the decision 
was unanimous in respect of the outcome, the judges offered disparate 
reasons for reaching it. It seemed that the court was "searching hopefully 
for a defence which could be formulated; they were not looking in an 
uncommitted way to decide whether such a defence already exists;"^^^ 
but in the end the court resorted to established defences to absolve the 
doctors of criminal responsibility. Concentrating solely on the two 
relevant judgments for present purposes,^^^ Brooke LJ controversially 
declared that the case was one of necessity.^^"^ The action taken by the 
doctors encroached on the most fundamental right of a human being and 
unlike the medical cases discussed in chapter three where treatment is 
considered necessary in the patient's 'best interests', the doctrine of 
necessity did not, until this case, concern situations of life or death. 
Conversely, Ward LJ used the language of self-defence as one possible 
justification for permitting the o p e r a t i o n . T h e merits of each approach 
are considered below. 
This section is concerned with the merits of the self-defence plea. Ward 
LJ asserted that in order to deny the culpability of the doctors the solution 
was to regard them as having a legal permission to intervene on Jodie's 
behalf to protect her from Mary who posed an unjust threat to her life. An 
illustrative analogy was drawn with the case of a six year-old boy 
shooting indiscriminately at other children in a school playground. 
Although the action of the young boy would not be unlawful,^^^ Ward 
claimed that: 
McEwan, Ibid, at 247. 
Jonathan Rogers, Necessity, Private Defence and the Killing of Mary' [2001] Criminal 
Law Review 5^5 a[ 5:9. 
Thereby largely disregarding the judgment of Walker LJ, whose reasoning is not 
pertinent to the present discussion. 
Re A (Cfiildren: Conjoined Twins) [2000] 4 All ER 961, per Brooke LJ at 1032-1052. 
All three judges ultimately concurred that the surgeons involved would have at their 
disposal a defence of necessity. It is nonetheless essential to examine the alternative 
approaches explored within the case in order to investigate the limits of self-defence and 
necessity. 
Andrew Phang, 'Conjoined Twins: The Limits of Reason and the Transcendent Hope 
- Part II' (2001) 147 Law and Justice 89 at 99. 
255 
Given that the age of criminal liability in England and Wales is 10 years. 
Re A (Children) [2000] 4 All ER 961 per Ward LJ at 1017. 
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"...in law killing that six year old boy in self-defence of others 
would be fully justified...! can see no difference in essence 
between that resort to legitimate self-defence and the doctors 
coming to Jodie's defence and removing the threat of fatal harm to 
her presented by Mary's draining her life-blood. The availability of 
such a plea of quasi self-defence, modified to meet the quite 
exceptional circumstances nature has inflicted on the twins, makes 
intervention by the doctors lawful. 
Thus, on Ward's analysis, the reality was that Mary was 'attacking' Jodie, 
albeit innocently, and permission must be granted to remove the threat of 
fatal harm presented by Mary's draining of her sister's life blood. As 
discussed in section 4.3 above, the proposed philosophical account of 
self-defence maintains that utilising defensive force against someone who 
poses an unjust threat to another is justified notwithstanding the fact that 
the threat is not acting offensively or that s/he does not intend to harm the 
other.^^^ Though prima facie the submission that self-defence could 
ground a justification for the killing is acceptable, it masks a number of 
conceptual difficulties which arguably render its application in such 
circumstances unsatisfactory. 
Some commentators would concur with Ward's submission that the 
private defence of Jodie against the bodily intrusion of Mary could have 
justified the o p e r a t i o n . O n e of the difficulties of providing a justification 
on the basis of self-defence in such circumstances is the unacceptable 
labelling of Mary as an attacl<er. Ward's comparison of Mary's status to 
that of the six year-old gunman is surely flawed as the boy is clearly an 
Re A (Children) [2000] 4 All ER 961 per Ward LJ at 1017. 
See section 4.3.9 above. See also Uniacke, Permissible Killing at 172-177. 
Leverick has suggested that the conjoined twins situation is comparable with roped 
mountaineer case in that Mary is the direct source of the threat to Jodie, see Leverick 
Killing in Self-Defence at 9. Kadish also draws this analogy and highlights the similarity 
of this case and the falling projectile considered by Nozick, see Sanford Kadish, 
'Respect for Life and Regard for Rights in Criminal Law' (1976) 64 California Law 
Review 871 at 889. In support of this view, Rabbanic law treated both the foetus 
'threatening' the mother's life and the refugee 'threatening' his host city as aggressors 
who could be permissibly destroyed in self-defence, see 'Justification and Excuse in the 
Judaic and Common Law' (1977) 52 New York University Law Review 624. Fletcher 
attributes a similarly libertarian strategy relating to aggression to Thomson in her 
defence of abortion, see Rethinking Criminal Law at 863. See also the comment in 
Smith & Hogan that "[Mary] was imperilling [Jodie's] life and the private defence solution 
avoids the argument, valid or not, that necessity can never justify killing," see Ormerod, 
Smith & Hogan: Criminal Law at 351. 
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active and direct source of the threat and, despite an absence of fault, is 
positively attacking his schoolmates. Mary may be similarly innocent but 
she is not. It is submitted here, an attacker\r\ any sense of the word. 
Yet self-defence may still be applicable since the dominant philosophical 
account outlined In section 4.3.9 above does not demand the requirement 
of an attack. Self-defensive force Is justified against an Innocent person 
who poses a passive unjust threat. To constitute an unjust threat (active 
or passive) there must be no objective moral justification for threat Mary 
poses to Jodie. The difficulty with this case is that the twins have been 
born Into a terrible situation for which neither is responsible. They have 
become linked to a threat which was essentially created by 
circumstances. Mary is not, on this approach, a direct source of the 
threat at all and it Is difficult to see how she exacerbates it. To label Mary 
an unjust threat we would have to find some independent right of Jodie's 
that Mary was threatening; but since they were born conjoined and 
neither had an independent existence, "there was never any invasive act 
by Mary that caused the state of a f f a i r s . H e r continued existence 
might Increase the chances of the threat turning into a reality (or In 
Uniacke's terms, she may expose the threat to her sister) but the threat 
exists Independent of anything Mary now does. It is therefore submitted 
that on this account the self-defence justification is unsuitable in these 
circumstances. 
Sabine Michalowski, 'Sanctity of Life: Are Some Lives More Sacred Than Others?' 
(2002) 22 Legal Studies 377 at 395. Uniacke also denies the availability of a self-
defence justification in such circumstances, see Suzanne Uniacke, 'Was Mary's Death 
Murder?' (2001) 9 Medical Law Review 208 at 213. 
There are other reasons, less significant to the current discussion, which could be 
used to deny self-defence. The appropriateness of the doctors choosing who shall live 
between two innocent parties who are equally faultless could be called into question. 
One could say that the third party has a legal permission (on the grounds of self-
defence) to intervene in order to protect the rights of (as Jodie is in this case) the 'victim', 
given that both were destined to die if no action was taken. This was not a case of 
choosing between lives, as Mary was destined to die regardless. A contrasting view is 
offered in Davis, 'Abortion and Self-Defense' at 175, where the author submits that third 
parties lack the agent-relative permission to kill an innocent threat which makes it 
permissible for the actual victim to kill another in order to save themselves. If agent-
relativity was crucial, however, it would surely be applicable across the board, meaning 
that we may always have permission to or be justified in killing others to save our own 
lives by virtue of being agent-relative. In this sense, it could be submitted that the killing 
of Mary to save Jodie is more appropriately justified by virtue of pure necessity, rather 
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4.5.3 Necessity and innocent incidental threats 
For some we will have reached the boundary between liability and non-
liability for intrusions against innocent persons. There are those who 
adhere to the absolutist view that it could never be right to commit the 
atrocious act of killing an innocent person who is essentially non-
threatening, such as the man on the ladder and the conjoined twin, even 
to prevent a greater w r o n g . T h e wrongness of this action is, for some, 
basic and axiomatic. According to a lesser form of absolutism, however, 
the usual wrongness of killing an innocent may have to yield in extreme 
circumstances. Thus, killing an innocent non-threatening person is not 
right in all times of pressure, but rather the usual categories of judgment 
in terms of 'rightness' and 'wrongness' do not apply in cases of 
extraordinary pressure.^" But if the occurrence of a crisis results in the 
ultimate breakdown of the concepts of right and wrong, how should we 
behave? In a situation of forced choice, whether the force emanates from 
a human agent or from circumstances, if a setback to the fundamental 
rights of a non-threatening person is to be permitted, the alternative must 
be a calamity of the kind we would normally be required to avoid. The 
only possible means by which the criminal law can justify serious 
infringements on the rights of another where the victim poses no unjust 
threat to the defendant is via a strictly defined defence of necessity. 
than unnecessarily stretching the boundaries of self-defence. The necessity defence 
might also be preferred because in Re A the death of both twins was not an immediate, 
or even imminent, prospect; they could well have lived for many more months. The 
account of self-defence offered here maintains the importance of an imminence 
requirement, see section 4.4 above. This was not a typically urgent case of self-defence 
in the sense that there was adequate time to seek guidance from the court. In relation to 
necessity it has been stressed that the operative principle should be "one of necessity, 
not emergency," per Lord Goff in Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1 at 75. 
See Gertrude EM Anscombe, 'War and Murder' in Gertrude EM Anscombe, Ethics, 
Religion and Politics, Collected Philosophical Papers (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1981); and John Finnis, Joseph Boyle and Germain Grisez, Nuclear 
Deterrence, Morality and Realism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987). 
This view was proposed by Charles Fned, Right and Wrong (Cambridge, Mass; 
Harvard University Press, 1978) at 10. 
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The doctrine of necessity, the conditions of which are described above in 
section 3.4, is traditionally labelled a "lesser-of-two-evils"^^'* defence, 
requiring that the harm avoided be significantly greater than the harm 
i n f l i c t e d . I t was submitted that in deceptively simple terms, the defence 
"applies to cases in which a person breaks the letter of the law but where 
In so doing they act In accordance with a value judgement that the law 
endorses."^^^ This value judgement is based on an all things considered 
objective evaluation of the reasons for and against acting. It was 
suggested that for necessity to justify a rights intrusion, there must be 
some overwhelming moral compulsion^^'' for the defendant to act. 
Because necessity Implies that the victim has been wronged, in that their 
rights have been Infringed, there must be a strong justification for 
choosing the course of action on the basis of some overriding reason, 
weighing competing priorities in the balance. Overriding reasons for 
action outweigh other competing priorities and this explains why the rights 
of others can be Infringed without criminal responsibility, even though this 
may set back their interests. According to Horder, a particular action may 
be deemed necessary If, objectively, it "accords with the best moral 
conception of persons, their lives, goals, and so on. In the society in 
question."26^ 
In situations of necessity, the danger or harm sought to be avoided 
Invariably does not stem from an unlawful assault upon the defendant. 
The source of the danger lies in a set of circumstances for which no one 
may be to blame and it Is arguably a central facet of necessity cases that 
the victim poses no unjust threat to the defendant claiming the defence^^^ 
and that circumstances create the dilemma as opposed to a human 
agent. Where the defendant sets back the personal or proprietary 
Uniacke, 'Was Mary's Death Murder?' at 215. 
Or perhaps a more convincing account of necessity would maintain that there need 
only be a 'balance of harms'. 
Uniacke, 'Was Mary's Death Murder?" at 215. 
Horder defines this as a moral imperative to act, see Horder, 'Self-Defence, 
Necessity and Duress. Understanding the Relationship' at 143. 
Ibid, at 156. 
Ibid, at 150. 
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interests of an Innocent person who poses no threat, unjustifiable or 
otherwise, the victim is therefore prima facie wronged on account of the 
intrusion on their legally protected interests. If, however, there is some 
overwhelming moral imperative for the defendant to act then the rights 
invasion may be justified and the actor exonerated. 
The necessity defence may be used in cases where, for instance, the 
defendant is compelled to encroach on the victim's property rights in 
order to secure rights of a higher order, such as rights of personhood. 
Necessity would, therefore, justify the action of someone who breaks Into 
an empty house in order to telephone for help in a dire emergency.^''" An 
intrinsic limitation on the defence of necessity is, however, that it should 
not be used to violate rights of personal integrity. For instance, the 
necessity defence, as currently defined, would not justify the taking of one 
innocent life to save one's own in circumstances where such a choice has 
to be made.^''^ It is clear that self-defence is capable of logical 
justification in a lethal context, but because of the limits on the defence 
and the fact that necessity cases exclusively Involve the infringing the 
rights of Innocents it Is much more difficult to justify killing by virtue of 
necessity than it Is to justify self-defensive killing. One significant 
practical obstacle to the recognition of necessity as a defence to 
intentional killing is the infamous authority of Dudley and Stephens^^^ 
which has, rightly or wrongly, restricted the use of the defence in murder 
cases for over a century. Significantly, in Re A the Court circumnavigated 
the phnciple by distinguishing Dudley on the grounds that Mary was 
chosen by fate as the victim and was destined to die, unlike the cabin boy 
in Dudley who was an Innocent bystander selected for death by his fellow 
sailors. The authority of Dudley was consequently retained, so as to 
prevent the potential misuse of the defence. But Re A (Cfiildren) 
demonstrates that Dudley does not ultimately pose an impenetrable 
" ° Simester and Sullivan, Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine at 718. 
David Wasserman, 'Justifying Self-Defense' (1987) 16 Philosophy and Public Affairs 
356 at 356. See also section 5.6 below. 
R V. Dudley and Stephens (1884) 14 QBD 273. For a more detailed discussion of the 
case see section 5.6 below. 
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barrier to the recognition of necessity as a defence to intentional killing in 
limited circumstances. 
In philosophical terms, the necessity principle has also been restricted in 
cases involving a choice between innocent lives. Examples often cited to 
illustrate the limits of the necessity principle include the instance of two 
drowning men fighting for a plank large enough to support one only; '^'"^ or 
that of shipwrecked persons climbing into a lifeboat unable to carry them 
all.^'^'* When natural events imperil two innocent lives equally, neither has 
any obvious justification for deflecting the loss to the other.^''^ Is it legally 
permissible to push the other person from the plank or to remove 
passengers from the lifeboat? This query is particularly troubling 
because it involves competing personal interests, such as one person's 
right to life conflicting with another's. Absent any moral reason for one 
life to be favoured over another, or a fair selection procedure, such action 
cannot be justified on an objective evaluation. Indeed, Williams submits 
that "where it is merely a case of life for life, the doctrine of necessity 
must generally be silent, because the two lives must be accounted equal 
in the eye of the law and there is nothing to choose between them."^^^ 
There is no 'lesser evil', nothing to tip the scales on a balance of harms, 
and no moral imperative to act. 
Despite all of this, it would be premature to discard the necessity doctrine 
altogether in cases such as the Herald of Free Enterprise and Re A 
(Children). These cases could be distinguished on the basis that neither 
was a straightforward 'life for life' case such as those contemplated by 
Williams. The problem to be resolved is whether the right to life of the 
man on the ladder or the conjoined twin should be honoured regardless 
of the consequences (which would involve the loss of life of other 
passengers, or the death of both twins); or whether that right is capable of 
See Immanuel Kant The Metaphysics of Morals (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991) at 60; also Uniacke Permissible Killing at 149-150. 
Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England volume II at 109-110. 
Schopp, Justification Defenses and Just Convictions at 78. 
Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law at 607. 
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being overridden by other considerations. Horder provides an 
illuminating response to this question which satisfies the intuition that 
Intruding on the rights of innocent incidental threats is justifiable without 
undermining the rights of the innocent party. The key to resolving the 
matter Is this: the man on the ladder was already designated fordeatf) 
himself; he was not only exposing the other passengers to the threat of 
death, but also himself.^^'^ Similarly, Mary was destined to die regardless 
of the operation and it was on this basis that Brooke LJ justified the killing 
on the principle of necessity.^''^ It follows that this consideration may well 
be crucial if such a serious violation of personal rights Is ever to be 
permitted under the rubric of necesslty.^''^ 
This argument Invites the criticism that it is a mask for unbounded 
consequentiallsm,^^° but the reasoning may be defended on the grounds 
that necessity is, in essence, concerned with a balancing of evils and 
harms and sensitivity to this basic principle does not necessarily signal 
descent Into unrestrained consequentialist c a l c u l a t i o n s . T h e logical 
corollary of this view is that the rights of the Innocent Incidental threat 
could not be legitimately invaded on the basis of necessity if that innocent 
person's rights could, in fact, be honoured in some way, even at the 
expense of other Individual rights. For Instance, If the man on the ladder 
was sufficiently highly perched that his own life was completely safe, or If 
Mary had a normal life expectancy and was not destined for death then 
Wicks disputes this proposition, maintaining that even in cases like Re A (Children: 
Conjoined Twins) where the victim is designated for death the courts had to accept that 
killing the child violated her fundamental right to life and encroached on her individual 
autonomy in the same way as the cabin boy in Dudley; see Elizabeth Wicks, 'The 
Greater Good? Issues of Proportionality and Democracy in the Doctrine of Necessity as 
applied \n Re A' (2003) 15 Common Law World Review 32. However, Dudley is 
distinguished from Re A on the account advanced in section 5.6 below. 
Brooke LJ based his decision on such a principle of necessity, giving intuitive 
preference to this defence as opposed to private defence because within the realms of 
necessity there is no requirement of unjust aggression or threats. Thus, the 
counterintuitive linguistic problems encountered by the self-defence doctrine are 
avoided; see Re A (Children: Conjoined Twins) [2000] 4 All ER 961 at 1032. 
Simester and Sullivan, Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine at 720. 
Horder acknowledges that this approach could be criticised for weighing the value of 
one human life against the value of others or encouraging a "consequentialist weighing 
of relative outcomes," see Horder, 'Self-Defence, Necessity and Duress: Understanding 
the Relationship' at 158. 
Horder, Ibid at 158. 
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innocent life could be honoured, even if that meant other individual 
interests were sacrificed. In those circumstances the right to life of the 
innocent incidental threat could not be justifiably infringed on the grounds 
of necessity as there is no longer an overriding reason to act. So, 
adapting the reasoning offered by Horder, drawing on the work of 
Uniacke, for the necessity defence to justify intrusions on the personal 
integrity of innocent persons the decisive factor is whether the innocent 
incidental threat is exposing her/himself as well as others to the threat. 
Alternatively, if the rights of the contingent threat can be honoured 
despite the fact that they are exposing others to a threat, then the 
necessity justification is inapplicable. 
4.5.4 Justifying Intrusions on the rights of innocent incidental 
threats: a summary 
The cases discussed in this section are fraught with moral and legal 
complexities of the highest order. The innocents whose interests are 
infringed are not comfortably classified as unjust threats, nor are they 
wholly innocent bystanders. They occupy a peripheral position between 
self-defence and necessity, in that they are closely connected to threat to 
the defendant's interests, but they are not the direct source of it. It is 
submitted here, for the reasons outlined in section 4.5.2 above, that 
incidental threats are not the legitimate target of self-defensive force. 
Rather, appeal should be made to the residual doctrine of necessity to 
justify otherwise criminal intrusions on the rights of such persons who 
cannot be construed as an independent source of the threat to the 
Horder suggests that there may be a broader basis on which the removal of frozen 
man on the ladder (and the fat pot-holer by analogy) may be justified on the basis of 
necessity. He proposes an argument to distinguish these cases, suggesting that the 
frozen man is 'in the way' of the route to safety of other passengers, and therefore can 
be justifiably removed. See Horder, 'Self-Defence, Necessity and Duress: 
Understanding the Relationship' at 159. It is submitted here that this argument shows 
too little respect for the rights of an essentially non-threatening innocent person; one 
cannot justifiably intrude on the rights of an autonomous individual simply on the basis 
that they are 'in one's way' (but see the argument in 5.6.2 below that such conduct may 
alternatively be excused). 
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defendant's interests. But the circumstances within which the defence is 
available are strictly confined in order that the interests of autonomous 
persons are not undermined. 
Two illustrative examples have been used to highlight the challenges 
presented by innocent incidental threats. The Herald of Free Enterprise 
disaster was a one-off emergency of the most horrendous proportions, 
requiring direct action to be taken without the luxury of deliberation and 
recourse to the courts. In the urgency of the situation, the actor's conduct 
was at least permissible, if not praiseworthy. On balance, given that he 
was destined to die anyway, the man on the ladder's rights were 
overridden by more pressing considerations. It has been suggested that 
in one-off s i t u a t i o n s , i t may therefore be permissible, on the basis of 
necessity, to override even the right to life of an innocent incidental threat 
caught up in a crisis.^^"^ 
In Re A the court effectively authorised, for the first time in legal history, 
the killing of a human being who was not directly threatening, and was 
entirely i n n o c e n t . G i v e n that there is an absence of philosophical 
consensus in such cases, a presumption against killing might have been 
expected, but we must remind ourselves that if nature had been left to run 
its course the death of both twins would have been the irrevocable 
consequence. Whilst cases involving such terrible dilemmas are rare, 
there must be some principled and consistent way of deciding the 
appropriate limits of criminal responsibility. On the account advanced 
here, the decisive factor in the cases discussed is that the incidental 
threats were exposing themselves as well as others to the threat, and 
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As distinct from other types of emergency which may be repeated. According to 
Horder, confining the necessity justification in this way will prevent any "argument by 
analogy that would force such overridings onto a wider moral and political agenda," see 
Horder, 'Self-Defence, Necessity and Duress: Understanding the Relationship' at 157. 
James Griffin, Value Judgement: Improving Our Ethical Beliefs (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996) at 98-102. Cf. Brudner, whose theory of necessity falls short of 
justifying the taking of innocent life, see Brudner, 'A Theory of Necessity.' 
It has been suggested that the decision would be of limited legal significance and 
was only intended as authority for the unique circumstances of the twins; but it is clear 
from the discussion above that the decision has much wider implications. 
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they were designated for death regardless. It is on this narrowly confined 
basis that necessity may provide a justification for any intrusion on the 
personal Interests of the innocent incidental threat. 
4.6 Conclusion to chapter four 
It is apparent that general societal protection cannot be afforded at all 
times when the individual Is subject to a sudden attack; but the criminal 
law "cannot respect the autonomy of the individual if it does not provide 
for this dire situation."^^^ In a liberal society a violation of an Individual's 
protected domain wrongfully sets back their interests and causes harm; 
the individual is therefore permitted to ward off any unjust threat, by the 
use of reasonable force, to protect their own autonomy. This permission 
extends to the use of defensive force against innocent threatening 
persons. Threatening persons who are not culpable for their actions, for 
reasons of insanity for instance, but who nonetheless actively attack the 
self-defender pose a direct unjust threat comparable to that of a culpable 
aggressor, at least from the defendant's perspective. Innocent persons 
who passively threaten the defendant's interests, such as the fallen 
mountaineer, also represent a direct unjust threat to the defendant's 
interests and therefore, it is argued here, may be legitimate targets of 
self-defensive force. 
In order to appreciate the full extent of criminal responsibility for intrusions 
on the rights of innocent persons, the chapter has responded to the 
philosophical and practical challenges presented by the self-defence 
justification. The account offered here advances a plausible rationale for 
self-defence which accommodates force used against innocent threats 
and establishes appropriate limitations on the defence. Self-defence in 
its purest form has been categorised as a justification, on account of the 
fact that there are, all things considered, good reasons for defendant to 
Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law at 138. 
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repel a threat to their interests, since the threat is posed for no objectively 
justified reason. However, putative self-defence is distinguished since, 
contrary to the defendant's perception, there are no justifying 
circumstances to vindicate the defensive action. Therefore the 
defendant's intrusion on the interests of an innocent person is merely 
excused; and it is recommended here that the excuse should be subject 
to the condition that s/he acted on a reasonable belief, in order for the 
criminal law to show sufficient respect for the rights of the innocent party. 
It is important to rationalise the self-defence justification and explain \Nhy 
it exculpates an actor who would otherwise have violated an offence 
definition. This philosophical clarification is particularly important in 
explicating cases where defensive force has been exercised to repel an 
/nnocenfthreat. It is suggested above that a rights-based philosophy, 
grounded on forfeiture principles, represents the most convincing 
justification for the use of self-defensive force in cases of culpable and 
non-culpable (active and passive) threats. This explanation supports the 
intuition that defensive force may be used against a person who 
innocently but unjustly threatens one's autonomy, since the absence of 
an objective justification for the threat renders the innocent person's 
rights temporarily forfeited. This account rightly excludes the use of force 
against innocent non-threatening bystanders and sets appropriate 
philosophical limits to the defence. 
The account is concluded by an examination of the parameters of self-
defence, with a particular focus on the role of the necessity and 
proportionality conditions. With regard to necessity of action, it is 
established that the defendant's autonomy would be unacceptably 
undermined if s/he was required to retreat from a threat, even if 
withdrawal is the morally preferable option. In order that the rights of the 
innocent unjust threat are sufficiently protected, the defendant must not 
engage in anticipatory violence but must instead not respond until the 
threatened harm is imminent. An actor who responds defensively to what 
s/he mistakenly perceives to be an unjust threat will fall outside the scope 
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of criminal liability by claiming an excusatory defence, provided the belief 
is well grounded. It is argued here that the acceptance of honest but 
unreasonable mistakes as the basis for an excusatory defence discounts 
the autonomy and rights of an innocent non-threatening victim mistaken 
for an attacker. Although at first blush it may not be Immediately obvious, 
the proposed rationale allows a role for the principle of proportionality. It 
is argued that any requirement that the force used should be 
proportionate to the harm prevented should be interpreted flexibly, but 
perhaps more guidance could be given in difficult cases involving lethal 
self-defensive force against sub-lethal harms and, more controversially, 
defence of property. 
It is more challenging to construct a defensible explanation of cases 
involving innocent incidental threats, who do not directly threaten but 
merely expose a threat, since there is little concurrence as to how such 
cases should be resolved. Even If instinct dictates that an actor should 
be not be held responsible for Impinging on the autonomy of an innocent 
incidental threat, such cases do not fit comfortably within any established 
category of defence. When the innocent person ceases to be an unjust 
threat to the defendant in any way, it Is argued In section 4.5.2 that this 
marks the end of the effective functioning of self-defence; and, for many, 
any further intrusion on the rights of an essentially non-threatening 
person is Impermissible. It Is suggested here, however, that a 
justificatory defence of necessity, which was discussed at length In 
chapter three, can be invoked. This residual justification may be 
available if the intrusion on the rights of the Innocent person violates an 
offence definition in circumstances that "render it more acceptable than 
the available alternatives but do not qualify for any [other] specific 
justification d e f e n s e . S o m e difficult examples were analysed In order 
to address the assimilation between self-defence and necessity, and 
outline the limits of the criminal law in relation to violating the rights of 
innocents. It is argued that in one-off situations where the victim exposes 
Schopp, Justification Defenses and Just Convictions at 2. 
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the threat to the defendant and is designated for death by the 
circumstances, the necessity justification may deny the criminal 
responsibility of the actor. 
In the case of innocent autonomous bystanders caught up in an 
unfortunate and tragic chain of events, however, the primary issue is 
whether such interference with the rights of wholly autonomous and 
blameless individuals who are not the source of the threat, and have not 
exposed another to the threat, can be carried out all. It is submitted 
here that in order to respect basic liberal ideals and to protect 
fundamental human rights, the necessity justification is inapplicable. It is, 
however, arguable that a defendant who seriously intrudes upon the 
autonomy of an innocent bystander may alternatively be excused by the 
criminal law in recognition of the pressure under which they acted. Clear 
guiding principles need to be developed in respect of defences which 
excuse the invasion of the rights of an innocent non-threatening person. 
This discussion is elaborated in chapter five, where the limits of the law of 
duress by threats, duress of circumstances and necessity in relation to 
innocent non-threats will be investigated further. 
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Chapter Five: 
Intruding on the rights of innocent bystanders 
5.1 Introduction to chapter five 
A central theme of this thesis is the paramount importance of individual 
autonomy and fundamental human rights when considering the legitimacy 
of Intrusions against innocent persons. Thus far it has been established 
that criminal responsibility for interfering with the rights of an innocent 
person may be avoided if the intrusion is necessary in the best interest of 
an Incompetent patient incapable of making meaningful decisions 
regarding their own welfare. Similarly, an actor has a right to defend 
themselves against any unjust threat to their interests (or those of 
another) since the rights of the threatening person, culpable or non-
culpable, are temporarily forfeited for the duration of the threat. 
Infringements on the autonomy of innocent persons who are not the 
direct source of the threat, but who expose it to themselves and others, 
may be justified by necessity in one-off situations if the rights of the 
innocent Incidental threat cannot be honoured regardless of the actor's 
conduct as their fate has already been decided. One final, and 
formidable, challenge remains: to what extent should the criminal law 
permit Interference with the protected interests of autonomous innocent 
bystanders, who pose no threat, direct or indirect, but are merely caught 
up in a conflict of rights created by circumstances or human agency? 
Innocent bystanders are those people who merely occupy "a position in 
the causal structure such that killing her [him] will be instrumental in 
averting a threat to the a g e n t . T h e y are non-threatening persons who 
do not in any way exacerbate a threat, expose a threat, or bring it any 
closer to being real; they are simply victims of circumstance. Where a 
^ McMahan, 'Self-Defense and the Innocent Attacker' at 267. 
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defendant deliberately and knowingly intrudes on the rights of an innocent 
bystander it is, at first blush, difficult to imagine how the attribution of 
criminal responsibility could be avoided. However, if the infringement is 
perpetrated in order to stave off an external threat to the defendant or a 
third party, the conduct may fall within the ambit of the defence of duress. 
A duress plea enables an accused person to avoid blame for violating a 
prohibitory norm by claiming that they were compelled to act because of 
threats made by a third party. The criminal responsibility of an actor may 
equally be challenged where the threat emanates from circumstances as 
opposed to human agent. In this situation the appropriate defence plea 
would be duress of circumstances, a comparatively novel judicial 
expansion which has developed by analogy with duress by threats. 
Before any conclusions may be reached regarding the scope of criminal 
responsibility for offences committed against innocent non-threatening 
bystanders, a more complete account of the defence of duress will be 
offered. The exact scope of this exculpatory defence is somewhat 
vague,^ and a brief historical analysis is offered in section 5.2. In section 
5.3 a plausible rationale for the defence will be advanced, which 
categorises duress as an excusatory defence. The excuse 
communicates the wrongfulness of the actor's conduct but denies the 
attribution of blame on the basis that the serious and compelling threats 
encountered by the actor left minimal opportunity to do anything but 
comply with the threat. Section 5.4 considers the particularty contentious 
debate surrounding the extent to which the defence should be available 
to excuse a /e^/7a/violation of the rights of an innocent non-threatening 
person. Section 5.5 outlines appropriate parameters for the defence, 
which are compatible with the proposed rationale, by examining the 
qualifying and evaluative conditions which restrict its availability. Section 
5.6 considers whether there is any residual role for the justification of 
necessity when the rights of innocent bystanders are infringed and the 
^ The operation of the defence has been described as "replete with vagaries, 
inconsistencies and anomalies," see Alan Reed, 'The Need for a New Anglo-American 
Approach to Duress' (1997) 61 Journal of Criminal Law 209 at 209. 
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threat is created by circumstances as opposed to human agent. It Is 
suggested that in the absence of a moral imperative to act in response to 
a natural threat, the excusatory duress of circumstances defence may 
still, subject to the fulfilment of strict conditions, allow the actor to avoid 
criminal responsibility for any intrusion on the protected domain of the 
innocent bystander. Finally section 5.7 concludes that In limited 
circumstances intrusions on the rights of an innocent bystander may be 
excused by appeal to either manifestation of the duress defence; and that 
the necessity justification will not generally exonerate an actor for such 
intrusion, only in the exceptional circumstances defined in chapter four. 
5.2 The doctrine of duress 
The defence of duress per minas^ was acknowledged at the time of the 
ancient Hebrews when it was accepted that no one was required to risk 
death by slavish obedience to the law, an Inference purportedly drawn 
from the scriptural text that man shall live through observance of the law."^  
According to Mendelsohn, the ancient Hebrews conceded that, "[t]he fear 
of death, threatened in the event of non-compliance with an order to 
commit a crime, is an excuse for the commission."^ The basic rationale 
behind the duress defence was given credence by Influential 
philosophers Including Blackstone, who reasoned that, "[a]s punishments 
are...only inflicted for the abuse of...free will...it is highly just and 
equitable that a man should be excused for those acts which are done 
through unavoidable force and compulsion."^ Hence the defence of 
compulsion as an excuse for otherwise criminal acts has been 
acknowledged in one form or another since ancient times and was 
^ Duress by threats, as distinguished from the closely related defence of duress of 
circumstances, which is discussed further in section 5.6 below. 
" Peter Rosenthal, 'Duress in the Criminal Law' (1989) 32 Criminal Law Quarterly 199 at 
200. 
^ Samuel Mendelsohn, The Criminal Jurisprudence of the Ancient Hebrews. 2"" edition 
(New York: Hermon, 1968) at 30, cited in Rosenthal, 'Duress in the Criminal Law' at 200. 
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England volume IV at 107-108, cited in 
Rosenthal, 'Duress in the Criminal Law' at 200-201. 
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generally accepted as a common law defence to certain categories of 
crime more than two hundred years ago. 
Significantly, however, none of the aforementioned scholars were 
disposed to extend the compulsion excuse to the intentional killing of an 
innocent subject, and this contentious issue will be addressed in detail in 
section 5.4 below. The common law has been heavily influenced in this 
regard by Hale, who stated his position regarding duress and intentional 
killing in unequivocal terms: 
"If a man be desperately assaulted, and in peril of death, and 
cannot otherwise escape, unless to satisfy his assailant's fury he 
will kill an innocent person then present, the fear and actual force 
will not acquit him of the crime and punishment of murder, if he 
commit the act; for he ought rather to die himself than kill an 
innocent."'' 
The subsequent judicial denial of a defence of duress to murder^ is 
reflective of an unfettered tradition, which can be traced back to the 
institutional writers, that serious personal intrusions against non-
threatening, autonomous, innocent persons will not be tolerated.^ Yet 
duress is recognised as a defence to most other crimes and, with the 
exception of violations of the right to life, it is generally accepted that 
compulsion absolves the actor of criminal responsibility for violating the 
rights of an innocent bystander. Why does duress exculpate a defendant 
even though an offence definition is fulfilled? This question must be 
addressed before any meaningful decisions regarding the scope of the 
duress defence in relation to intrusions on the rights of innocent 
autonomous bystanders can be made. 
Matthew Hale, Pleas of the Crown (1736) (London: Professional Books Ltd., 1971) 
volume I at 51 and 434. 
® The defence was firmly denied in R v. Tyler and Price (1838) 8 C & P 616; similarly in 
R V. Dudley and Stephens (1884) 14 QBD 273, the defence of necessity was denied to 
the intentional killing of the cabin boy. Both of these decisions were subsequently 
confirmed in R v. Howe [1987] AC 417, which is discussed further in section 5.4 below. 
^ This point was emphasised by M Sornarajah, 'Duress and Murder in Commonwealth 
Criminal Law' (1981) 30 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 660 at 664. 
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5.3 Theoretical foundations of duress 
Although most commentators have accepted the need for a defence of 
duress, there is significant indecision regarding its rationale. One view 
that is considered, and rejected, below is that duress should not be 
regarded as a true defence at all, but rather that it consists of a denial of 
one the elements of the offence definition. Most commentators regard 
duress as an exculpatory defence but there is further disagreement as to 
whether it provides a justification for action or merely an excuse. The 
predominant view, which is supported here, is that duress excuses the 
actor from criminal liability, yet still there is tension regarding the rationale 
which grounds the excuse. These issues are considered in greater detail 
below. 
5.3.1 A negation of actus reus, mens rea or an exculpatory defence? 
It has frequently been stated that in situations of duress the serious threat 
to the interests of the defendant renders the conduct of the accused 
involuntary, and thereby negates the actus reus of the offence. Some 
senior members of the judiciary have sanctioned this view, Lord Widgery 
asserting the 'established' proposition that: 
"duress provides a defence...if the will of the accused has been 
overborne by threats of death or serious personal injury so that the 
commission of the alleged offence was no longer the voluntary act 
of the accused."^" 
An act can surely only be regarded as wholly involuntary if the defendant 
does not, in fact, have any choice whatsoever in the fulfilment or 
otherwise of the actus reus of the crime. Hale offers the following 
example: "[i]f there be an actual forcing of a man, as if A by force takes 
the arm of B and the weapon in his hand and therewith stabs C whereof 
'° Per Widgery LJ in R v. Hudson [1971] 2 QB 202 at 206. 
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he dies, this is murder in A but B is not guilty."^^ In this context, the action 
of the accused is physically involuntary^^ and s/he is no more than an 
innocent agent in the crimes committed by the agent issuing the threat. 
In such a situation there would be no need to afford the actor a defence 
at all, since no crime has been carried out through her/his own volition in 
the first instance/'"' Horder confirms that if an actor's will truly has been 
broken or overborne this equates to a complete denial of responsibility in 
which there is no need to resort to the duress defence.^" In the typical 
case of duress, however, a conscious and real (albeit constrained) choice 
has to be made between the commission of an offence and the suffering 
of some serious harm or death to oneself or one's family. 
There is some academic debate surrounding the relationship between 
duress and mens rea, and it has been proposed alternatively that duress 
operates as a negation of this element of the offence definition. There is 
some support for this view in the case of Steane,^^ and other 
commentators do not rule out the possibility of duress operating as a 
negation of mens rea: 
"In most cases, duress will not negative the mens rea; in fact, 
evidence of duress would often provide the motive for the accused 
to intend to bring about certain consequences. However, this is no 
reason to deny the finder of fact in any given case the possibility of 
Hale, Pleas of the Crown (1736) volume I at 534, cited in Ormerod, Smith & Hogan: 
Criminal Law at 297. 
If the action of the accused was deemed physically involuntary, there would be a 
negation of the actus reus of the offence; conversely, a claim of moral involuntariness 
relates to the existence of a defence. For further analysis see Stanley Yeo, 'Challenging 
Moral Involuntariness as a Principle of Fundamental Justice', (2002) 28 Queen's Law 
Journal 335 at 342, who provides a critique of the 'tentative', 'amorphous' and 
'ambiguous' concept of moral involuntariness as a basis for determining criminal 
responsibility. 
This assertion supports the suggestion that defence pleas such as automatism and 
insanity are not general defences at all, but instead constitute exemptions from criminal 
liability. This point is discussed in section 3.3.1 above. 
Horder, Excusing Crime at 95-96. 
Rupert Cross suggests that even in the most abhorrent cases where instantaneous 
action is required by the defendant, there is still an element of choice (coupled with 
intention), see Rupert Cross, 'Murder Under Duress' (1978) 28 University of Toronto 
Law Journal 369 at 373. 
Rv. Sfeane[1947] 1 KB 997. 
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determining that evidence of compulsion has cast a reasonable 
doubt on the existence of the required mens rea." 17 
However, there is general judicial reluctance to accept the view that 
duress is incompatible with a finding of mens rea. According to Lord 
Kilbrandon in Lynch, the decision of the threatened person whose 
"constancy is overborne so that [s]he yields to the threat, is a calculated 
decision to do what [s]he knows to be wrong, and is therefore that of a 
[person] with, perhaps to some exceptionally limited extent, a 'guilty 
mind'".^^ This view was approved by Lord Hailsham in Howe,^^ supported 
by numerous academic writers,^° and is accepted here. 
By far the most common view, then, is that duress will only be relevant to 
liability once the prosecution has established the necessary ac^tvs reus 
and mens rea elements of the o f f e n c e . T h i s approach was adopted by 
Lord Wilberforce in Lynch, who submitted that duress is something which 
is: 
"...superimposed on the other ingredients which by themselves 
would make up an offence, i.e. on the act and intention. Coactus 
volui sums up the combination: the victim completes the act and 
Rosenthal, 'Duress in the Criminal Law' at 208. 
Per Lord Kilbrandon in Lynch v. DPP for Northern Ireland [1975] 1 All ER 913 at 945. 
Per Lord Hailsham in R v. Howe [1987] AC 417 at 428. 
^° See, for example, Martin WasJk, 'Duress and Criminal Responsibility' [1977] Criminal 
Law Review 453, who submits, at 455, that considering mens rea in the context of 
duress "cramp[s] our thinking here." See also Anthony Duff, 'Rule-Violations and 
Wrongdoings' in Shute and Simester (eds ) Criminal Law Theory at 64. Following the 
Supreme Court decision in Perka v. R [1984] 2 SCR 232 the Canadian courts have 
"tended not to consider how extreme emotion affects mens rea, preferring to move 
considerations of emotion into the developing jurisprudence of defences of excuse," see 
Alexander Reilly and Rudolf Mikus, 'R v. Hibbert: The Theoretical Foundations of 
Duress' (1996) 30 University of British Columbia Law Review 181 at 183. 
See Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law who, at 578, describes this formulation as 
"plainly right." See also Reed, 'The Need for a New Anglo-American Approach to 
Duress' at 210; and Yeo, 'Challenging Moral Involuntariness as a Principle of 
Fundamental Justice' who suggests, at 338, that the question for the duress defence is 
whether the coerced actor should be excused or justified once fault has already been 
established. On the other hand, Brudner contends that, "the concept of law cannot 
rationally admit as a ground of exculpation the fact that a choice was coerced, for if the 
law is contradicted by an unlawful consequence that is desired by the agent, it must also 
be contradicted by an unlawful consequence that is intended by the agent because 
necessary for the satisfaction of another desire," see Brudner, 'A Theory of Necessity' at 
349. 
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knows that he is doing so; but the addition of the element of duress 
prevents the law from treating what he has done as a crime."^^ 
So, it is clear that the majority opinion accepts duress as an exculpatory 
defence independent of ac^us reus and mens rea requirements.^"' But 
what is the underlying rationale of the defence, how can it be reconciled 
with the other defences, and on what grounds do we allow it to exculpate 
the defendant? A relatively brief assessment of some of the main 
theoretical explanations of the duress defence is presented below, which 
should illuminate the reasons why we are prepared to excuse an actor 
who is compelled by circumstances or threats to intrude on the interests 
of an innocent bystander. 
5.3.2 Duress: justification or excuse? 
As noted previously in section 3.3.1 above, much academic literature has 
been dedicated to classifying defences as either justifications, whereby 
the conduct is permissible if not praiseworthy, or excuses, whereby the 
actor wrongfully intrudes on the legally protected interests of the another 
person but there are reasons to negate the responsibility of the actor 
whilst maintaining the wrongfulness of the act. Although some would 
prefer to avoid the language of justification and excuse altogether, such 
analysis has been adopted as the preferred mode of classifying defences 
throughout this thesis. Consequently, it must be established how the 
duress defence fits into this classification: is it a justification for setting 
back the interests of an innocent bystander or an excuse?^'' The defence 
Per Lord Wilberforce in Lynch v. DPP for Northern Ireland [^975] 1 All ER 913 at 926. 
R V. Fisher [2004] Crim LR 938 and R v. Hasan [2005] UKHL 22, per Lord Bingham at 
[18], cited in Ormerod, Smith & Hogan: Criminal Law at 326. 
" Schopp asserts that duress is neither a justification nor an excuse, but accepts that 
punishment in some difficult cases is not warranted. He suggests that the presence of 
duress should operate as a 'purely vindicating condition' for which there is no 
consequent punishment, see Schopp, Justification Defenses and Just Convictions at 
152. This approach is criticised by Simester and Sullivan who assert that Schopp 
underestimates the stigma inherent in conviction for a serious criminal offence, see 
Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine at 677. 
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appears to contain elements of both and for that reason there is some 
debate regarding its conceptual basis. 
Contrary to the mainstream view, some commentators contend that 
duress is a justification d e f e n c e . F o r instance, Simester and Sullivan 
suggest that sometimes duress appears to be justificatory at least in 
cases where there is great disparity between the criminal act required of 
the defendant and the harm threatened.^'' If an aggressor threatens a 
defendant with death unless they steal an inexpensive item from a shop, 
there appears to be some merit in the claim that the defendant's action is 
justified if they are compliant with the threat. S/he has chosen the lesser 
of two evils by opting to violate a minor property right to safeguard the 
more fundamental right to life.^ ® 
But invading an innocent and autonomous third party's personal or 
proprietary rights merely to negate a threat to one's own interests is 
surely not the kind of behaviour the criminal law wishes to encourage. 
Although there does appear to be some element of justification embodied 
by crimes committed in the circumstances described above, it is arguably 
merely a personal, agent-specific form of jus t i f i ca t ion .There is no 
objective value to be served in the defendant's compliance with the 
threat, even if the crime is trivial, and all things considered the action is 
Schopp, Justification Defenses and Just Convictions at 10 and 138. 
Peter Westen and James Mangiafico, 'The Criminal Defense of Duress: A 
Justification, not an Excuse - and Why it Matters' (2003) 6 Buffalo Criminal Law Review 
833. Westen and Mangiafico's submission which regards duress as a justificatory 
defence is subjected to detailed criticism and is, rightly, rejected, by Mitchell N Berman, 
'Justification and Excuse, Law and Morality' (2003) 53 Duke Law Journal 1 at 27-29. 
The authors do suggest that the defence does also operate as an excuse, see 
Simester and Sullivan, Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine at 665-666. 
®^ This reasoning is also supported by Westen and Mangiafico, 'The Criminal Defense of 
Duress: A Justification, not an Excuse - and Why it Matters' at 835, but the authors do 
not accept that duress may sometimes also have an excusatory basis, unlike Simester 
and Sullivan. Hart also commented that where such disparity exists between the harm 
threatened and the offence committed, "there would be no absurdity on treating A's 
threat as a justification for B's conduct, although few legal systems overtly do this," see 
Hart, Punishment and Responsibility at 16. 
®^ Horder, Excusing Crime at 59. 
^° Horder refers to subjective reasons for action as 'agent-specific', drawing on the work 
of Uniacke, see Horder, 'Self-Defence, Duress and Necessity: Understanding the 
Relationship' at 160-161; and Uniacke Permissible Killing, chapter two. 
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not socially permissible. The accused should rather be excused on the 
basis that they had personal reasons for the action because they 
personally set a value on their own life.^^ The action is grounded in 
excuse because ". ..the experience of the threat as coercive is intrinsic to 
the excusatory basis of [the defendant's] personal (agent specific) 
justification for complying with the...demand.""'^ Hence the argument that 
sometimes duress operates as a justification where there is disparity 
between the minor interest breached and the threatened harm is 
defeated. 
A further dispute relates to the requirement in English law that a person 
must have acted reasonably before they are permitted a defence of 
d u r e s s . F o r Westen and Mangiafico if a defendant has reasonably 
given in to a threat then their conduct must surely be tolerated by the law, 
and therefore justified rather than excused.^"* But the point remains that 
even if an actor gives in to a threat, as any other reasonable person 
would, there is still an all things considered violation of the rights of an 
innocent bystander. There is no good reason for the intrusion from 
society's point of view and hence no justification for the action. The fact 
that the defendant is morally and legally excused when the response is 
reasonable demonstrates that society understands the defendant's 
response;''^ but the provision of an excuse as opposed to a justification 
conveys a clear message that the action is not encouraged by the 
criminal law. 
A similar tension regarding the distinction between objective and 
subjective elements of the duress defence is seen in the work of 
Wertheimer and Honore. Wertheimer has constructed a moralised rights-
based theory of coercion to exempt the coerced actor from responsibility. 
This argument is advanced by Horder, in 'Self-Defence, Duress and Necessity: 
Understanding the Relationship' at 162-163. 
Ibid, at 163. 
See section 5.5 below for further discussion of the conditions of the defence. 
^ Westen and Mangiafico, 'The Criminal Defense of Duress: A Justification, not an 
Excuse - and Why it Matters' at 906-912. 
Berman, 'Justification and Excuse, Law and Morality' at 29. 
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which may be applicable to cases of duress, and which purports to 
appeal to both law and m o r a l s . T h e theory operates on the fulfilment of 
two conditions: first, that the party issuing the threat (X) threatens the 
coerced actor (D) wrongfully (that is, without moral justification) and D will 
be in a worse position than he is entitled to expect unless the threat is 
complied with; and, secondly, that D is morally justified in complying (and 
does comply) with the threat.^'^ In duress cases, Wertheimer thus 
contends that a defendant will only be absolved of responsibility if there is 
some moral justification for succumbing to the threat.'^^ This proposition 
is criticised by Honore"^^ who contends that if a coerced defendant 
complies with a threat to avoid serious harm to themselves or another, 
the exculpation from liability must surely be couched in the language of 
excuse; to deem it justified conduct is to say that the defendant has some 
entitlement, permission, or imperative, to commit the unlawful act. 
Honore accepts the merit in Wertheimer's explanation that the coerced 
defendant has an agent-relative reason for succumbing to the threat, but 
contends that the actor does not have an agent-neutral reason. It is 
submitted here that having agent-relative reasons for criminal conduct 
renders that behaviour excused rather than justified. As Honore suggests 
the logical conclusion is that, "justification will not do all the work,""" and 
consequently that duress is an excuse for any wrongful violation of the 
rights of an innocent bystander. 
®^ The theory has been developed with regard to coercion generally, but expressly 
covers the defence of duress in criminal law; see Alan Wertheimer, Coercion (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1987). 
This synopsis of the theory is proffered by Tony Honore, 'A Theory of Coercion' (1990) 
10 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 94 at 94-95. 
®^ Wertheimer, Coercion at 165-169. 
Honore, 'A Theory of Coercion' at 100, where he submits that "it is simplistic to say 
flatly that duress in criminal law provides a justification." 
'° Ibid, at 100. 
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5.3.3 Duress as an excuse 
It is submitted here that duress is considered to be the "quintessential 
excuse,""^ requiring as it does a concession to human frailty. Where a 
defendant submits to pressure and seeks the duress defence to 
exculpate their actions, a successful plea does not, as it would in 
necessity cases, imply that any objective value has been served in 
complying with the threat. Rather, it acknowledges that any reasonable 
person would have succumbed to the extraordinary pressure, and that 
the actor had good subjective reasons for their reaction. Having 
determined that duress is an excuse, a subsequent problem arises in 
respect of the appropriate formulation of a theory of excuses which 
appeals to the wide variety of excusing conditions which absolve criminal 
liability."^ Because the debate is well rehearsed, the following section 
does not intend to provide an exhaustive analysis of the various 
excusatory schemes, but merely presents an overview of some of the 
predominant theories in an attempt to formulate a coherent explanation of 
the excusatory force of the duress defence. 
5.3.3.1 Duress and character 
One popular rationale for excuse defences is that they provide the 
context which prompted the accused to act contrary to their established 
character.'^"' This theory operates on the premise that if a defendant 
See Fletcher, The Individualisation of Excusing Conditions'; Simester and Sullivan, 
Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine at 665; and R v. Hasan [2005] UKHL 22 at 
paragraph [18]; and Berman, 'Justification and Excuse, Law and Morality' at 27. 
Brudner highlights the disparity between duress (or necessity) as an excuse and other 
excusatory defences such as mistake, insanity and intoxication. The former category of 
defences involves the wilful and conscious infringement of a right; the latter negates the 
intentional commission of the act. In this regard, for Brudner, the challenge of 
formulating an overarching theory of excuse is insurmountable. See Brudner, 'A Theory 
of Necessity' at 345; see also Wilson, 'The Structure of Criminal Defences' [2005] 
Criminal Law Review 371. The analysis here does not purport to advance a general 
theory applicable to all excuses, but merely considers a rationale for the defence of 
duress. 
See Nicola Lacey, Sfafe Pfv/7/s/7menf (London: Routledge, 1988) at 65-68; and Norvin 
Richards, 'Acting Under Duress' (1987) 37 Philosophical Quarterly 2^. 
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violates a legal prohibition this is not determinative of the enduring moral 
character of the accused; nothing can be inferred about that person's 
general respect for the rights of others.'*'' In relation to duress, a coerced 
defendant may be excused because their conduct, though wrongful, is 
not reflective of a vicious character and therefore it would be unjust to 
inflict any punishment.''^ The coerced actor is, on this approach, not 
acting as her/his true self."*^ 
This theoretical approach to excuses has been viewed with scepticism by 
many,''^ Brudner providing a particularly penetrating critique in which he 
condemns the character theory for advancing unsupportable assertions.'*® 
Horder also comments that the character theory is not completely 
consistent with the liberal values underpinning the harm principle, which 
does not support the punishment of wrongful acts simply because the 
defendant has a bad character."^ The fact that a wrongful violation of the 
rights of an innocent third party was out of character could legitimately 
count towards mitigation of punishment, but should not negate 
conviction.^° Further, any useful evaluation of whether an actor behaved 
'out of character' rests on a presupposition that the defendant has a 
settled character in the first instance.^' Horder suggests that this claim is 
simply not defensible bearing in mind that criminal responsibility in 
English law may be imposed on a defendant from the age of ten. Any 
See Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law at 800. 
Fletcher considers the theory in greater detail in, 'The Individualisation of Excusing 
Conditions' at 1271. 
See Michael D Bayles, Character, Purpose and Criminal Responsibility' (1982) 1 Law 
and Philosophy 1 for further discussion of the merits of this rationale for excuse 
defences generally, 
Wilson, 'The Structure of Criminal Law Defences'; John Gardner, 'The Gist of 
Excuses' (1998) 1 Buffalo Criminal Law Review 575; Victor Tadros 'The Characters of 
Excuse' (2001) 21 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 495. 
For instance, the basic premise that vicious character is the determinant of criminal 
desert, see Brudner, 'A Theory of Necessity' at 345-347. 
Horder, Excusing Crime at 118-119. 
^° Gardner, 'The Gist of Excuses' at 578. Tadros accepts that some 'ordinary' claims 
that an action is out of character will only count towards mitigation; he distinguishes 
ordinary claims from claims that an actor's character is 'destabilized', which he asserts 
do provide a legitimate excuse, see Tadros, The Characters of Excuse' at 502-503. 
Sullivan's articulation of the theory supposes that certain "core values" are attributable 
to the defendant, see Robert Sullivan, 'Making Excuses', in Simester and Smith (eds.) 
Harm and Culpability at 137. 
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suggestion that one's character is established or settled at such a young 
age seems implausible.^^ In view of the deficiencies of the character 
theory highlighted by the substantive arguments above, it is suggested 
that the rationale for the duress excuse should be located elsewhere. 
The most plausible explanation appears to be one which accepts that the 
defendant's choice to commit the crime is constrained by the threat, but 
holds the actor to an objective standard of reasonableness. 
5.3.3.2 Duress and lack of choice 
A contemporary scheme familiar in current criminal law theory, is what 
may broadly be termed the capacity theory of excuse. It was established 
in section 5.3.1 above that the rationale for excuses does not rest on the 
premise that the defendant had no choice to commit an act, because in 
cases of duress the actor did have some degree of choice regarding the 
intrusion on the innocent bystander's rights, albeit constrained by the 
threat of serious harm. A coerced defendant may claim that s/he 'had no 
real choice' but to engage in criminal conduct, but this statement reveals 
that the conduct is morally, as opposed to physically, involuntary.^"' The 
concept of moral involuntariness requires the exoneration of those actors 
who had 'no realistic choice', not 'no choice at alP. Embracing this notion 
of moral involuntariness leads to difficult questions regarding what 
constitutes a realistic choice. In the words of the Supreme Court of 
Canada: 
Horder, Excusing Crime at 122-123. 
" See Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law at 802-807. Reed suggests that in a typical 
duress scenario "there is no real choice, and the actions involve moral involuntariness," 
see Reed, 'The Need for a New Anglo-American Approach to Duress' at 218. This 
reasoning was also adopted in the Canadian case Parka v. The Queen (1985) 13 DLR 
(4**^ ) 1 where the choice facing a coerced defendant is described, at 14-15, as "not a 
'voluntary' one. [The defendants] 'choice' to break the law is no true choice at all; it is 
remorselessly compelled by normal human instincts." In another Canadian case, R v 
Ruzic [2001] 1 SCR 687, the Supreme Court of Canada defined moral involuntariness 
as applying to persons who had conscious control over physical movements, but whose 
actions were "not, in any realistic way, freely chosen," at paragraph [44]. For further 
discussion of the case see Yeo, 'Challenging Moral Involuntariness as a Principle of 
Fundamental Justice'. 
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"Depriving a person of liberty and branding her with the stigma of 
criminal liability would infringe the principles of fundamental justice 
if the accused did not have any realistic choice...It risks 
jeopardising the liberty and security interests [of the actor, and]...it 
has the potential of convicting persons who have not acted 
voluntarily."^"* 
Hence, it is important not to impose criminal responsibility on an 
undeserving defendant but the determination of whether the accused had 
no real choice is arguably value-laden and i m p r e c i s e . T h i s is why when 
faced with such a choice, the defence of duress measures moral 
involuntariness against the standard of the person of reasonable fortitude, 
and concedes that sometimes even the ordinary person would succumb 
to threats and commit crime to avoid serious harm or death being caused 
to themselves or another. 
The notion of constrained choice has led to the development of a number 
of theories which purport to explain excuses in terms of the defendant's 
lack of capacity to withstand the threat. A chief proponent of one 
capacity-based theory of excuses is Hart, who contends that criminal 
responsibility is denied where the accused possessed neither the 
capacity to conform to relevant standards of behaviour^^ or a fair 
opportunity to do so:^'' 
"[A] primary vindication of the principle of responsibility could rest 
on the simple idea that unless a man has the capacity and a fair 
opportunity or chance to adjust his behaviour to the law its 
penalties ought not to be applied to him."^^ 
^'^ Rv Ruzic [2001] 1 SCR 687 at paragraph [47] and [90], Note also the criticism of the 
case by Yeo, who submits that defences play a secondary role when determining 
criminal liability (the offence elements taking the primary role), and thus any principle of 
moral involuntariness is also consequently subsidiary, see Yeo, 'Challenging Moral 
Involuntariness as a Principle of Fundamental Justice' at 337-338. 
Yeo, 'Challenging Moral Involuntariness as a Principle of Fundamental Justice' at 346. 
®^ For example, in cases of insanity. This point presupposes that insanity is an excuse 
for criminal conduct, however. It is suggested here that insanity is perhaps more 
a_ppropriately considered as an exemption from liability, see section 3.3.1 above. 
^ For instance, in cases of duress. 
Hart, Punishment and Responsibility at 181. 
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On this theory, a coerced defendant does not possess a fair opportunity 
to avoid violating the rights of an innocent third party due to the gravity of 
threat weighing on her/his mind. Similarly, in Dressler's terms the 
provision of an excuse depends on whether the actor "possesses and 
had a fair chance to apply a critical attribute of personhood, namely free 
choice."^^ The actor's liberty should not be restrained by the imposition of 
criminal responsibility unless they had the capacity and fair opportunity to 
conform to the law. 
Horder has helpfully distinguished various capacity-based accounts into 
subjective and objective versions.^° The subjective capacity theory in 
relation to duress would allow the coerced actor an excuse if it can be 
shown that s/he personally should have been more resistant to the threat. 
It is submitted here that to excuse the coerced actor's violation of the 
rights of an innocent bystander on the basis that they met an agent-
specific, as opposed to agent-neutral, standard makes little moral sense 
as no meaningful measure of behaviour has been set. Conversely, the 
objective version, which is supported here, furnishes the defendant with 
an excuse if their compliance with the threat lived up to the standards 
expected of reasonable people confronted by serious threats to their 
interests.^^ According to Duff, the reasonable person is "someone with a 
reasonable or proper regard for the law and the values it protects."^^ It 
follows that if the defendant is expected to live up to an objective 
standard, the fundamental values guarded by a liberal society will be 
promoted; whereas allowing the coerced defendant to set their own 
subjective standard only serves to undermine these protected v a l u e s . I t 
®^ Dressier, 'Reflections on Excusing Wrongdoers: Moral Theory, New Excuses and the 
Model Penal Code' at 675. 
^° For a fuller discussion of the two versions, see Horder, Excusing Crime at 125-128. 
®^  This approach was adopted in Perka v. The Queen (1984) 13 DLR (4"") 1 where it was 
suggested that the involuntariness must be, "measured on the basis of society's 
expectation of appropriate and normal resistance to pressure," see Ormerod, Smith & 
Hogan: Criminal Law at 326. 
" Anthony Duff, 'Choice, Character and Criminal Liability' (1993) 12 Law and Philosophy 
345 at 358. 
®^  A counter-argument is presented by Wilson, who claims that the objective version of 
the capacity theory is too demanding as it punishes rule-breakers without taking into 
account their real capacities and opportunities to conform, see Wilson, Central Issues in 
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is submitted, therefore, that reasonableness is "a consistent requirement 
for any excuse based upon non-pathological absence of moral 
restraint,"^" which demands that the defendant must respect the protected 
values and interests of innocent persons, but also recognises that 
pressure can impair the capacity for rational thought. So, the actor 
cannot avoid liability solely on the basis of subjective reasons for their 
action since the standard of reasonableness plays a normative role in 
evaluating the defendant's conduct and in the decision to absolve the 
actor from blame. 
When a defendant wrongfully violates the personal or proprietary 
interests of an innocent non-threatening bystander, they have violated a 
criminal law prohibition by causing the type of harm the criminal law in a 
liberal society seeks to prevent. The only plausible way, then, to 
exonerate the defendant in such circumstances is via the mechanism of 
excuse, based on an objective evaluation of the defendant's capacity 
which accounts for the subjective reasons on which the defendant acted. 
This acknowledges that in a choice between personal sacrifice and 
violating the rights of an innocent non-threat, there was an agent-specific 
reason for the response which, if displaying an appropriate level of 
steadfastness, will exculpate the defendant. The rationale proposed here 
would, in principle, permit the duress excuse as a defence to any crime 
as long as the conditions highlighted above are satisfied. Yet the defence 
does not currently operate as an excuse to murder, even if the defendant 
had good personal reasons for the action which would have been 
accepted as reasonable on a normative evaluation of the conduct. The 
reasons for this approach are considered, and challenged, below. 
Criminal Theory at 339. However, although the theory is essentially objective, it is not 
suggested that individual capacities are dismissed outright, merely that the actor's ability 
to resist a threat is judged by a standard of reasonableness. 
KJM Smith and William Wilson, 'Impaired Voluntariness and Criminal Responsibility: 
Reworking Hart's Theory of Excuses - The English Judicial Response' (1993) 13 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 69 at 95. 
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5.4 Duress and violating the right to life of an innocent bystander 
5.4.1 The scope of duress 
It was suggested in section 5.2 above that duress provides a defence to 
many crimes, except murder. Indeed, there has been judicial acceptance 
that threats of immediate death or serious personal injury are sufficient to 
overwhelm ordinary powers of resistance to criminal conduct, where the 
chme comprises, for example, manslaughter,^^ damage to property, 
arson,^'' theft,^^ per ju ry ,o f fences under the Official Secrets Acts,''° drug 
offences''^ and even some forms of t r e a s o n . T h e recent formulation of 
the defence of duress of circumstances has resulted in exculpation for 
defendants charged with, for instance, various road traffic offences and 
hi-jacking.''^ However, the availability of duress as a defence has always 
been restricted'"' and, in particular, the inapplicability of the defence to a 
charge of murder (and attempted murder) has caused much contention.''^ 
In respect of the excluded offences, the courts have made a clear social 
R V. Evans and Gardiner [:976] VR 517 and R v. Evans and Gardiner (No. 2) [1976] 
VR 523. 
^® R V. Crutchley {^&3^) 5 C & P 133. 
R V. Shiartos (1961) unreported. 
Rv. G///[1963] 2 All ER 688. 
Rv. Hudson [1971] 2 QB 202; R v. K(1983) 78 Cr App R 82; R v. Lewis {^ 992) 96 Cr 
App R412. 
^° R V. S/iay/er[2001] Crim LR 986. 
R V. Valderrama-Vega [1985] Crim LR 220; R v. Ortiz (1986) 83 Cr App R 173. 
" Oldcastle's case (1419) Hale I PC 50; Stratton (1779) 21 State Tr 1045; and more 
recently R v. Purdy (1946) 10 J Cr L 182. However, the offence of treason takes many 
different forms and it would be presumptuous to say that threats (even of death) will 
always furnish the accused with a defence. 
" R V. Abdul-Hussain [1999] Crim LR 570. See section 5.6 for further discussion of the 
duress of circumstances defence. 
Even in the law of the ancient Hebrews, the defence was not available to murder, 
sexual offences or certain charges of idolatry, see Mendelsohn, The Criminal 
Jurisprudence of the Ancient Hebrews at 30-31, cited in Rosenthal, 'Duress in the 
Criminal Law' at 211. Similar restrictions on the defence are provided in legislative form 
in Canada, several Australian jurisdictions, New Zealand and significant parts of South 
Asia and Africa, see Gamini Laksman Peiris, 'Duress, Volition and Criminal 
Responsibility: Current Problems in English and Commonwealth Law' (1988) 17 Anglo-
American Law Review 182 at 182. 
In R V. Wilson (Ashlea) [2007] EWCA Crim 1251, the Court of Appeal reluctantly 
confirmed the restriction of the defence by denying it to a thirteen year old boy charged 
with murder, acting under coercion from his father. 
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and moral judgment that the level of fault pertaining to the accused is too 
great to render them deserving of any defence. 
The inapplicability of the defence to intentional killing is underscored by 
the unforgiving notion that "no man, from a fear of consequences to 
himself, has a right to make himself party to committing mischief on 
mankind,"^^ especially the taking of life. The persuasive authority 
commanded by Hale's views on the common law of England, set down in 
his institutional text, has permeated (critics might say stultified)'''' 
subsequent judicial pronouncements on the matter. Indeed, in three 
seminal cases. Lynch, Abbott and Howe^^, the applicability of duress to 
murder was fiercely debated.''^ In Lynch the House of Lords held, by a 
narrow majority of three to two, that the defence of duress was available 
to an aider or abettor of murder, in the instant case the driver of the 
getaway vehicle. A careful analysis of relevant previous authority^° 
enabled Lord Wilberforce to establish that, although it would be 
problematic to deny the weight of authority rejecting a defence of duress 
to a principal murderer in the first degree, the defence could be permitted 
for lesser degrees of participation.^^ In Abbott, the Privy Council ruled, 
Rv. ry /er(1838)8 C & P 6 1 6 . 
" Peiris comments that the very essence of the common law doctrine is innovation, and 
the ability to adapt to the needs of the modern age, "without unimaginative commitment 
to obsolete values and assumptions", see Peiris, 'Duress, 'Volition and Criminal 
Responsibility: Current Problems in English and Commonwealth Law' at 188. It is also 
noteworthy that Hale originally denied the defence to crimes of robbery and treason, yet 
English common law has since retracted from this position in recent years. So, any 
argument that the restrictions on duress cannot be removed because of loyalty to 
tradition is easily defeated. 
Lynch v. DPP for Northern Ireland [1975] 1 All ER 913; Abbott v. R [1976] 3 All ER 
140; and R v. Howe [1987] AC 417. 
See also R v. Gotts [1992] 1 All ER 832 which denies the duress defence to attempted 
murder. 
^° Including the Court of Appeal authority R v. Kray (Ronald) (1969) 53 Cr App R 569. 
However, Peiris offers a note of caution when drawing any decisive inferences from 
older authorities because case law governing the availability of the duress defence to 
murder is sparse due to the practical limitations on the giving of evidence prior to the 
enactment of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898. Until this point, an accused person could 
not give evidence on her/his own behalf, and therefore lacked the opportunity to explain 
why s/he acted as s/he did under the circumstances, see Peiris, 'Duress, Volition and 
Criminal Responsibility: Current Problems in English and Commonwealth Law' at 188. 
Interestingly, a close reading of the LyncA) judgment reveals that Lord Wilberforce and 
Lord Edmund-Davies saw no principled reason for denying the defence of duress to a 
principal in the first degree, although they were not asked to rule on the matter; see the 
comments of Lord Wilberforce in Lynch [1975] 1 All ER 913 at 924, and by Lord 
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again by a three to two majority, that the duress defence does not extend 
to a principal actor, distinguishing Lynch. Lord Salmon displayed 
unstinting loyalty to tradition, declaring, "[fjrom time immemorial it has 
been accepted by the common law of England that duress is no defence 
to murder."^^ He also adhered to the view that it would be a dangerous 
relaxation in the law if concession was made to exculpate a defendant 
who has deliberately killed innocent people, even taking into account that 
the accused feared for his own life or that of his family.®"^ The contours of 
the defence were consequently to be developed by reference to the 
degree of participation of the defendant in the killing. The diametrically 
opposed decisions in Lynch and Abbott are based entirely upon the 
tenuous distinction between principals in the first and second degree^"* 
but, arguably, "[t]his is not a distinction which should receive practical 
effect in the law."^^ There is, morally speaking, often no comprehensible 
rationale for distinguishing between the blameworthiness of a defendant 
who is forced to drive a perpetrator to the scene of the crime, and one 
who is forced to partake in that crime on arrival. 
The anomaly of attributing different degrees of culpability to defendants 
who were often perceived as equally blameworthy required resolution and 
the courts were under pressure to make a clear policy choice to either 
accept the defence in relation principal actors in the first and second 
degree, or reject it outright. In Howe, the House of Lords clarified the 
current state of the law by the categorical assertion that duress is not 
available to a defendant charged with murder, whether as principal or 
Edmund-Davies at 946. This point is highlighted by Helen P Milgate Duress and the 
Criminal Law: Another About Turn by the House of Lords' (1988) 47 Cambridge Law 
Journal 6^ at 65. 
Per Lord Salmon in Abbott v. R [1976] 3 All ER 140 at 145. Lord Wilberforce and Lord 
Edmund-Davies, dissenting, expressed discontent with the majority's acceptance of the 
flat declaration that actual killers could not be absolved of liability by a plea of duress. At 
151 Lord Wilberforce was critical of the assumption that such an approach "makes for 
sounder law and better ethics. In truth, the contrary is the case." 
" Per Lord Salmon in Abbott v. R [1976] 3 All ER 140 at 146. 
A distinction denounced by the dissenting judges in Abbott, Lord Wilberforce and Lord 
Edmund-Davies, and descritjed in Smitti and Hogan as "technical and absurd," see 
Ormerod, Smitti & Hogan: Criminal Law at 340. 
Per Lord Mackay in R v. Howe [1987] AC 417 at 542. 
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a c c e s s o r y . T h i s remains the current position to date; despite serious 
compulsion, the person coerced into intentionally violating the right to life 
of an innocent autonomous bystander must demonstrate unwavering 
resistance to the threat regardless of the personal sacrifice to their own 
interests. It is argued here that this limitation on the defence is 
unreasonable, and incorrectly assumes that when faced with serious 
threats to one's own interests no one but a coward would succumb. 
5.4.2 A rationale for the decision in Howe? 
The rationale for the decision in Howe is purportedly borne out of concern 
for the autonomy of the innocent bystander and respect for the sanctity of 
human life. It is based upon the ideal that a person of reasonable 
fortitude is expected to sacrifice their own life rather than take that of an 
innocent unoffending third party, fortified by the pronouncements of 
prominent scholars such as Blackstone, who have suggested that an 
actor under duress, "ought rather to die himself than escape by the 
murder of an innocent."®'' This demand is underscored by the idea that 
the highest duty of the law is to protect the freedom and fundamental 
rights of those that live under it. The House of Lords have suggested that 
"[t]he sanctity of human life lies at the root of this ideal... and the 
expectation is that the ordinary person of reasonable fortitude should be 
®^  Thereby the House of Lords overruled Lynch, one of its own previous decisions, a 
process permitted by the Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) [1966] 1 WLR 1234. 
Interestingly, Lord Griffiths was the only judge to explicitly deny the defence to attennpted 
murder also, see R v. Howe [1987] AC 417 at 445. The House of Lords subsequently 
confirmed this position, by a narrow majority of three to two (Lord Keith and Lord Lowry 
dissenting), in R v. Gotts [1992] 1 All ER 832, thereby perpetuating the anomaly that the 
defence is not available for attempted murder, but is applicable to a charge under 
section 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (causing grievous bodily harm 
with intent). For further discussion see Simon Gardner, 'Duress in Attempted Murder' 
(1991) 107 Law Quarterly Review 389. 
' Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England volume IV at 28. Other influential 
academics also support this approach, for instance JW Cecil Turner, Kenny's Outlines of 
Criminal Law 19"" edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966) at 84 and 
Russell on Crime 12"" edition (London: Stevens, 1964) at 90. 
Per Lord Griffiths in R v. Howe [1987] AC 417 at 443-444. 
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"capable of heroism"^^ if asked to take an innocent life rather than 
sacrifice their own. Lord Hailsham justified this approach by asserting: 
"I have known. . .too many acts of heroism by ordinary human 
beings of no more than ordinary fortitude to regard a law as either 
'just or humane' which withdraws the protection of the criminal law 
from the innocent victim and casts the cloak of its protection upon 
the coward and poltroon in the name of a 'concession to human 
frailty'."9° 
Whilst he was prepared to accept that in respect of lesser crimes the law 
could make concession to human frailty, Lord Hailsham suggested that 
different considerations arise when innocent life is taken to avoid the 
threat of death or serious harm: 
"In such case, a reasonable man might reflect that one innocent 
human life is at least as valuable as his own or that of his loved 
one. In such a case a man cannot claim that he is choosing the 
lesser of two evils. Instead, he is embracing the cognate, but 
morally disreputable principle that the end justifies the means."^^ 
Further, Lord Hailsham, Lord Bridge and Lord Griffiths were conscious of 
the lack of legislative activity regarding the duress defence, despite 
pressure in the past from the Law Commission^^ to extend its scope to 
encompass murder.^^ It is also evident from their respective speeches 
that the judges were convinced that cases which yielded particularly 
harsh results for the coerced defendant could be dealt with either by not 
prosecuting in the first instance,^'* or by exercising sentencing discretion 
Per Lord Hailsham in R v. Howe [1987] ,AC 417 at 432. 
'° Ibid. 
" Ibid, at 433. 
See Law Commission, Report on the Defences of General Application (Law Com No 
83) (London: HMSO, 1977) the central recommendation of which was that duress should 
be a defence to all crimes. This suggestion has recently been reiterated in Law 
Commission, Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide (Law Com No 304) (London; HMSO, 
2006), in particular part 6. 
Per Lord Hailsham, Lord Bridge and Lord Griffiths in R v. Howe [1987] AC 417 at 430, 
437 and 443 respectively. This point was also raised by Lord Jauncey in R v. Gotts 
[1992] 1 All ER 832 at 839. 
Per Lord Griffiths in R v. Howe [1987] AC 417 at 445. 
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for a convicted person who would otherwise have secured the defence of 
duress. 
The arguments advanced in Howe have, however, been subject to 
vehement criticism^^ and many remain unconvinced by the reasoning 
offered which is deplored by one commentator as "utterly fallacious."^'^ 
The judgment has been described as "weak and one-sided"^^, apt to 
cause "extraordinary injustice,"^^ leaving "grotesque anomalies in its 
wake"^°° and resulting in a lack of internal coherence and consistency. It 
Is contended that, "by this decision [the House of Lords] set it's face 
against gradations typifying the spirit of more cautious approaches and 
Per Lord Hailsham in R v. Howe [1987] AC 417 at 433; and per Lord Griffiths at 445-
446. 
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Powerful criticism was even expressed at the time of the decision, see John C Smith, 
'Case Comment: R v. Howe' [1987] Criminal Law Review 480; Connor Gearty, 'Howe to 
be a Hero' (1987) 46 Cambridge Law Journal 202; Milgate 'Duress and the Criminal 
Law; Another About Turn by the House of Lords'; Lynden Walters, 'Murder Under 
Duress and Judicial Decision-Making in the House of Lords' (1988) 8 Legal Studies 61 . 
' Reed, 'The Need for a New Anglo-American Approach to Duress' at 213. The 
reasoning has even been treated with scepticism in the international context, see the 
dissenting opinions of Judge Stephen and Judge Cassese in the Appeals Chamber of 
the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons for Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia, in the case ICTY Prosecutor 
V. Drazen Erdemovic (Case No IT-96-22-A). Erdemovic, a soldier, claimed that he was 
acting under immense duress, as his commanding officer threatened to kill him too if he 
did not participate in the execution of seventy Bosnian Muslims. The Appeals Chamber 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia held (by a majority of 
three to two) that duress does not afford a complete defence to a soldier charged with a 
crime against humanity and involving the killing of innocent human beings. The 
dissenting judges were vociferous in their criticism of the majority decision, claiming the 
result was marred by the Court's preoccupation with '"policy considerations' substantially 
based on English law;" see Judge Cassese's Separate and Dissenting Opinion, at [11]. 
®^ Milgate, 'Duress and the Criminal Law: Another About-Turn by the House of Lords' at 
75. 
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Rosenthal, 'Duress in the Criminal Law' at 213. 
GJ Bennett and Brian Hogan, 'Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure and Sentencing' 
(1987) All ER Annual Review 75 at 75. The authors suggest that an anomaly arises 
because a person charged with a serious assault, say wounding with intent by virtue of 
section 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, would be entitled to a defence 
of duress, but if the victim subsequently died prior to trial, the defendant would be given 
a mandatory life sentence with no exoneration. Such anomaly was acknowledged by 
the House of Lords, Lord Griffiths explaining that the justification for the approach flows 
from the "special regard the law has for human life. It may not be logical but it is real 
and it has to be accepted," per Lord Griffiths in R v. Howe [1987] AC 417 at 445. 
Commenting on the anomaly. Reed asserts that it could cause gross injustice and 
"provides example of the need for urgent reform of this sorry area of the law," see Reed, 
'The Need for a New Anglo-American Approach to Duress' at 219. For further insightful 
criticism see also Milgate 'Duress and the Criminal Law: Another About Turn by the 
House of Lords' at 74. 
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opted instead for a drastic solution. Yet despite spirited attempts to 
revise the position adopted in /-/oi/i/e,^°^ the principle in English law that 
duress is no defence to an intentional killing has long held sway. The 
decision is disapproved of by the vast majority of lawyers, academics and 
philosophers and some of the predominant criticisms are considered 
below. 
5.4.3 Criticisms of the decision in Howe 
The inthnsically heinous nature of the crime of murder may provide some 
justification for its exclusion from a plea of duress. But the circumstances 
within which an intentional killing may be carried out are so varied that it 
is arguably wrong to entirely rule out the availability of duress. The 
defence would reflect the degree of blameworthiness attributable to the 
perpetrator, meaning that the more morally repugnant the circumstances 
of the killing, the less accessible the defence. Denying the defence of 
duress to the killing of an innocent when faced with overwhelming 
coercion surely undermines the purpose of criminal law, which is to 
punish only conduct which merits condemnation. The purpose is not to 
condemn conduct which is the product of truly irresistible pressure. In 
further support of this assertion, the American Law Institute, rephrasing a 
quote from Hart,^°"^ affirm: 
"Law is ineffective in the deepest sense, indeed...it is hypocritical, 
if it imposes on the actor who has the misfortune to confront a 
dilemmatic choice, a standard that his judges are not prepared to 
Peiris, 'Duress, Volition and Criminal Responsibility' at 183. 
The Law Commission have recommended that duress be a full defence to murder in 
Law Commission, Legislating the Criminal Code: Offences against the Person and 
General Principles (Law Com No 218) (London: HMSO, 1993) and most recently in Law 
Commission, Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide (Law Com No 304) (London: HMSO, 
2006). This approach has seemingly filtered through to the courts, as the House of 
Lords recognised the logic of the Law Commission's earlier approach in R v. Hasan 
f2005]UKHL22 at [21]. 
°^ Henry Melvin Hart, 'The Aims of the Criminal Law' (1958) 23 Law and Contemporary 
Problems 401 at 404. 
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affirm that they should and could comply with if their turn to face 
the problem should arise."^"^ 
In order to avoid such hypocrisy it is submitted here that the defence of 
duress should be available to excuse the actor for a lethal violation of the 
rights of an innocent third party in appropriately limited and clearly 
defined circumstances. 
5.4.3.1 The demands of heroism argument 
Pragmatists would argue that by denying duress as a defence to 
intentional killing in circumstances of overwhelming compulsion, the level 
of fortitude expected of ordinary citizens is unrealistic. The need for a 
change in the law is, it is suggested here, undeniably " i r r e s i s t i b l e " . I n 
situations of exceptional pressure arising from grave threats to one's 
interests (or those of another), the level of steadfastness demanded by 
the present law in relation to murder is simply too great and contrary to 
basic human i n s t i n c t . T h e r e is a general consensus that in certain 
dilemmas no moral code would fault a defendant for committing an 
offence against person or property in response to serious threats; and in 
many other areas of criminal law the accused is judged by a standard of 
the reasonable person, not the reasonable hero.^^^ Although it is right 
that the law must protect the interests of autonomous unoffending 
innocent v i c t i m s , t h e r e is little evidence that by denying the defence to 
American Law Institute, Model Penal Code and Commentaries Part I (Philadelphia, 
1985). 
Per Lord Bingham in R v. Hasan [2005] UKHL at [21]. See also Reed, The Need for 
a New Anglo American Approach to Duress' at 212 and 217, where the author strongly 
denounces the law's demand for heroism as "the apotheosis of absurdity" which sets 
down a "fundamentally false standard." 
Simester and Sullivan describe the exclusion of murder and attempted murder from 
the defence of duress as "too rigid," see Simester and Sullivan, Criminal Law: Theory 
and Doctrine at 670. 
For instance, for a successful plea of provocation the defendant must show that they 
reacted as a reasonable person would have in response to the provocative incident; see 
Attorney-General for Jersey v. Holley [2005] UKPC 23. 
This basic principle is rigorously defended by Jerome Hall, General Principles of the 
Criminal Law 2"" edition (Indianapolis: New York, 1960) at 444-448; and James 
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murder the incidence of coerced defendants taking innocent lives has 
d e c r e a s e d . F u r t h e r , if the self-sacrifice required by the current law is 
driven by the ideal of protecting the lives of innocent persons at all costs, 
there is an implicit presumption that "...a person unlucky enough to be 
subjected to threats is less innocent than the intended victim."^ ^° 
In Lynch Lord Morris acknowledged the austerity of denying the defence 
to murder in the following summary: 
"If someone is threatened with death or serious injury unless [s]he 
does what [s]he is told to do, is the law to pay no heed to the 
miserable, agonising plight of such a person? For the law to 
understand not only how the timid but also the stalwart may in a 
moment of crisis behave is not to make the law weak but to make 
it just. In the calm of the courtroom measures of fortitude or of 
heroic behaviour are surely not to be demanded when they could 
not in moments for decisions reasonably have been expected even 
of the resolute and the well-disposed."^ 
Hence, even senior members of the judiciary concede that there are 
strong arguments that the criminal law should not make heroism a 
'requirement' by imposing liability on ordinary people who fail to live up to 
this standard. Gearty emphasises the point, contesting that, "...heroism 
by definition requires extraordinary acts of courage. The law is setting a 
standard that it knows most cannot match - and calling those who fail 
murderers (and cowards and poltroons, as well, for good measure)." 
Fitzjames Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England volume I (London: 
Macmillan & Co., 1883) at 107. 
One author offers a more intuitive response: "[t]he instinct of self-preservation in the 
face of an immediate threat will nearly always take precedence over the threat of legal 
punishment at some future time - unless, of course, the individual possesses heroic 
qualities in which case the deterrent effect of the criminal law is superfluous," see 
Walters, Murder Under Duress and Judicial Decision-Making in the House of Lords' at 
69. See also Peter Alldridge, Duress, Murder and the House of Lords' (1988) 52 
Journal of Criminal Law 186 at 189, who refers to the decision as 'naive' in this regard; 
Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law who, at 755, suggests that there are limits to the 
efficacy of threats of punishment to deter criminal conduct; and M Sornarajah, 'Duress 
and Murder in Commonwealth Criminal Law' (1981) 30 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 660 at 668, who asserts that self-preservation is a much more potent 
consideration than the threat of punishment when faced with the threat of death or 
serious harm. 
Gearty, 'Howe to be a Hero' at 205. 
Per Lord Morris in Lynch v. DPP for Northern Ireland [^975] 1 All ER 913 at 917. 
Gearty, 'Howe to be a Hero' at 205. 
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No doubt heroism in such circumstances should be encouraged and 
praised, but an actor who succumbs to the pressure is not an appropriate 
target of criminal punishment. 
The current demands of the law in relation to killing an innocent 
bystander are ignorant of natural human impulses, and have been 
described by one commentator as "ludicrous""^ and by the Law 
Commission as " f u t i l e . " ^The Commission categorically assert that, 
"[t]he attainment of a heroic standard of behaviour will always count for 
great merit; but failure to achieve that standard should not be met with 
punishment by the State."^^^ Ordinary people show a natural preference 
for their own lives (or that of family members) over others and only those 
who possess the extraordinary qualities of heroism will intentionally lay 
down their life for another person. By not permitting any defence where a 
defendant intentionally kills under compulsion, the law insists on higher 
standards than the average person can realistically achieve. Dressier 
advances the persuasive argument that such a rule: 
"...has the imprint of self-hghteousness, which the law should 
avoid. The rule asks us to be virtuous; more accurately, it 
demands our virtual saintliness, which the law has no right to 
require. It is precisely in the case of kill-or-be-killed threats that the 
criminal law ought to be prepared in some cases to attempt to 
assuage the guilt feelings of the homicidal wrongdoer by excusing 
him.""^ 
One of the outstanding features of the decision in Howe is their Lordships 
slavish loyalty to the sanctity of life principle, presented as a reason for 
restricting the scope of duress. Although idealistic, in reality the sanctity 
'^^ Reed, 'The Need for a New Anglo-American Approach to Duress' at 217. 
Law Commission, Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide (Law Com No 304) (London: 
HMSO, 2006). 
Law Commission, Legislating the Criminal Code: Offences against the Person and 
General Principles (Law Com No 218) (London: HMSO, 1993) at [30.11]. 
'^^ Joshua Dressier, 'Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and 
Searching For Its Proper Limits' (1989) 62 Southern California Law Review 1331 at 
1373. 
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of human life is not absolute and is qualified by other considerations."'' 
The discussion in chapter four supports this assertion, since it establishes 
that the self-defence and necessity justifications should render it 
permissible to kill an innocent unjust threat and, in limited circumstances, 
an innocent incidental threat respectively."^ Howe also overlooks the 
point that if the coerced defendant is threatened with death to her/himself 
and their family unless sehous harm is inflicted on an innocent third party, 
succumbing to the threat might well be encouraged as the choice may be 
one which constitutes the lesser of two e v i l s . I f the accused was, as an 
alternative, threatened with the death of his wife, or of his wife and child, 
does the sanctity of life argument still have such potent force?^^° If 
human life is held in such high esteem, why is it that the current law 
would demand that the accused not respond to such threats, with the 
result that two innocent people die as opposed to one?^^^ The decision in 
Howe seems to generate more questions than answers; it is argued here 
that the demands of heroism are impracticable and the sanctity of life 
argument unsustainable when a defendant is faced with extraordinarily 
coercive threats. 
5.4.3.2 The inefficacy of punishment argument 
Many believe that where a defendant is compelled (by another or by 
circumstances) to violate the right of an innocent bystander under duress, 
the deterrent strength of criminal sanctions is futile when in competition 
It was submitted in section 2.3 1 above that rights are not absolute and can be 
infringed without being violated and violated without criminal responsibility ensuing. 
See also Walters, 'Murder Under Duress and Judicial Decision-Making in the House 
of Lords' at 68. 
The decision in Howe is challenged on this point by Ormerod, Smith and Hogan: 
Criminal Law at 341. 
It has been contended that "...when a third person's life is also at stake even the path 
of heroism is obscure", see Herbert Weschler and Jerome Michael, 'A Rationale of the 
Law of Homicide' (1937) 37 Columbia Law Review 738. 
Sornarajah formulates a similar argument that the 'higher morality' on which the 
current position is based is undermined when the action of the coerced defendant 
results in a net saving of lives, see Sornarajah, 'Duress and Murder in Commonwealth 
Criminal Law' at 666. See further discussion on this point in Milgate 'Duress and the 
Criminal Law; Another About Turn by the House of Lords' at 68. 
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with countervailing threats of either imminent death or serious injury. 
Peiris comments that the imposition of criminal liability on a defendant 
who kills under duress is somewhat misplaced as criminal sanctions can 
have no conceivable impact on the will of the accused. He opines: 
". . .The price of submission to the dictates of the penal system is 
the infliction of instantaneous harm, of equivalent or greater 
degree, by the party from whom the illicit threat proceeds. The 
potency of the latter threat must perforce overwhelm, in 
immediacy, any countervailing threat which the penal law can hold 
out, so that the scope for any productive role to be assigned to the 
criminal law in this area is plainly marginal."^^^ 
It is arguable, on a utilitarian view of punishment at least, that imposing 
criminal liability upon the accused who acted because of unyielding 
imminent and serious threats is unnecessary and achieves no overall 
good.^^'' Conversely, it could be said that the punitive force of the 
criminal law should be at its most uncompromising when innocent life is 
taken. There is an internal conflict relating to the general and individual 
deterrent effect of the criminal law at play here; as Simester and Sullivan 
contend, it is "possible to subscribe to general deterrence as a justifying 
principle for state punishment, while insisting that the infliction of a 
sanction on a particular individual should satisfy the requirements of 
justice."^^^ There are few who would suggest that individual justice would 
be achieved by punishing persons who have engaged in criminal conduct 
to avoid grave harm to themselves or another.^^^ 
Simester and Sullivan, Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine at 665. 
Peiris, 'Duress, Volition and Criminal Responsibility' at 184-185. 
This is the general view.of Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (London: Pelican, 1968). 
Simester and Sullivan, Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine at 665, citing the authority 
of Hart, Punishment and Responsibility chapter vii. 
Although Schopp recommends that the accused should be convicted, but not 
punished, see Justification Defenses and Just Convictions at 142-152. 
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5.4.3.3 The legislative activity argument 
A further argument advanced in Howe was that there had been little 
legislative activity with regard to extending the duress defence to murder, 
despite opportunities to do so. It is indeed true that the Law Commission 
had recommended that duress should be permitted as a defence to all 
crimes, including murder, some ten years prior to the decision in Howe.^^^ 
The absence of subsequent corresponding legislation led their Lordships 
to the somewhat illogical conclusion that there was neither public demand 
for, nor legislative will to secure a defence of duress to intentional 
k i l l i n g . E c h o i n g the sentiments of many other c r i t i c s , O r m e r o d is 
robust in his assertion that the lack of legislative activity regarding the 
extension of the duress defence to murder "proves n o t h i n g . I t is 
wrong to assume that simply because parliamentary time has not been 
devoted to such pursuits any inference can be drawn with respect to the 
need for reform.^"^^ In support of this argument, Alldridge contends that 
nothing can be reasonably inferred from legislative inaction, "and 
finding. ..Parliamentary intention in a blank statute book is ludicrous."^^^ 
The fact that much time has been, and continues to be, devoted to 
discussing the unacceptable restriction on the duress defence 
undermines any argument that there is no public pressure to reform the 
current position. 
See Law Commission, Report on the Defences of General Application (Law Com No 
83) (London: HMSO, 1977). 
See the comments of Lord Bridge in R v. Howe [1987] AC 417 at 437 and Lord 
Griffiths at 443. 
Including many who were critical of the decision at the time of its conception, such as 
Milgate 'Duress and the Criminal Law: Another About Turn by the House of Lords' at 70; 
Smith 'Case Comment: R v. Howe' at 482. 
Ormerod, Smith and Hogan: Criminal Law at 341. 
Ada Kewley, 'Murder and the Availability of the Defence of Duress in the Criminal 
Law' (1993) 57 Journal of Criminal Law 298 at 302. 
Alldridge, 'Duress, Murder and the House of Lords' at 196. 
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5.4.3.4 The mitigation and prosecutorial discretion argument 
It was further suggested in Howe that any harsh result produced by the 
denial of duress as a defence to murder could, in the most agonising 
cases, be mitigated by the exercise of executive clemency in recognition 
that a plea of duress is something other than a general defence. 
Prosecutorial discretion might be exercised, for instance, or the resulting 
sentence mitigated in cases where the defendant acted under extreme 
p r e s s u r e . L o r d Griffiths was confident that through this machinery "the 
respective culpability of those involved in a murder case can be fairly 
weighted and reflected in the time they are to serve in custody."^^"^ Their 
Lordships view may have been motivated by the reluctance of influential 
scholars to accept the defence of duress as a substantive defence at all, 
to any crime. In the late nineteenth century Stephen was a chief 
proponent of the view that compulsion by threats should be considered 
merely in mitigation as opposed to providing exoneration for criminal 
conduct. His antipathy to the defence is manifest in the following 
remarks: 
"Criminal law is itself a system of compulsion on the widest scale. 
It is a collection of threats of injury to life, liberty, and property if 
people do commit crimes. Are such threats to be withdrawn as 
soon as they are encountered by opposing threats?...Surely it is at 
the moment when temptation to crime is strongest that the law 
should speak most clearly and emphatically to the contrary."^^^ 
133 In Howe, their Lordships also investigated, and subsequently rejected, the possibility 
of duress reducing a murder charge to one of manslaughter, see R v. Howe [1987] AC 
417, per Lord Hailsham at 435, Lord Mackay at 455, and Lord Griffiths at 446. The Law 
Commission recently revived this discussion, suggesting that duress should reduce a 
charge of first degree murder to second degree murder, in Law Commission A New 
Homicide Act for England and Wales? (Law Com CP No 177) (London: HMSO, 2005) at 
paragraph 7.32 onwards. In their final report, however, the Commission retracted from 
their original position and recommended that duress should be a full defence to first 
degree, second degree and attempted murder, see Law Commission, Murder, 
fJlanslaughter and Infanticide (Law Com No 304) (London: HMSO, 2006) particularly 
paragraphs 6.21-6.72. 
Per Lord Griffiths in R v. Howe [1987] AC 417 at 445-446. 
Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England (London: 
Macmillan & Co. 1883) at 107-108, cited in Rosenthal, 'Duress in the Criminal Law' at 
200 and also in R v Abbott [1976] 3 All ER 140 per Lord Salmon at 147. For an 
equivalent view in respect of the necessity defence, see DW Elliott, 'Necessity, Duress 
and Self-Defence' [1989] Criminal Law Review 6:0 at 610; and Law Commission, 
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other commentators have shown support for the proposition that duress 
should not exonerate the accused, but merely mitigate the punishment 
received. Schopp contends that if the requisite elements of an offence 
are established a conviction should ensue, despite the existence of 
serious threats which compelled the defendant to act.^ "^ ^ For him, the 
criminal law should convey a clear message that the action is wrongful by 
convicting a coerced defendant, although he concedes that duress could 
have significant mitigating force to the extent that in some cases no 
punishment whatsoever should e n s u e . S i m i l a r l y , Wasik asserts that it 
makes sense for duress only to be taken into account at the sentencing 
stage because, "it would provide a better solution for cases where it may 
be thought the defence is too wide."^^^ For Peiris, the merit in accepting 
duress as a mitigating factor is derived from the inescapable fact that the 
accused acts voluntarily despite the presence of duress. The idea of 
duress offering mitigation as opposed to exculpation may therefore be 
appealing. In spite of this, Peiris also admits that the countervailing 
criticism of this approach, based on the stigma of chminal conviction, is 
"by no means answerable."^^^ 
It may be admitted that although there is value in the suggestion that the 
pressure of threats could be reflected by mitigation rather than 
exoneration, none of the arguments presented are sufficiently persuasive 
for the simple reason that the stigma of criminality would still be present 
even in the absence of punishment. With respect, a criminal law system 
which only affords a defence to those who show the same degree of 
steadfastness as a person of reasonable fortitude is demanding enough; 
one which apportions blame to a defendant who acted as any other 
reasonable person would in the circumstances is simply too severe. 
Report on the Defences of General Application (Law Com No 83) (London; HMSO, 
1977) at paragraph 4.33. 
Schopp, Justification Defenses and Just Convictions chapter 5. 
To this end Schopp proposes the imposition of a special verdict, "a purely vindicating 
conviction" which reflects societal disappointment with the criminal behaviour, but 
acknowledges the difficult choice facing the defendant, see 144-145 in particular. 
Wasik, 'Duress and Criminal Responsibility' at 457 
Peihs, 'Duress, Volition and Criminal Responsibility; Current Problems in English and 
Commonwealth Law' at 208. 
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Those who call for duress to be merely a factor in mitigation do not 
appear to attach great weight to the stigma inherent in a criminal 
conviction, and it is submitted here that this approach should not be 
adopted. Through mitigation of sentence, the injustice of punishing a 
coerced actor would not be extinguished altogether, but merely reduced 
as conviction may be seen as a form of punishment in Itself.^"*" 
Further arguments have been advanced that in the most extreme cases 
of coercion, rather than extend the defence of duress to exonerate the 
actor, prosecutorial discretion may be exercised. Although it may be 
"inconceivable,"^'*^ in the words of Lord Griffiths, that actors faced with the 
most abhorrent choices in the wake of duress would ever be brought to 
prosecution, this attitude is dangerously optimistic. For many 
commentators, leaving the plight of the defendant to the discretion of the 
prosecutor is simply unacceptable.^'*^ It is a fact that difficult cases do 
reach the courtroom and it is, with respect, irresponsible of the senior 
judiciary to rely on prosecutorial discretion in order to circumvent the 
problems of extending the duress defence to murder cases. Indeed, it 
seems incongruous that Lord Hailsham and Lord Griffiths are, on the one 
hand, insistent that coerced actors who kill should not be exempt from 
criminal sanctions, yet on the other extol the virtues of other 
administrative remedies available.*"*^ The Law Commission has voiced 
its concern on the matter: 
"Reliance on executive discretion is not adequate in principle or in 
practice. Even if a prosecutor knows of a plea of duress, he may 
not be able or think it proper to judge its merits; and apart from any 
other consideration, those responsible for considering a prisoner's 
release would have to judge his claim without the benefit of a trial 
on the issue."*'*'* 
Cross, 'Murder Under Duress' at 378. 
Per Lord Griffiths in R v. Howe [1987] AC 417, at 445. 
'^'^  Milgate 'Duress and the Criminal Law: Another About Turn by the House of Lords' at 
71. 
"^^  This point is raised by Alldridge, 'Duress, Murder and the House of Lords' at 199-200. 
^"^ Law Commission A New Homicide Act for England and Wales? (Law Com CP No 
177) (London: HMSO, 2005) at [7.19]. 
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Ormerod has added his weight to the Law Commission stance, 
commenting that "even if [s]he were not prosecuted, the 'duressee' would 
be, in law, a murderer [and] a morally innocent person should not be left 
at the mercy of administrative discretion on a murder charge."^''^ 
It would be unfortunate if, in an attempt to maintain the supremacy of 
higher morality by demanding the conviction of the coerced actor,^'*^ the 
onus rested entirely on administrative prerogative to secure a just and fair 
outcome. Aside from the Inherent uncertainty, there is an acute danger 
that when this discretion Is exercised, considerations which have no 
bearing on the culpability of the accused (for example broader policy 
considerations) may permeate the decision.^'^'^ At base, the 
pronouncement In Howe seems ignorant of the significant conceptual 
disparity between mitigation and excuses In respect of their role In 
determining responsibility. ^ ''^  For these reasons the prosecutorial and 
mitigation arguments are vehemently rejected. 
5.4.3.5 The precedent argument 
According to the long-established authority of Dudley and Stephens,^"^^ if 
circumstances place a defendant In a position where s/he must make a 
choice between taking the life of a non-threatening, Innocent person in 
order to preserve their own, then the natural Instinct for self-preservation 
must be resisted In order to avoid the Imposition of criminal liability. This 
point Is reiterated throughout the thesis. The defence of necessity seems 
to expire at the point where the lives of Innocent bystanders are taken as 
a means to an end simply because the actor prefers her/his own life and 
Ormerod, Smith & Hogan: Criminal Law at 341. 
'"^ Williams, Textbook on Criminal Law at 626. . , 
Walters, 'Murder Under Duress and Judicial Decision-Making in the House of Lords 
ayo. 
''^ Rv. oJdley and Stephens (1884) 14 QBD 273. The case is discussed in more detail 
in section 5.6 below. 
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there are cogent reasons for the restriction placed upon the defence. 
Lord Coleridge outlined his reservations on extending the necessity 
defence to justify the intentional killing of innocent autonomous people: 
"Who is to be the judge of this sort of necessity? By what measure 
is the comparative value of lives to be measured?...It is plain that 
the principle leaves to him who is to profit by it to determine the 
necessity which will justify him in deliberately taking another's life 
to save his own."^^^ 
The obdurate approach taken by English courts to the taking of innocent 
life where threats to one's own life emerge from a natural calamity has 
perhaps tempered any enthusiasm towards the availability of an 
excusatory defence of duress where the threat emanates from a human 
agent.^^^ Indeed, it would surely be contradictory to accept a defence to 
the intentional killing of an innocent bystander where threats to one's own 
life were brought to bear by another being, yet simultaneously deny the 
existence of any defence where the threat is a product of nature. On 
what basis could this distinction be drawn? Preoccupied by such 
considerations, the House of Lords in Howe sought to use Dudley \o 
justify the restriction on the availability of duress in murder cases. 
The authoritative force of Dudley has been subject to numerous 
challenges'^"* and the blunt acceptance that the crux of the decision is 
that necessity can never operate as a defence to murder is 
For further discussion, see section 5.6 below. 
Per Lord Colendge CJ in R v. Dudley and Stephens (1884) 14 QBD 273 at 286. 
But see section 5.6 below where it is proposed that duress of circumstances should 
be extended to excuse an actor who intentionally kills when faced with extraordinary 
pressure from a circumstantial threat 
Lord Mackay suggested that the dilemma in duress cases was the same as that 
experienced in Dudley, and thus the defence should be similarly limited, see R v. Howe 
[1987] AC 417 at 453. Lord Hailsham submitted at 429 that the previous decision in 
Lynch could not be "justified on authority," presumably a reference to the restrictions on 
the necessity defence emanating from Dudley. The limitations imposed by Dudley have 
been acknowledged by some as "the strongest argument advanced in Howe"; see 
Milgate 'Duress and the Criminal Law: Another About Turn by the House of Lords' at 69. 
However, given the comparative weakness of the other arguments advanced in the case 
this assertion does not cause great concern. 
See, for example, Peter R Glazebrook, 'The Necessity Plea in English Criminal Law' 
(1972) 30 Cambridge Law Journal 87 at 112-115; Glanville Williams, 'A Commentary on 
R V. Dudley and Stephens' (1978) 9 Cambrian Law Review 94; and Walters, 'Murder 
Under Duress and Judicial Decision-Making in the House of Lords' at 63-64. 
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u n s a t i s f a c t o r y . I t is significant that the decision in Dudley v/as couched 
almost entirely in the language of justification, and was therefore 
unconcerned with any excusatory defence which may absolve a 
defendant from intentionally killing when threatened by circumstances. 
This is perhaps forgivable given the undeveloped dialogue of justification 
and excuse at the time of the decision; but the same allowance cannot be 
made for the decision in Howe over a century later. Hence, although the 
necessity defence was denied on the facts in Dudley since the intrusion 
on the rights of an innocent autonomous non-threatening individual who 
is simply used as a means to an end can never be justified, no further 
inferences should be drawn from the case regarding the scope of the 
excusatory defence of duress. 
It seems that on the logic presented above there is scope for a defence of 
duress to operate as a complete defence to intentional killing in 
exceptional circumstances, despite the fact that such action wrongfully 
violates the right to life of an innocent bystander. It is not, however, 
suggested that duress should always be a defence to intentional killing; 
there are other stringent limitations on the availability of the defence and 
the jury should always have the option of convicting those who do not 
display a reasonable level of steadfastness when faced with immediate 
and serious threats. The requisite qualifying and evaluative conditions 
are considered in brief below. 
5.5 The conditions of duress 
Despite duress becoming a more popular defence plea in recent times, 
the defence has been described as nebulous and ill-defined.^^'' The 
See section 5.6 below for further discussion of Dudley. 
This assertion was made in Ian Dennis, 'Duress, Murder and Criminal Responsibility' 
(1980) 106 Law Quarterly Review 208 and confirmed in 2005 by Lord Bingham in R v. 
Hasan [2005] UKHL 22 at [22]. 
One commentator observed in 1988 that, despite significant judicial pronouncements 
at the time, the defence was "no better charted that it was a decade ago," see Peiris, 
228 
position has perhaps improved somewhat recently, with an authoritative 
summary of the constituent elements of the defence provided by Lord 
Bingham in Hasan:^^® there must be a threat of death or serious injury 
made to the defendant, an immediate family member or someone for 
whom D regards her/himself as responsible; D's perception of the threat 
and his subsequent conduct is to be judged according to an objective 
assessment; the criminal conduct must be directly induced by the threat; 
there must be no opportunity for evasive action on D's part; the defence 
will not be available where D has voluntarily exposed her/himself to the 
threat; and, reluctantly, the defence is not applicable where the crime 
chosen is murder, attempted murder or some forms of treason. Even if 
duress was to be made available in murder cases, as recommended 
here, the defence is, rightly, still subject to strict rules that should prevent 
the potential for misuse which has troubled the courts in the past. The 
defendant is required to fulfil both qualifying and evaluative conditions for 
a successful plea, and the scope of these limitations will be now be 
examined. 
5.5.1 The qualifying conditions 
5.5.1.1 Proportionality 
It is generally accepted that there must be a degree of proportionality 
between the threat and the offence as a prerequisite of the defence in 
order that the harm caused does not outweigh the harm threatened. To 
quote an illustrative example provided by Lord Hailsham in Howe: 
"Few would resist threats to the life of a loved one if the alternative 
were driving across the red lights or in excess of 70 mph on the 
motorway. But... it would take rather more that the threat of a slap 
'Duress, Volition and Criminal Responsibility: Current Problems in English and 
Commonwealth Law' at 182. 
R V. Hasan [2005] UKHL 22, summarised at [21] by Lord Bingham, 
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on the wrist...to discharge the evidential burden even in the case 
of a fairly serious assault."^^^ 
Lord Hailsham went on to assert, "I am entitled...to believe that some 
degree of proportionality between the threat and the offence must, at 
least to some extent, be a prerequisite of the defence under existing 
law."^^° This statement is further supported by Lord Wilberforce's 
suggestion in Lynch that "[n]obody would dispute that the greater the 
degree of heinousness of the crime, the greater and less resistible must 
be the degree of pressure, if pressure is to exist."^^^ Hence it seems that 
there must be some nexus between the resulting harm and that which is 
threatened. This requirement may not be too onerous since one may 
only claim duress if the threat is one of serious harm or death. 
5.5.1.2 The nature of the threat 
There has been some debate as to what type of threat grounds a claim of 
duress, but the current law now seems relatively settled as the courts 
have set a minimum threshold of threats which will suffice. It is well 
established that the minimum level of threat required is that of death or 
serious bodily harm:^^^ no lesser threat will suffice as a basis for the 
Per Lord Hailsham in R v. Howe [1987] AC 417 at 433. 
Ibid, at 432-433. 
Per Lord Wilberforce in Lynch v. DPP for Northern Ireland [1975] 1 All ER 913 at 927. 
This view was given credence by Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 
volume IV at 30, whose views have permeated judicial pronouncements on duress for 
many years: see, for example, Attorney-General v. Whelan [1934] IR 518; R v. Hudson 
[1971] 2 QB 202; R v. Graham [1982] 1 All ER 801; R v. Howe [1987] AC 417; R v. 
Conway [1989] QB 290; R v. Aikens [2003] EWCA Crim 1573; and R v. Radford [2004] 
EWCA Crim 2878. The Law Commission also endorsed this limitation on the 
applicability of the defence, see Law Commission, Codification of the Criminal Law (Law 
Com No 143) (London: HMSO, 1985) and the Draft Criminal Code (clause 42 and 43). 
In a number of relatively recent duress of circumstances cases, the courts have strictly 
construed the requirement of a threat of serious personal injury, asserting that cannabis 
use could not be excused on the grounds that there was a serious threat of 'injury', 
where that injury constituted a greater degree of pain, see R v. Brown [2003] EWCA 
Crim 2637 and R v. Quayle [2005] EWCA Crim 1415. In Valderrama-Vega [1985] Crim 
LR 220, financial pressures and sexual blackmail were insufficient to find a defence of 
duress. The Law Commission have recently recommended that if the duress defence is 
extended to intentional killing the threat must be one of death or life-threatening harm, 
see Law Commission, Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide (Law Com No 304) 
(London: HMSO, 2006) at paragraph [6.73] 
230 
defence,^^'^ even where the defendant has committed a relatively minor 
crime. There is some argument that a similar concession should be 
made for threats to cherished property, since "the causative potency of 
the threats...may not be materially different in these c a s e s . B u t the 
challenge presented by other threats with the potential to undermine 
resistance was succinctly articulated by Lord Simon in Lynch. 
"...the threat may be to burn down [the accused's] house unless 
the householder merely keeps watch against interruption while a 
crime is committed. Or a fugitive from justice might say, "I have it 
in my power to make your son bankrupt. You can avoid that 
merely by driving me to the airport." Would not many ordinary 
people yield to such threats, and act contrary to their wish not to 
perform an action prohibited by law?"^^^ 
Although recognising that non-physical threats may be compelling in the 
same way that threats against the person are, Lord Simon also 
acknowledged that, as a matter of policy, permitting such threats would 
render the defence unacceptably broad. He concedes that a line must be 
drawn somewhere and, "as a result of experience and human valuation, 
the law draws it between threats to property and threats to the 
person.'"^®® There is some Inconsistency here with the general law 
relating to offences against the person. For a successful plea of duress, 
physical harm is a pre-requisite;^^'' yet the courts have generously 
interpreted 'harm' as including psychiatric injury in the general law.^^^ 
Although duress demands a threat to be imminent, and the paradigm 
example will be of the imminent infliction of physical harm, It is certainly 
conceivable that the Initiator of the pressure may threaten to inflict serious 
psychological injury on the accused. Yet the recent declaration of the 
^^^\nRv. Sfeane[1947] 1 KB 997, the Court of Appeal suggested that a threat of false 
imprisonment would be sufficient to ground a defence of duress, but this decision has 
not been followed in subsequent cases; see, for example, DPP v. Hicks [2002] All ER 
285, in which the Queen's Bench Division denied the defence to a defendant who drove 
while intoxicated in order to source a pain killer for his sick daughter. 
Peiris, 'Duress, Volition and Criminal Responsibility: Current Problems in English and 
Commonwealth Law' at 197. 
Per Lord Simon in R v. Lynch [1975] 1 All ER 771 at 932. 
Ibid. 
This was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in R v. Baker and Wilkins [1997] Crim LR 
497. 
R V. Burstow [1998] AC 147. 
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conditions of duress in Hasan suggests a more explicit policy to interpret 
the limitations restrictively, so it is unlikely that anything less than a threat 
of physical harm will s u f f i c e . T h i s general trend of restrictive 
interpretation is encouraged here in light of the proposal that duress 
should be extended to intentional killing. 
5.5.1.3 Threats to a third party 
In English law, threats waged against a third party may also substantiate 
a d e f e n c e . I n d e e d , there would be no plausible basis for restricting the 
defence to threats made to the accused since it is certainly conceivable 
that threats made to one's own family may overpower one's will, perhaps 
to an even greater extent than had the threats been directed at the 
accused personally, and that sentiment has long been accepted by the 
courts.^''^ There is now also judicial recognition of the fact that threats 
made to a complete stranger may, in certain circumstances, also bear on 
the accused's ability to avoid criminal conduct. In Shayler, it was noted, 
"the evil must be directed towards the defendant or a person or persons 
for whom he has responsibility or...persons for whom the situation makes 
him responsible."^''^ The following example is offered: a threat is issued 
against the defendant that unless s/he commits the unlawful act, a bomb 
will be detonated with potentially lethal consequences. Although the 
potential victims may be unknown to the defendant, the circumstances 
have Imposed some kind of responsibility on the accused to act. It seems 
Simester and Sullivan, Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine at 667. 
R V. Hurley and Murray [1967] VR 526 (threats to the defendant's de facto wife); R v. 
CoA7way[1989] QB 290, [1988] 3 All ER 1025 (threats against the defendant's 
passenger); R v. Martin [1989] 1 All ER 652 (defendant's wife threatened to commit 
suicide); and R v. Ortiz (1986) 83 Cr App R 173 (threats to the defendant's wife and 
daughter were sufficient). 
This was exemplified in the case of R v. Steane [1947] 1 KB 997, whereby the 
defendant made broadcasts for Germany during the war, having succumbed to threats 
to the safety of his wife and children. It is important to note, however, that duress was 
held not to be in issue in that case. \n R v. Ortiz (1986) 83 Cr App R 173, it was 
suggested that one of the limiting conditions on the defence was that the threat must be 
aimed at either the defendant or a close family member. 
R V. S/jay/er[2001] 1 WLR 2206 at paragraph [49], approving a statement made by 
Rose LJ in R v. Abdul-Hussain [1999] Crim LR 570. This assertion was also received 
with approval more recently in R v. Hasan [2005] UKHL 22, per Lord Bingham at [19]. 
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appropriate, therefore, for threats to another to be included within the 
remit of the defence of duress, and this approach is supported here.^ '^ •^ 
5.5.1.4 Immediacy 
There is a further significant limitation on the availability of the duress 
defence in English law; that the threat must be ' immed ia te ' . ^ In the 
past, the courts have interpreted this requirement flexibly, the Court of 
Appeal in Hudson^^^ submitting that "the threatened injury may not follow 
instantly, but after an interval."^''^ Subsequently, the courts began to 
favour the term 'imminent' as opposed to ' i m m e d i a t e ' , b u t there were 
still fears that the defence would become unmanageable if the requisite 
elements were relaxed any further.^''^ Contemporary judicial 
pronouncements on the issue have cautiously reverted to a narrow 
construction of this requirement. Lord Bingham in Hasan reaffirming the 
importance of a more restrictively defined notion of immediacy within the 
defence. 
Connected to the immediacy requirement is the contention that for the 
defence to be effective, the threat must have been operative at the time 
of the commission of the offence and unavoidable. Lord Lane CJ 
The Draft Criminal Code, clause 42, expressly provided for threats "to cause death or 
serious personal harm to himself or another," see Law Commission, Codification of the 
Criminal Law {lavj Com No 143) (London: HMSO, 1985). 
The Court of Appeal affirmed that "the accused must know or believe that the threat 
is one which will be carried out immediately or before the accused or the other person 
threatened, can obtain official protection," see R v. Hurst (1995) 1 Cr App R 82 at 93; 
and also R v. Flatt [1996] Crim LR 576. 
R V. Hudson [1971] 2 QB 202. 
Per Lord Parker CJ Ibid at 207. 
^ " Indeed, more recently in the case of R v. Abdul Hussain [1999] Crim LR 570, the 
court preferred the term 'imminent' to 'imm.ediate', thus broadening the scope of the 
defence. 
In R V. Cole [1994] Crim LR 582, this fear was dispelled as the Court of Appeal 
rejected the defence of duress to a charge of robbery on the grounds that the threat was 
not sufficiently imminent to justify the excuse. Similarly in R v. S/?ay/er [2001] 1 WLR 
2206, the Court of Appeal confirmed that an uncertain future emergency (here, the 
possible covert action by members of the security services) did not provide sufficient 
grounds for a plea of duress. 
™ R V. Hasan [2005] UKHL 22 per Lord Bingham at [21]. 
233 
emphasised this point, asserting that, "[n]o one could question that if a 
person can avoid the effect of duress by escaping from the threats, 
without damage to [her or] himself, [s]he must do so."^®° This constraint 
has been described as one of the 'cardinal features' of the defence, 
and as a consequence if the defendant has a safe avenue of escape or a 
reasonable opportunity to resort to protection of the law, they are required 
to take it in order to benefit from the d e f e n c e . O n a similar note it is 
contended that the defence will not be available to those defendants who 
would have carried out the unlawful act regardless of the threat.^®^ In 
other words, even if the sober person of reasonable firmness would have 
responded to the serious threat, it must also be shown that the 
defendant's will was overborne by the threat to the extent that they were 
impelled to commit the crime. Conversely, the particular threat does not 
have to be the sole, or even the main, reason for the defendant's action, 
as long as it is a substantive reason.^^'^ 
5.5.1.5 Nomination of the crime 
The particular criminal offence committed by the accused under duress is 
typically nominated by the party issuing the threat. In Co/e^®^ the 
defendant was denied the defence on the grounds that he had chosen 
the crime himself, which in the instant case was robbing a building 
society. Perhaps a more plausible explanation for the decision in Cole Is 
not that the crime was self-elected, but that the threat was not sufficiently 
imminent. Indeed, the mere fact of nomination does not seem to have 
Per Lord Lane CJ in R v. Sharp [1987] QB 853 at 857. This submission was further 
endorsed in R v. Gill [1963] 2 All ER 688; and R v. Hurley and Murray [1967] VR 526. 
Per Lord Bingham in R v. Hasan [2005] UKHL 22 at [25]-[26]. 
'^^Rv. Hudson 97^2 QB 202, R V. Baker and lVard(1999) 2 Cr App R 335. 
This point was discussed in DPP v. Bell (Derek) [1992] Crim LR 176, where the 
defendant drove with excess alcohol to escape the threat of an aggressor; the defence 
of duress of circumstances was available since had it not been for the threat the 
defendant might have changed his mind or been dissuaded from driving his vehicle. 
See R V. Valderrama Vega [1985] Crim LR 220, where the threatened harm 
consisted of exposure of the defendant's homosexuality, financial loss, and physical 
violence; only the latter threat would be legally relevant to a plea of duress. 
R V. Cole [1994] Chm LR 582. 
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stifled the courts in their development of the analogous defence of duress 
of circumstances, where the crime is invariably elected by the accused. 
Therefore, in view of this expansion of the duress defence and in the 
interests of consistency, any requirement of nomination is now defunct. 
5.5.1.6 Voluntary exposure 
The general undercurrent of the decision in Howe was that the social 
climate of the day was not apt to cope with any relaxation of the law 
regarding murder^^'' and the House of Lords expressed particular concern 
that terrorists may exploit the defence by claiming that their actions were 
motivated by fear of fellow members of their organisation. The fear that 
the defence might amount to some kind of 'terrorists charter' had also 
emerged in earlier c a s e s . T h e Law Commission has since noted that, 
"the absence of a strict rule of voluntary exposure at the time of the 
decision in Howe may well have influenced the decision."^^^ However, it 
is now accepted beyond doubt, on the House of Lords authority offered in 
Hasan, that those who have knowingly^^° and voluntarily^^^ exposed 
With the exception, perhaps of R v. Martin (Colin) [1989] 1 All ER 652, where the 
defendant attempted to avert a threat of suicide by his wife by driving his son to work 
whilst disqualified; see section 5.6 below. 
Kewiey, 'Murder and the Availability of the Defence of Duress in the Criminal Law' at 
302. Lord Jauncey also commented in R v. Gotts [1992] 1 All ER 832 at 839, that 
". . .given the climate of violence and terrorism which ordinary law-abiding citizens have 
now to face Parliament might well do well to consider whether the defence should 
continue to be available in the case of all very serious crimes." However, many 
academic commentators at the time suggested that there was no basis for this 
assumption, see Alldridge, 'Murder Under Duress - Awaiting the Final Word' at 262. 
Per Lord Simon in Lynch v. DPP for Northern Ireland [1975] 1 All ER 913 at 933; per 
Lord Salmon in Abbott v. R [1976] 3 All ER 140 at 146. 
Law Commission A A/6w Homicide Act for England and Wales? (Law Com CP No 
177) (London: HMSO, 2005) at [7.67]-[7.70]. 
For the defence to be denied, the accused must have had actual knowledge of the 
risk of being coerced into the commission of crime, see R v. Sharp [1987] QB 853 at 
861. 
It has been confirmed by the English courts in R v. Hasan [2005] UKHL 22 at [21] 
and [29]-[37]; R v. Sharp [1987] QB 853; R v. Lynch [1975] 1 All ER 913 (per Lord 
Morris, Wilberforce and Simon); and by the Court of Criminal Appeal in Northern Ireland 
in R V. Fitzpatrick [1977] Nl 20, that the defendant's voluntary involvement with a 
chminal enterprise (without reasonable excuse) would deny her/him the defence of 
duress. It should be noted, however, that the defence is not automatically negated if the 
defendant is compelled to join the criminal gang because of threats of death or serious 
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themselves to a risk of being threatened^^^ by involvement with a violent 
criminal enterprise^^^ which uses violence as one of its organising 
principles cannot rely on the defence. Thus the protests of their 
Lordships in Howe have lost much of their force.^^"^ Their Lordship's 
recent assertion is undoubtedly underscored by the idea that those with 
some level of prior culpability should not be permitted to exploit the 
defence, which it was noted was becoming too readily available because 
of a relaxation of the restrictive requirements. 
This brief synopsis of the conditions which must be satisfied before a 
duress plea will qualify for consideration illustrate that the defence is 
strictly construed in order to prevent it from becoming unmanageable. 
Since it is recommended here that the defence should logically be 
extended to defendants who intentionally kill an innocent bystander, the 
recent tightening of the requirements is to be welcomed. The excuse 
must be strictly construed so as not to allow a defence to an actor who 
makes a disingenuous claim and to protect the rights of the innocent 
bodily harm (although it is unclear whether any lesser threat would suffice, see Ormerod, 
Smith & Hogan: Criminal Law at 337). 
There has been some controversy surrounding the threat to which D exposed 
himself. The courts have questioned whether the defence should be denied to the 
defendant who has put her/himself in a position where s/he was aware of the risk that 
there would be pressure to commit offences of the type alleged, or whether the defence 
would be unavailable where the defendant knew that s/he would be subjected to threats 
to commit any crime, more generally. In R v. Baker and Ward [1999] 2 Cr App R 355, 
the Court of Appeal adopted the former, less restrictive approach, which was more 
favourable to the defendant. However, following R v. Heath [2000] Crim LR 109 and R 
V. Harmer[2002] Crim LR 401, the House of Lords in R v. Hasan [2005] UKHL 22, 
declared at [37] that Baker had been wrongly decided. Lord Bingham confirmed that, 
"The defendant is, ex hypothesi, a person who has voluntarily surrendered his will to the 
domination of another. Nothing should turn on foresight of the manner in which, in the 
event, the dominant party chooses to exploit the defendant's subservience." Hence, the 
defence is denied to a defendant who exposes her/himself to a risk of pressure to 
commit any crime, where the defendant knows or ought to have known of the risk of 
compulsion (on this latter point, see Lord Bingham in R v. Hasan [2005] UKHL 22 at 
P8]). 
What constitutes a criminal organisation is not clear, but the defence has been 
denied where the defendant is voluntarily associated with, for example, gangs of armed 
robbers (R v. Sharp [1987] QB 853) and paramilitary organisations (R v. Fitzpatrick 
[1977] Nl 20). In R v. Lewis (1992) 96 Cr App Rep 412 it was noted that voluntary 
membership of "a paramilitary or gangster-tyrant style of organization" would preclude 
reliance on the defence. 
Milgate 'Duress and the Criminal Law: Another About Turn by the House of Lords' at 
73. 
See in particular Lord Bingham's speech in R v. Hasan [2005] UK HL 22 at [22]. 
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autonomous bystander. Should the actor satisfy the qualifying conditions 
of the defence, their conduct is then subject to a normative evaluation, 
the substance of which is considered in greater detail below. 
5.5.2 The evaluative condition 
In addition to the qualifying conditions considered above, the duress plea 
is further limited by an evaluative test laid down by the Court of Appeal In 
Graham, which permits the jury to reject the defence if in the 
circumstances a person of ordinary firmness would not have taken part in 
the crime as d e m a n d e d . T h e following direction, taken from the 
speech of Lord Lane CJ in Graham, has been subsequently approved by 
the House of Lords: 
"(1) Was [the defendant], or may he have been, impelled to act as 
he did because, as a result of what he reasonably believed [E] had 
said or done, he had good cause to fear that if he did not so act [E] 
would kill him or...cause him serious physical injury? (2) If so, 
have the prosecution made the jury sure that a sober person of 
reasonable firmness, sharing the characteristics of [the defendant], 
would not have responded to whatever he reasonably believed [E] 
said or did by taking part in the killing?"''^'' 
When faced with extreme pressure to act emanating from a serious 
threat, personal circumstances might affect the capacity of a person to 
either form reasonable beliefs, or to act reasonably on the basis of those 
beliefs. On the authority provided, it would seem that, first, the defendant 
must have reasonably believed in the circumstances giving rise to the 
threat and have good cause to fear that they would be subjected to 
serious injury or death; and, second, the defendant's subsequent reaction 
must be one which would have been expected of a sober person of 
reasonable firmness, sharing the defendant's characteristics. 
R V. Graham (Paul) [1982] 1 All ER 801. 
Per Lord Lane CJ in R v. Graham (Paul) [1982] 1 All ER 801 at 806; approved by the 
House of Lords in R v. Howe [1987] AC 417 and R v. Hasan [2005] UKHL 22. This 
approach is also endorsed in Law Commission, Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide 
(Law Com No 304) (London: HMSO, 2006) at paragraph [6.77]-[6.80]. 
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In relation to the first issue a relatively strict standard is set by the 
direction in Graham by requiring that the defendant has a reasonable 
belief In the circumstances of the threat. Some have argued that this 
standard is too rigorous; according to Smith and Hogan a defendant 
should be judged on the basis of an honest and genuine belief In the 
existence of the threat by analogy with self-defence and provocation. 
The suggestion is that a person may be deemed credulous or even stupid 
for believing in the circumstances of the threat, but that does not make 
her/him any more blameworthy than the defendant whose fear is founded 
upon reasonable g r o u n d s . I t is submitted here, however, that the 
objective approach to mistaken belief is more tenable because it 
encourages the defendant to carefully consider the circumstances of the 
threat before responding to it, and this restriction must surely help to 
safeguard the rights of the innocent bystander.^°° Although no explicit 
declaration was offered on the matter, Lord Bingham's speech in Hasan 
indicates that the objective formulation of the first part of the direction is to 
See Ormerod, Smith & Hogan: Criminal Law at 331, citing William Wilson, 'The 
Structure of Defences' [2005] Criminal Law Review 108 at 115-116 in support. Indeed, 
in DPP V. Rogers [1998] Crim LR 202, the Divisional Court appear to have (incorrectly) 
assumed a more subjective approach to the issue; similarly, the Court of Appeal in R v. 
Martin (DP) (2002) 2 Cr App R 42 permitted the defendant's characteristics to be taken 
into account as his schizoid affective disorder made him more likely to believe in the 
existence of threats and that they would be carried out; and the Court of Appeal in R v. 
M [2003] EWCA Crim 1170 also appears to endorse a subjective approach when 
considering the defendant's belief in the threats. The subjective approach is criticised in 
Jeremy Horder, 'Occupying the Moral High Ground' [1994] Criminal Law Review 334 at 
341, and the objectivity of this part of the test was restored (albeit implicitly in the first 
case) in R v. Safi and others [2003] Crim LR72^ :Rv. Blake [2004] EWCA Crim 1238 at 
[18]; and R v. Bronson [2004] EWCA Crim 903 at [23]. It is worth noting that in self-
defence and the provocation beliefs need only be honest and genuine, and are not 
required to be based on reasonable grounds (see R v. Gladstone (Williams) (1984) 78 
Cr App R 276) although it is suggested in section 4.4.1.3 that belief in the need to use 
force in self-defence should be reasonable. Clarification is needed as to why there is a 
divergence of approach where some defences require beliefs to be reasonably held, and 
others merely require a subjective, honest belief to ground a defence. As Jeremy 
Horder emphasises, there may be plausible reasons for this discordance, see 
'Occupying the Moral High Ground' [1994] Criminal Law Review 334. For instance, self-
defence is a justificatory defence and duress excusatory; and in cases of duress the 
actor has a more considered choice to comply with the threat than a defendant acting in 
defence of a threat to their interests, see Law Commission, Murder, Manslaughter and 
Infanticide (Law Com No 304) (London: HMSO, 2006) at paragraph [6.78]. 
Ormerod, Smith & Hogan: Criminal Law at 331. 
See the discussion in section 4.4.1.3 above, where it is suggested that beliefs in the 
need to use self-defensive force should similarly be objective. 
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be preferred; the defendant must, therefore, have reasonab/y believed in 
the circumstances of the threat. 
In relation to the second part of the test, it has long been acknowledged 
that duress is a "concession to human frailty,"^°^ yet the exoneration 
provided by the defence is restricted to those defendants displaying the 
"steadfastness reasonably to be expected of the ordinary citizen in his 
s i t u a t i o n . T h e courts have strictly determined the standard of conduct 
to be expected of a defendant when faced with extreme pressure to 
violate the personal or proprietary rights of an innocent third party,^°"' an 
approach which is echoed throughout the rest of the criminal law.^""* The 
law is indisputably driven by a sound motive; that the more intrusive the 
crime committed against the innocent bystander, the stronger and more 
irresistible the threat must be before criminal responsibility is avoided. 
The Graham direction does, however, permit some latitude for the 
characteristics of the defendant to be considered when evaluating the 
conduct. In Bowen^°^ the Court of Appeal determined that a defined set 
of characteristics could be pertinent to the assessment of whether a 
person of reasonable fortitude would be able to resist threats. Age and 
sex are identified as relevant, as are pregnancy and serious physical 
disability. The court also suggested that "recognized mental illness or 
psychiatric condition, such as post traumatic stress disorder leading to 
learned helplessness" may be taken into account.^°'' Whilst careful not to 
Per Lord Hailsham in R v. Howe [1987] AC 417 at 432. 
R V. Graham (Paul) [1982] 1 All ER 801 at 806. 
The objective approach was confirmed most recently in R v. Hasan [2005] UKHL 22. 
In self-defence, the degree of force used by the accused must be reasonable; 
similarly in provocation, the defendant must show that the provocative incident was 
"enough to make a reasonable man do as he did". Homicide Act 1957, section 3. 
Indeed, Lord Lane CJ expressly drew a direct analogy with the provocation defence, in 
R V. Graham [1982] 1 All ER 801 at 806. 
See comments made by Lord Wilberforce and Lord Edmund-Davies (dissenting) in 
the Privy Council case Abbott v. R [1976] 3 All ER 140 at 152. 
R V. Bowen [1996] 4 All ER 837 
The court cautiously ruled out a low intelligence quotient, emotional instability, 
unusually pliability, or vulnerability to pressure as relevant considerations: "[the] mere 
fact that the accused is more pliable, vulnerable, timid or susceptible to threats than a 
normal person are not characteristics [sic] with which it is legitimate to invest the 
reasonable or ordinary person for the purpose of considering the objective test," see R v. 
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undermine the yardstick of reasonableness by permitting the evaluation 
of a vast array of individual peculiarities which might affect the 
defendant's ability to withstand pressure, the admission of recognized 
mental illness as a relevant consideration suggests a more subjective 
approach In determining the reasonableness or othenwise of the 
defendants response to t h r e a t s . S o , the current position in relation to 
the second objective limb of the test is that the courts are required to 
differentiate between recognised conditions and unusual vulnerabilities, 
only the former being relevant to the assessment of reasonableness. 
Basic human frailties are permitted by the current formulation of the 
duress defence, but only to the extent that "the law demands that the 
human frailty be a personal reason why, in the circumstances, the actor 
could not act reasonably."^°^ There is some divergence of opinion as to 
whether the defence deserves the label of 'concession to human frailty', 
when in fact the current interpretation does not generally permit individual 
peculiarities, other than age and sex and recognised psychiatric 
conditions, to be considered. The concept of human frailty is an 
uncertain one: it may refer to a lack of ability, an inability to cope with 
extreme pressure and emotional conditions, or pre-existing mental illness 
or physical disabillty.^^° In the objective judgement of whether a person 
subject to serious threats responded with reasonable fortitude, to what 
extent should these human frailties infiltrate the evaluation? 
BoweA)[1996]4AIIER 837 at844. \n R v. Emery (^992) 14 Cr App R 394, the Court of 
Appeal somewhat controversially affirmed, obiter, that a recognised psychiatric 
syndrome or mental illness could be relevant to the assessment of reasonableness. In 
the instant case, the defendant was a woman suffering from post-traumatic stress 
disorder leading to a condition of learned helplessness. Many commentators have 
questioned the validity of an objective test which permits such considerations, see Keith 
JM Smith, 'Duress, and Steadfastness: In Pursuit of the Unintelligible' [1999] Criminal 
Law Review 363. 
The Court of Appeal have, however, excluded characteristics such as a grossly 
elevated neurotic state (R v. Hegarty [1994] Crim LR 353), unusual vulnerability to 
pressure (R v. Home [1994] Crim LR 584), and lack of firmness arising from sexual 
abuse (R v. Hirst (1995) 1 Cr App R 82). These cases are cited in Simester and 
Sullivan, Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine at 671. 
Reilly and Mikus, 'R v. Hibbert. The Theoretical Foundations of Duress' at 184. 
These ideas are adapted from Reilly and Mikus, Ibid, at 184. 
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On one view, the question of individual characteristics should be 
excluded from deliberation altogether. On this approach, the objective 
standard is strictly construed and makes no allowance for any human 
infirmity, no matter how significantly it might affect an actor's capacity to 
make alternative choices.^^^ According to Reilly and Mikus, on this 
approach, "[i]f objectively there was a safe avenue of escape, [the 
defendant] will be expected to take it regardless of her stupidity, illiteracy 
or inability to function effectively under extreme fear."^^^ An alternative 
view is that this strict approach should be tempered somewhat by 
allowing more extensive scrutiny of the notion of capacity in duress, 
thereby permitting certain frailties to filter into the objective test. On this 
approach, the jury should be permitted to take into account a broader 
range of characteristics of the defendant so the evaluation of the 
reasonableness of the defendant's response is more individualised. 
There may be some merit in Lord Simon's belief expounded in Lynch, 
that "the standard should be purely subjective," and that it is contrary to 
principle to require defendant's to attain a standard which is beyond their 
reach.^^"^ If an actor cannot display the same degree of steadfastness as 
an 'ordinary' person because of some recognised incapacity, then they 
should be judged by the standards of a person with the same incapacity. 
Reilly and Mikus extol the merits of this approach by acknowledging that, 
when subject to duress, the "fortitude, courage, intelligence and cunning 
of the actor might all be tested. Any predisposition to fear or to cowardice 
is likely to be fatal to the actor's ability to avoid the unlawful conduct."^^^ 
This appears to be similar to the approach adopted by the Law Commission, who 
suggest that the defendant's age and all other circumstances other than those which 
bear on the defendant's capacity to withstand duress will be relevant to the objective 
test, see Law Commission, Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide (Law Com No 304) 
(London: HMSO, 2006) at paragraph [7.38]-[7.44]. This diverges from the approach in 
Bowen as recognised psychiatric conditions would be excluded, apparently motivated by 
the need to be consistent with analogous defences such as provocation, see Attorney-
General for Jersey v. Ho//ey [2005] UKPC 23. 
Reilly and Mikus, 'R v. Hibbert: The Theoretical Foundations of Duress' at 185. 
See Reed, 'The Need for a New Anglo-American Approach to Duress' who contends, 
at 214 that by "adopting a subjectivist approach focusing on the peculiarities of the 
individual more logical and humane principles can be adopted." See also Law 
Commission Legislating the Criminal Code: Offences against the Person and General 
Principles (Law Com No 218) (London: HMSO, 1993) at 52. 
Per Lord Simon in Lynch v. DPP for Northern Ireland [1975] 1 All ER 913 at 931. 
Reilly and Mikus, 'R v. Hibbert. The Theoretical Foundations of Duress' at 186. 
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Rather than expressly identifying individual human frailties when 
calculating the objective test, perhaps frailties should be considered 
within the broader contextual circumstances, so that considerations of 
whether the action of the accused is reasonable do not hinge entirely on 
some identifiable condition or syndrome to excuse the defendant. 
Instead, weight can be attached to a broader range of surrounding 
circumstances which may help to explain why the reaction is deemed 
reasonable in that context. 
The extent to which human frailties can be taken into account within the 
objective test in duress is a question that remains unresolved in academic 
discussion, but it is clear that the law as stated in Bowen is the preferred 
judicial approach at the present time. It is acknowledged here that 
judgements about the reasonableness (or othenwise) of the defendants 
criminal conduct committed under duress can fluctuate depending on the 
frailty displayed by the person under duress. Reilly and Mikus explain: 
"At one extreme [the actor] might be temporarily incapacitated to 
the extent that they are compelled, in their emotional condition, to 
act illegally....Alternatively, actors might be temporarily incapable 
of correctly perceiving their options. For example, if preoccupied 
with the threat that is faced, an actor might simply not consider the 
available option of phoning the police. Finally, actors might be 
temporarily incapacitated to the extent that they are incapable of 
exercising an option that they do in fact perceive. For example, an 
actor might not be physically capable of dialling a telephone 
number to seek help because her hands are shaking in extreme 
fear."^^^ 
If the objective test remains pure in the sense that it is unwilling to excuse 
criminal conduct despite the presence of some incapacity which falls 
short of a recognised syndrome, then it undoubtedly offers uniformity and 
increased protection for the innocent bystander whose personal or 
proprietary interests are threatened. But there is one significant negative 
aspect of this approach: some defendants are held to a standard which 
they could never realistically achieve. A purely objective test would 
Ibid, at 189-190. 
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discriminate against defendants who lack a fair opportunity to resist the 
coercive t h r e a t s . I f the test is individualised by making broader 
concessions to human frailty, greater support Is offered to the defendant 
subjected to the threat. Importing an element of subjectivity into what 
remains essentially an objective test permits the jury more latitude in 
considering the personal circumstances of the accused in their evaluation 
of reasonableness and this approach is supported here. In the interests 
of consistency, however, the law must be clear about which individual 
incapacities can be taken into consideration, as the current distinction 
between recognised psychiatric conditions and non-relevant 
characteristics is a very difficult one to draw. 
The above summary of the qualifying and evaluative conditions of the 
duress plea serves to highlight the appropriately restricted scope of the 
defence. It is established that duress by threats should, subject to the 
fulfilment of these strict conditions, be available to excuse an actor for 
wrongfully violating the rights of an innocent bystander when threatened 
with death or serious injury by another agent. It is proposed that the actor 
should even avoid the attribution of criminal responsibility where the right 
to life of a non-threatening autonomous bystander is violated by their 
action, provided the prescribed requirements are satisfied. The final 
substantive issue to be addressed In this chapter is the scope of criminal 
responsibility of a defendant who sets back the interests of an innocent 
bystander in order to deflect a threat which emanates from circumstances 
rather than human agent. When compelled to intrude on the rights of an 
innocent bystander by virtue of a naturally occurring external threat the 
criminal law can absolve the actor of blame for the intrusion by appeal to 
one of two potential defences: necessity or duress of circumstances. The 
limits of each defence in relation to invasions on the protected domain of 
innocent non-threatening bystanders are considered in the following 
section. 
This point is emphasised by Wilson, Criminal Law Doctrine and Theory at 242. 
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5.6 Necessity, duress of circumstances and innocent bystanders 
If compelled to encroach on the protected domain of an Innocent 
bystander as a consequence of a naturally occurring threat, one may 
empathise with the pressure experienced by the defendant. Despite the 
compassion we may feel for the actor who commits a criminal offence 
under extreme circumstantial pressure, it would appear that "common-law 
judges have reacted...sternly and...discriminatingly to pleas of this 
kind."^^^ The courts are prepared to offer a defence for the infringement, 
but are, rightly, reluctant to extend the justification of necessity to 
exonerate the actor, instead developing the excuse of duress by 
circumstances which, it will be argued here, provides a more suitable 
ground of exculpation. 
5.6.1 Necessity and innocent bystanders 
The scope of the necessity defence has already been outlined in some 
detail in chapters three and four, but a recapitulation of the limitations of 
the defence may be useful for the present inquiry. Necessity has been 
acknowledged as a defence where the defendant is compelled by a moral 
imperative to commit what would ordinarily constitute a crime. Although 
the actor's conduct may impinge on the protected interests of an innocent 
bystander who is non-threatening, the necessity principle acknowledges 
that, all things considered, some objective value will be served by the 
intrusion. In this regard necessity offers a justification for the infringement 
which conveys the message that the actor is free from blame as the 
conduct is not morally wrongful; from an objective perspective there is no 
violation of the rights of the innocent person. It was established in section 
4.5.3 above that necessity may, in very rare circumstances, exculpate an 
actor who lethally intrudes on the rights of an innocent person. The 
availability of the defence in these circumstances is dependent on the 
Brudner, 'A Theory of Necessity' at 339. 
244 
innocent person being indirectly connected (or incidental) to the direct 
threat to the defendant's interests. Crucially, the defence will only be 
available in one-off crisis situations where the victim's interests cannot be 
honoured regardless of the action taken. This proposition should not 
have wider ramifications and it is strongly submitted here that necessity 
will not, as a general rule, justify interference with the rights of an 
innocent autonomous non-threatening bystander. Indeed, Simester and 
Sullivan suggest that, "[t]he most important constraint on the necessity 
plea is that it cannot be invoked in circumstances where D overrides a 
legal right of a non-consenting person whose conduct constitutes no 
threat to the person or property of others."^^^ But this general rule is 
sometimes c h a l l e n g e d . I n order to complete the account on the limits 
of necessity initiated in previous chapters, this final section will consider 
whether the defence can ever be extended beyond its narrow application 
in chapter three, to justify medical intervention in the best interest of the 
incompetent patient, and chapter four, to justify intrusions on the rights of 
innocent incidental threats in one-off crises where the innocent person's 
fate is already mapped out. 
It is suggested in chapter three that it might sometimes be acceptable to 
trump the personal or proprietary rights of innocent non-threatening 
bystanders in limited circumstances, where there is a moral imperative to 
act. For instance, if an emergency vehicle requires immediate access to 
a burning building and the only way to access it is to cross private 
property, the usurpation of the property interests of the owner (who is a 
non-threatening innocent bystander) is surely justified. Consider another 
example: two mountaineers embark on a climb and one suddenly falls 
and is seriously injured. It becomes clear that injured party is in 
desperate need of helicopter rescue. A fellow mountaineer passes by 
Simester and Sullivan, Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine at 718. 
As illustrated by the case of the Speluncean Explorers, Lon Fuller's moral and legal 
dilemma in which five men trapped in a cave killed one of their party in order that the 
remaining four survive until rescued. All five judges w/restled to find an adequate 
solution, and all five suggested different reasons for determining a justification for the 
otherwise illegal conduct. See Lon L Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers' 
(1949) 62 Harvard Law Review6^6. 
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with a mobile phone but refuses to hand it over. Can the passer-by be 
legitimately restrained in order to acquire use of the mobile? It would be 
unpalatable if the conduct of the defendant in such a case warranted the 
imposition of criminal liability. There are sound objective reasons for the 
action and the defendant acts on those reasons; consequently the action 
is not wrongful. Thus, there is arguably some scope for necessitous 
intervention where the minor proprietary and personal interests of 
innocent bystanders can be justifiably infringed, as it is uncontroversial to 
regard these minor intrusions as permissible on a balance of interests. 
The concrete rights vindicated clearly outweigh those infringed. 
In relation to rights of personhood, however, and in particular lethal 
intrusions on the right to life of the innocent bystander, the position is 
more contentious. One modern example which may help to clarify our 
thinking on the scope of the necessity defence is the destruction of the 
World Trade Centre in New York by hijacked aircraft. It now appears to 
be recognised by authoritative commentators if not yet by the courts, 
that it would be lawfuHo shoot down a hijacked plane, killing all of the 
innocent passengers and crew if this were the only way to prevent a 
much greater impending disaster. Yet the passengers on board are 
innocent non-threatening bystanders who are by no means causally 
connected to the production of the existing threat that consists of 
thousands of lives being at risk. Nor do they expose the threat to others 
and as bystanders they have a right not to be killed by the shooter.^^^ 
Ordinarily the necessity justification would not permit such a serious 
violation of rights, regardless of the overall net saving of lives that would 
be achieved by the action. The special circumstances of this case do, 
however, allow an appeal to the necessity justification: the passengers 
are destined to die irrespective of the defendant's intrusion. It was 
proposed in section 4.5.3 that this factor is immensely significant if 
necessity is ever to justify an infringement on the closely guarded 
Alexander, 'Lesser Evils: A Closer Look at the Paradigmatic Justification' at 613. 
See Ormerod, Smith & Hogan Criminal Law at 351-352. 
See the account offered by Thompson in 'Self-Defense' at 299. 
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personal interests of an innocent bystander. In the one-off ennergency 
where the lives of the innocent passengers cannot be honoured whatever 
course of action is taken, it seems, therefore, that a necessity plea is at 
least a possibility.^^'* 
A slightly altered version of the facts may change our view of the criminal 
responsibility of the actor. Imagine that an air traffic controller diverts a 
much greater catastrophe in terms of net lives lost by directing a plane full 
of entirely innocent non-threatening passengers to crash into a terrorist 
plane in order to prevent an impending crash into the tower. The 
passengers on the non-terrorist plane are innocent, non-threatening 
subjects who are not causally linked to the threat in any way and, 
crucially, who are not otherwise destined for death. If, in order for the real 
source of the threat to be eliminated, a number of innocents must be 
sacrificed to yield a net saving of lives, then some would argue that it is 
permissible for these innocents to be killed on the basis of pure 
consequentialism.^^^ On this view when it comes to crises situations 
where a choice is forced it is better to kill one innocent than several and 
this intrusion must be regarded as the 'lesser evil'. It is submitted here, 
however, that whatever welfare or greater good might be promoted in 
terms of lives saved, the rights and interests of non-threatening 
autonomous bystanders whose lives can be honoured if the defendant 
Other examples include the Trolley Problem, where I can switch my trolley onto one 
side of the track, and this will definitely kill one person who is trapped there; or I can 
switch it onto the other side where several innocent people, also trapped, will definitely 
be killed. Innocent life cannot be honoured whatever I do so I may be entitled to a 
necessity justification if I save five lives in a situation where innocent life cannot be 
honoured. See Judith J Thomson, 'Killing, Letting Die and the Trolley Problem' (1975-
1976) 59 The Monist 204. This is not a concession to unbridled consequentialism; it is 
merely that where innocent life cannot be honoured, numbers may take on a different 
significance than they ordinarily would in a situation where I have used another person 
as a means to an end. For further discussion see Horder, Self-Defence, Necessity and 
Duress: Understanding the Relationship'; Michael Bohlander, 'In Extremis - Hijacked 
Airplanes, 'Collateral Damage' and the Limits of the Criminal Law' [2006] Criminal Law 
Review 579. Bohlander suggests a different approach to the example cited in the text, 
claiming at 580 that "the outwardly cynical but logically proper approach is that necessity 
does not enter into it at all because there is no balancing exercise" in cases where the 
innocents are destined to die. 
Philippa Foot in 'The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect', 
reprinted in Virtues and Vices (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978) at 19-32; see also 
Bohlander, 'In Extremis - Hijacked Airplanes, 'Collateral Damage' and the Limits of the 
Criminal Law'. 
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refrains from action, would be significantly undermined if such an 
intrusion was justified by necessity. If numbers were the only concern of 
a balance of harms calculation the logical, and wholly unacceptable, 
extension of this premise is that a surgeon would be justified in forcing an 
autonomous patient into having a blood transfusion simply because there 
is an emergency whereby five dying patients require blood. It is asserted 
here that the necessity defence should never justify such a serious 
intrusion upon the rights of an innocent non-threatening person, who is 
merely being used as a means to an end, a r e s o u r c e . O n the facts 
described above, absent any other convincing reasons to the contrary, 
the necessity justification has no force, and any violation of the rights of 
innocent bystanders who are not otherwise designated for death would 
seriously undermine the principle of autonomy. 
The familiar case of Dudley and Stepliens provides us with a further 
opportunity to test the hypothesis set out in the previous paragraph that 
the necessity justification cannot be extended any further than the limited 
circumstances already defined. A group of sailors were shipwrecked in 
the South Atlantic Ocean; there was real hope of rescue within days but 
none of the sailors would survive to that point without food. They took the 
decision to kill the youngest and weakest member of the crew, a cabin 
boy, to provide them with necessary sustenance for the days ahead. In 
their subsequent trial, the defendant and his companions raised a 
defence of necessity, but the defence was famously and categorically 
rejected. Lord Coleridge noted that the victim was a "weak and 
unoffending boy," an autonomous individual constituting no threat to 
anyone. For that reason, necessity was not permitted as a defence to the 
murder of the cabin boy. 
The reasons for the denial of the defence are not entirely clear from the 
judgment. Commonly, the decision has been interpreted to deny the 
For a similar view see Alexander, 'Lesser Evils: A Closer Look at the Paradigmatic 
Justification' at 615. See also John Taurek, 'Should the Numbers Count? (1977) 6 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 299; and Weyma Lubbe, 'Taurek's No Worse Claim' 
(2008) 36 Philosophy and Public Affairs 69. 
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availability of the necessity justification to murder.^^'' But the reasoning in 
the case can be interpreted much more narrowly than this.^^^ It is 
suggested here that the defence was withheld not because necessity 
should never be a defence to intentional killing, but because the cabin 
boy was effectively an autonomous innocent bystander. He constituted 
no threat to the other sailors; nor did he exacerbate, expose, or trigger 
the threat, or bring it closer to being a reality. The cabin boy was simply 
used as a resource, a means to an end, and his death was simply a 
product of the sailors preferring their own lives over his. If the defendants 
were claiming that their action was justified on the basis that they were 
under pressure from the circumstances then it is understandable that the 
necessity defence was rejected. In accordance with the principles 
established here, the law would not permit a defendant to sacrifice the life 
of another wholly innocent bystander who was not otherwise designated 
for death merely to save their own. There would be no objective 
justification for the action and the intrusion on the protected domain of the 
innocent person would be wrongful. Equally, the necessity justification is 
denied if the killing of one innocent person would save the lives of many 
others in peril as this value judgment is arguably not for the defendant to 
make. So the necessity justification was nghtly denied in Dudley. 
Ashworth has suggested that allowing a legal justification where the 
victim has been chosen, as the cabin was, as opposed to pre-designated, 
"would be to regard the victim's rights as morally and politically less 
worthy than the rights of those protected by the action taken, which 
represents a clear violation of the principle of individual autonomy."^^^ It 
is submitted here that such manifest disregard for the rights and 
freedoms of another human being cannot be justified on the basis of 
necessity. 
It does not necessarily follow from the above analysis, however, that 
defendants such as the sailors in Dtvd/ey will always be held criminally 
Rv. Howe [1987] AC 417. 
Simester and Sullivan, Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine at 719-721 
229 - . - . . . . . . . . .y. _ . Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law at 153-154. 
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responsible for intruding on the rights of an innocent bystander. Despite 
the denial of a justification it is acknowledged below that we may 
sometimes be prepared to excuse a defendant who acts in circumstances 
of compulsion to deflect the harm onto an autonomous bystander by 
appealing to the defence of duress of circumstances.^^° The limits of this 
novel excusatory defence will be discussed in the following section. 
5.6.2 Duress of circumstances and innocent bystanders 
In recent years, the courts have acknowledged a defence of duress of 
circumstances, a sub-division of the traditional duress by threats defence 
where a defendant is compelled to commit an offence, of their own 
nomination, by threats of death or serious injury which emanate from 
circumstances.By paralleling these two defences, duress of 
circumstances adheres to ready-made jurisprudence^^^ in the form of 
long-established rules and principles that have emerged from cases of 
duress by t h r e a t s . P r i o r to the development of the defence over two 
decades ago, if a defendant committed a crime of his own selection in 
order to avoid harm, the most appropriate plea was that of necessity, not 
duress.^• '^^  The duress of circumstances defence "advances the law of 
excuse-based defences"^^^ in the sense that if a defendant commits a 
crime of their own selection and the necessity defence is unavailable due 
Indeed the Law Commission suggest that Dudley is, properly analysed, a duress of 
circumstances case and not one of necessity at all, see Law Commission, Murder, 
Manslaughter ar)d Infanticide (Law Com No 304) (London: HMSO, 2006) at paragraph 
[6.7]. 
See, for instance, R v. Cole [1994] Crim LR 582; and R v. >4//[1995] Crim LR 303. 
See also Simon Gardner 'Necessity's Newest Inventions' (1991) 11 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 125. The only apparent difference between the two defences is the 
source of the danger: if the threat emanates from another person, then duress by threats 
is the most appropriate defence; if the threat comes from any other source, the defence 
to be invoked is duress of circumstances. Otherwise the defences are analogous. 
Gardner, 'Necessity's Newest Inventions' at 126. 
See section 5.5 above for further consideration of the qualifying and evaluative 
conditions pertaining to the duress by threats defence; see also R v. Hasan [2005] 
UKHL22 at [21]. 
Horder, 'Self-Defence, Necessity and Duress: Understanding the Relationship' at 
143. 
Simester and Sullivan, Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine at 674. 
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to the absence of an objective justification, the defendant may be 
alternatively excused where previously no defence would have been 
a c c e s s i b l e . O f course, the defence is only available subject to the 
stringent limitations imposed on the traditional version of duress. 
The defence made its first tenuous appearance in the Court of Appeal in 
Willer,^^^ a reckless driving case where the accused mounted a pavement 
in order to avoid a threatening situation. The defendant's conviction was 
quashed on the basis that the duress defence had not been left to the 
jury's consideration. Although no explicit reference was made to a new 
defence, exculpating the actor on the grounds of duress involved a 
departure from the traditional formulation of the defence in that there was 
no nomination of the crime by another agent in the paradigm 'do this or 
else' scenario. Subsequent cases have recognised this defence 
expressly as 'duress of circumstances', an expansion of the conventional 
duress by threats d e f e n c e . I n Martin the Court of Appeal confirmed 
that, the defence can arise from: 
"other objective dangers threatening the accused or 
others. . .the defence is available only if, from an objective 
standpoint, the accused can be said to be acting reasonably and 
proportionately in order to avoid a threat of death or serious 
injury."239 
The introduction of a statutory defence of duress of circumstances has been mooted 
in the past by the Law Commission, see Legislating the Criminal Code: Offences against 
the Person and General Principles (Law Com No 218) (London: HMSO, 1993) and the 
Draft Criminal Law Bill, clause 26. Necessity is also recognised in this excusatory form 
in the German Penal Code, section 35. 
R v. Wilier {^9B6) 83 Cr App R 225. 
R V. Conway [1989] 0 8 290; and R v. Martin (Colin) [1989] 1 All ER 652. More 
recently in the case of R v. Jones [2005] Crim LR 122 the Court of Appeal held that the 
defence of duress of circumstances was not available where the defendants had 
intentionally caused damage to an air-force base in an effort to prevent the 'illegal' war 
waged to the detriment of Iraqi civilians. 
Per Simon Brown J in R v^ . Martin (Colin) [1989] 1 All ER 652 at 653. Although 
purporting to be an example of duress of circumstances, the decision in Martin could, 
however, be explained with reference to the established duress by threats defence. 
Serious physical harm was threatened, the threat was directed against the defendant's 
wife, and the crime was effectively chosen by the threat. It is at this juncture that Wilier 
and Conway part company with Martin, in the sense that the defendants in the former 
cases responded to the threat by committing a crime of their own selection. Although 
there is no acknowledgement in the cases that the law is being extended, there is a 
clear extension of the classic excuse of duress. Previously, if a defendant selected the 
crime to commit the justification defence of necessity would be invoked (or self-defence, 
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This confirms that the defence is, rightly, limited by the rules pertaining to 
the duress by threats defence. The original cases, however, all involved 
victimless crimes in which "no-one's rights or interests were 
o v e r r i d d e n . B u t it is submitted here that the duress of circumstances 
defence may be equally applicable where the actor violates the personal 
or proprietary rights of an innocent autonomous person when threatened 
by circumstances; and by analogy with duress by threats it is proposed 
that the defence should also be extended to intentional killing. 
Although duress of circumstances is often thought to be a subset of 
necessity, or an excusatory form of the defence,^"^^ it arguably does not 
reflect the true spirit of necessity which entails a moral imperative to act. 
Necessity has been defended here as a strongly justificatory defence to 
action which, all things considered, serves some objective value. 
Necessity cannot provide a justification for the type of violation in Dudley, 
or in the case of diverting a passenger plane which is otherwise safe from 
danger, as there is no objective value to be served by interfering with the 
rights of the innocent autonomous victims. A traditional example often 
used to highlight the limits of justification is that of two stranded sailors 
grappling over a plank of wood which will prevent only one of them from 
d r o w n i n g . I f one sailor snatches the plank from the other in order to 
save their own life at the expense of the other sailor who will now 
certainly die, there is no objective justification for such a serious violation 
of the rights of another.^'*^ There may, however, in this example and in all 
of those in which the necessity justification has been denied, be an 
where relevant). But the conduct is not justified or 'right' in these circumstances; it is 
conduct which should be excused and, for this reason, the extension of the excuse-
based defence seems fitting. For further consideration of the distinction between 
necessity and duress of circumstances, see R v. Pommell [1995] 2 Cr App R 607; 
Simester and Sullivan, Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine at 673-675; DW Elliot, 
'Necessity, Duress and Self-Defence' [1989] Criminal Law Review \ and Horder, 
'Self-Defence, Necessity and Duress: Understanding the Relationship'. 
Simester and Sullivan, Criminal law: Theory and Doctrine at 717. 
'^'^  Reed suggests that duress of circumstances is an excusatory form of necessity 
which the judges have allowed "in through the back-door by judicial sleight of hand," see 
Reed, 'The Need for a New Anglo-American Approach to Duress' at 221. 
^"^ Immanuel Kant, Metaphysics of Morals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991)at 235. 
^"^ Horder, Excusing Crime at 134. 
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excusatory defence of duress of circumstances available in the 
alternative. Duress of circumstances, like duress by threats, is "granted 
because of the strong fear and mental pressure out of which the actor 
acted. In the circumstances, his will was overborne by the fear, and he 
did not have a fair opportunity to avoid acting as he did."^'^'* Since duress 
of circumstances, by analogy with duress by threats, operates as an 
excuse rather than a justification the defendant may be exculpated for 
intruding on the rights of an innocent bystander if the action was taken to 
avoid some grave personal sacrifice.^''^ The action continues to be 
deemed wrongful but the actor is not criminally responsible on the basis 
that the compulsion to act stems from fear which may provide the actor 
with sound agent-specific reasons for the violation. Therefore, where the 
fear is created by circumstances and the intrusion cannot be justified by 
necessity, it may be by excused by duress of circumstances, subject to 
the same strict conditions which limit the scope of duress by threats. 
In summary, the duress of circumstances defence is currently, in principle 
at least, available as a defence to all crimes other than murder so it could 
excuse violations of the personal and proprietary rights of innocent 
autonomous persons provided that the actor had good personal reasons 
for so acting. By excluding murder from the ambit of the excuse, a 
defendant is required by law to make a personal sacrifice which involves 
a serious set back to his/her interests. It is suggested here, therefore, 
that the defence should logically be extended to lethal violations of the 
right to life of innocent bystanders. Such expansion would enable an 
actor to avoid criminal responsibility for conduct which is not morally 
blameworthy, but fails to satisfy the requirements of a justification 
defence as the action itself is objectively wrongful. For instance, if an 
aircraft full of innocent passengers is diverted to wipe out the threat of a 
terrorist aircraft in order to avert a greater disaster, although the intrusion 
on the rights of the innocent persons on board is not justifiable, it may be 
Kugler, 'Necessity as a justification in Re A (Children)' at 442. 
^"^ This point is emphasised by Horder, 'Self-Defence, Necessity and Duress: 
Understanding the Relationship' at 161. 
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excusable if we accept that the defendant acted under extreme pressure 
and that any reasonable person would have acted in the same way. 
There may also be an excuse for the stranded sailor who violates the 
rights of another in circumstances which would have otherwise involved 
overwhelming personal sacrifice. The availability of the defence in such 
circumstances is sufficiently restricted by the stringent requirements 
equally applicable to duress by threats cases to avoid unmeritorious 
claims, which will be excluded by the qualifying and evaluative conditions 
and the good sense of the jury. 
5.7 Conclusion to chapter five 
English law acknowledges that sometimes one can succumb to a threat, 
even if compliance wrongfully sets back the interests of an unoffending, 
autonomous bystander, without incurring criminal responsibility in respect 
of that violation. It is argued in this chapter that in the absence of 
objectively sound reasons for deflecting the harm onto an innocent 
person, the only plausible rationale for a defence is located within the 
bounds of excuse. The criminal law is prepared to excuse the actor 
because their capacity to make the right choice was impaired by the 
pressure exerted upon them. The excuse concedes that there is a 
wrongful violation of an innocent person's protected interests and that the 
conduct is harmful; but criminal responsibility is avoided on a moral 
evaluation of the defendant's capacity which takes into account the 
subjective reasons for the violation. The excuse acknowledges that when 
confronted by a choice between personal surrender and violating the 
rights of an innocent non-threatening bystander, there is an agent-specific 
reason for choosing the latter option. If the actor displays an appropriate 
level of steadfastness, s/he will be exculpated. In cases where there is a 
violation of a right of minor significance to the innocent bystander, for 
instance a minor violation of property rights, the excuse may be 
underpinned by strong personal justifications for the action. In cases 
where more fundamental rights of personhood are violated, such as the 
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right to life, the personal reasons offered by the defendant are inevitably 
vulnerable to challenge. 
Where an innocent bystander's hght to life is violated the defence of 
duress is currently excluded, regardless of the degree of pressure faced 
by the defendant. As discussed above, the decision in IHowe has 
prevented the extension of duress on the basis of a purported respect for 
the sanctity of life of innocent autonomous bystanders. This cautionary 
approach to the defence is perhaps understandable since arguably the 
most formidable challenge to the limits of criminal responsibility arises 
when the life of an innocent, non-threatening third party is at stake. 
However, an important corollary of the decision is that defendants are 
expected to withstand serious threats and sacrifice their own protected 
interests to spare the rights of another innocent person. The current law 
unreasonably demands heroism by maintaining that anyone who 
succumbs to a threat by encroaching on the domain of an innocent 
autonomous person will be criminally responsible, despite the absence of 
moral blameworthiness. The decision in Howe, which arguably consists 
of a superficial examination of the principles underpinning duress with no 
clear grounding in either policy or principle,^''^ has severely inhibited the 
appropriate development of the duress defence. It is submitted here that 
the unrealistic demands of the decision, which have permeated English 
criminal law ever since, should now be abandoned. 
Although the restriction on the availability of the defence in Howe is 
unsustainable, the defence is underpinned by numerous other conditions 
relating to, for instance, the immediacy and seriousness of the threat and 
the reasonableness of the defendant's belief and response. This strict 
set of limitations is defensible as a mechanism for weeding out fallacious 
claims in which more could reasonably have been expected of a 
defendant. In this moral evaluation of the defendant's conduct certain 
characteristics which affect the capacity to withstand threats may be 
^"^ Similar comments are made by Walters, 'Murder Under Duress and Judicial 
Decision-Making in the House of Lords' at 62. 
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considered, but otherwise the defendant is, rightly, held to the standard of 
the reasonable person. If the test was subjectivised further it would 
enable defendants to set their own standards of behaviour as a measure; 
and that would set no meaningful yardstick at all. 
It is suggested above that there is little scope to extend the necessity 
justification to intrusions on the rights of innocent bystanders where the 
threat occurs naturally, since the defence demands that there are good 
objective reasons for conduct. Necessity only provides a justification in 
the narrow circumstances explained in chapters three and four; that is, 
where an actor intrudes on the rights of an incapacitated person in their 
best interests; or where there is some compulsion to act created by a 
one-off crisis in which the innocent person's interests cannot be 
honoured. If an innocent person's rights can be honoured, however, 
there is little scope for a necessity defence in the form defended here. 
Alternatively, appeal may be made to the duress of circumstances 
defence which parallels the traditional version of duress and which would 
effectively excuse an actor who intrudes on the rights of an innocent 
bystander even in the absence of good moral reasons for acting. As long 
as the defendant can offer sound personal reasons for the violation, and 
their conduct satisfies an objective moral evaluation, criminal 
responsibility for the violation may be excused. By allowing both duress 
by threats and duress of circumstances to excuse violations of the 
personal and proprietary rights of an autonomous non-threatening 
person, the criminal law acknowledges the overwhelming coercion faced 
by the accused, whilst maintaining the wrongfulness of the response. As 
long as the defence continues to be limited by strict rules which demand 
a certain degree of steadfastness, there is little chance of it being used to 
excuse undeserving rights violations even if the defence was extended to 
murder. 
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Chapter Six: 
Conclusion 
6.1 Introduction to chapter six 
The overarching aim of this thesis, as outlined in chapter one, was to 
explore the boundaries of criminal responsibility for intentional 
infringements of the legally protected interests of innocent persons, 
where the defendant acted in circumstances of self-defence, necessity or 
duress. The scope of these defences was challenged with reference to 
intrusions on the rights of specific categories of innocent persons: first, 
innocent incompetent patients; next, innocent persons who pose a threat, 
unjust or incidental, to the interests of the defendant; and finally, innocent 
non-threatening bystanders caught up in a conflict of interests created by 
another human agent or by circumstances. It was suggested that in 
English law the precise scope of liability for deliberate setbacks to the 
interests of innocent persons is unclear and an attempt was made to 
provide a more consistent set of principles to govern the limits of criminal 
responsibility in this difficult area. This final section offers a synopsis of 
the findings of each chapter and concludes with some final remarks on 
the scope of criminal responsibility for intrusions on the rights of innocent 
persons. 
6.2 Principles of criminalisation 
It was established at the outset of the thesis that no meaningful decisions 
could be made regarding the criminality of actors who encroach on the 
rights and protected interests of innocent parties without reference to the 
broader moral limits of the criminal law. A general theme underpinning 
this thesis is the paramount importance of individual autonomy and 
human rights and in chapter two a commitment was made to a liberal 
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philosophy to guide the subsequent analysis. It was submitted that in a 
liberal society which promotes the primacy of individual autonomy and 
dictates minimal state interference, citizens should be free to make their 
own choices, wise or foolish. However, it was also conceded that 
autonomy cannot be boundless and that the criminal justice system may 
intervene to prohibit conduct which causes harm to others. It was 
suggested that criminal liability should not be imposed on an individual for 
immoral conduct or for acting in a way which the state views as 
detrimental to the individual's own welfare interests as these reasons are 
not, perse, sufficient to justify criminal law intervention. Moralistic and 
paternalistic approaches to criminalisation were, therefore, considered 
briefly and rejected as governing principles since they have the potential 
to significantly undermine individual autonomy. 
It was also established in chapter two that criminal responsibility should 
be reserved for those who cause harm to others and Feinberg's influential 
analysis of harm was considered. It was contended that, on this analysis, 
only conduct which wrongfully sets back or violates the rights of another 
autonomous person should be construed as harmful (and thus criminal) 
behaviour. It was suggested that the harm principle leaves considerable 
latitude for the operation of criminal law defences and that conduct which 
encroaches on the rights of another person is not harmful if the 
infringement can be justified or excused. Justification defences leave the 
prohibitory norm in tact as there is no objectively wrongful setback to the 
interests of another. Excuse defences also affect criminal responsibility, 
as they dictate that although an actor wrongfully violates the rights of 
another, they will not be held liable for their conduct. This is compatible 
with the harm principle which suggests that not all wrongful harm should 
necessarily be criminalised. It was contended that the seriousness of the 
harm should be weighed against the blameworthiness of the defendant 
and the consequences of criminalisation. Thus, the liberal philosophy 
and the harm principle provided a useful framework for the analysis of the 
role played by the defences of self-defence, necessity and duress in 
exculpating defendants of criminal liability. 
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6.3 Intruding on the rights of innocent persons in their 'best 
interests' 
Criminal responsibility for intrusions on the hghts of innocent persons in 
their best interests was considered in chapter three. It was argued at the 
outset that any encroachment on the rights of an autonomous individual 
who is non-threatening and competent will, on the harm principle 
articulated in chapter two, constitute a wrongful violation of rights. Each 
competent individual is the guardian of their own body and any intrusion 
upon it without consent will constitute a criminal offence. However, it was 
acknowledged that in medical cases the necessity principle is relatively 
well established to exculpate a doctor who administers medical treatment 
to an incompetent patient, where that intervention would othenwise 
constitute a very serious intrusion. 
Necessity was located in the broader theory of criminal defences in which 
justifications for action are distinguished from excuses. This classification 
was adopted in chapter two as a convenient scheme for analysing the 
defences under consideration, and the potential ramifications of the 
distinction were addressed. Necessity was classified as a strong 
justification for interfering with the rights of an innocent incompetent 
person, provided the intrusion is necessary to secure the best interests of 
the patient. It was further contended that the defence operates as a 
rights-based justification for action taken as a matter of necessity to 
preserve the life, health or well being of another who is unable to give 
valid consent. Provided the defendant acts to vindicate a superior right 
(or best interest) of the patient they will avoid criminal responsibility on 
the basis that their action did not cause a wrongful setback to interests 
and was consequently not harmful. The evaluation of best interests has 
been the source of much controversy, with very broad considerations 
beyond the physical health of the patient being weighed in the balance. 
The potential for the best interests test to be influenced by paternalistic 
motivations was noted with reference to some particularly troubling cases 
involving organ donation, non-therapeutic sterilisation and detention. It 
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was argued that in order for cases involving a best interests evaluation to 
remain free f rom human rights chal lenges, a more careful consideration 
of the concrete rights of the innocent person is required. It was 
suggested that the courtroom is the most appropriate forum in which the 
hierarchy of rights should be del iberated in a more principled and 
consistent manner. 
6.4 Intruding on the rights of innocent threats 
The scope of criminal responsibil ity for intruding on the rights of innocent 
unjust threats was considered in chapter four. It was argued that if an 
innocent person poses an unjust threat to the protected interests of the 
actor, that threat can be justif iably repelled or warded off by encroaching 
on the (otherwise) protected domain of the threatening person. The 
innocent threats considered fell into two distinct categories: innocent 
unjust threats and innocent incidental threats. 
The first category accommodates morally innocent but active unjust 
threats, such as the insane, the automaton, the child and the mistaken 
attacker. It also comprises unoffending passive unjust threats, such as 
the dangling mountaineer who directly threatens the interests of the 
defendant but is not positively aggressing at all. It was submitted that the 
defendant has a legal permission to exercise self-defensive force to 
protect their own interests or those of another, whether the threat is 
culpable or innocent, active or passive. Self-defence was categorised as 
a justif icatory defence on account of the fact that the threat to the 
defendant 's interests is objectively unjust, providing the actor with a good 
agent-neutral reason for forcibly warding off the threat. In searching for a 
defensible phi losophical explanation of the self-defence justif ication it was 
observed that many accounts are too restrictive. Numerous theories, 
including those appeal ing to consequential ist principles, the personal 
partiality of the actor and the doctrine of double effect, were considered 
and rejected for arbitrarily limiting the defence to either culpable threats or 
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culpable and innocent active threats. A r ights-based phi losophy was 
defended as the nnost plausible account, since it permits the use of 
defensive force to be used against innocent passive threats, as well as 
culpable and innocent active threats. The permission derives its 
justif icatory force f rom the fact that any unjust threat, culpable or 
innocent, active or passive, forfeits their rights for the duration of the 
threat. The defendant has a legal permission to intrude on the protected 
domain of the aggressor to secure her/his own autonomy and the conduct 
cannot be construed as harmful since there is no wrongful setback to the 
interests of the threatening person. Despite the defence having a broad 
philosophical base, it was acknowledged that in order to benefit f rom it a 
number of str ingent condit ions must be fulfi l led. The use of force in self-
defence is limited by a broad, flexible test of reasonableness which, in the 
interests of justice, incorporates considerat ions of necessity and 
proportionality, and the scope of these condit ions was considered in 
some detail. 
Also considered in chapter four was the scope of criminal responsibil ity 
where an actor encroaches on the protected domain of an innocent 
incidental (contingent) tiireat. This category of innocent person is not the 
direct source of a threat but exposes a threat to themselves and others. 
Examples included the frozen man on the ladder blocking the route to 
safety of his fel low passengers. An intrusion on the rights of the innocent 
contingent threat is intuitively beyond the scope of criminalisation as it 
does not cause a wrongful setback to the interests of the innocent 
person. However, it was established that the self-defence justif ication is 
inapplicable since the innocent person is not, in themselves, a direct 
unjust threat to the defendant 's interests. Alternatively, it was proposed 
that the necessity justif ication may exonerate the actor if, all things 
considered, there is an overriding reason, a strong justi f ication, for the 
infr ingement. The moral imperative to act derives f rom the fact that the 
interests of the innocent person could not be honoured since they were 
not only exposing the threat to others, but also to themselves. For 
instance, the frozen man on the ladder was dest ined to die whatever the 
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actor did so there was an overriding reason to encroach on his autonomy. 
Had the man been perched sufficiently highly on the ladder that his life 
would have been saved, the necessity phnciple could not justify the 
interference with his protected interests. So It was suggested that the 
necessity justif ication could, in principle, even be a defence to intentional 
killing in these carefully limited circumstances. 
6.5 Intruding on the rights of innocent bystanders 
The scope of criminal responsibil ity for intrusions on the rights of innocent 
bystanders was considered in chapter five. A defendant may claim they 
are not criminally responsible for intruding on the personal or proprietary 
rights of an innocent bystander when they are faced with a threat of death 
or serious bodily harm to themselves or someone with whom they are 
connected. Where the threats emanate f rom a human agent, it was 
establ ished that the deflection of the harm onto an innocent bystander 
could not be justif ied, even where the harm caused was far less than that 
threatened, as there Is no objectively justif ied reason for the act ion. 
Instead, It was establ ished that the presence of duress provides an 
excusatory defence which concedes that the shifting of harm onto an 
innocent bystander Is wrongful , but al lows the personal reasons of the 
actor to be evaluated. The provision of an excuse suggests that we do 
not blame the actor because they lacked a fair opportunity to resist the 
criminal Intrusion on account of the serious threats endured. The 
exclusion of the duress defence to intentional killing was criticised as too 
demanding and based on insubstantial arguments, and it was proposed 
that the duress excuse should logically be extended to murder charges. 
Mindful that caution must be exercised to protect the autonomy of the 
innocent bystander, it was establ ished that the defence Is restricted by 
appropriately rigorous qualifying and evaluative condit ions. Significantly, 
the threats must be of immediate harm and perhaps most importantly the 
defendant must have reasonably believed in the existence of the 
threatening circumstances and must have responded as a reasonable 
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person would in the circumstances. Al though sonne characterist ics of the 
accused may be considered when evaluating the reasonableness of the 
response, the defendant is held to an objective standard so the potential 
for unmeritorious claims is minimal. 
Chapter f ive also assessed the scope of criminal responsibil ity for 
intrusions on the interests of innocent autonomous bystanders where 
threats arise from circumstances. It was argued that the necessity 
defence could not justify such violations because any serious setback to 
an innocent non-threatening competent individual's interests would be 
wrongful , in accordance with liberal principles which fiercely guard 
autonomy. Necessity will only operate as a residual defence in the 
carefully defined circumstances described in chapters three and four: 
where infr ingements are in the best interests of an innocent incompetent 
person; and where an innocent person's interests cannot be honoured 
regardless of the defendant 's act ion. If, however, the circumstances 
dictate that any reasonable person would have been compel led to protect 
their own autonomy (or that of another person) by violating the rights of 
an unoffending person, the actor may still avoid criminal responsibil i ty for 
the intrusion. Duress of c ircumstances, an excusatory defence governed 
by the strict rules dictating duress, could exculpate an accountable agent 
who commit ted an unjustified offence under extraordinari ly coercive 
circumstances. Subject to the fulf i lment of the limiting condit ions, such a 
defendant would not merit convict ion or punishment. 
6.6 Criminal responsibility for intrusions on the rights of innocent 
persons 
An exhaustive analysis of the scope of criminal liability for intrusions on 
the rights of innocent persons has been undertaken. It is hoped that the 
thesis i l luminates some guiding principles regarding the scope of the 
related defences of self-defence, necessity and duress which show 
appropriate respect for the individual autonomy of both defendant and 
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victim. Individuals should be free to define their lives, subject to criminal 
laws that prohibit conduct which is harmful and causes wrongful setbacks 
to the interests of others. However, there may somet imes be morally 
relevant reasons for b lame and punishment to be avoided. It is hoped 
that this thesis has identified which reasons are, and which are not, 
sufficient to avoid the attribution of blame for infringing the rights of 
innocent persons. To summarise, criminal responsibil i ty may be 
justif iably avoided for intrusions on the rights of innocent incompetent 
persons in their best interests, innocent unjust threats (active and 
passive) and innocent incidental threats where the rights of the individual 
cannot be honoured regardless of the defendant 's act ion. Irrespective of 
the degree of coercion, legal permission is not extended to interference 
with the rights of innocent autonomous persons who are competent and 
non-threatening. However, criminal responsibility for such intrusion may 
still be avoided if the pressure bearing down on the defendant is so great 
that any reasonable person would have acted likewise. 
264 
Bibliography 
Alexander, Larry, 'Harm, Offense and Morality' (1994) 7 Canadian 
Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 199 
Alexander, Larry, 'Justif ication and Innocent Aggressors ' (1987) 33 
Wayne Law Review 1177 
Alexander, Larry, 'Lesser Evils: A Closer Look at the Paradigmatic 
Justif ication' (2005) 24 Law and Philosophy 611 
Alldridge, Peter, 'Duress, Duress of Circumstances and Necessity' (1989) 
139 New Law Journal 911 
Alldridge, Peter, 'Murder Under Duress - Await ing the Final Word ' (1986) 
50 Journal of Criminal Law 257 
Al len, Michael J. Elliott & Wood's Cases and Materials on Criminal Law 
8'" edition (London: Sweet & Maxwel l , 2001) 
Amer ican Law Institute, Model Penal Code and Commentaries Part I 
(Philadelphia, 1985) 
Anscombe, Gertrude EM. 'War and Murder', Anscombe, Gertrude EM, 
Ethics, Religion and Politics, Collected Philosophical Papers 
(Minneapol is: University of Minnesota Press, 1981) 
Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Theologica, (London: Blackfriars, 1975) 
Ashworth, Andrew, 'Criminal Liability in a Medical Context: The Treatment 
of Good Intentions,' in Simester, Andrew P and Smith A T H (eds.). 
Harm and Culpability {Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) 
Ashworth, Andrew and Mitchell, Barry, (eds.) Rethinking English 
Homicide Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 
Ashworth, Andrew, 'Case Comment: Andronicou and Constantinou v. 
Cyprus' [1998] Criminal Law Review 823 
Ashworth, Andrew, 'Self-Defence and the Right to Life' (1975) 34 
Cambridge Law Journal 282 
Ashworth, Andrew, Principles of Criminal Law 2"'^ edition (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995) 
Ashworth, Andrew, Principles of Criminal Law 3'^ edit ion (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999) 
Ayyildiz, El isabeth, 'When Battered Woman 's Syndrome Does Not Go Far 
Enough: The Battered Woman as Vigi lante' (1995) 4 American 
University Journal of Gender and the Law 141 
Bailey-Harris, Rebecca, 'Pregnancy, Autonomy and Refusal of Medical 
Treatment ' (1998) 114 Law Quarterly Review 550 
Bartlett, Peter, 'A Matter of Necessity? Enforced Treatment under the 
Mental Health Act' (2007) 15 Medical Law Review 86 
Bartlett, Peter, 'The Test of Compulsion in Mental Health Law: Capacity, 
Therapeut ic Benefit and Dangerousness as Possible Criteria' 
(2003) 11 Medical Law Review 326 
Bayles, Michael, 'Character, Purpose and Criminal Responsibil i ty' (1982) 
1 Law and Philosophy 1 
Beale, Joseph H. 'Homicide in Self-Defense' (1903) 3 Columbia Law 
Review 526 
Bennett, GJ and Hogan, Brian, 'Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure and 
Sentencing' (1987) All ER Annual Review 75 
265 
Bennett, Jonathan, Ttie Act Itself {Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press, 1995) 
Berman, Mitchell N, 'Justif ication and Excuse, Law and Morality' (2003) 
53 Duke Law Journal 1 
Blackstone, Wi l l iam, Commentaries on the Laws of England 4 volumes 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1765) 
Bohlander, Michael, 'Of Shipwrecked Sailors, Unborn Chi ldren, Conjoined 
Twins and Hijacked Airplanes: Taking Human Life and the 
Defence of Necessity' (2006) 70 Journal of Criminal Law 147 
Bohlander, Michael, 'In Extremis - Hijacked Airplanes, 'Collateral 
Damage' and the Limits of the Criminal Law' [2006] Criminal Law 
Review 579 
Botterell, Andrew, 'In Defence of Infringement' (2008) 27 Law and 
Philosophy 269 
Brandt, Richard B. 'Conscience (Rule) Util itarianism and the Criminal 
Law' (1995) 14 Law and Philosophy 65 
British Medical Associat ion, Withholding and Withdrawing Life-Prolonging 
Medical Treatment: Guidance for Decision Making 2'"^ edit ion 
(British Medical Associat ion, 2001) 
Brown, Bernard J. 'Self-Defence in Homicide: From Strict Liability to 
Complete Exculpation' (1958) Criminal Law Review 583 
Brudner, A lan, 'A Theory of Necessity' (1987) 7 Oxford Joumal of Legal 
Studies 338 
Buller, Tom, 'Competence and Risk-Relativity' (2001) 15 Bioethics 93 
Chan, Winnie and Simester, Andrew P. 'Duress, Necessity: How Many 
Defences?' (2005) 16 King's College Law Journal 121 
Christopher, Russell L. 'Mistake of Fact in the Object ive Theory of 
Justif ication: Do Two Rights Make Two Wrongs Make Two 
Rights?' (1994) 85 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 295 
Christopher, Russell L. 'Unknowing Justif ication and the Logical 
Necessity of the Dadson Principle in Self-Defence' (1995) 15 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 229 
Clarkson, Chris MV. 'Necessary Act ion: A New Defence' [2004] Criminal 
Law Review 81 
Cohen, Jane M. 'Regimes of Private Tyranny: Wha t Do They Mean to 
Morality and for the Criminal Law?' (1996) 57 University of 
Pittsburgh Law Review 757 
Colvin, Eric, 'Exculpatory Defences in Criminal Law', (1990) 10 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 381 
Colvin, Eric, Principles of Criminal Law, 2"^ edit ion (Toronto: Thomson 
Carswell , 1991) 
Criminal Law Revision Commit tee, Offences against the Person (Cmnd 
7844) (London: Home Office, 1980) 
Cross, Rupert, 'Murder under Duress' (1978) 28 University of Toronto 
Law Journal 369 
Davis, Nancy, 'Abort ion and Self-Defense' (1984) 13 Philosophy & Public 
Affairs 171 
Kates, Don B and Enberg, NJ. 'Deadly Force Self-Defense against Rape' 
(1982) 15 University of California Davis Law Review 873 
De Gama, Katherine, 'A Brave New Wor ld? Rights Discourse and the 
Politics of Reproductive Autonomy' in Bottomley, Anne and 
266 
Conaghan, Joanne, (eds.) Feminist Theory and Legal Strategy 
(Oxford: Blackwell , 1993) 
Dell, Susanne, Murder into Manslaughter: The Diminished Responsibility 
Defence in Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984) 
Dennis, Ian, 'A Pointless Exercise' [2008] 7 Criminal Law Review bOil 
Dennis, Ian, 'Duress, Murder and Criminal Responsibil i ty' (1980) 106 Law 
Quarterly Review 208 
Department of Health, Protecting the Vulnerable: The Bournewood 
Consultation (London: Department of Health, 2006) 
Department of Health, Bournewood Briefing Sheet (London: Department 
of Health, 2006) 
Devlin, Patrick, The Enforcement of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1965) 
Diamond, Gregory A. T o Have But Not To Hold: Can 'Resistance Against 
Kidnapping' Justify Lethal Self-Defense Against Incapacitated 
Batterers?' (2002) 102 Columbia Law Review 729 
Harris, DJ, O'Boyle, Michael, and Warbrick, Col in, Law of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (London: Buttenworths, 1998) 
Draper, Heather, 'Anorexia Nervosa and Respecting a Refusal of Life-
Prolonging Therapy: A Limited Justif ication' (2000) 14 Bioethics 
120 
Draper, Heather, 'Women, Reproductive Responsibil i t ies and Forced 
Caesareans' (1996) 22 Journal of Medical Ethics 327 
Dressier, Joshua, 'Battered W o m e n Who Kill Their Sleeping Tormentors: 
Reflections on Maintaining Respect for Human Life while Killing 
Moral Monsters' in Shute, Stephen and Simester, Andrew P. (eds.) 
Criminal Law Theory: Doctrines of the General Part (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002) 
Dressier, Joshua, 'Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse 
and Searching for its Proper Limits' (1989) 62 Southern California 
Law Review 1331 
Dressier, Joshua, 'New Thoughts about the Concept of Justif ication in the 
Criminal Law: A Critique of Fletcher's Thinking and Re-thinking' 
(1984) 32 University College of Los Angeles Law Review 61 
Dressier, Joshua, 'Reflections on Excusing Wrongdoers : Moral Theory, 
New Excuses and the Model Penal Code' (1988) 19 Rutgers Law 
Journal 671 
Dressier, Joshua, 'Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defence in Search of a 
Rationale' (1982) 73 Journal of Chminal Law and Criminology 421 
Duff, Anthony and Green, Stuart P. (eds.) Defining Crimes: Essays on the 
Criminal Law's Special Part (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005) 
Duff, Anthony, 'Choice, Character and Criminal Liability' (1993) 12 Law 
and Philosophy 345 
Duff, Anthony, 'Harms and Wrongs ' (2001) 5 Buffalo Criminal Law 
Review 13 
Duff, Anthony, 'Rule-Violations and Wrongdoings ' in Shute, Stephen and 
Simester, Andrew P. (eds.) Criminal Law Theory (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002) 
Duff, Anthony, Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability (Oxford: Basil 
267 
Blackwell , 1990) 
Durkheim, Emile, The Division of Labour in Society (London: Macmil lan, 
1984) 
Dworkin, Gerald, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy {Cambridge: 
Cambr idge University Press, 1988) 
Dworkin, Ronald, 'Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals' (1965-66) 
75 Yale Law Journal 986 
Dworkin, Ronald, Life's Dominion: An Argument about Abortion and 
Euthanasia {London: HarperCol l ins , 1993) 
Dworkin, Ronald, Taking Rights Seriously {London: Duckworth, 1977) 
East, Edward H. Pleas of the Crown (Oxford: Professional Books Limited, 
1987) 
Elliott, Catherine 'Patients Doubtfully Capable or Incapable of Consent ' in 
Kuhse, Helga & Singer, Peter (eds.) A Companion to Bioethics 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1998) 
Elliot, DW, 'Necessity, Duress and Self-Defence' [1989] Criminal Law 
Review 6^^ 
Eser, Albin, 'Justif ication and Excuse' (1976) 24 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 621 
Estrich, Susan, 'Defending W o m e n ' (1990) 88 Michigan Law Review 
1430 
Ewing, Charles P. 'Psychological Self-Defence: A Proposed Justif ication 
for Battered W o m e n who Kill' (1990) 14 Law and Human 
Behaviour 579 
Feinberg, Joel, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law (New York: Oxford 
University Press) vo lume 1, Harm to Others (1984); vo lume 2, 
Offense to Others (1985); volume 3, Harm to Se/f (1986); vo lume 
4, Harmless Wrongdoing (1988) 
Feinberg, Joel , 'Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life' 
(1978) 7 Philosophy and Public Affairs 93 
Fennel!, Phillip, 'Doctor Knows Best? Therapeutic Detention under 
Common Law, the Mental Health Act, and the European 
Convent ion ' (1998) 6 Medical Law Review 322 
Fennell, Phillip, ' Inscribing Paternalism in the Law: Consent to Treatment 
and Mental Disorder' (1990) 17 Journal of Law and Society 29 
Finkelstein, Claire, 'Self-Defense as a Rational Excuse' (1996) 57 
University of Pittsburgh Law Review 621 
Finnis, John, Boyle, Joseph and Grisez, Germain, Nuclear Deterrence, 
Morality and Realism {Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987) 
Fletcher, George P. 'Proportionality and the Psychotic Aggressor: A 
Vignette in Comparat ive Criminal Theory' (1973) 8 Israel Law 
Review 367 
Fletcher, George P. 'The Individualisation of Excusing Condit ions' (1974) 
47 Southern California Law Review 1269 
Fletcher, George P. 'The Right and the Reasonable ' (1985) 98 Harvard 
Law Review 949 
Fletcher, George P. 'The Right to Life' (1980) 63 The Monist 135 
Fletcher, George P. Rethinking Criminal Law {Boston: Little Brown, 1978) 
Foot, Phil ippa , Virtues and Vices, and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978) 
268 
Fortin, Jane ES. 'Legal Protection for the Unborn Chi ld ' (1988) 51 Modern 
Law Review 54 
Fox, Marie and McHale, Jean, 'In Whose Best Interests?' (1996) 60 
Modern Law Review 700 
Fried, Charles, Right and Wrong (Cambridge, Mass; Harvard University 
Press, 1978) 
Fuller, Lon L. 'The Case of the Speluncean Explorers' (1949) 62 Harvard 
Law Review 6^6 
Gallagher, Janet, 'Prenatal Invasions and Interventions: What 's Wrong 
with Fetal Rights?' (1987) 10 Harvard Women's Law Journals 
Gardner, John and Shute, Stephen, 'The Wrongness of Rape', in 
Horder, Jeremy (ed.) Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence 4'^ edit ion 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000) 
Gardner, John, 'Justif ication and Reasons' in Simester, Andrew P and 
Smith, ATH (eds.), Hanri and Culpability {Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1996) 
Gardner, John, 'The Gist of Excuses' (1998) 1 Buffalo Criminal Law 
Review 575 
Gardner, S imon, 'Direct Act ion and the Defence of Necessity' [2005] 
Criminal Law Review 371 
Gardner, Simon, 'Duress in At tempted Murder' (1991) 107 Law Quarterly 
Review 389 
Gardner, Simon 'Necessity's Newest Inventions' (1991) 11 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 125 
Gavison, Ruth, (ed.). Issues in Contemporary Legal Philosophy {Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1987) 
Gearty, Connor, 'Hoive to be a Hero' (1987) 46 Cambridge Law Joumal 
203 
Gil lon, Raanan, 'On Sterilising Severely Mentally Handicapped People' 
(1987) 13 Journal of Medical Ethics 59 
Glazebrook, Peter R. 'The Necessity Plea in English Criminal Law' (1972) 
30 Cambridge Law Journal 87 
Glick, Sharon, 'The Morality of Coercion' (2000) 26 Journal of Medical 
Ethics 393 
Gordon, GH. The Criminal Law of Scotland 2""^ edit ion (Edinburgh: W 
Green, 1978) 
Gorr, Michael, 'Private Defence' (1990) 9 Law and Philosophy 2A^ 
Greenawalt , Kent, 'Distinguishing Justif ications from Excuses' (1986) 49 
Law and Contemporary Problems 89 
Greenawalt , Kent, 'The Perplexing Borders of Justif ication and Excuse' 
(1984) 84 Columbia Law Review 1897 
Greenawalt , Kent, Conflicts of Law and Morality (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1989) 
Griff in, James, Value Judgement: Improving Our Ethical Beliefs (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1996) 
Grisez, Germain and Shaw, Russell , Beyond the New Morality (Notre 
Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1974) 
Grisez, Germain, 'Towards a Consistent Natural Law Ethic of Kill ing' 
(1970) 15 American Journal of Jurisprudence 64 
Grisso, Thomas and Appe lbaum, Paul S. Assessing Competence to 
269 
Consent to Treatment: A Guide to Physicians and Other Health 
Officials (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) 
Gross, Hyman, A Theory of Criminal Justice (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1979) 
Gunn, Michael et al., 'Decision-Making Capacity' (1999) 7 Medical Law 
Review 269 
Gunn, Michael, 'The Meaning of Incapacity' (1994) 2 Medical Law Review 
8 
Gur-Arye, Mir iam, 'Should the Criminal Law Distinguish between 
Necessity as a Justif ication and Necessity as an Excuse?' (1986) 
102 Law Quarterly Review 71 
Hale, Matthew, Pleas of the Crown (London: Professional Books Ltd., 
1971) 
Hall, Jerome, 'Comment on Justif ication and Excuse' (1976) 24 American 
Journal of Comparative Law 638 
Hall, Jerome, General Principles of Criminal Law, 2""^ edit ion 
(Indianapolis: New York, 1960) 
Harrison, Beverly W. Our Right to Choose: Towards a New Ethic of 
Abortion (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983) 
Hart, Henry M, T h e A ims of the Criminal Law' (1958) 23 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 401 
Hart, Herbert LA and Honore, Tony, Causation in the Law 2"^ edit ion 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985) 
Hart, Herbert LA. Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1988) 
Hart, Herbert, Punishment and Responsibility {Oxiord: Oxford University 
Press, 1968) 
Hawkins, Wi l l iam, A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown 3'^ ^ edit ion 
(London: E and R Nutt and R Gosl ing, 1739) 
Hegel, George W F . Philosophy of Right {Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1962) 
Hewitt, David, 'Closing the Boumewood Gap?' (2006) 156 New Law 
Journal 1234 
Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan (London: Pelican, 1968) 
Hodson, John D. 'Nozick, Libertarianlsm, and Rights' (1977) 19 Arizona 
Law Review 212 
Hohfeld, Wesley N. Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1919) 
Honore, Tony, 'A Theory of Coercion' (1990) 10 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 94 
Horder, Jeremy, 'Killing the Passive Abuser: A Theoret ical Defence' in 
Shute, Stephen and Simester, Andrew P. Criminal Law Theory: 
Doctrines of the General Part (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002) 
Horder, Jeremy, 'Occupying the Moral High Ground? The Law 
Commiss ion on Duress' [1994] Criminal Law Review 334 
Horder, Jeremy, 'Redrawing the Boundaries of Self-Defence' (1995) 58 
Modern Law Review 431 
Horder, Jeremy, 'Self-Defence, Necessity and Duress: Understanding the 
270 
Relationship' (1998) 11 Canadian Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudence 143 
Horder, Jeremy, Excusing Crime (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) 
Horder, Jeremy, Provocation and Responsibility {Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1992) 
Horowitz, Donald L. 'Justification and Excuse in the Program of the 
Criminal Law' (1986) 49 Law and Contemporary Problems 109 
Huigens, Kyron, 'Duress is not a Justif ication' (2004) 2 Ohio Journal of 
Criminal Law 303 
Husak, Douglas, 'Limitations on Criminalisation and the General Part of 
the Criminal Law' in Shute, Stephen and Simester, Andrew P. 
(eds.) Criminal Law Theory: Doctrines of the General Part (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002) 
Husak, Douglas, 'The Complete Guide to Self-Defence' (1996) 15 Law 
and Philosophy 399 
Husak, Douglas, 'The Nature and Justifiability of Nonconsummate 
Offences' (1995) 37 Arizona Law Review ^5^ 
Jackson, Emily, Medical Law: Text, Cases & Materials (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006) 
Turner, J W Cecil, Kenny's Outlines of Criminal Law, 19'^ ^ edit ion 
(Cambridge: Cambr idge University Press, 1966) 
Kadish, Sanford H. 'Excusing Crime' (1987) 75 California Law Review 
257 
Kadish, Sanford H. 'Justif ication and Excuse in the Judaic and Common 
Law' (1977) 52 New York University Law Review 624 
Kadish, Sanford H. 'Respect for Life and Regard for Rights in Criminal 
Law' (1976) 64 California Law Review 871 
Kamm, Frances, 'Insanity Defence, Innocent Threats and Limited 
Alternatives' (1987) 6 Chminal Justice Ethics 61 
Kant, Immanuel, The Metaphysics of Morals (Cambridge: Cambr idge 
University Press, 1991) 
Kasachkoff, Tziporah, 'Comment and Reply to Suzanne Uniacke's 'A 
Response to Two Crit ics" (2000) 19 Law and Philosophy 635 
Kasachkoff, Tziporah, 'Killing in Self-Defence: an Unquest ionable or 
Problematic Defence? (1998) 17 Law and Philosophy 509 
Kennedy, Ian and Grubb, Andrew, Principles of Medical Law l^'^ ed. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) 
Kennedy, Ian, Treat Me Right: Essays in Medical Law and Ethics (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1991) 
Kessler-Ferzan, Kimberly, 'Justifying Self-Defense' (2005) 24 Law and 
Philosophy 711 
Kewley, Ada, 'Murder and the Availabil ity of the Defence of Duress in the 
Criminal Law' (1993) 57 Journal of Criminal Law 298 
Keywood, Kirsty, 'Detaining Mentally Disordered Patients Lacking 
Capacity: The Arbitrariness of Informal Detention and the Common 
Law Doctrine of Necessity' (2005) 13 Medical Law Review 108 
Kleinig, John, 'Criminally Harming Others' (1986) 5 Crime, Justice & 
Ethics 3 
Kolder, Veronica EB, Gallagher, Janet and Parsons, Michael T. 'Court 
271 
Ordered Obstetrical Interventions' (1987) 316 New England 
Journal of Medicine 1192 
Kremnitzer, Mordechai, 'Proportionality and the Psychotic Aggressor: 
Another View' (1983) 18 Israel Law Review 178 
Kugler, Itzhak, 'Necessity as a Justif ication in Re A (Children)' (2004) 68 
Journal of Criminal Law 440 
Kuhse, Helga & Singer, Peter, (eds.) A Companion to Bioethics (Oxford: 
Blackwell , 1998) 
Kymlicka, Wil l , Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1989) 
Lacey, Nicola, 'Partial Defences to Homicide: Quest ions of Power and 
Principle in Imperfect and Less Imperfect Wor lds ' , in Ashwor th , 
Andrew, Rethinking English Homicide Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2000) 
Lacey, Nicola, State Punishment (London: Routledge, 1988) 
Law Commiss ion, A Criminal Code for England and Wales (Law Com No 
177) (London: HMSO, 1989) 
Law Commiss ion A New Homicide Act for England and Wales? (Law 
Com CP No 177) (London: HMSO, 2005) 
Law Commiss ion, Codification of the Criminal Law (Law Com No 143) 
(London: HMSO, 1985) 
Law Commiss ion Consent and Offences against the Person (Law Com 
CP No 134) (London: HMSO, 1994) 
Law Commiss ion, Legislating the Criminal Code: Offences against the 
Person and General Principles (Law Com No 218) (London: 
HMSO, 1993) 
Law Commiss ion, Mentally Incapacitated Adults and Decision-Making: A 
New Jurisdiction (Law Com CP No 128) (London: HMSO, 1993) 
Law Commiss ion, Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide (Law Com No 
304) (London: HMSO, 2006) 
Law Commiss ion, Partial Defences to Murder (Law Com No 290) 
(London: HMSO, 2004) 
Law Commiss ion, Report on Injuries to the Unborn Child (Law Com No 
60) (London: HMSO, 1974) 
Law Commiss ion, Report on the Defences of General Application (Law 
Com No 83) (London: HMSO, 1977) 
Leverick, Fiona, 'Defending Self-Defence' (2007) 27 Oxford Joumal of 
Legal Studies 563 
Leverick, Fiona, 'Is English Self-Defence Law Incompatible with Article 2 
of the ECHR?' [2002] Criminal Law Review 347 
Leverick, Fiona, Killing in Self-Defence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006) 
Levine, Susan, 'The Moral Permissibil ity of Killing a 'Material Aggressor ' 
in Self-Defense' (1984) 45 Philosophical Studies 69 
Lewis, Penney, 'Feeding Anorexic Patients Who Refuse Food' (1999) 7 
Medical Law Review 21 
Leigh, LH. 'Necessity and the Case of Dr Morgentaler' [1978] Criminal 
Law Review 151 
Locke, John, Two Treatises of Government (Nev^ York: Dutton, 1924) 
Lubbe, Weyma, 'Taurek's No Worse Claim' (2008) 36 Philosophy and 
272 
Public Affairs 69 
Macfarlane, Leslie J. The Theory and Practice of Human Rights (London: 
Maurice Temple Smith, 1985) 
Mackay, Ronnie D. Mental Condition Defences in the Criminal Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) 
Maclean, Alasdair R. 'Advance Directives, Future Selves and Decision-
Making' (2006) 14 Medical Law Review 29: 
Mason, John K and Laurie, Greame T. Mason & McCall Smith's Law and 
Medical Ethics 7'" edit ion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 
McEwan, Jenny, 'Murder by Design: The 'Feel-Good Factor' and the 
Criminal Law' (2001) 9 Medical Law Review 246. 
McLean, Sheila, Old Law, New Medicine (London: Pandora, 1999) 
McMahan, Jeff, 'Self-Defense and the Innocent Attacker' (1994) 104 
Ethics 252 
Mendelsohn, Samuel , The Criminal Jurisprudence of the Ancient 
Hebrews, 2""^ edit ion (New York: Hermon, 1968) 
Michalowski, Sabine, 'Sanctity of Life: Are Some Lives More Sacred Than 
Others?' (2002) 22 Legal Studies 377 
Milgate, Helen P. 'Duress and the Criminal Law: Another About Turn by 
the House of Lords' (1988) 47 Cambridge Law Journal 6: 
Mill, John S. 'Uti l i tarianism', in Robson, John M. (ed.). The Collected 
Works of John Stuart Mill (London: Routledge, 1969) 
Mill, John S. On L/berty (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974) 
Mill, John S. Utilitarianism (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1957) 
Miller, Seamus, 'Self-Defence and Forcing the Choice between Lives' 
(1992) 9 Joumal of Applied Philosophy 239 
Montague, Phillip, 'Self-Defense and Choosing Between Lives' (1981) 40 
Philosophical Studies 207 
Montague, Phillip, 'The Morality of Self-Defense: A Reply to Wasserman ' 
(1988) 17 Philosophy and Public Affairs 81 
Moore, Michael S. Placing Blame (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) 
Morris, Nerval, Madness and the Criminal Law (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1982) 
Murdoch, Jeffrey B. 'Is Imminence Really Necessary? Reconci l ing 
Tradit ional Self-Defense Doctrine with the Battered W o m e n 
Syndrome' (2000) 20 North Illinois University Law Review 191 
Murphy, Jeffrie G. 'Legal Moral ism and Liberalism' (1995) 37 Arizona Law 
Review 73 
Murphy, Jeffrie G. 'Rights and Borderl ine Cases' (1977) 19 Arizona Law 
Review 228 
Norman, Richard, Ethics, Killing a n d l/Var (Cambridge: Cambr idge 
University Press, 1995) 
Norrie, A lan, Crime, Reason and History: A Critical Introduction to 
Criminal Law 2"'^ edition (London: Butterworths, 2001) 
Nourse, Victoria F. 'Self-Defense and Subjectivity' (2001) 68 University of 
Chicago Law Review 1235 
Nozick, Robert, Anarchy, State and Utopia (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1974) 
Omichinski , Nancy M. 'Applying the Theories of Justif iable Homicide to 
Confl icts in the Doctrine of Self-Defense' (1987) 33 Wayne Law 
273 
Review 1447 
Ormerod, David, Smith and Hogan: Criminal Law 12'^ edition (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008) 
Otsuka, Michael, 'Killing the Innocent in Self-Defense' (1994) 23 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 65 
Peiris, Gamini L. 'Duress, Volit ion and Chminal Responsibil i ty: Current 
Problems in English and Commonweal th Law' (1988) 17 Anglo-
American Law Review 182 
Phang, Andrew, 'Conjoined Twins: The Limits of Reason and the 
Transcendent Hope - Part II ' (2001) 147 Law and Justice 89 
Rawls, John, 'The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus ' (1987) 7 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 1 
Rawls, John, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1993) 
Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1971) 
Raz, Joseph, Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1994) 
Raz, Joseph, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1986) 
Reed, Alan, 'The Need for a New Anglo-American Approach to Duress' 
(1997) 61 Journal of Criminal Law 209 
Reilly, Alexander and Mikus, Rudolf, '/? v. Hibbert: The Theoretical 
Foundations of Duress' (1996) 30 University of British Columbia 
Law Review 181 
Report of the Royal Commission on the Law Relating to Indictable 
Offences {^879) (C 2345) 
Richards, Norvin, 'Acting under Duress' (1987) 37 Philosophical 
Quarterly 2^ 
Ripstein, Arthur, 'Self-Defense and Equal Protection' (1996) 57 University 
of Pittsburgh Law Review 685 
Roberts, Paul, 'The Philosophical Foundations of Consent in the Criminal 
Law' (1997) 17 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 389 
Robinson, Paul H. 'A Theory of Justif ication: Societal Harm as a 
Prerequisite for Criminal Liability' (1975) 23 University of California 
at Los Angeles Law Review 266 
Robinson, Paul H. 'Compet ing Theories of Justif ication: Deeds v 
Reasons' in Simester, Andrew P. and Smith, A T H (eds.) Harm and 
Culpability {Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) 
Robinson, Paul H. 'Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis ' (1982) 
82 Columbia Law Review 199 
Robinson, Paul H. Chminal Law Defenses (St. Paul, Minnesota: West 
Publishing, 1984) 
Rodin, David, War and Self-Defense (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002) 
Rogers, Jonathan, 'Necessity, Private Defence and the Killing of Mary' 
[2001] Criminal Law Review 515 
Rogers, Jonathan, 'Publication Review: Killing in Self-Defence' (2008) 
Law Quarterly Review 172 
Rosen, Cathryn J. 'The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting an Historical 
274 
Accident on Behalf of Battered W o m e n who Kill' (1986) 96 
American University Law Review 11 
Rosen, Richard, 'On Self-Defense, Imminence and Battered W o m e n who 
Kill Their Batterers' (1993) 71 North Carolina Law Review 371 
Rosenthal, Peter, 'Duress in the Criminal Law' (1989) 32 Criminal Law 
Quarterly 199 
Ryan, Cheyney, 'Self-Defence, Pacif ism and the Possibility of Killing' 
(1983) 93 Ethics 508 
Sangero, Boaz, Self-Defence in Criminal Law {Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2006) 
Sarkar, Sameer and Adshead, Gwen, 'Treatment over Object ion: Minds, 
Bodies and Beneficence' (2002) Journal of Mental Health Law 105 
Savulescu, Julian and Momeyer, Richard W. 'Should Informed Consent 
be based upon Rational Beliefs?' (1997) 23 Journal of Medical 
Ethics 282 
Schonsheck, Jonathan, On Criminalisation: An Essay in the Philosophy of 
the Criminal Law {Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994) 
Schopp, Robert F. Automatism, Insanity and Psychology of Criminal 
Responsibility: A Philosophical Inquiry (Cambridge: Cambr idge 
University Press, 1991) 
Schopp, Robert F. Justification Defenses and Just Convictions 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 
Schullofer, Stephen J. 'The Gender Quest ion in Criminal Law' In Paul, 
Ellen Frankel, Miller, Fred D and Paul, Jeffrey (eds.), Chme, 
Culpability and Remedy {Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990) 
Scoccia, Danny, 'In Defense of Hard Paternal ism' (2008) 27 Law and 
Philosophy 351 
Scott, Rosamund, Rights, Duties and the Body: Law and Ethics of the 
Maternal-Fetal Conflict {Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002) 
Sebok, Anthony J. 'Does an Objective Theory of Self-Defense Demand 
Too Much?' (1996) 57 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 725 
Shute, Stephen and Simester, Andrew P. (eds.) Criminal Law Theory: 
Doctrines of the General Part (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002) 
Shute, Stephen, 'Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed: 
Three Aspects of the Project' [1996] Criminal Law Review 684 
Simester, Andrew P. and Sull ivan, Robert, Criminal Law: Theory and 
Doctrine 3"^ edition (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007) 
Simester, Andrew P. 'Mistakes in Defences' (1992) 12 Oxford Joumal of 
Legal Studies 295 
Singer, Richard G. 'The Resurgence of Mens Rea II: Honest but 
Unreasonable Mistake of Fact in Self-Defense' (1986-7) 28 8os fon 
College Law Review 459 
Sinel, Zoe, 'The Duress Di lemma: Potential Solutions in the Theory of 
Right' (2005) 10 Appeal Review of Current Law and Legal Reform 
56 
Smart, Brian J. 'Understanding and Justifying Self-Defense' (1989) 4 
International Journal of Moral and Social Studies 231 
Smith, A T H . Property Offences: The Protection of Property through the 
Criminal Law (London: Sweet and Maxwel l , 1994) 
275 
Smith, John C. 'Case Comment: R v. Howe' [1987] Criminal Law Review 
480 
Smith, John C. 'The Use of Force in Public or Private Defence and Article 
2' [2002] Criminal Law Review 958 
Smith, John C. Justification and Excuse in the Criminal Law (London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 1989) 
Smith, John C. The Law of Theft 7'^ edition (London: Butterworths, 1993) 
Smith Keith JM and Wilson, William, 'Impaired Voluntariness and Criminal 
Responsibility: Reworking Hart's Theory of Excuses - The English 
Judicial Response' (1993) 13 Oxford Joumal of Legal Studies 69 
Smith, Keith JM, 'Duress, and Steadfastness: In Pursuit of the 
Unintelligible' (1999) Criminal Law Review 363 
Sneiderman, Barney and Verhoef, Marja, 'Patient Autonomy and the 
Defense of Medical Necessity: Five Dutch Euthanasia Cases' 
(1996) 34 Alberta Law Review 374 
Sornarajah, M, 'Duress and Murder in Commonwealth Criminal Law' 
(1981) 30 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 660 
Stell, Lana K. 'Close Encounters of the Lethal Kind: The Use of Deadly 
Force in Self-Defence' (1986) 49 Law and Contemporary Problems 
113 
Stephen, James F. A Digest of the Criminal Law 4th edition (London: 
John Murray, 1887) 
Stephen, James F. A History of the Criminal Law of England (London: 
Macmillan & Co. 1883) 
Stephen, James F. Liberty, Equality and Fraternity (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1991) 
Stewart, Hamish, 'Harms, Wrongs, and Set-Backs in Feinberg's Moral 
Limits of the Criminal Law" (2001) 5 Buffalo Criminal Law Review 
47 
Sullivan, Robert, 'Making Excuses', in Simester, Andrew P. and Smith 
ATH. (eds.) Harm and Culpability (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1996) 
Szasz, Thomas S. 'The Myth of Mental Illness' (1960) ^ 5 American 
Psychologist 113 
Tadros, Victor, 'The Characters of Excuse' (2001) 21 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 495 
Taurek, John, 'Should the Numbers Count? (1977) 6 Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 299 
Thomson, Judith J. 'Killing, Letting Die and the Trolley Problem' (1975-
1976) 59 7/76 Mon/sf 204 
Thomson, Judith J. 'Self-Defense' (1991) 20 Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 283 
Thomson, Judith J. 'Some Ruminations on Rights' (1977) 19 Arizona Law 
Review 45 
Thomson, Judith J. Rights, Restitution and Risk: Essays in Moral Theory 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1986) 
Thomson, Michael, 'After Re S' (1994) 2 Medical Law Review 127 
Tribe, Laurence H. American Constitutional Law (Foundation Press, 
1979) 
Turner, JW Cecil, Kenny's Outlines of Criminal Law 19'^ edition 
276 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966) 
Turner, JW Cecil, Russell on Crime 12'^ edition (London: Stevens, 1964) 
Uniacke, Suzanne Permissible Killing: The Self-Defence Justification of 
Homicide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) 
Uniacke, Suzanne, 'In Defence of Permissible Killing: A Response to Two 
Critics' (2000) 19 Law and Philosophy 627 
Uniacke, Suzanne, 'Rights and Relativistic Justifications: Replies to 
Kasachkoff and Husak' (2000) 19 Law and Philosophy 645 
Uniacke, Suzanne, 'The Doctrine of Double Effect' (1984) 48 T^e Thomist 
188 
Uniacke, Suzanne, 'Was Mary's Death Murder?' (2001) 9 Medical Law 
Review 208 
Veinsreideris, Martin E. 'The Prospective Effects of Modifying Existing 
Law to Accommodate Pre-emptive Self-Defense by Battered 
Women' (2000) 149 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 6^3 
Von Hirsch, Andrew and Jareborg, Nils, 'Gauging Criminal Harm: A 
Living-Standard Analysis' (1991) 11 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 1 
Von Hirsch, Andrew, 'Extending the Harm Principle: 'Remote' Harms and 
Fair Imputation' in Simester, Andrew P. and Smith, ATH. (eds.), 
Harm and Culpability (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) 
Wallerstein, Shiomit, 'Justifying the Right to Self-Defense: A Theory of 
Forced Consequences' (2005) 91 Virginia Law Review 999 
Walters, Lynden, 'Murder under Duress and Judicial Decision-Making in 
the House of Lords' (1988) 8 Legal Studies 61 
Wasik, Martin, 'A Case of Necessity?' [1984] Criminal Law Review 544 
Wasik, Martin, 'Duress and Criminal Responsibility' [1977] Criminal Law 
Review 453 
Wasserman, David, 'Justifying Self-Defense' (1987) 16 Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 356 
Watson, Michael, 'A Necessary Defence?' (1999) 90 Criminal Lawyer 1 
Wells, Celia, Corporations and Criminal Responsibility 2"^ edition (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001) 
Wertheimer, Alan, Coercion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987) 
Weschler, Herbert and Michael, Jerome, 'A Rationale of the Law of 
Homicide' (1937) 37 Columbia Law Review738 
Westen, Peter and Mangiafico, James, 'The Criminal Defense of Duress: 
A Justification, not an Excuse - and Why it Matters' (2003) 6 
Buffalo Criminal Law Review 833 
Wicks, Elizabeth, 'The Greater Good? Issues of Proportionality and 
Democracy in the Doctrine of Necessity as applied in Re A (2003) 
32 Common Law World Review 15 
Wicks, Elizabeth, 'The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment under the 
European Convention on Human Rights' (2001) 9 Medical Law 
Review 17 
Wicks, Elizabeth, Human Rights and Healthcare (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2007) 
Williams, Bernard, 'A Critique of Utilitarianism' in Smart, JJC and 
Williams, Bernard, Utilitarianism: For and Against {Cambudge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1973) 
277 
Williams, Glanville, 'A Commentary on R v. Dudley and Stephens' (1978) 
9 Cambrian Law Review 94 
Williams, Glanville, Criminal Law: The General Part 2'^'^ edition (London: 
Stevens & Sons, 1961) 
Williams, Glanville, 'Necessity' [1978] Criminal Law Review 128 
Williams, Glanville, 'The Defence of Necessity' (1953) Current Legal 
Problems 2^6 
Williams, Glanville, 'The Theory of Excuses' [1982] Criminal Law Review 
732 
Williams, Glanville, Textbook of Criminal Law 2"^^ edition (London: 
Stevens & Sons, 1978) 
Wilson, William, 'The Structure of Criminal Defences' [2005] Criminal Law 
Review 371 
Wilson, William, Central Issues in Criminal Theory (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2002) 
Wilson, William, Criminal Law: Doctrine and Theory 3"^  edition (London: 
Pearson, 2008) 
Wolf, Clark, 'Liberalism and Fundamental Constitutional Rights' (1995) 37 
Arizona Law Review 185 
Wright, Michael, 'Medical Treatment: The Right to Refuse' (1993) 3 
Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 204 
Yeo, Stanley, 'Challenging Moral Involuntariness as a Principle of 
Fundamental Justice' (2002) 28 Queen's Law Journal 335 
f^^'^ 278 
